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Chapter 1
On the Reflexive Relations Between 
Knowledge, Governance, and Space
Johannes Glückler, Gary Herrigel, and Michael Handke
Governance is both a contested concept and an increasingly empirical concern. On 
the one hand, it has become an almost universal and all-encompassing concept, 
which has attracted scholarly interest from many disciplines and over many decades 
to tackle the dilemmas of collective action and to facilitate effective coordination of 
interests and resources toward commonly accepted goals. On the other hand, con-
ceptions of governance vary considerably, and their meanings depend on disciplin-
ary perspectives, theoretical traditions, and empirical focus. Although it is easy to 
agree what governance is not, it is more challenging to create broad consensus on 
what it is and how it works effectively. Most capaciously, governance denotes the 
coordination of collective action. These actions take place in institutionally or phys-
ically organized spaces of interaction, where knowledge is needed to shape gover-
nance appropriately. Organized spaces and knowledge are both conditions as well 
as consequences of the governance process.
Contributions to theories and perspectives of governance originate from diverse 
disciplinary fields, including political science, economics, organization studies, 
sociology, geography, and planning studies. The authors of recent handbooks pro-
vide comprehensive overviews of the interdisciplinary breadth of ideas and debates 
of governance (e.g., Ansell & Torfing, 2016; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Bevir, 2010; 
Chhotray & Stoker, 2009; Levi-Faur, 2012). They portray the multitude of applica-
tions and concepts, ranging from practical fields such as corporate, contract, project, 
public, private, or nonprofit governance, to internet, land, urban, risk, environmen-
tal, and climate governance, to conceptual or normative approaches of network, 
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collaborative, participative, fair or good governance, and to various levels ranging 
from local to regional and national to global and multilevel governance.
Sometimes, it is helpful for an emergent concept not to be defined too narrowly 
in order to attract continuous attention and research effort and to stimulate scholarly 
conversation. Yet such diversity may also make it difficult for researchers to 
exchange, compare, and assess empirical studies on common ground. Therefore, 
governance research often remains locked within a discipline’s cognitive boundar-
ies. Governance debates always comprise a selection of perspectives. Debaters view 
the complex reality in a certain way, concentrating on selected characteristics and 
neglecting other ones (Benz & Dose, 2010). The polysemy of the concept of gover-
nance confronts scholars with the difficult task of coherently theorizing the social, 
political, environmental, institutional, and economic challenges to collective action.
We are positioning our book at the neglected intersection between disciplines, 
conceptual perspectives, and geographical scales to offer room for conversation on 
the role of knowledge and space in governance theory and practice. We are bringing 
together conceptual and empirical work on governance from varying fields, and the 
contributions’ authors not only illustrate the multidisciplinary character of gover-
nance research, but they also point to new opportunities for interdisciplinary 
exchange. We argue for—and the chapters each speak to—particular aspects of the 
reflexive nature of the relationships between governance, knowledge, and space. In 
the next section, we briefly define an inclusive framing of some of the characteris-
tics of governance, before we elaborate on the reflexive relations between gover-
nance, knowledge and space. By doing so, we highlight the contributions of the 
individual chapters of this volume to each of these relations, which also provide the 
rationale for structuring the book into distinct parts.
 Framing Governance
Rather than unnecessarily restricting the concept of governance, we propose carv-
ing out some of its commonly shared characteristics by means of comparison with 
related notions in social science, such as management, government, and institutions. 
All three concepts relate to mechanisms that yield and sustain some degree of social 
order. Utilizing the governance perspective sheds new conceptual light on these 
concepts by emphasizing the process character of coordinating and moderating 
organized social interactions. Governance represents relational practices. There is 
governance inside firms and across firms, and there is governance within govern-
ments and across government boundaries. Governance also coordinates between 
firms and governments. However, unlike management or government, governance 
is not an actor capable of making decisions. Rather, it offers a reliable structure for 
interaction, which is something that it has in common with institutions (Glückler, 
Suddaby, & Lenz, 2018). In many cases, these structures have yet to be established 
and institutionalized by the actors involved in governance practices, which once 
again leads back to the process character of governance (Pierre & Peters, 2000).
J. Glückler et al.
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To capture the specific meaning of governance, we place it on a conceptual con-
tinuum that expands along the dimensions of time (from long-term to short-term 
convertibility) and of authority (from heteronomy or interdependence to autonomy). 
Concretely, we conceive governance as lying between the concepts of institutions 
on one end of longer term societal coordination, and of management as well as of 
government on the other end of shorter  term coordination and decision  making 
within the scope of a single authority (organization, state).
Researchers use the concept of institutions to describe relatively stable patterns 
of social interactions that are based on legitimate mutual expectations and that are 
enforced by social sanctions (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Glückler et  al., 2018; 
Hodgson, 2006; Scott, 2007). Institutions refer to legitimate beliefs and practices 
that are shared to varying degrees by society, guarantee social order, offer behav-
ioral orientation, and facilitate individual action within society. It is, therefore, dif-
ficult for individuals or organizations to actively change or overturn existing 
institutions (Lawrence, Leca, & Zilber, 2013), and if so only over longer periods. 
Institutional change often unfolds incrementally and only in exceptional cases can 
it be interpreted ex post as the result of specific moments that disrupted the repro-
duction of institutional practices, and which then gave rise to collective strategies to 
recompose rules and institutional features (Glückler & Lenz, 2018; Herrigel, 2010; 
Streeck & Thelen, 2005).
Whereas institutions are characterized by relative temporal stability and usually 
slow rates of transformation, the other end of the continuum comprises shorter term, 
current forms of coordination by means of management. Researchers use “manage-
ment” to describe the administration of an organization, including the choice of a 
strategy and the coordination of all the resources in pursuit of the organization’s 
objective. Consequently, management is a coordination mode bounded within the 
scope of and legitimized by one single authority. Managers are entitled to take deci-
sions within their organizational jurisdiction and thus are empowered to allocate 
resources, design organizational structures and processes, to assign roles and 
responsibilities, to solve conflicts, and allocate resources in pursuit of the organiza-
tion’s goals.
Governance should also not be confused with government (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992), which also provides hierarchical order. A repub-
lican form of government, for example, is composed of temporary legitimated rep-
resentatives who execute the power of the state and, similarly to management, 
internally assign roles and allocate resources towards collective goals. These goals 
have grown in number and diversity in modern societies, disproportionately increas-
ing intervention costs for the state. However, being a prominent object of study in 
conceptual government research (Kooiman, 1993), hierarchical structures often 
become encrusted and retain decision making in the silos of specific knowledge 
domains. Government thus risks failing to appropriately address contemporary col-
lective problems, especially if they transcend different functional and territorial 
jurisdiction (Mayntz, 2003). Meanwhile, modern governments are increasingly 
confronted with the idea that sovereignty lies with the people and not with their 
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representatives—what role, then, can a government play as an actor in governance 
processes?
In contrast to longer term and less dirigible institutions on the one hand, and 
hierarchically controllable shorter term management or temporarily elected govern-
ments on the other, we conceive governance as the coordination of distinct stake-
holders toward the achievement of consensual goals. These stakeholders might be 
legally independent of each other, but interdependently linked by a collective prob-
lem. In contrast to management or government, governance extends beyond the 
scope of the rule enforcement of a single authority, and, hence, requires negotiation 
between different interests (Rhodes, 1996). In governance, those affected by rules 
are themselves involved in the design of regulation and their institutional enforce-
ment (Marin & Mayntz, 1991). In this way, governance differs from social institu-
tions in that creators of governance processes actively and purposively tackle 
collective action problems to find acceptable solutions. Such a broad understanding 
of interdependent controllability or “heterarchy” (Jessop, 1998), including negotia-
tion, collaboration, and legitimacy, is supported in most governance approaches.
 Knowledge and Governance
Governance attracts much of its attention as an analytical perspective because it is 
used to address learning processes in changing environments (Stoker, 1998). The 
relationship between knowledge and governance is reflexive in nature: Knowledge 
is a prerequisite for governance as much as governance affects how one creates or 
shares knowledge. Being at the core of this book series, the concept of knowledge 
denotes the human understanding of concrete and abstract phenomena. Whereas 
people can keep “stocks” and exchange “flows” of data and information, the cre-
ation of knowledge is initially bound to the individual mind. However, individuals 
are not atomistic, isolated actors, but embedded in social and institutional contexts. 
People constantly compare and align their understandings with the understandings 
of others, and engage in imitation and communication to challenge or confirm com-
mon understanding. When framing knowledge as a relational rather than a substan-
tive concept of human understanding, knowledge is difficult to produce in isolation, 
to store or protect from spillovers, or to copy and reuse in other contexts (Bathelt & 
Glückler, 2011; Glückler, Meusburger, & El Meskioui, 2013). Whereas knowledge 
represents the practice of knowing, knowledge creation emerges from the practice 
of learning, the circulation and interpretation of information, cumulative experi-
ence, and cognition (Amin & Cohendet, 2004; Borgatti & Cross, 2003). In this 
sense, the dynamics of knowing and learning are fundamentally social and most 
often interactive processes (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994). It includes the collective 
creation of knowledge as well as its imitation through others. Researchers have 
acknowledged learning as a reflexive, interactive, and continuous process of recom-
bining knowledge towards new understanding. However, learning is focused on 
more than just the recombination of existing knowledge. Bridging the barriers to 
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communication between different communities is important (Nooteboom, 2000), 
but so is collective learning across the boundaries of thought collectives to generate 
new knowledge for new solutions (Fleck, 1935; Herrigel, Wittke, & Voskamp, 2013; 
Punstein & Glückler, 2020). Knowledge in governance can be seen as both an input 
and a collective outcome that is newly created (Hess & Ostrom, 2007). The joint 
learning process reinforces the positive aspects of interdependence among other-
wise loosely coupled actors.
Both knowledge and learning are contextual rather than universal (Bathelt & 
Glückler, 2011; Meusburger, 2008), which makes effective governance processes a 
truly complex challenge. Knowledge is hard to store or accumulate and difficult to 
value. The production of knowledge and recognizing its value (utility) in common 
depend on the social and spatial context. Governance is always an arranged rela-
tional practice. The authors of much of the economic governance literature refer to 
governance arrangements as “mechanisms.” These include markets, hierarchies, 
and relational contracts (Williamson, 2005). Others also include networks as gover-
nance arrangements (Keast, 2016; Powell, 1991). The economic arguments, how-
ever, often remain very abstract and are therefore difficult to relate to the common 
usage of the concept in other disciplines. In the following, we elaborate on the 
reflexive relationship between knowledge and governance in more detail and divide 
the book into three parts. The authors of the first two parts refer to the role of knowl-
edge for governance. Whereas those of the first section discuss how knowledge 
enables governance organization, those of the second analyze how knowledge for 
governance influences its impact and efficacy. In turn, the third part is a collection 
of conceptual and empirical contributions that discuss how governance affects 
learning processes and how it generates new knowledge to solve collective prob-
lems. The individual book chapters complement each other thematically and with 
their analytical emphasis on specific problems of coordinating collective actions.
 How Knowledge Enables Governance
The development and implementation of effective governance solutions often 
requires bringing together distinct knowledge about the collective problem. A pre-
cise definition of the problem is often not possible from the very beginning and thus 
becomes an explicit goal of the governance process. Knowledge can be mobilized 
and recombined either by drawing on the experience of the actors involved in gov-
ernance, which often includes those affected by the collective problems, or it can be 
incorporated as proven expertise provided by outsiders. Expert knowledge is par-
ticularly important for governance if the actors involved have not yet made it clear 
how their different and sometimes conflicting interests relate to each other. This is 
particularly evident, for example, in the principles Ostrom (2005) has suggested for 
the appropriate design of the governance of collective goods. The character of col-
lective goods becomes particularly evident with many natural, renewable resources, 
which are threatened by overexploitation, that is, when actors prioritize the pursuit 
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of individual profit over collective gains (Hardin, 1968). Knowledge about the prop-
erties of these resources, the periods of their renewal, their location in space, and 
their accessibility for exploitation are a prerequisite of resource governance. In 
addition, knowledge about the constellation of actors involved in the use of the 
resources as well as knowledge about the possibilities to monitor and sanction those 
who direct their behavior against the collective gain relevance. It helps actors to 
assign roles and responsibilities in governance processes. Knowing the institutional 
context (Glückler, 2020; Glückler, Punstein, Wuttke, & Kirchner, 2020) allows 
actors to establish governance practices that are coherent or complementary with 
legitimate mutual expectations (Boyer, 2005). Institutions provide and impart 
knowledge for governance in their own specific way.
The authors of the book’s first part illustrate and discuss the extent to which 
knowledge is a prerequisite for governance. Questions of the sources and the quality 
of available knowledge inputs pave the way to assess the appropriateness of differ-
ent types of knowledge for a specific governance case. Not all knowledge is suitable 
for usage and valorization in governance. Knowledge for governance is often sub-
ject to doubts on the part of certain participating actors, a circumstance that must be 
taken seriously in the design of a governance process. In the five chapters forming 
this part of the book, the contributors tackle four important yet empirically con-
tested ways in which knowledge becomes a crucial resource and prerequisite for 
governance: (i) the availability and control of knowledge for governance (see 
Chap. 2 by Lipo, Mischen, and Hunt), (ii) the manipulation of the content and inter-
pretation of knowledge (see Chap. 3 by Scott), (iii) the varying relevance of differ-
ent types of knowledge for governance (see Chap. 4 by Stehr and Chap. 5 by Renn), 
and (iv) the differences in legitimacy of those who know (see Chap. 6 by Bell and 
Hindmoor). These five sets of contributors deal with these aspects from different 
perspectives of disciplinary governance research.
In the second chapter, Carl P. Lipo, Pamela Mischen, and Terry L. Hunt empha-
size the importance of having sophisticated knowledge about a resource’s availabil-
ity and the characteristics of its place of origin in order to be able to manage it 
sustainably. They use the example of prehistoric Rapa Nui to demonstrate how 
humankind wrestles place dependently over issues of governance by developing 
capabilities to survive on an isolated island with scarce resources. Ever since their 
arrival on Easter Island (now belonging to Chile), the Rapa Nui have been con-
fronted with uncertainties about global climate change and fluctuating resource 
stores. Lipo, Mischen, and Hunt argue that whereas the case of prehistoric Rapa Nui 
has often been treated as a warning about human-caused ecological catastrophe, 
new archaeological and multidisciplinary findings indicate that land use on Easter 
Island had been sustainable during its prehistory until the Europeans arrived. In 
retrospect, the governance practices collectively applied at Easter Island appear to 
have been highly innovative and locally appropriate. These findings point to the 
potential of alternative action models and new governance structures. The authors 
further show that scientists who analyze governance cases must constantly reassess 
their own knowledge.
J. Glückler et al.
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Actors utilize different techniques to control knowledge for governance. 
Discursive knowledge (van Dijk, 2014), for example, influences the contents and 
contested negotiations in governance processes. Knowledge can be manipulated 
with certain modes of communication. Rule-based routines (Becker & Knudsen, 
2005; Ostrom, 2000) are a way of collectively preserving knowledge and facilitat-
ing decision making in governance. However, they must first often be discovered 
and adjusted to each other. In the third chapter, Michael Scott analyzes how knowl-
edge as well as particular opinions can be specifically controlled in governance 
processes in order to reach agreement and influence results. Drawing on empirical 
cases of coastal property developments in South Australia, he investigates how key 
actors in land-use governance—such as developers, planners, politicians, and scien-
tists—reflexively deploy “techniques of neutralization” to deflect critiques and 
manage opposition to contentious new developments. Scott explores how actors use 
these techniques to draw on particular spatial metaphors and images to suggest that, 
somewhat ironically, a tacit metatechnique is to neutralize the projected environ-
mental risks to coastal space through narratives of time. Awareness of the usage of 
these techniques is a valuable knowledge input for governance on its own.
The manner in which knowledge is made relevant, structured, communicated, 
and exploited is shaped by its source. The contributors of the two subsequent chap-
ters focus on the way in which governance processes become both a competition 
among ideas and a contest regarding what may count as legitimate. In the book’s 
fourth chapter, Nico Stehr highlights how important scientific knowledge is a pre-
requisite for effective climate policy. He critically illustrates how local, regional, 
and national actions related to climate deliberately ignore the expertise of scientists 
and unacceptably limit the effectiveness of climate policy. On this basis, he diagno-
ses the failure of large social organizations to respond in a timely fashion to the 
progress of climate change knowledge, an observation that he denotes as “inconve-
nient institutions.” The sense of political ineffectiveness felt especially among cli-
mate scientists provokes a strong disenchantment with democratic governance. As a 
result, he proposes that political action based on principles of democratic gover-
nance be abandoned. Stehr concludes that such a view is mistaken and calls instead 
for better democratic processes.
In a similar direction and with regard to risk governance, Ortwin Renn argues in 
the fifth chapter that scientific knowledge does not provide answers to everything. 
Instead, in many cases it is ambivalent and uncertain and cannot grasp every aspect 
of a collective action problem at once. In his conceptual contribution, he argues that 
risk governance is above all about organizing communication processes so that con-
stant knowledge inputs can feed and reproduce an ongoing learning process. Renn 
introduces the concept of risk governance developed by the International Risk 
Governance Council in Geneva, which provides guidance for constructing compre-
hensive assessment and management strategies to cope with risk. It integrates three 
types of scientific input: classic, curiosity-driven research; strategic, goal-oriented 
research; and catalytic, process-related investigations. He demonstrates how these 
three knowledge pools can help risk assessors and managers to better understand 
complex risk situations. In many governance cases, expert and scientific knowledge 
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seem to have interpretive sovereignty. The authors of recent studies illustrate, how-
ever, that governance failure is likely if social stakeholders, who are invited to par-
ticipate in governance processes alongside experts from scientific fields, find that 
their practical knowledge is ignored or undervalued (e.g., in cases where their expe-
rience is affected by unsolved collective goods problems; cf. also Chap. 18 by 
Herrigel in the third part of this book).
For some collective action problems, (scientific) knowledge does not exist in the 
first place, either because the collective problem represents a new phenomenon or 
because it is one that only evolves progressively. In this case, actors must rely on 
experiential knowledge. In Chap. 6, Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor discuss 
how failures incurred by previous decisions are an important source of learning in 
governance that can make it possible to improve the coordination of collective 
action. Drawing on the phenomenon of systemic risk in financial markets that 
occurs when financial actors collectively (if inadvertently) bring on a major finan-
cial crisis through the withholding of credit and asset fire sales, they focus on coor-
dinated efforts to prevent such calamities. Using the European debt crisis as an 
empirical example, they show that where appropriate knowledge and governance 
arrangements can be put in place, collective action may be arranged to help prevent 
the uncertain crystallization of systemic risk.
The authors of the five chapters in the first part of this book show not only how 
important knowledge is as a prerequisite for governance; they also demonstrate that 
knowledge, and its interpretation, is not free of mistakes. Actors often purposively 
manipulate or unintentionally modify knowledge by discourse and normative 
intervention.
 How Knowledge Drives the Effectiveness of Governance
Due to the context-specificity of knowledge and the many alternatives for organiz-
ing governance over time, similar and comparable knowledge inputs can often yield 
different results. The second part of this book, therefore, contains a series of five 
chapters that, despite differences in their research questions, all help reveal how 
knowledge drives the very efficacy of governance. These chapters’ authors focus on 
the way in which the level of knowledge and expertise effects governance outcomes 
(see Chap. 7 by Avellaneda, Bello-Gómez, and Olvera). Contributors variously 
focus on the type of knowledge, such as restriction on only one domain (see Chap. 
8 by Handke); the adaptation of knowledge to local contexts (see Chap. 9 by Knox- 
Hayes, Hayes, and Hughes); the limitations of knowledge in breaking up ineffective 
governance (see Chap. 10 by Pohlmann and Valarini); and the way in which knowl-
edge of governance structures can improve legitimacy relations among governance 
actors (see Chap. 11 by Glückler).
In Chap. 7, Claudia N.  Avellaneda, Ricardo Andrés Bello-Gómez, and 
Johabed G. Olvera assess the impact of differential levels of knowledge on gover-
nance. To this end, they look at the local level of communal politics in Mexico and 
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Colombia, where recent efforts to decentralize responsibilities have produced 
diverse results. Empirically, they are interested in how mayors’ wide range of tech-
nical training (codified knowledge) and experience (uncodified knowledge) steer 
official action towards locally improved development. Depending on the context, 
decision makers’ specialist knowledge and experience can have very different 
effects. Indeed, sometimes their actions make no difference whatsoever. With their 
findings, they caution governance researchers from generalizing results. What 
drives performance in one country may not have the same explanatory power in 
another country.
In Chap. 8, Michael Handke looks at how the use of knowledge from just one 
rigid domain can blind actors to possible new solutions for solving collective action 
dilemmas. He argues that unilaterally quantified knowledge about forest fire risks in 
Chile fails to capture the spatiotemporal diversity of this very context-specific risk. 
Whereas some big private companies consider hierarchical risk control and making 
use of the insurance market to be cost efficient, small forest owners in Chile do not 
have the same access to this form of risk management due to its high demand on 
technical knowledge and organizational competences. On the regional scale, where 
actors perceive forest fires as a collective problem, this leads to negative external 
effects and social conflicts. Handke assesses the strengths and weaknesses of inter-
acting hierarchical and market forms of risk management and pleads for a geo-
graphical approach to risk governance. He demonstrates that current risk 
management practices explicitly decontextualize detailed geographical knowledge 
of forest fire risks. Localized knowledge of the causes and effects of forest fire risks 
thus gets lost in the process.
In Chap. 9, Janelle Knox-Hayes, Jarrod Hayes and Erik-Logan Hughes suggest 
that knowledge inputs in governance must be adapted to local regulatory and insti-
tutional conditions, questioning the doctrine of placeless perfect markets. 
Empirically, they illustrate how markets have to be contextually designed in order 
to be effective. Using the example of markets for CO2 certificates that are estab-
lished around the world and that the Kyoto Protocol incentivizes as the dominant 
mechanism for mitigating climate change, they analyze how textbook knowledge 
about the functioning of markets needs to be given context-specific value. They 
conclude that international efforts to promulgate market mechanisms run up against 
local cultures of markets that shape economic practices and knowledge to different 
degrees. Markets are enacted via political processes entailing different amounts of 
public, stakeholder, and expert involvement and varying levels of trust in techno-
cratic government agencies, private firms, and scientific authority. Market cultures 
highlight issues at the interface of political and economic governance, including 
issues of citizen, state, and industry participation, and the materiality of economic 
and financial productivity.
In some circumstances, however, any governance effort to solve problems of col-
lective action may fail completely. Long-established practices of coordinating inter-
ests in society can turn out to be institutionally encrusted so that new impulses for 
governance remain ineffective. In Chap. 10, Markus Pohlmann and Elizangela 
Valarini analyze anticorruption governance in Brazil. By carrying out content 
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analyses of court files on corporate crime and the involvement of the public sector, 
they show how systemic institutional encrustation undermines changes in gover-
nance practice. Even with new knowledge for governance—in this case the imple-
mentation of rigid international standards for good governance—corruption persists, 
with far-reaching consequences for Brazil’s development.
Finally, knowledge about governance itself helps actors assess, improve, or adapt 
governance models in a particular context. If governance refers to the purposive 
coordination of collective action between interdependent stakeholders, then meth-
ods of social network analysis can be helpful to map and analyze the structure of 
social interactions that reflect the “lived” practices of coordination and deci-
sion making. At this intersection, governance theory and network theory offer space 
for crossfertilization (Glückler, Lazega, & Hammer, 2017). Not only do social net-
work researchers offer useful methods to identify the patterns of relations among 
sets of actors; they also provide valuable theories on how specific positions within a 
network, and how specific formations of whole networks, facilitate certain social 
outcomes such as innovation, social support, and solidarity or other types of prob-
lem  solving (e.g., Kilduff & Tsai, 2003; Knoke, 2012). In Chap. 11, Johannes 
Glückler goes beyond viewing networks as a governance mode (Podolny & Page, 
1998; Williamson, 1991) to examine how the lived practice of governance in a net-
work actually conveys legitimate and acceptable collective coordination. He 
advances the concept of lateral network governance in the empirical context of 
organized networks, in which firms pool resources and join their interests in the 
pursuit of common goals. To solve the puzzle of how independent equals commit 
themselves to coordinating their actions, Glückler proposes overcoming the tradi-
tional dualism between formal and informal mechanisms of governance. He con-
ceives lateral network governance as a structure for the legitimate delegation of 
decision making and develops a social network analytic approach to assessing the 
relational distribution of legitimacy, utilizing two case studies of interfirm network 
organizations to illustrate the extent to which the actual legitimacy distribution 
diverges from formal governance authority.
 How Governance Affects Learning and Innovation
In part three of this volume, the contributors invert the perspective given in the pre-
vious chapters and reveal how governance also affects the creation and adoption of 
knowledge. In five chapters, each from a different angle, they show that learning in 
governance takes time and needs to be actively organized (see Chap. 12 by 
Niemeyer), that it requires a minimum degree of flexibility to allow learning from 
mistakes during the organization of the process (see Chap. 13 by Schultz, West, and 
Florêncio), and that the outcome of learning processes depends in part on whether 
organizations have the capacity to act under fragmented responsibilities (see 
Chap. 14 by Raab, Kenis, Kraaij-Dirkzwager, and Timen) or are able to link collec-
tive learning to institutional collective action (see Chap. 15 by Kim, Swann, and 
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Feiock). In addition, fragmentation seems to facilitate learning outcomes. Learning 
also occurs in the course of the renegotiation of power, which may in turn change 
the meaning of knowledge (see Chap. 16 by Hayter and Clapp).
Contemporary collective challenges, such as global environmental change, can-
not be dealt with by drawing on the knowledge of one generation alone. In Chap. 12, 
Simon Niemeyer argues that in order to overcome global dynamics, individuals 
must adopt an open and humble deliberative attitude to be able to accelerate the 
assessment of uncertain and complex collective issues. He draws evidence from 
small-scale settings characterized by deliberative minipublics, in other words, orga-
nized communication processes at the microlevel of governance. In group meetings 
and organized face-to-face situations, actors incrementally pass on knowledge and 
views on climate change to other governance participants. Perceptions change 
depending on the group affiliation. The observed mechanisms can be “scaled up” to 
inform possibilities for wider reform of the processes governing the uptake and use 
of knowledge.
Flexibility in the organization and coordination of governance stakeholders can 
accelerate the learning process. In Chap. 13, Lisen Schultz, Simon West, and 
Cláudia Florêncio argue that actors in learning situations must be allowed to make 
mistakes in order to adapt to heterogeneous contexts. They call this adaptive gover-
nance. Focusing on the people, practices, and politics involved with adaptive gover-
nance in the Global South, they use the administration of the Kruger to Canyons 
Biosphere Region in South Africa to show that the practices for generating knowl-
edge, sharing information, collaborating, and responding to change emerge as play-
ers navigate tensions between diverse values, norms, and routines. Focusing on the 
way that people, practices, and politics monitor and prevent poaching highlights 
how adaptive governance is situated and involves agency, meaning, and creativity. 
In this respect, successful governance often requires changes to existing institu-
tional structures: “The governance concept points to the creation of a structure or an 
order which cannot be externally imposed but is the result of the interaction of a 
multiplicity of governing and each other influencing actors” (Kooiman & van Vliet, 
1993, p. 64).
Although actors involved in governance orient their actions towards a common 
goal, this does not rule out the possibility that their interests diverge. The manner in 
which individual interests are reflected in governance can influence the effective-
ness of learning processes. In Chap. 14, Jörg Raab, Patrick Kenis, Marleen Kraaij- 
Dirkzwager, and Aura Timen examine organizations’ capacity to act under 
fragmented responsibility. They focus on the risk of epidemic catastrophes and 
demonstrate that involved actors perceive knowledge and timely information about 
the spread of viruses differently, ultimately hindering interorganizational learning. 
They demonstrate how the organizational network governance approach can gener-
ate information necessary for specific organizational players to limit the transmis-
sion of a virus and its impact.
In contrast to this, Serena Y. Kim, William L. Swann, and Richard C. Feiock 
demonstrate how the capacity for organizational learning can be collectively sup-
ported even in situations of conflicting interests. In Chap. 15, they argue that greater 
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knowledge about collaboration and more information about partners enables actors 
to better deal with collaboration problems, heterogeneous preferences, and weak 
institutions for collaboration. In their conceptual contribution, they posit three path-
ways that link collective learning to institutional collective action and put forward 
propositions as to how such learning can reduce collective action dilemmas and 
enhance future collaboration. In the first path, collaborative choices and outcomes 
affect collective learning. In the second path, collective learning directly mitigates 
collaboration risks and in turn alters the choice of integrative mechanism. In the 
third path, collective learning moderates the relation between the collaboration situ-
ation and risks—that is, collective learning has greater impact in situations charac-
terized by highly fragmented, specialized, and multifaceted contexts than in 
low-complexity situations.
The reflexive relationship of knowledge and governance is particularly evident in 
those cases in which knowledge enters both as an input to governance and evolves 
as an improved outcome in the course of the governance process. In Chap. 16, Roger 
Hayter and Alex Clapp look at conflicts over forest and timber resources in British 
Columbia, analyzing how stakeholders with different geographical presence and 
influence continuously renegotiate the societally accepted values of these resources. 
Negotiations are part of the governance process and lead to a remapping of the rela-
tionship between economy and society. Hayter and Clapp interpret remapping in 
British Columbia as an attempt to transform the commodity-driven and shareholder- 
oriented forest management associated with Fordism into more locally diverse 
forms of governance as part of a post-Fordist, techno-economic paradigm. This 
remapping goes hand in hand with institutional thickening, in other words, a process 
to bring together opposing parties to exchange views and develop respectful rela-
tionships and to implement new forms of governance. Stakeholder remapping is not 
just a practice, but also a result of governance. The authors of this book’s last three 
contributions all place industrial innovation at the center of their analysis as the 
result of planned governance efforts. In Chap. 17, Christian Binz and Bernhard 
Truffer suggest that technological innovation increasingly depends on multiscalar 
actor networks and institutions. They criticize perspectives on innovation that 
bracket the problem of scale and focus exclusively on discrete spatial units (regions 
or countries) that both act as agents structuring innovation governance and serve 
effectively as containers providing institutional conditions for success. Instead, they 
elaborate on the recently formulated Global Innovation Systems approach, which 
enables researchers to capture the emergence of system resources across spatial 
scales. With this framework, Binz and Truffer emphasize that beyond the focus on 
knowledge generation, a better understanding of “valuation” processes is necessary 
to guide governance structures for generating new technologies and products.
Complementarily to this, Gary Herrigel in Chap. 18 explores a particular form of 
MNC governance practices within interlinked global production clusters producing 
identical end products in different markets. Because diffusion of these clusters is 
accompanied by significant operational uncertainty, Herrigel claims that many 
emergent MNC governance practices have an experimentalist character. Stakeholder 
inclusive teams at the center provisionally set product standards and performance 
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metrics that are then appropriately and transparently modified by local teams, often 
resulting, through formal justification procedures, in the modification of the initial 
central standards and metrics. Recursivity in knowledge flow and practice diffuses 
learning and innovation throughout the MNC. Movement towards experimentalist 
governance in MNCs exists but is neither seamless nor uncomplicated. Three sorts 
of obstacles are most common—hierarchical insulation, stakeholder exclusion, and 
inadequate empowerment resources for participants. These obstacles exist not only 
ex ante, as firms attempt to construct formal experimentalist systems and implement 
them throughout their global operations; they also are continually regenerated by 
the experimentalist dynamics themselves. In order to prevent such obstacles from 
paralyzing the global process of recursive learning, MNCs are developing an array 
of destabilization mechanisms that systematically undermine insulation and exclu-
sion strategies within the global firm and reconstitute the deliberative experimental-
ist learning process.
In the final chapter of this volume, Nebahat Tokatli explores the innovation pro-
cesses in the flat-glass industry, questioning the extent to which interfirm networks 
facilitate innovation over a long period of time. Ultimately, Toklati argues that net-
works lose influence on innovations in the course of the evolution of an industry. 
When it comes to the secondary processing of flat glass, the assets of innovation are 
now much more dispersed (locally and globally) than they were before. In addition, 
contexts in which individual products and processes draw on multiple internal and 
external sources of technology are now becoming more and more pervasive in the 
secondary processing of glass.
 Governance and Geography
Governance fulfills tasks in a wide variety of fields and across a variety of spatial 
scales. One of this book’s key arguments is that governance cannot be conceived as 
a placeless category (Glückler, Rehner, & Handke, 2019). Geography and space are 
important in at least two respects, again reflecting the logic of reflexivity: First, 
space is a context for governance. Material conditions as well as social relations and 
institutions are often place-specific and thus pose particular conditions and require 
specific adaptation for governance to be effective. A seemingly universal, a-spatial 
governance blueprint will yield differential effect in different places. Therefore, we 
claim that governance theory is unlikely to yield general solutions that convey opti-
mal outcomes at any place and any time. Second, and conversely, space is an object 
of governance, and governance creates spaces. Governance has implications for the 
geographical boundedness (jurisdiction) as well as the quality of opportunities and 
constraints of actors. Governance may also generate geographical spillover effects 
on other actors not directly involved in the process, both locally and in other places 
(e.g., climate change, financial crises, forest fire risk, or environmental pollution). 
The relation to space is not only about locality but also about relations between 
regions and across scales. For instance, governance can resolve local dependencies 
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and combine them with action in other places, as in a local environmental move-
ment’s cooperation with a global NGO, in order to develop greater impact on 
the ground.
The first relationship between governance and space becomes clear simply by 
the fact that actors, collective action, and collective problems are situated and 
bounded in geographical contexts. Governance actors must respond to the specific 
physical, social, political, and institutional contexts in particular places in order to 
address conflicts of interest and collective action problems for a common good. The 
traditions of governance research differ fundamentally in the way in which they 
conceive the actors and the roles ascribed to them (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002; Peters, 
2014). Governance can be driven forward by self-organizing, autonomous stake-
holders (Gardner, Ostrom, & Walker, 1992; Rhodes, 1996) who coordinate their 
collective actions in a targeted manner, especially at the local or regional level, 
where interactions are particularly visible and manageable. Governance is also 
about differently organizing the relations between the state and civic actors (Bell & 
Hindmoor, 2009). The role of states in governance is no longer limited to regulation 
in the legal territorial area that they supervise. It ranges from direct alliances with 
multiple stakeholders (Osborne, 2000) to its action as the “shadow of the hierarchy” 
(Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008). Governance is acknowledged to create its own insti-
tutional space.
Several contributors to this volume take geographical location as the starting 
point for their governance analysis. They either refer to problems in dealing with the 
accessibility and exploitability of spatially distributed collective resources, such as 
agricultural land in the confined space of Easter Island (see Chap. 2 by Lipo et al.),1 
or they highlight the spatial dimensions of risks, as in the case of forest fires in 
Chile, which threaten larger groups in society (see Chap. 8 by Handke).2 Space is a 
suitable category for locating collective problems, even where many problems 
transgress the conventional distinction between local and global. Researchers use 
the geography of governance to not only look at the diversity and relations between 
places, but also at the interdependencies across spatial scales. Often, governance 
cannot be restricted to just one scale but requires the analysis of several scales and 
of the interrelations across them. Several contributors to our book, for example, 
address the challenges of mastering global climate change in context-specific ways 
(see Chap. 9 by Knox-Hayes et al., Chap. 12 by Niemeyer, and Chap. 4 by Stehr).
Other contributors elaborate on the second relationship between governance and 
geography, how collective interactions make and transform geography. Space is the 
place in and through which knowledge is generated, to which certain knowledge is 
bound, and from which it is intentionally exploited. Situated action and spatial 
social relationships influence the functionality of governance (see Chap. 12 by 
Niemeyer and Chap.  10 by Pohlmann and Valarini). Individual actors and their 
1 Also forest landscapes and timber resources in Canada (see Chap. 16 by Hayter and Clapp).
2 Also the spread of infectious viruses (see Chap. 14 by Raab et al.) or coastal regions affected by 
rising sea levels in Australia (see Chap. 3 by Scott).
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levels of impact can be taken as the starting point for a deeper analysis. Influences 
on their decisions and actions, however, come from many other dimensions that 
governance research must take into account. Several authors analyze how localized 
collective coordination problems affect innovations for global markets and recog-
nize the disadvantages of location-bound and one-sided hierarchical or market-
based forms of governance (see Chap. 17 by Binz and Truffer, Chap. 18 by Herrigel, 
and Chap. 19 by Tokatli).
A comparative empirical approach on governance research creates new analyti-
cal opportunities. Researchers should put particular emphasis on analyzing gover-
nance cases to assess the utility of and fit with fundamental governance models, and 
on designing and adapting appropriate contextual solutions (Glückler et al., 2019). 
In addition, by constant collection and comparison of governance cases, researchers 
are sensitized to the experience that general models perform differently in different 
situations, that similar governance challenges can be met with different models, and 
that well-designed governance processes can fail or have unintended 
consequences.
 Conclusion and Questions Ahead
Governance emerged as a scholarly preoccupation, historically, as the post-World- 
War-II global order began to fall into crisis in the 1990s. Bureaucratic mechanisms 
deployed by the state (planning) and by corporations (managerial hierarchies/verti-
cal integration) were revealed to be overly rigid and unsustainable. Global competi-
tion and pressures for nearly permanent innovation as well as natural hazards and 
growing environmental impact of social and economic activities together destabi-
lized roles, industries, and regions, while simultaneously placing a high value on 
flexibility. Traditional top-down command and control bureaucracy was simply 
overwhelmed by the new conditions. At the same time, despite great ideological 
enthusiasm, it quickly became clear that market mechanisms alone were nearly 
always incapable of maintaining stable and equitable coordination. Competition 
frequently broke down as players undercut one another to improve (or maintain) 
their position, whereas social and environmental collateral damage from market 
action generated pushback from many affected quarters. The result has been perva-
sive exploration of modes of coordination that subsume, abandon, and sometimes 
transcend both bureaucratic and market forms of social ordering. The authors of this 
volume demonstrate quite clearly how governance arrangements today can come in 
a remarkable array of guises and in ways that transgress traditional, formerly very 
reliable, analytical oppositions between public and private, bureaucracy and market, 
national and transnational, political and economic—and so on.
Although we do not pretend to present a comprehensive overview of governance 
in this volume, the essays here do show how plastic and wide ranging the problem 
of governance has become. The chapters’ authors discuss a remarkably diverse 
range of governance concepts and techniques. These concepts include corporate 
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governance (see Chap. 17 by Binz and Truffer), network governance (see Chap. 11 
by Glückler), adaptive governance (see Chap. 13 by Schultz et  al.), deliberative 
governance (see Chap. 12 by Niemeyer), risk governance (see Chap. 6 by Bell and 
Hindmoore, Chap. 8 by Handke, and Chap. 5 by Renn), and environmental gover-
nance (see Chap. 4 by Stehr, Chap. 3 by Scott, and Chap. 9 by Knox-Hayes et al.), 
governance by experimentalism (see Chap. 18 by Herrigel) as well as good gover-
nance (see Chap. 7 by Avellaneda et al. and Chap. 10 by Pohlman and Valarini). In 
the governance cases presented, civil society (see Chap. 16 by Hayter and Clapp 
and Chap. 2 by Lipo et al.), the state (see Chap. 15 by Kim et al. and Chap. 14 by 
Raab et al.) and the private sector (see Chap. 18 by Herrigel and Chap. 19 by Tokatli) 
perform different roles with different levels of divisions of labor.
Very broadly, the essays in this volume permit a number of theoretical and 
loosely empirical observations that can be explored in future research. To start with, 
its contributors indicate that governance can be profitably arranged along two 
dimensions. First, governance refers to efforts on the part of interdependent actors 
(however constituted) to resolve social, economic, or political problems that have 
been either jointly defined or commonly agreed upon. Second, space and knowl-
edge are two crucial parameters for governance. Knowledge gives content to and 
drives practice, whereas all forms of action both unfold in and construct space. In 
future, researchers need to explore the relationship between power and knowledge 
within governance practices. In particular, to what degree is “jointness” in the iden-
tification of coordination difficulties compatible with power asymmetries? Can col-
laborative governance, dependent upon input from affected stakeholders, be 
imposed from above, either by states or corporate management (say, in the gover-
nance of their supply chains)? To what degree are the more traditional governance 
mechanisms of hierarchy and market still salient in contemporary governance 
arrangements and coordination practices?
Along the same lines, the essays here not only serve as testament to the centrality 
of knowledge in contemporary economic and social life, but also reveal consider-
able ambiguity about the scope and limits of knowledge for governance. How much 
knowledge is enough? Can coordination be sustained while important knowledge 
carrying players are excluded from the design and practice of governance arrange-
ments? What are the limits of inclusivity for the identification of joint problems and 
goals for associated actors? More broadly, must researchers explore the extent to 
which governance arrangements can exclude forms of knowledge from entering 
into participant governance deliberations? How can actors make governance prac-
tices more robust and sustainable, capable of accommodating a broad range of chal-
lenges and innovations? Similar questions can be posed about space: How fungible 
are the spatial dimensions of governance? Researchers must more thoroughly 
examine the extent to which space acts as a constraint on the construction of gover-
nance arrangements, and the extent to which the search for stable coordination 
recasts social interaction spatially.
Finally, two other aspects of the governance discussion in this volume emerge as 
crucial for future work. First, uncertainty, driven by competition, on-going organi-
zational and technological innovation and collateral political and social 
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recomposition, is a crucial environmental condition for understanding contempo-
rary governance efforts. To what extent do those making governance arrangements 
seek to accommodate themselves to this uncertainty? That is, how are practices 
arranged in such a way that continuous innovation and “dynamic capabilities” 
(Teece et al., 1997) are the outcome of governance? Alternatively, is it possible for 
interconnected players to construct governance arrangements that insulate them 
from uncertainty? Secondly, reflexivity, in other words, the organized practice of 
observing the outcomes of coordinated action and adjusting rules and roles in social 
coordination in light of those observations, is an emergent and crucially important 
area for analytical attention. Crises come when old arrangements for governing 
coordination no longer function and alternative forms of coordination have yet to be 
created. What kinds of creative search and recombinatory processes do actors 
deploy to overcome crisis and reestablish stable governance? Can such search and 
learning processes be organized in a systematic manner, such that disruptive and 
paralyzing crises can be avoided? These and other questions indicate some of the 
directions for future research in a promising and growing field of transdisciplinary 
scholarship whose participants aim to help solve collective action dilemmas in envi-
ronmental, social, political, and economic contexts.
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Chapter 2
Lessons from Rapa Nui (Easter Island, 
Chile) for Governance in Conditions 
of Environmental Uncertainty
Carl P. Lipo, Pamela Mischen, and Terry L. Hunt
It amazes me how people are often more willing to act based on little or no data than to use 
data that is a challenge to assemble. (Robert J. Shiller, Economist (Heins, 2010))
Over the past several years, a group of islanders living on a remote and tiny island 
in the corner of the southeastern Pacific Ocean have been wrestling with complex 
but fundamental issues of governance. The island of Rapa Nui (Easter Island, Chile) 
is just 161 km2 with a resident population of about 6600 people as of 2016 (see 
Figs. 2.1 and 2.2). After more than 130 years of Chilean rule—located more than 
3600 km away across the sea—islanders have been working to establish a gover-
nance system to equitably manage the island’s cultural and natural resources while 
also addressing the overlapping sets of authority that stem from family groups, a 
series of 10 clans (mata), resident-elected town government officials, a provincial 
governor appointed by the Chilean President, and numerous Chilean agencies at the 
provincial and national levels. Although the island has been a sovereign territory of 
Chile since 1888, challenges to the overarching colonial structure of governance 
have been growing over the past several decades, as islanders have moved from 
addressing voting rights in the 1960s (Tector, 2014), to referendums for decoloniza-
tion in the 1980s (Delaune, 2012, p. 129), to the first native governor appointment 
in 1984, to its status as a special territory in 2007, to calls for complete autonomy, 
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demonstrations, and open conflict in 2010−2012 (COHA, 2011; Delaune, 2012; 
Warren, 2011). The most recent step towards reshaping island governance has been 
the establishment of Ma’u Henua, a Native Rapa Nui organization that recently 
assumed administration of the large portion of the island comprising the National 
Park and formerly under the Chilean National Forest Corporation (i.e., CONAF).
Efforts to change Rapa Nui’s governance structure are particularly timely given 
present and growing threats to the island’s resources. With increasing numbers of 
flights and cruise ship visits, the annual number of visitors to the island has surged 
to more than 60,000 (CODEIPA, 2015), with expectations of significant increases. 
Such increased numbers have resulted in greater use of the natural landscape, with 
widespread impacts to the archaeological record. In 2008, for example, a Finnish 
tourist broke a portion of an ear from one of the island’s iconic statues, a moai, cre-
ating an international incident (Barfelz, 2011). These kinds of events have led to 
greater efforts to restrict access to archaeological features and keep tourists from 
damaging the cultural resources they come to see. In addition to rising visitor num-
bers, the island’s residents grew from about 3000 to nearly 4000 between 1992 and 
2002, and the current 6600 has surpassed predictions of just a few years ago 
(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacionale de Chile, 2015). The population growth has 
resulted in many new houses in the town of Hanga Roa and its surrounding area, 























Fig. 2.1 Location of Rapa Nui in East Polynesia. Source: Design by authors
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hotels and businesses to support tourism. From a resource perspective, the popula-
tion growth places an ever-increasing burden on the freshwater resources that come 
from wells, garbage that must be removed or put in landfills, septic systems, energy 
requirements, as well as imported fuel, food, and building materials. The impacts to 
the island’s resources are occurring at a time when island residents are increasingly 
worried about the predicted effects of global climate change (Carabine & Dupar, 
2014). To meet such challenges, governance structures must operate efficiently, 
effectively, and equitably.
Rapa Nui is a particularly notable case when it comes to identifying strategies for 
living on a remote island in the face of tremendous adversity. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, Rapa Nui has been promulgated as a case of an island community 
whose poor decisions ultimately led to environmental and demographic catastro-
phe. Although this perspective is derived from narratives of the earliest Europeans 
who visited the island in the eighteeth century (Hunt & Lipo, 2011), the idea that 
Rapa Nui’s past represents a case of failure of governance remains strong in popular 
culture. Part of this popularity comes from the work of Jared Diamond via his vari-
ous essays (e.g., Diamond, 1995) and his book Collapse: How Societies Choose to 
Fail or Succeed (2005). The popularity of this notion has also led many scholars to 
offer Rapa Nui as an exemplar case for potential future human population growth 
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Fig. 2.2 The island of Rapa Nui (Easter Island, Chile). Source: Design by authors
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coupled with dwindling natural resources (e.g., Erickson & Gowdy, 2000; Foot, 
2004; Nagarajan, 2006). In these cases, Rapa Nui is used to illustrate what happens 
if communities fail to consider the long-term consequences of their actions, and that 
if we are to avoid the same fate as Rapa Nui, we (i.e., contemporary Western societ-
ies) need to avoid making the same kinds of mistakes. One key assumption embed-
ded in this logic is that prehistoric Rapa Nui was a failed governance system—a 
community that made the wrong choices and thus provides a warning for the future 
(Flenley & Bahn, 2003). Given that the governance of Rapa Nui is moving toward 
more traditional forms of governance, the veracity of our knowledge of Rapa Nui’s 
past is critical for understanding the possibility of success in the future.
In this chapter, we explore how knowledge informs governance in general and 
why understanding the foundations for knowledge is critical to effective governance 
systems. We present the changing face of modern Rapa Nui governance that points 
toward a move to more traditional forms of governance. Based on this discussion, 
we examine the logic that supports the notion of Rapa Nui as a case of environmen-
tal and demographic catastrophe. We then review how new research has drastically 
reshaped our understanding of Rapa Nui prehistory. Based on this new information, 
we reconsider how the people of Rapa Nui are changing their governance to suit the 
community’s new challenges. We suggest that a better understanding of the role of 
knowledge in governance potentially re-shapes our assumptions about strategies for 
the future and how we can engineer governance systems to consider new and chang-
ing information.
 Governance and Knowledge
As social communities, we are challenged to make effective decisions that have 
future impacts. Much of the difficulty that surrounds systems of decision-making 
comes from the uncertainty associated with the knowledge upon which decisions 
might be based: The greater the uncertainty, the more difficult the decision. People 
often use policy to guide their decisions and by doing so assume a degree of veracity 
of a priori knowledge with the hope that their decisions will have a greater likeli-
hood of achieving some desired outcome. For example, policymakers use experi-
ence with the incidences of forest fires and the conditions that cause them to guide 
policy about building requirements and fire break maintenance. The degree to which 
one can make decisions based on knowledge comes from one’s understanding of 
risk (i.e., events for which one can calculate the odds) and minimizing uncertainty 
(i.e., events for which one lacks sufficient information to accurately calculate the 
odds (Knight, 1921)). Uncertainty arises in situations where the number of factors 
leading to an outcome are unknown, too numerous, and/or too complex based on 
current systems understanding. Although decisions based on an assessment of risk 
are typically made by balancing the odds, costs, and potential returns, uncertainty 
can only be mitigated through the generation of knowledge. The more one knows 
about a phenomenon and its explanation, the lower the degree of uncertainty and the 
better one’s decision-making can be.
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It is in this way that knowledge and its creation are critical features in the opera-
tion of effective governance. Traditionally, governance is viewed as “the process by 
which a society or organization steers itself” (Rosell, 1999, p. 1). For the purposes 
of this chapter and to accommodate contemporary and archaeological contexts, we 
must establish a definition for governance that contains the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for all forms (i.e., observed and inferred from archaeological evidence). 
Here, we combine a cultural framework from cultural inheritance theory (e.g., 
Eerkens & Lipo, 2007; Laing, 2008; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) with mechanisms 
that favor pro-social behaviors on the scale of groups (Bowles, Choi, & Hopfensitz, 
2003; Henrich, 2004). For our discussion, governance is thus defined as the cultur-
ally inherited rule set for individual and group behaviors that serve to benefit group 
level unit of organization. Based on this definition, the rule set can be explicit (e.g., 
written) and/or implicit (e.g., culturally inherited) and can take a form that is formal 
(e.g., laws) and/or informal (e.g., customs). The rule sets are also cultural and 
contingency- bound, as governance depends on contingent history as well as the 
combination of information used to assemble the rule set. Because information can 
change over time, so can governance structures.
Decision-making can happen in one of four contexts: simple, complicated, com-
plex, or chaotic (Snowden & Boone, 2007). Modern day governance occurs largely 
within a complex context, which is characterized by flux and unpredictability, 
unknown unknowns, many competing ideas, and the need for creative and innova-
tive approaches (Snowden & Boone, 2007, p. 7). The governance of Rapa Nui is no 
exception. Governing in complex contexts means recognizing many bases of knowl-
edge. Clarke et al. (2013) argue that in situations such as coastal adaptation to cli-
mate change, science and technical knowledge alone are inadequate to deal with the 
system uncertainties and that participatory, local (particularly indigenous) knowl-
edge and a networked approach to governance is preferred.
 Governance Structure
Within contemporary forms of governance, knowledge is managed in ways that 
depend on the underlying philosophy of governance. The public administration 
regime, which emerged during industrialization, produced what we now recognize 
as the large governmental bureaucracy. According to Max Weber, “the more compli-
cated and specialized modern culture becomes, the more its external supporting 
apparatus demands the personally detached and strictly ‘objective’ expert” (Weber, 
1978, p. 216). Other influential perspectives during this time period were scientific 
management (Taylor, 1911), which prized efficiency over all else and the separation 
of politics and administration (Goodnow, 1900). Taken together, the focus of these 
theories was the objectivity of knowledge and its place within large bureaucratic 
organizations. Toward the end of this period, theorists came to recognize the issue 
of equity (Frederickson, 1971), but remained focused on governmental institutions 
as having primary responsibility for the creation of a more equitable state. As time 
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passed and large bureaucracies became known as inflexible bastions of red tape, the 
public sector began looking to the private sector for answers. Under this New Public 
Management (NPM) regime (sensu Osborne, 2010), knowledge shifted from the 
bureaucracy to the “customer.” Osborne and Gaebler (1992) argued that as society 
became one of knowledge workers, the “one-size-fits-all services” of government 
were no longer satisfactory. They called for government agencies to “reinvent” 
themselves by being entrepreneurial and listening to their customers. The market 
became the mechanism by which knowledge exerted its impact on the public sector. 
The lasting effects of NPM were outsourcing and decentralization (Alonso, Clifton, 
& Díaz-Fuentes, 2015), both of which served to broaden the base of knowledge 
from mainly within a large federal bureaucracy to include the private and nonprofit 
sectors as well as local governments.
Since the late 1990s, western public administration has been moving to yet 
another governance regime: New Public Governance. To understand the New Public 
Governance approach to knowledge, one must look at the networks and collabora-
tion literature. As early as 1997, O’Toole (1997, p. 45) urged the field of public 
administration to “treat networks seriously” as “[p]ublic administration increas-
ingly takes place in settings of networked actors who necessarily rely on each other 
and cannot compel compliance on the part of the rest.” Since that time, there has 
been an explosion of literature regarding networks and collaboration. Emerson and 
Nabatchi (2015, p. 25) created an integrative framework for collaborative gover-
nance that “attempts to identify and arrange the concepts needed to study and under-
stand collaborative governance regimes.” They view knowledge as critical for 
creating the capacity for joint action. Just as knowledge was the currency of the 
market in the New Public Management approach, Emerson and Nabatchi (2015, 
p. 71) argue:
In many ways, knowledge is the currency of collaboration. Knowledge, once guarded, must 
be shared with others; and knowledge jointly needed must be generated by participants 
working together. Contested knowledge requires full consideration, and incomplete knowl-
edge must be balanced and enhanced with new knowledge. In essence, collaboration 
requires the aggregation, division, and reassembling of data and information, as well as the 
generation of new, shared information.
One can also look at the roles that information and knowledge play from an orga-
nizational perspective. Wei Choo (2006, p. ix) argues that organizations use infor-
mation for sense making, knowledge creation, and decision-making. A “knowing 
organization” can anticipate environmental changes, learn and innovate, and “take 
timely, purposive action.”
The key here is that as groups begin to confront new social, economic, and envi-
ronmental challenges such as those produced by climate change, there will be pres-
sures on governance systems to change to ones better suited to managing a 
multiplicity of issues and voices. Additionally, those governance structures best 
suited to a radically uncertain future are those that are most able to attend to change 
and that can adapt to new knowledge.
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 Governance of Modern-Day Rapa Nui
When one examines the recent historical governance structures of Rapa Nui, one 
finds systems that were imposed by an external entity (Chile) to operationalize a 
colonial structure. This structure emphasized external knowledge in the actions of 
governance. For example, the Rapa Nui National Park (RNNP) was created in 1935. 
In 1973, the park administration was officially given to the National Forestry 
Corporation (CONAF). In addition to managing erosion and deforestation, CONAF 
was charged with the management of the park as a cultural resource and source of 
cultural tourism (CODEIPA, 2015, p. 10). CONAF is comprised of three depart-
ments. The first, Park Administration, oversees park operations, supervizes the park 
rangers, and includes one archaeological expert. The second department is Natural 
Resources, which is in charge of the nursey and the Forest Fire Brigade. The third is 
the Administration and Finance Department.
Several criticisms have arisen regarding CONAF’s management of the Park and 
resulted in the creation of a proposal for a new park administration (CODEIPA, 
2015). The charges can be divided into two categories. The first category addresses 
inadequacies in CONAF’s current management of the park, seen as resulting in the 
damage of archaeological artifacts, including an inadequate number of park rangers 
for the protection of the archaeological and cultural artifacts, inadequate collection 
of entry fees, and an insufficient number of archaeological experts.
The second category is longer-standing and relates to the history of how lands 
have been acquired, used, and allocated. In 1988, 36 five-hectare parcels of land 
(parcelas) were taken from the National Park and repatriated to islanders (Ramirez, 
2000). Later, the Comisión de Desarrollo de Isla de Pascua, created by the Indigenous 
Law in 1993 and launched in June 1999, began distributing parcelas to 267 fami-
lies, land that was owned by the state development corporation Corfo (IWGIA, 
2012). Although this process has rightly resulted in the return of land to the island’s 
native community, the transfer of property to individuals has resulted in substantial 
conflict over land received (given disparities in economic value), leading to greater 
community strife and loss of protection for the archaeological record (Ramirez, 2000).
In 2014, the Rapa Nui Commissions of CODEIPA asked CONAF to establish a 
wholly indigenous management system for the park. CONAF instead presented a 
co-administration plan (known as GOSPAN), in which the Rapanui People’s role 
was merely consultative (CODEIPA, 2015, p. 2). CODEIPA responded with its own 
proposal for an organization called Ma’u Henua, to be implemented in three phases. 
The first phase, viewed as a transition phase, is the GOSPAN proposal, which 
allowed for co-administration between CONAF and the Rapanui People represented 
by the Ma’u Henua Council. In this phase, operations continued to be the responsi-
bility of CONAF, but the voice of the Rapanui People was enhanced in strategic 
decision-making and the management of a Reinvestment Fund. During this phase, 
the emphasis was on adequate representation of the Rapanui and the building of 
organizational capacity to better manage the archaeological and cultural resources.
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The second phase, beginning in June 2018, was called the Law Stage. In this 
phase, the authors of the Ma’u Henua proposal argued for the creation of a Public 
Law Corporation, managed by the members of the Rapanui. In this phase, roles 
were reversed and CONAF became subsumed by a Public Law Corporation respon-
sible for the management of the park, with state officials acting as advisors. 
Additionally, a Rapa Nui Park Law established new park boundaries under the 
administration of the Corporation. The Board of the Corporation is constituted by 
four members of Rapanui, elected by the 36 traditional families, four Rapa Nui 
professionals, elected by popular election by members of the Rapanui, one repre-
sentative of the Council of Elders, one representative of the Provisional Government, 
one representative of the Municipality of Isla de Pascua, and one representative of 
CONAF. In addition to the Board of Directors, there is a Technical Advisory Board 
that includes members from the Provincial Government, Municipality of Easter 
Island, CONAF, Council of Monuments, CAM, Ministry of National Assets, 
CONADI, and Sernatur (CODEIPA, 2015, pp.  35–36). The Corporation will be 
comprised of seven (rather than three) departments: Operations, Archaeology and 
Heritage, Natural Resources, Planning and Development, Administration, 
Communications, and Financing.
The final stage, proposed for the year 2025, is called the Consolidation Stage. 
During this stage, the vision is for the Board of the Corporation to be comprised 
only of members of the Rapanui People (the four members elected by families, four 
professionals, and one representative of the Council of Elders).
 Analysis of Governance Regimes: From CONAF 
to Ma’u Henua
How are the theories of governance and knowledge reflected in the past, present, 
and future governance of the park? Beginning with CONAF administration of the 
park, it is evident that the initial approach was the public administration approach. 
Complete control of the park rested within this bureaucracy and knowledge was 
largely provided from external sources in a colonialist fashion. Over time, with 
indigenous claims to land and occupations of the park, one could argue that CONAF 
moved to more of a New Public Management style, dominated by market mecha-
nisms and private property rights rather than collective decision-making. The 
GOSPAN proposal represents a move toward a New Public Governance approach to 
the park. However, by continuing to hold the reins and cede no real control of the 
park to the Rapanui People, CONAF set the stage for the Ma’u Henua proposal, 
which continues organizational (rather that network) governance of the park, but 
under the control of the Native Rapanui.
The second stage of the Ma’u Henua proposal most closely resembles the New 
Public Governance regime. It is plural and pluralist in its approach, with representa-
tives of the Rapanui, local elected officials (which may or may not be Rapanui), and 
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CONAF on the Board of Directors, as well as a more expansive Technical Advisory 
Board that includes representatives of Chilean government organizations. The focus 
is not solely on the organization, but the organization and its environment, and will 
undoubtedly deal with the negotiation of values, meanings, and relationships.
The type of governance that will emerge during the Consolidation Stage is 
unclear. The Ma’u Henua proposal includes an emphasis on moving toward a tradi-
tional (Polynesian) governance approach. Therefore, to understand what the gover-
nance approach of the future will be, one must look to the governance of the past.
How do the authors of the Ma’u Henua proposal handle the role of changing 
knowledge? One type of knowledge is technical. The Ma’u Henua proposal’s 
authors recognize this as a lack of concern for archaeological expertise as tradition-
ally embraced by CONAF. Although the new organization will certainly provide 
direct contribution by local community members over the protection and preserva-
tion of the archaeological record, it is not clear from the proposal, however, just how 
the new organization will foster new forms of expertise that would come from a 
blend of local knowledge combined with the potential for external technological 
contributions. Educational programs that train community members, however, will 
certainly result in significant contributions in this area.
The second is cultural. In the new Ma’u Henua structure, local knowledge is now 
embedded explicitly into governance through the pluralist organization. This struc-
ture will potentially go a long way to enabling the community to respond to local 
needs and in ways that are consistent with local values. But is this governance struc-
ture sufficiently adaptive to cope with the magnitude and uncertainty of impacts of 
events that are associated with future climate change? From the traditional narrative 
of the island, one might conclude that the answer is no. The “collapse” accounts that 
are often assumed to be (e.g., Diamond, 2005; Flenley & Bahn, 2003) suggest that 
the island’s populations, acting on individual maximizing strategies, tend to overex-
ploit resources and produce their own demise. Thus, one might argue that the degree 
to which local knowledge is incorporated into governance, as was entirely the case 
in prehistoric times, will be correlated with the likelihood of failure. Anti-colonial 
sentiments aside, wouldn’t the island do better with a smartly designed, top-down 
governance structure?
This claim and the potential that Ma’u Henua and local information play in guid-
ing the future of the island requires an evaluation of the assumptions built into tra-
ditional ideas about Rapa Nui. Is Rapa Nui’s past as solid an example of ecological 
destruction? Did local strategies for managing limited resources and environmental 
uncertainty ultimately fail, leading to “collapse”? To develop an understanding of 
how reliance on traditional governance structures will impact the future sustainabil-
ity of Rapa Nui, one must reconsider what one knows about Rapa Nui’s past.
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 Knowledge of the Past
Based on popular media such as the 1994 movie Rapa Nui (Reynolds & Rose-Price, 
1994) and Diamond’s 2005 book Collapse, the prehistory of Rapa Nui is commonly 
considered to represent “the” canonical example of a population that failed cata-
strophically through its own actions. In this account and with steadily increasing 
intensity, past populations are assumed to have engaged in an island-wide cult of 
massive statue construction and transport that required tremendous resources to 
support. Ultimately, due to the resources required to sustain the outsized population 
and their outlandish behavior, the island’s originally abundant natural resources 
became depleted. Consequently, the people of Rapa Nui suffered the inevitable con-
sequences of their actions: ecological failure, warfare, starvation, cannibalism, 
depopulation, and societal collapse. The remaining people of the island were left in 
an environment that was forever degraded relative to previous times of ecological 
abundance.
Until relatively recently, Rapa Nui’s tale has gone largely unchallenged. For 
much of the twentieth century, this kind of story was taken as simple fact, for its 
logic seems unassailable. Researchers’ assumptions about Rapa Nui were rein-
forced general assumptions about humans and their behavior. Indeed, the notion 
that a “Paradise Lost” parable could have transpired on Rapa Nui is certainly not 
far-fetched when one examines the environment and geography of the island. For 
instance, the island is remarkably small—just 161 km2 in overall surface area, a size 
that allows one to walk across in a single leisurely day. The island is also located in 
a remote part of the southeastern Pacific, more than 3500  km from the coast of 
South America, 4000 km from Tahiti, and almost 2000 km from Pitcairn Island, the 
nearest other inhabited island. And if the small size and remote location were not 
enough to make inhabitation unlikely, the island is exceedingly poor in natural 
resources. There are no permanent streams and only limited terrestrial and marine 
resources. The volcanic soils that comprise the entire island have experienced mil-
lennia of weathering and, as a result, have low agricultural productivity, the island 
lacks a productive fringing reef, and the climate is subtropical with seasonally vari-
able rainfall and droughts. At first glance, Rapa Nui is an island that would present 
a challenge to simple human habitation, much less monumental architecture.
Paradoxically and despite the limited abundance of natural resources, the island 
boasts some of the most dramatic examples of prehistoric monuments and statues in 
the world. European visitors were repeatedly astonished to find that islanders had 
created more than 1000 massive statues, known as moai, with hundreds transported 
many kilometers across the volcanic terrain and placed atop massive stone- 
constructed platforms, or ahu. This record stands in stark contrast with the island’s 
natural setting.
One way in which the contradiction between the island and its limited natural 
resources has been reconciled is to presume that the number of statues and monu-
ments can only have been constructed if there was a time in which resources were 
more plentiful. Speculations about the cause of the island’s deforestation and 
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cultural ruin began with one of the island’s early European visitors. From a single 
day’s visit in April 1786, French explorer Jean-François de Galaup La Pérouse spec-
ulated that Rapa Nui’s past inhabitants decimated the island’s trees and that the 
present inhabitants were “indebted to the imprudence of their ancestors for their 
present unfortunate situation” (La Pérouse, 1797, pp. 318–319). This speculation 
forms much of the basis for the assumptions made by later authors. For example, 
many speculate what the likely population must have been (e.g., Bologna & Flores, 
2008; Brander & Scott Taylor, 1998; Puleston et  al., 2017; Reuveny & Decker, 
2000) and then use this to model the environment, assuming that so many statues 
could not possibly have been made on such a tiny island in any other way. As 
Diamond (1995, p. 62) reasons: “[T]he statues imply a society very different from 
the one that Roggeveen saw in 1722. Their sheer number and size suggest a popula-
tion much larger than 2000 people.”
The logic is simple: Large statues dictate that more massive numbers of popula-
tions of people once existed and that they were fueled by an environment that must 
have been more abundant than what was observed at contact. This logic is certainly 
seductive, in part due to the deep-rooted nature of the idea that humans tend to 
despoil the world in which they live.
 Ecology and Rapa Nui
Drawing on growing ecological awareness, William Mulloy (1974) published an 
account of pre-contact Rapa Nui society in which the population invested in spec-
tacular constructions, statues, and ceremonial activities leading to over-exploitation 
of the island’s fragile resources and devastating warfare. Mulloy’s narrative gained 
additional support with the documentation that the island lost a once-extensive palm 
forest through studies of sediment cores taken from the island’s volcanic lakes (e.g., 
Flenley, 1979; Flenley et al., 1991; Flenley & King, 1984). Kirch (1984, p. 264) 
echoed this story, writing that by the time of European contact the island had 
“already begun a downward spiral of cultural regression” and “crashed devastat-
ingly.” Bahn and Flenley (1992) followed this thread and argued for “collapse” 
scenario, suggesting Rapa Nui served as a microcosm of the Earth’s impending 
resource and population crisis.
The biogeographer and popular science author Jared Diamond (1995, p. 63) later 
adopted these accounts and widely popularized them as a moral for our time: “In 
just a few centuries, the people of Easter Island wiped out their forest, drove their 
plants and animals to extinction, and saw their complex society spiral into chaos and 
cannibalism. Are we about to follow their lead?” Diamond (2005, p. 118) asserts 
that Rapa Nui is “the clearest example of a society that destroyed itself by over 
exploiting its own resources” and that the consequences of deforestation “start with 
starvation, a population crash, and a descent into cannibalism.” Diamond (2005) 
goes on to argue that for Rapa Nui the efforts required to carve and transport the 
giant statues eventually led the population to deplete their own natural resources and 
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plunge into crisis induced by overpopulation and environmental destruction. In 
other words, people willingly destroyed their island and, in turn, destroyed them-
selves, thus committing “ecocide.”
Diamond and other researchers (e.g., Flenley & Bahn, 2003) tell a story that pro-
vides a powerful warning for today’s potential destruction of the global environment. 
With scientific recognition that human industrial practices are resulting in rapid cli-
mate change with radical impacts to habitat, rainfall patterns, storms, and sea-level, 
there are compelling reasons to accept the Rapa Nui “ecocide” narrative as simple 
fact (even if it is not). Flenley and Bahn (2007, p. 13) argue that “the point about the 
present ecological prognoses for the world is not that they are absolutely proven, but 
that they may well happen, and therefore we must take evasive action before it is too 
late.” Apparently, the facts do not matter as much as the need to act quickly.
From this perspective, it is not surprising that Rapa Nui has served as an exem-
plar of the consequences of ignoring the impacts that humans make on their envi-
ronment. As of December 5th, 2017, for example, the topic of “Easter Island,” 
“environment,” and “warning” currently appears on more than 1,470,000 websites 
and countless blogs (e.g., Busch, 2016; Hari, 2005). The warning narrative of Rapa 
Nui has spread through popular culture while also providing rationale for gover-
nance decisions—around the globe but also on Rapa Nui itself, as islanders are 
presently considering the best strategies for local governance of the island’s limited 
resources.
Given the importance of society’s understanding of the consequences of its 
actions relative to the future, if one hopes to use Rapa Nui as a case study that leads 
to behavior change, one should be particularly concerned about the veracity of cur-
rent understanding of the island’s prehistory. Although the idea that Rapa Nui’s 
history demonstrates the consequences of unbounded growth is consistent with gen-
eral and widespread ideas about human behavior as well as contemporary ecologi-
cal fears, does the evidence found in the archaeological record of the island support 
these assumptions? The answer to this question is significant, as the effectiveness of 
governance will depend on the degree we have well-documented and thoroughly 
researched evidence.
 Questioning Assumptions of Rapa Nui Governance Failure
Proponents of the “collapse” narrative for Rapa Nui make the critical assumption 
that the governance structures (i.e., the cultural traditions connected to individual 
and group-level organization) resulted in actions inconsistent with the island’s 
empirical constraints and conditions. The carving and transport of massive statues 
and documented loss of a palm forest with the assumed consequences would appear 
to be inconsistent with resource management of the island, leading one to think that 
the Rapanui lacked a governance system that accounted for the long-term effects of 
their actions. But given the fact the islanders lived in a remote and isolated location 
where their actions (e.g., how much food to grow, where to plant, how much land to 
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clear, how many children to have, how much to share, how to compete) directly 
determined their survival on an seasonal basis, it is reasonable to question the idea 
that the islanders engaged in activities without some reason to believe that their 
efforts would prove beneficial—even they were ultimately disastrous. From an 
islander’s perspective, one should wonder if local conditions led the population to 
expect long-term benefits from their behavior.
The “collapse” narrative assumes that statue-making was fueled by a population 
of organizational “complexity” and then, in the words of Kirch (1984), experienced 
a “downward spiral of cultural regression.” The assumption is based in orthogene-
sis, the idea that societies progress in their development and reach “peaks,” as indi-
cated by the level of apparent organization exhibited by the cultural achievements 
and driven by progress (variously defined, if at all) as an inherent mechanism of 
change. Extrinsic changes, then, necessarily result in failure and regression to ear-
lier simpler states. Orthogenesis—and the related assumptions about the way which 
societies change—provides much of the theoretical warrant for a concept of “col-
lapse.” Overall, however, empirical studies of the nature of change reject orthogen-
esis. As the many contributions to McAnany and Yoffee’s (2009) book Questioning 
Collapse indicate, population “collapse” is often just change in the way populations 
are organized without any “failure” or “cultural regression.” In these views, local 
populations change with innovation in new solutions for success, even though those 
new solutions might appear as “collapse.” Here, we might ask ourselves whether 
Rapa Nui statue manufacture and the loss of palm forest might have been solutions 
to the island’s constraints, rather than wanton behavior leading to destruction.
There are multiple reasons to challenge the collapse narrative and to look care-
fully at the evidence about the conditions leading to monumental architecture, envi-
ronmental change, and the observations made by early Europeans as they arrived on 
the island in the eighteenth century.
 A New Understanding of Rapa Nui Prehistory: Five Things 
Now Known About the Island and Its Past
Although the “collapse” story of Rapa Nui fits many cultural expectations about 
human behavior, researchers conducting fresh studies have greatly reshaped what is 
now known about the island (e.g., Cauwe, 2011; Cauwe & de Dapper, 2015; Hunt, 
2007; Hunt & Lipo, 2006, 2008, 2011; Lipo & Hunt, 2009; Lipo, Hunt, Horneman, & 
Bonhomme, 2016;  Lipo, Hunt, & Rapu Haoa, 2013; Morrison, 2012; Mulrooney, 
2012, 2013; Mulrooney, Ladefoged, Stevenson, & Rapu Haoa, 2009). Based on exca-
vations, extensive surface surveys, remote sensing of island structure, revaluation of 
chronological evidence and detailed examinations of attributes related moai transport, 
the new findings can be summarized in these five categories: (1) the empirical basis for 
prehistoric “collapse,” (2) post-European-contact events, (3) prehistoric population 
size and structure, (4) the island’s natural resources, and (5) moai transportation.
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 Collapse
Most significantly, there is simply no empirical evidence for a prehistoric demo-
graphic catastrophe. Instead, notions of a “collapse” prior to European contact can 
be traced to the misconceptions of these early visitors (Hunt & Lipo, 2011) and the 
perpetuation of historic myths (Hunt & Lipo, 2010, 2011;  Lipo & Hunt, 2009; 
Mulrooney, 2012; Mulrooney et al., 2009). Archaeological evidence cited for a pre- 
contact “collapse” reveals just the opposite: steadily expanding landscape use 
(Stevenson et al., 2015) until the arrival of Europeans followed by well-documented 
impacts due to European contact (e.g., see Lipo & Hunt, 2009; Mulrooney, 2012). 
Fundamentally, there are few archaeological indications that the population of Rapa 
Nui was ever much larger than the estimated 3000 witnessed at European contact 
(Boersema, 2017; Corney, 1908; Hunt, 2007; Morrison, 2012) or that it had ever 
been substantially larger in the past and then declined. Although researchers con-
tinue to make claims of much larger populations (e.g., Diamond, 2005; Puleston 
et al., 2017), they base these claims on conjecture or preconceptions of what “could 
have” happened without linking the claims to any empirical evidence for population 
size. For example, there is currently no evidence for a hiatus in the archaeological 
record that might signal a massive population decline (Mulrooney, 2013; Mulrooney 
et al., 2009; Stevenson et al., 2015), which would be required if a large population 
once existed. There is also little evidence for the level of conflict associated with the 
“collapse” narrative, including that for lethal skeletal trauma, mass graves, system-
atic production of lethal weapons, or fortifications (DiNapoli, Morrison, Lipo, Hunt, 
& Lane, 2018; Gill & Stefan, 2016; Lipo et  al., 2016;  Lipo & Hunt, 2009; 
Owsley, Barca, Simon, & Gill, 2016). A population at contact of about 3000, as 
Spanish observers reported in 1770 (Boersema, 2017), is consistent with archaeo-
logical studies whose authors demonstrate a low-density and dispersed settlement/
land-use pattern (Morrison, 2012).
 Post-European Contact Events
Historians document dramatic population decline resulting from the impacts of 
European contact and the introduction of Old-World diseases, slave raiding, and 
other calamities (Fischer, 2005; Hunt & Lipo, 2011). The case for European-caused 
population loss is unquestionable: It is documented in historic accounts (see Fischer, 
2005) with the population ultimately declining to just 111 people in 1877. Early 
observers, however, were largely unaware of the effects of disease produced by 
contact, leading them to interpret the island’s state as the result of the “imprudence 
of the ancestors” (e.g., La Pérouse, 1797, p. 319). Sadly, this confusion has pro-
duced the collapse narrative, in which the victims of European contact have been 
blamed for their own demise (Hunt & Lipo, 2010, 2011; Rainbird, 2002).
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 Prehistoric Population Structure
Uncovering new evidence, researchers have now documented that the island was 
always resource poor and that small numbers of people could easily have carved and 
transported the moai (Hunt & Lipo, 2011; Lipo et al., 2013). This observation is sup-
ported by studies of archaeological community patterning and structure: There is no 
evidence of large, dense settlements indicative of large populations. Instead, archae-
ological data from extensive field surveys and satellite image analysis of rock mulch 
(Ladefoged, Flaws, A., & Stevenson, 2013; Kovalchik, 2014) and manavai garden-
ing (Ayala-Bradford,  Lipo, & Hunt, 2005) suggest that the island’s communities 
consisted of distinct groups arrayed along the coast in dispersed settlement patterns 
(Morrison, 2012; Stevenson, 1984). Rather than living in nucleated villages, com-
munities consisted of family groups living at low density interspersed with areas of 
cultivation. Ahu and moai served as central locations for episodic gatherings that 
served to bind communities in activities and resource sharing (Hunt & Lipo, 2011).
 Natural Resources of Rapa Nui
Vast areas of the island were transformed into rock mulch gardens (e.g., Bork, Mieth, & 
Tschochner, 2004; Hunt & Lipo, 2011; Stevenson, Wozniak, & Rapu Haoa, 1999; 
Wozniak, 1998, 1999). These gardens’ remains can be seen across the island as arti-
ficial rock concentrations on the surface. Although European visitors have often 
viewed these rocky landscapes as the result of “ecocide,” such mulch formed a criti-
cal dimension to survival. Rapa Nui’s soils are derived from heavily weathered vol-
canic rocks. Given their age, these soils are relatively nutrient poor. Adding broken 
rock to the soil (i.e., “lithic mulching”) served to enrich nutrient- leached soils. Soil 
samples taken from rock mulch areas show elevated levels of nitrogen, phosphorus, 
and potassium, key nutrients for cultivation of plants such as taro and sweet potato 
(Hunt & Lipo, 2011; Ladefoged et  al., 2010; Ladefoged, Stevenson, Vitousek, & 
Chadwick, 2005). In this way, a key dimension to the island’s productivity was the 
area covered by rock mulch gardening. More than 10% of the island’s total land sur-
face may have been devoted to lithic mulch cultivation (Ladefoged et  al., 2013). 
Small walled gardens known as manavai also contributed to food production but 
were likely used to grow plants such as taro, banana, and sugar cane that needed 
additional protection and care to flourish (Ayala- Bradford et al., 2005).
Recognizing the significance of rock-mulch gardening has played a central role 
in rethinking Rapa Nui’s prehistory. Contrary to early observations, rock mulch 
formed the basis of a productive agricultural system key to the population’s success. 
Second, replacing the now-extinct palm trees with gardens increased agricultural 
potential and was not a catastrophe, as traditionally assumed. Third, cultivation was 
widely dispersed, and no single part of the island provided an abundance of crops. 
Dispersed cultivation coincides with a relatively small population living at low den-
sity. Thus, the population size observed by the first European observers, of about 
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3000 individuals, reflects a likely stable population size and not a remnant popula-
tion that survived “post-collapse” (Hunt & Lipo, 2011; Morrison, 2012).
 Moai Transportation
The question of how the multi-ton statues (moai) of Easter were transported has 
puzzled visitors and researchers for centuries, and for some it even played a role in 
deforestation. No visitors to the island ever witnessed the process, leaving much to 
an array of speculations. The islanders’ oral traditions have long recounted simply 
that the statues “walked” (e.g., Thomson, 1889). Modern attempts to explain moai 
transport, however, have focused on experiments that began with Heyerdahl’s efforts 
in the 1950s that involved simply dragging them (Heyerdahl, 1989). To resolve 
problems of friction and damage to statues, later efforts employed wooden sledges, 
pods, rollers, and sliders in various configurations (Hunt & Lipo, 2011). The idea 
that wood contraptions were used fits pre-existing notions of statue transport con-
tributing to deforestation, and researchers have thus rarely questioned it.
New field research and experimentation has resolved the question of statue trans-
port. A central finding of the research of Hunt and Lipo (2011; Lipo et al., 2013) is 
that the statues found along prehistoric roads have shapes that distinguish them 
from those statues erected on platforms (ahu). The road moai have statistically 
wider bases when measured relative to shoulder width than ahu moai (see Lipo 
et al., 2013, Fig. 3). Once statues arrived on platforms, prehistoric carvers modified 
the statues to decrease the width of the base relative to the shoulders. In addition, 
although ahu moai stand in an upright fashion with their mass located well over 
their base, road moai show a distinctive angled base that would cause the statue to 
lean significantly forward, often well over 10 degrees. The pronounced forward lean 
of the road moai points to how they were “walked” in an upright position with little 
wear to the base. Moai “walking” is achieved by ropes tilting the body from side to 
side, while allowing it to fall forward, controlled by a rope to the rear. This arrange-
ment minimizes friction between the base and the ground, allowing for conservation 
of energy, increasing overall efficiency, and removing the potential for damage as 
the statue “walks” (Lipo et al., 2013). This means of transportation is only possible, 
however, because the statute is carefully shaped to move in this fashion.
Apart from labor and engineering expertise, moai transport required only ropes; 
few if any trees were required in statue transport. A woody shrub (hau hau, 
Triumfetta semitrioba) provided abundant materials for making rope (Metraux, 
1940; Skottsberg, 1920). Thus, moai carving and transport did not contribute to 
deforestation, nor can one argue that forests were cleared for extensive cultivation 
of surplus crops to feed thousands of statue workers, as some have supposed (see 
Diamond, 2005; van Tilburg & Ralston, 2005, p. 299). Instead, the evidence for 
moai carving and transport points to activities by small-scale social groups rather 
than the product of laborers unified under a powerful centralized chiefdom.
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 Explaining the Success of Rapa Nui
Rather than a story of catastrophe and collapse, Rapa Nui prehistory is a case study 
of success on a remote, resource-poor island. Polynesians populated Rapa Nui 
around AD 1200 as part of rapid expansion throughout the remote Pacific (Hunt & 
Lipo, 2006; Wilmshurst, Hunt, Lipo, & Anderson, 2011). Colonists brought a roster 
of plants (taro, sweet potato, banana, sugar cane, etc.) and animals (rats, chickens) 
along with a variety of knowledge about subsistence strategies (fishing, cultivation) 
and cultural practices (statue and monument construction). Starting with these vari-
ables, Rapanui populations quickly grew in number as the island was transformed 
from a palm forest into an agricultural and human landscape.
Polynesian rats, as hitchhikers or an intentional introduction, rapidly spread 
across the island, potentially reaching numbers in the millions in a short time (Hunt, 
2007). Rats would prey upon native plant seeds—especially the nuts of a dominant 
palm forest—contributing to depressed recruitment and ultimately the forest’s 
demise. Forest removal would make way for cultivation, with workers using slash- 
and- burn cultivation practices common in Polynesian food production. The nutri-
ents released from burning vegetation would have been key to making the relatively 
poor soils temporarily more productive. Thus, given rats’ predilection for palm nuts, 
the slow rate of growth of the native Jubaea palm, and on-going land clearance with 
fire, the palms went extinct over several centuries. Importantly, no carrying capacity 
calamity befell the island when the forests were cleared. Clearing the landscape for 
cultivation and nutrients released from the burned trees created opportunities for at 
least short-term soil enrichment and cultivation as the island was transformed from 
a natural to an agricultural landscape.
From the available archaeological evidence, populations resided in multiple, func-
tionally redundant dispersed communities, but groups benefited from interaction 
through activities at large ahu (Hunt & Lipo, 2011). The benefits of interaction among 
dispersed communities likely explain why investment in monuments, although present 
elsewhere across the Pacific, took such an exuberant form in this location. On Rapa 
Nui, monument construction provided advantages to individuals and communities, 
serving to provide individuals with ways of competing while also mitigating problems 
of resource uncertainty (through sharing) and reducing inevitable intergroup competi-
tion as populations grew (see Hunt & Lipo, 2011 for a more in-depth discussion).
The benefits of moai and ahu construction on Rapa Nui allow one to understand 
these phenomena as the products of effective governance, even if such things are not 
consistent with common assumptions about what “successful” societies should do. 
Moai making and transport appear incongruous with the island’s resource limita-
tions and remote isolation, and thus stand apart from what one might assume as 
central to survival. On this island, however, moai werethe key to long-term sustain-
ability. Although activities and forms of investments varied over time, the Rapanui 
successfully persisted. Populations remained stable and reasonably healthy until 
1722 and the arrival of the Europeans. Rapa Nui’s success over its pre-European 
history is tied directly to the cultural practices involved in moai and how these prac-
tices structured and supported the island’s communities.
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 From the Past and Looking at the Future: Governance 
on Rapa Nui
This new understanding of the way prehistoric people on Rapa Nui managed uncer-
tainty offers a means of evaluating governance structures from the recent past as 
well as what might best be implemented for the future. From the archaeological 
record, one can see that the island’s long-term success came from governance struc-
tures comprised of multiple local groups that cooperate as well as compete with one 
another. Such a structure allowed for variability in local knowledge to feed back into 
practice and spread across the island, thus leading to a system that would dynami-
cally accommodate changes in environmental conditions. This system worked until 
the Europeans’ arrival, when extrinsic changes resulted in social disruption and 
massive population loss due to disease and other European-driven catastrophes 
(Hunt & Lipo, 2011).
An important question for Rapa Nui’s future is how well this traditional gover-
nance structure will work under vastly different circumstances. Cooperation and 
competition between local groups must be managed in ways that foster multi-level 
governance, support a population twice the size of the prehistorical carrying capac-
ity, and enable flows of people and goods between the island and the rest of the 
world. The knowledge of how to live sustainably on the island will need to evolve 
and adapt to these changes in circumstances. Furthermore, the pluralist form is not 
necessarily as adaptive as it was in the past, as it still retains a strong top-down 
structure, a legacy of CONAF. This structure, therefore, might limit the ability for 
local innovations to emerge and spread across the island, constraining the commu-
nity’s ability to respond to changing and uncertain conditions. So, although Ma’u 
Henua represents a significant positive step forward toward decolonization and the 
embracing of local knowledge, it still potentially suffers from over-emphasis on 
top-down governance. Based on the factors that appear to explain Rapa Nui’s sus-
tained prehistorical success, future policymakers might well consider adding dimen-
sions of polycentric governance (e.g., Ostrom, 2010; Waring et  al., 2015) that 
combine cooperation and competition at more local levels than what is currently 
envisioned. For example, the establishment of events that encourage groups to work 
together while simultaneously competing in some capacity can have tremendously 
beneficial effects that result in increased prosociality. Wilson (2011), for example, 
has demonstrated that group-level competition can increase within group coopera-
tion while also increasing global levels of cooperation across a population. The 
basis of such mechanisms already exists on the island in the form of Tapati, a festi-
val that was created in 1968 in which clan groups compete in a series of cultural and 
athletic events. Like the cooperative efforts involved in making and transporting 
moai that were the foundation of prehistoric Rapa Nui society and governance, 
events like Tapati have the potential to enhance the island’s ability to govern effec-
tively in the face of future uncertainty.
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 Conclusions
Overall, our new understanding of Rapa Nui challenges the idea that traditional, 
local-based governance systems are inherently flawed. New knowledge, however, 
brings with it new productive areas in which to consider governance and knowledge 
systems. Our studies of the archaeological record demonstrate that Rapa Nui’s suc-
cess in the face of uncertainty and constraints (socially, environmentally, and geo-
graphically) derived from governance structures in which individuals and local 
communities shared information and resources. Innovations spread easily through 
the interaction of multiple, dispersed communities, and resource shortfalls were met 
by embedded collaborative efforts marked by activities involved in the construction 
and transport of moai. Following the example provided by Rapa Nui prehistory, we 
suggest that any regular activities (i.e., competitions, rituals, gatherings) that bring 
communities together and promote within-group cooperation will provide a direct 
benefit to everyone who participates. With local structures, those groups that coop-
erate more strongly will do better, particularly in the context of uncertainty. On the 
island scale, then, competition between these groups who also participate in 
between-group cooperation will produce general sustainability. The constraints and 
local conditions faced by populations living on Rapa Nui give an example of resil-
ient and adaptive governance at its finest.
Our understanding has many implications for thinking about governance struc-
tures and how their members consider knowledge under conditions of uncertainty. 
Researchers must first carefully—and constantly—evaluate the assumptions made 
about the nature of social change. Although long-cherished beliefs might fit con-
temporary perspectives, they need to explore where these believes come from and 
to assess their empirical warrant, and must distinguish between the social accept-
ability of a conclusion versus its empirical support. This concern is why science 
matters so greatly, particularly when the stakes of failure grow in magnitude. Those 
in the field must fight the tendency to view knowledge generation as producing 
“alternative facts,” but instead see knowledge as a process by which one continually 
and critically re-evaluates information from as many sources as possible.
Given that much knowledge about social and cultural change comes from an 
understanding of the past, science-based archaeology that demands falsifiability in 
any claims is particularly required. This suggestion does not prioritize science over 
locally generated knowledge. Instead, one must see knowledge generation as an 
iterative process in which we continually evaluate all sources of information. 
Despite having a “scientific” pedigree, the lack of such critical evaluation has con-
tributed significantly to the erroneous acceptance of the “collapse” narrative. There 
are likely other areas where the field’s perceived knowledge must be closely exam-
ined for empirical warrant. Likewise, one must not simply rely on “facts” as the 
basis for knowledge. One’s knowledge comes not only from observations, but also 
the way in which one generates those observations. In this sense, theory is para-
mount. The idea that human societies will inevitably result in environmental destruc-
tion is not only unsupported by the evidence, but also violates a basic understanding 
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about the relations between organisms and resources: There are conditions in which 
balances can be reached and sustainability obtained. Researchers must forge their 
observations from explicit and robust theory (Lewontin, 1974).
In cases of uncertainty such as that posed by imminent climate change, an addi-
tional imperative exists to incorporate processes that accommodate dynamic knowl-
edge change into one’s governance systems. As society begins to encounter 
environmental conditions that radically deviate from those upon which its actions 
have been traditionally based, governance must become increasingly adaptive and 
dynamic. The systems required must be more like that of prehistoric Rapa Nui: local 
and pluralist. Following the quote by Robert Shiller that begins this chapter, society 
requires dynamic and adaptive governance systems that accommodate the iterative 
process of knowledge generation—rather than those that act on traditional assump-
tions. These kinds of adaptive management systems (Williams & Brown, 2014) are 
particularly well-suited to the changing nature of knowledge, as innovation in one 
area can be evaluated locally and then shared across communities– a process that is 
difficult to implement in top-down governance models. In this way, Rapa Nui stands 
to serve once again as an exemplary cultural system, though one of success and 
promise rather than of collapse and catastrophe.
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Chapter 3
Knowledge of Governance as Knowledge 
for Governance: Spatialized Techniques 
of Neutralization
Michael Scott
Governance is a key concept in the social sciences (see Bevir, 2011). It refers to 
processes of intersectoral, interorganizational modes of networked steering that 
lead to collaborative and negotiated decision making (Rhodes, 1997). For sociospa-
tial researchers, knowledge for governance evokes images of governmental knowl-
edge of populations and their attitudes, technical knowledge of space and its physical 
properties, formal and informal bureaucratic processes of problem definition, and 
the creation of knowledge through stakeholder engagement to address pressing 
social issues. This rendering of governance has a normative inflection. When done 
well, governance generates more equitable, socially just, and consensus-derived 
decision making through the integration of diverse stakeholder voices and technical 
expertise.
Nevertheless, behind governance lurks government (MacLeod & Goodwin, 
1999). Legal systems, public funding, and bureaucratic rationalities often cast a 
shadow over noble normative aims. Governance as an activity then emerges as a 
domain of negotiation and contest within state-managed systems. Here, actors aim 
to advance interests through reference to state power, which they call upon to enact, 
arbitrate, or legitimate governance-derived decisions. Therefore, governance is per-
formed at the cultural-institutional interstices of, in Weber’s (1978) terms, authority 
and legitimation. Outcomes must be enacted (via state authority), and they must be 
seen as just (legitimate). In these settings, actors assume that the best technical or 
scientific knowledge enables authoritative action and is woven into narratives, argu-
ments, and framings to legitimate decisions (Hajer, 2001).
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But is knowledge for governance primarily technical or expert? Or does gover-
nance require managing representations, stakeholder voice, and impressions? How 
might knowledge of how to speak and debate within governance processes emerge as 
a form of knowledge of governance, for governance? How can such knowledge of 
how to argue be deployed to legitimate socially contentious decisions? Although there 
is an extensive literature on knowledge uses in governance (e.g., Nursey-Bray et al., 
2014), which includes critical studies of ways of knowing and the governance of 
knowledge (van Buuren, 2009) as well as the uses of nonknowledge and the unknown 
in governance (McGoey, 2012), the following further problematizes the image of 
knowledge for governance as a consensual input into collaborative decision making.
In this chapter, I investigate how governance actors legitimate contentious coastal 
land developments. I do so using qualitative data and the articulation of two contrast-
ing literatures: techniques of neutralization from the sociology deviance (Sykes & 
Matza, 1957) and theorizations of spatiality—social produced space—from human 
geography (e.g., Massey, 2005; Soja, 1989). As Boiral (2016, p. 754) notes, tech-
niques of neutralization involve “the release of information aimed at rationalizing 
and legitimizing, through different types of socially acceptable arguments.” From an 
argumentative perspective, these techniques are a form of knowledge of governance 
used to debate, deflect criticism, and neutralize opposition (Fischer, 1990). 
Researchers using techniques of neutralization in sociospatial research have recently 
considered ethical and sustainable consumption practices (Antonetti & Maklan, 
2014; Hansmann, Bernasconi, Smieszek, Loukopoulos, & Scholz, 2006; Harris & 
Daunt, 2011; Johnstone & Tan, 2015; Yeow, Dean, & Tucker, 2014), wildlife crime 
(Enticott, 2011), and corporate social responsibility and industrial production 
(Boiral, 2016; Fooks,  Gilmore, Collin, Holden, & Lee, 2013; Meyer & Höllerer, 
2016; Stuart & Worosz, 2012; Talbot & Boiral, 2015; Teh, Ahmed, & D’Arcy, 2015). 
Yet the intersections of knowledge, governance, and techniques of neutralization in 
land use governance have yet to be considered. This is puzzling because techniques 
of neutralization provide a frame to explore how legitimating rationalizations are 
deployed without questioning the environmental impacts of the land use planning.
Crucially, the coastal zone is an inherently contested space and thus an exem-
plary site to explore the spatialized techniques of neutralization in governance set-
tings. As the meeting point of land and sea, the coast affords multiple human uses 
including recreation, conservation, and aesthetics. The coast is also habitat and eco-
system linked to species reproduction. Moreover, the coast is a site for capital valo-
rization through land development underscored by the cultural draw of living by the 
sea. Yet, under anthropogenically accelerated climate change and sea level rise 
(SLR), storm surges now impact the coast in greater frequency and intensity, 
reclaiming private and public property, while threatening infrastructure and ecosys-
tems. In such locales, the interaction of state control of coastal land use (through 
planning institutions) and diverse stakeholders offers insights into the enactment of 
knowledge of governance, for governance.
I develop this analysis over four sections. First, I review the qualitative methods 
and the South Australian cases. Second, I outline land-use planning as a governance 
institution, the techniques of neutralization, and spatiality. In the following section, 
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I illustrate how actors adapt the techniques of neutralization using spatial metaphors 
that refer to the political-juridical, economic, and ideological dimensions of coastal 
land use. In the final section, I propose a metatheme in these spatialized techniques 
of neutralization: the ongoing privileging of time over space.
 Methodology
This research was a component of an Australia-wide CSIRO project (2010–2013) 
investigating the social and cultural barriers to the uptake of scientific knowledge 
into costal decision making (Clarke et al., 2013). As part of the South Australian 
research cluster, my focus lay on land-use planning institutions, social networks, 
and the cultural narratives operating within these (Scott,  Balaev, & Clarke, 
2018; Scott & Harvey, 2016). South Australia has a long history of employing land- 
use planning to protect and manage its coastline, which varies from high energy 
Southern Ocean zones to low energy gulf waters. Not only was it the first Australian 
state to account for SLR in its development setbacks (the permitted distance of the 
built environment to the coastal zone), it is also recognized as having transparent 
and well-governed planning systems (Harvey & Caton, 2010).
South Australia’s planning framework regulates coastal land use. Under the 
“Development Act” (Government of South Australia, 2014), a state agency, the 
Coast Protection Board (CPB), oversees coastal planning, development, protection, 
and restoration. It provides advice and direction on coastal matters to the Minister 
for the Environment, the state planning authority (the Development Assessment 
Commission or DAC), and local government authorities (LGAs or local councils). 
In general, LGAs assess coastal development proposals with reference to the rele-
vant section of the Development Plan. Coastal LGAs must also give regard (but not 
legally adhere) to CPB policy on setbacks and coastal flooding hazards (Coast 
Protection Board, 1991). These scalar planning arrangements guided the research 
design. In June 2011, a focus group with the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources (DENR) identified cases that were:
• Examples of key coastal development decisions
• An initial list of the key actors and organisations involved in these planning 
decisions
• Examples where scientific knowledge of coastal processes influenced the 
decision
• Examples where scientific knowledge on coastal processes where not accounted 
for in the decision
Following the focus group, researchers selected four case studies of coastal 
developments exposed to SLR risks: a coastal retirement apartment complex and a 
surf club redevelopment on Adelaide’s metropolitan coast (whose extensive white 
sand beach is managed by costly sand carting), a regional coastal resort, and a large 
peri-urban coastal township development on a flood plain adjacent the Gulf of 
3 Knowledge of Governance as Knowledge for Governance: Spatialized Techniques…
54
St Vincent. They selected all cases on the basis that they were relatively recent 
(within the past six  years), so that interviewees could recall the events and pro-
cesses. Moreover, these examples of coastal development are paradigmatic cases 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 80). They highlight the more general characteristics of land-use 
governance and the uses of knowledge. Here, contests over coastal development and 
the projected risks from SLR provide an exemplar of the narratives circulating 
within land use governance. If the techniques of neutralization were deployed in the 
South Australian case—where the planning system is robust and transparent—they 
would be likely to be deployed elsewhere.
Data collection took place between July 2011 and May 2012. From the list of 
cases, I identified potential respondents in three ways. First, the DENR focus group 
provided a list of potential interview subjects. Second, a Factiva search of media 
articles on the selected cases highlighted political and community actors. Third, I 
identified additional individuals through a search of secondary data: publicly avail-
able policy documents, development plans, CPB Reports, council submissions to 
developers, the South Australian Hansard, surf lifesaving club annual reports, draft 
plans, architectural plans, and submissions to the state’s DAC.
With this snowballing process (Noy, 2008), I was able to identify 47 actors, of 
which only two declined to participate. I conducted semistructured interviews last-
ing between 30 and 90 min, allowing respondents to extensively recount their sub-
jective experiences in coastal governance. I then transcribed and analysed the 
interviews using NVivo, and deductively coded the data along the themes of the 
techniques of neutralization (discussed below) and further analyzed them through 
reference to spatial concepts.
 Land-Use Planning, Techniques of Neutralization, 
and Spatiality
 Land-Use Planning
Land-use planning requires elaboration, as it is a pivotal institution in the gover-
nance of coastal developments. Theoretically, land-use planning and its attendant 
mapping create property rights. Following Polanyi (1957), land is one of the ficti-
tious commodities (the others being labour and money). These are fictitious for they 
do not easily lend themselves to commodification, and thus exchange in the market 
economy. Furthermore, land cannot be expropriated without the risk of short- or 
long-term degradation, negative externalities, or unintended consequences on adja-
cent areas. Formalization in property law and planning bureaucracies is necessary to 
secure land’s continued social uses and future valorisation via market exchange 
(Harvey, 1978). In urban contexts, land development often occurs through growth 
coalitions between property developers and state or municipal power (Logan & 
Molotch, 2007). Crucially, land use planning undergirds urbanisation and is one of 
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the few economic development levers available to Australian states operating under 
the pressures of competitive federalism, ongoing deindustrialization, and the need 
to attract investment.
Carving up the earth’s surface under state authority planning creates different 
zones. Land-use planning is about “what goes where” (Taussik, 2007). Zones regu-
late what development constructions—or protections—occur in that space. Still, 
zoning and development is not a technocratic procedure of high modernist planning. 
Instead, this institutionalization of land means planning is called upon to meet “con-
crete, multiply-determined objectives that could contain various social processes 
simultaneously” (Krippner, 2002, p. 804), including the triple bottom line of social, 
economic, and environmental benefits (Elkington, 1999). As such, planning does 
not necessarily predetermine development ends. New developments involve gover-
nance and networked decision-making that brings together legal processes assign-
ing rights with social assessments of the proposed development’s risks and benefits. 
Here state actors and LGA planners coordinate a range of knowledge holders: engi-
neers, scientists, politicians, community groups, NGOs, and other stakeholders with 
an interest in the site and its adjacent uses (see Scott et al., 2018).
State planning organizations also establish due processes, which are a game and 
an incentive structure to be engaged (North, 1990). Land’s fictitious nature and its 
multiple uses means no planning policy can cover every contingency a development 
proposal might present, nor account for changing political economic or environ-
mental conditions under which developments are proposed. There is an art to align-
ing, negotiating, and, importantly, legitimating land-use development at controversial 
sites. This requires knowledgeable and reflexive actors engaging in negotiations and 
the deft marshalling of various forms of evidence to enact authority over the use of 
space. Planning’s legitimacy then rests upon “a belief in the legality of enacted rules 
and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issues commands” 
(Weber, 1978, p. 215). Because the future is (relatively/somewhat) unknown, devel-
opment proposals in contentious locations are as much about the production of 
belief in the authority of the planning system as they are of technical knowledge. 
Development decisions can therefore  be justified in multiple ways—economic, 
sociocultural, or environmental—with no form of knowledge as ultimate arbiter; 
what planning assessors call “a balanced decision” (Scott & Harvey, 2016). In open-
ing this discursive space for heterogeneous, yet socially acceptable narratives, the 
techniques of neutralization emerge as a form of knowledge of governance.
 Techniques of Neutralization and Spatiality
Sykes and Matza (1957) developed “techniques of neutralization” in the sociology 
of deviance to differentiate the narratives “delinquents” used to justify their norm- 
and law-breaking behaviour. Sykes and Matza argue that techniques of neutraliza-
tion are a learnt response allowing delinquents to reconcile the conflicting demands 
of their primary subculture with the external demands of the norm- and law-abiding 
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community. As part of deviant subgroups, delinquents recognise the social pres-
sures to conform but also possess a willingness to break laws in which they too 
believe. Therefore, if society’s formal rules are qualified and flexible, how can they 
be bent in some ways but not broken? Here the techniques of neutralization are a 
means to deflect, remould, and recast criticism from the justice system and society. 
They include:
 1. Denial of responsibility: the appeal to external forces beyond the actor’s control. 
Injuries are produced by circumstance and the actor denies personal account-
ability by claiming to have been “hopelessly propelled” into a situation; one is 
“acted upon rather than acting” (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 667).
 2. Denial of injury: pivots on the legal distinction between “acts which are wrong 
in themselves and acts which are illegal but not immoral” (Sykes & Matza, 1957, 
p. 667). The question is has anyone been physically hurt by the deviant acts, such 
as graffiti or brawls between willing parties? Although counter to the law, the 
action does not cause significant harm.
 3. Denial of the victim: when the delinquent accepts responsibility for their actions 
the victim can be denied. Any injury sustained is downplayed, for the victim 
might have deserved it or becomes transformed into a wrong doer. Awareness of 
the victim is further weakened if the deviant behaviour is against property. Where 
there is no immediate physical harm to owners, there is diminished awareness of 
the victim.
 4. The condemnation of the condemners: involves “a rejection of the rejecters” 
(Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 668). This rationalization deflects claims against the 
deviant by shifting doubt on to the motives and behaviours of those who disap-
prove. Here cynicism is expressed towards those upholding society’s norms, 
casting them as “hypocrites, deviants in disguise, or impelled by personal spite” 
(p. 668). The delinquent, in effect, has changed the subject of the conversation in 
the dialogue between his own deviant impulses and the reactions of others; and 
by attacking others, the wrongfulness of his own behaviour is more easily 
repressed or lost from view (p. 668).
 5. Appeal to higher loyalties: a process of articulating a devotion to smaller sub-
groups who are claimed to be more important than wider society: family, friends, 
and cliques. The actor does not reject all norms, but rather makes claims to group 
“norms that are higher or more pressing” (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 668).
In identify these neutralizing techniques, Skyes and Matza do not suggest that any 
one possesses ultimate efficacy, or carries more weight in determining justice out-
comes. Instead, techniques of neutralization emerge as a way to place doubt upon an 
opponent’s arguments while allowing the wrong doer to identify with societal norms. 
Therefore, unlike Schopenhauer’s (2004) “Art of Being Right,” techniques of neu-
tralization are not explicitly about winning debates but are discursive strategies to 
diminish the social opprobrium of accusations, and subsequent penalties, when the 
accused is aware they have violated social norms. As Sykes and Matza (1957, p. 669) 
claim, these techniques are only “tangential or glancing lows at a dominant norma-
tive systems rather than creating an opposing ideology.” Their use allows actors to 
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drift between value systems—wider social norms and subcultural values (Mooney, 
2007)—while providing a context dependent explanation for deviant behaviour. 
However, a telling critique of techniques of neutralization is that they cannot explain 
the causes of deviance, only actors’ post-factum explanations, rationalizations, and 
justifications for rule breaking (Cavanagh, Dobash, Dobash, & Lewis, 2001).
My contention is that these neutralization techniques emerge as a form of knowl-
edge of governance to legitimate, rationalize, or deflect critiques in contentious 
coastal governance processes. In this milieu they are spatialized. Here, I adopt a 
broadly materialist interpretation of spatiality which recognises that space “is 
socially produced, exists in both substantial forms (concrete spatialities) and as a set 
of relations between individuals and groups, an ‘embodiment’ and medium of social 
life itself” (Soja, 1989, p. 120). Material spatiality then creates dialectical, recur-
sive, and reciprocal sites for action through the interplay of social processes and 
geophysical space (Massey, 2005). From this perspective, spatiality is constituted 
through overlapping domains: political-juridical (the institutions regulating space 
such as planning, interwoven political systems of scale and territory), economic 
(space as a site for the creation of investment and profits, production and consump-
tion), and ideological (the symbolic use of space—the coast as a cultural expression 
of freedom and nature or of progress and development). No single domain is deter-
mining. Within these domains, spatiality is also metaphorical, for it contains a mul-
tiplicity of potential social uses and meanings, and paradoxical, as it is produced by 
different knowledge forms and is consequently simultaneously knowable and 
unknowable (Kitchin, 2009). This kaleidoscopic spatiality creates numerous oppor-
tunities to deploy the spatialized techniques of neutralization in the governance of 
coastal developments.
 Spatialized Techniques of Neutralization
 Denial of Responsibility: Political-Juridical Structures
Actors in coastal land use governance recognize the larger political-juridical struc-
tures bearing on their actions. These can thwart, obstruct, or constrain efforts to 
incorporate protective measures, alter development proposals or to stop environ-
mental protections outright. In its spatialized form, the denial of responsibility is a 
deferral to broader planning processes, their bureaucratic limitations, and the pro- 
development logics of growth coalitions. As an LGA planner laments in an inter-
view, the scalar hierarchy of planning means “[s]tate government are the ones who 
have ownership of our development plan and we’re the ones who try to fit it in.” To 
neutralize complaints over coastal development, state planners who make final 
assessments deploy this technique. Their repertoires for action are circumscribed by 
external planning hierarchies, zonings, and regulations that are beyond their control:
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… we don’t design the development, we don’t select the location but we get a copy of the 
application with the design and that determines the nature of the development and the appli-
cation process we follow and we make the assessment on that against the plan, and then 
make recommendations to accept, amend, or reject the application. (State planner)
… the [land use zone] document might be old, deficient, very general, it may not be worded 
in a way that is easily understandable, it might be open to interpretation—it doesn’t matter; 
that is what we have and that’s what we have to work with. (State planner)
Here, denial for responsibility for future environmental impacts is conjured 
through reference to due process: Hopelessly propelled by legitimate procedure, the 
state planners reached a balanced decision regarding the development. A strident 
critique of this mode of neutralizing is that it limits accounting for exceptions. This 
is presented by actors less central to the making of coastal development decisions—
scientists and engineers who provide expert advice:
… [planners and bureaucrats] tick the checklist—if they get away from the checklist men-
tality and work towards a decision, in other words become involved in a process rather than 
being the police of the process, then I think they’ll have a much better [outcome]. 
(Consultant, environmental scientist)
Moreover, advocates of environmental protection see planning assessments 
weighted towards valorizing the coast as economic space. Inversely, an iteration of 
the denial of responsibility is that the marshalling alternative forms of evidence to 
counter development proposals are burdensome:
… I think economic and environmental arguments are considered differently, probably in 
the community as well as government, and economic arguments of ‘this is going to be the 
benefit’ are fairly quick to be accepted, whereas the environmental argument is often, I’m 
exaggerating here for effect, ‘well prove that four different ways.’ There is a different bur-
den of proof required for environmental arguments and environmental issues than there is 
on economic ones—that’s my personal view not a departmental view—I will make that 
clear! (State engineer)
Overall, this spatialized neutralization deflects environmental or future risks that 
cannot be managed within the existing political-juridical domain of planning assess-
ment. This allows planners and other governance actors to claim that they are acted 
upon by larger structures and systemic forces. Overlapping with the denial of 
responsibility is the coast as an economic space.
 Denial of Injury and Victim: Legitimating Economic Spatiality
Implicit in planning is the ongoing use of the coast as economic space. Materially, 
new developments benefit private users through land price appreciation and LGAs 
through rate inflation, whereas recreation hubs such as surf lifesaving clubs carry 
positive economic and social externalities. Hence, an urban LGA planner seeking to 
implement prudent coastal development recognises economic pressures (while 
engaging in a denial of responsibility):
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The barriers [to implementing environmental protections or blocking coastal development] 
are poor [meaning legally weak] state government policy for the coast. We don’t have much 
to stop development. There is really nothing in any of the state government policies that we 
have to draw from to put in our development plan, stopping development. Development is 
always going to happen but it’s a matter of mitigating the issues that go with it. That’s all 
we can ever do. There is no policy to re-establish the [sand] dunes when a house reaches the 
end of its life.
In addition, the shorter term pressures for using coastal space for economic 
action follows the political imperatives of growth coalition driven economic devel-
opment. As an LGA planner managing the development of a new coastal town-
ship notes:
All the big projects are in [politically] marginal seats. [We] can’t do anything as develop-
ment plans are under the control of state governments. The Economic Development Board 
is mostly real estate developers and people who invest money.
To mitigate paradoxical norms—governance as protecting property from envi-
ronmental risk; governance as enabling built development—the denial of injury and 
the denial of victim overlap. Both create a distinction between acts that are wrong 
in themselves and acts that are illegal but not immoral: no significant physical or 
individual harm arguments are developed. When deployed at sites where projected 
SLR will impact on new developments, these techniques deny future injuries and 
victims through an appeal to a wider, and more diffuse, social group. SLR will 
impact other communities so why restrict economic development at this site? For 
example, a LGA councillor supporting the large peri-urban township development 
dismisses SLR projections through reference to other communities that might be 
affected:
… but a lot of the project [township development] is above places like [an adjacent indus-
trial and residential] Peninsula, which are actually below the levels of where most of this 
development is. So if we do have the problems of the rising sea levels it is going to hit a lot 
of other areas first!
Likewise, for a representative of a surf life-saving club redevelopment abutting 
the Adelaide metropolitan coast:
… we’ve done what we can to observe what the [state planner] said. One of their comments 
was that 3-meter waves will hit the building. If that is going to happen then the whole met-
ropolitan coast will be in danger so you can’t prepare against that. Although it might sound 
ridiculous to those that live along here, you simply can’t prevent that if it is going to happen 
and the whole state would be under threat, not just us. I said, ‘If you feel our building is 
under that sort of threat then you had better tell everybody that lives along the coast line to 
sell now and don’t expect your kids to inherit the building, the house, on the seafront 
because it won’t be there.’ (Private developer)
Such statements could be interpreted as a denial of capability—the inevitability 
that SLR cannot be held back. However, this denial of victim and injury invokes a 
tacit socialization. Here the projected injuries of new developments become parsed 
through appeals to a generalized coastal community, present and future. Potential 
injury and victim caused by a new coastal development can be denied; if everyone 
else on the coast is affected, there is no specific victim or injury. There is disaster. 
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Therefore, the ongoing use of the coast as economic space can be legitimated by 
broadening the victim base, which is further diffused through reference to future 
uncertainty. Debates over the coast as economic space then broaden out into ideo-
logical clashes between pro- and anti-development actors, and the condemnation of 
condemners.
 The Condemnation of the Condemners: Ideological Spatiality I
This technique is a brazen “rejection of the rejecters” (Sykes & Matza, 1957, 
p. 668). It calls into question the motives and behaviours of those who disapprove. 
This could be disapproval over developments or disapproval over pro- environmental/
prudential development positions within governance settings. These techniques 
were widely articulated. Although descending into sophisticated name-calling, this 
technique echoes the metaphorical and paradoxical dimensions of the coast; its 
symbolic uses can be presented in different ways. Two indicative examples from 
pro- and anti-development MPs illustrate how ideological interests are condemned, 
first through reference to the uncertainty of coastal science, and second through 
growth coalition solidarity. The state MP managing the development process of a 
surf lifesaving club, whose location on a promenade sees it buffeted by storm 
surges, states:
One thing I know for certain is that if I whacked half a dozen (coastal) scientists in this 
room we might come up with six different views, and the one thing they will all agree on is 
the need for more funding for research. What we often see is scientists being pitted against 
each other as opposed to an agreed position. The advocates for not doing anything will 
always say ‘but we need more research.’ (State MP)
Meanwhile, a state MP opposing a periurban township development on a coastal 
flood plain argues:
I’ve made many speeches in parliament about the conflict of interest [the state government] 
has under the GAI—the Growth Areas Investigation. They did the major study for govern-
ment for areas for growth on the outskirts of the city [including coastal zones]. They did that 
work for government and at the same time they represented private developers who had 
been buying up land on the fringes … for ages. Then, surprise, surprise they happen to 
recommend to government that areas that their clients owned were suitable for urban devel-
opment! (State MP)
By making the self-interest within putatively transparent governance practices 
hyper visible, these MPs are condemning their opponents’ motives. Scientists want 
more money, growth coalitions want to consolidate power over space. Broadly, pro- 
development groups can condemn by pointing to the coast’s paradoxical nature—it 
is known and unknown—whereas antidevelopment groups condemn growth coali-
tions that privatize profits and socialise costs. In governance debates, they offer 
archetypical counterweights over the valorization of coastal space. A similar strat-
egy appears in appeals to higher loyalties.
M. Scott
61
 Appeal to Higher Loyalties: Ideological Spatiality II
In criminology literature, appeals to higher loyalties refer to gangs, brotherhoods, or 
immediate family whose interests are placed above the law or societal expectations. 
This approach then acts through reference to an alternative value system carried by 
subgroups. In its spatialized form, this occurs through the privileging of subgroups 
along paradoxical ideological scales. One iteration of this technique is to displace 
critiques over environmental risks through a claim to the higher loyalty of the local 
community as the ideologically privileged scale. Here, a pro-development LGA 
councillor mixes the condemnation of condemners with the high loyalties of local 
community:
… because of this vocal minority (referring here to community environmental activists) 
drive things, the [planning] bureaucracy listens to them. But we didn’t just have the vocal 
minority but a whole range of people, which gave us what I call ‘the real people,’ and not 
just self-appointed activists. As I say, I work with the people. Activists are vocal and dishon-
est. (LGA councillor)
An alternative higher loyalty is the belief in science and rational communicative 
action. The subgroup loyalty is to specialist expertise that is increasingly questioned 
in “post-truth” public and political discourse (see Kelly & McGoey, 2018). Yet, the 
higher loyalty to global scientific authorities can legitimate planning:
There is public scepticism, but if you are presenting a project, like the (coastal resort) proj-
ect or something like that, you include in your information that you’ve considered the IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) guidelines and things like that. These recom-
mendations that you’re putting forward go to government departments or local council or 
something like that. And while there may be a lot of scepticism in the community in gen-
eral, you don’t get that back from government departments or local council … It’s all done 
to get development approval on projects. (Consulting engineer)
Appeals to higher loyalties—or the other neutralizing techniques—are no guar-
antor of success in reaching objectives. They emerge in on-the-ground planning 
process where debates descend into a series of governance tropes or ritualistic 
manoeuvres to signal towards, and call to account, the actions of opponents. They 
are a gesture to say: “We know what you are doing and this argument/rationalisation 
might not change the development process, but you should be aware that we know 
what you are doing.”
Within these examples, there is of course slippage between narratives and prac-
tices, blurred lines of authority and condemnation, and multiple, imperfect paths to 
legitimation within coastal planning systems. There are also evolving governance 
networks, ongoing tension between technical knowledge and planning systems, and 
the incessant economic pressures on land use, which means governance is a painful, 
state-managed process of negotiation. Here, the spatialized techniques of neutral-
ization are but one component of a suite of tacit tools used in negotiations. What 
these techniques then intimate is a spatial meta-narrative: the neutralizing of space 
through reference to time.
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 Neutralizing Space Through Time?
Human geographers view the space-time dialectic as a core theme and organising 
paradigm. Nevertheless, these two concepts are not created equal in either academic 
or everyday narratives. As Soja (1989) argues, too often space is subsumed under 
time; time is active and becoming, space is dead and inert—the physical crystalliza-
tion of time. In studies of global capitalism, such as Harvey’s work from 1989, capi-
tal’s accumulation dynamics are the annihilation of inert space (distance) by time 
through new technologies and institutional convergence, whereas land simultane-
ously provides a spatial fix to rounds of capital investment. Massey (2005) is more 
moderate in her claims, yet sees the space-time dialectic as coconstituting:
Here the representation of space takes place through its convening into a temporal sequence. 
The challenge of space is addressed by the imagination of time … (modernity is one space 
viewed through time) … The real import of spatiality, the possibility of multiple narratives, 
was lost. The regulation of the world into a single trajectory, via the temporal convening of 
space, was, and still often is, a way of refusing to address the essential multiplicity of the 
spatial. It is the imposition of a single universal. (p. 71)
One implication of Massey’s argument is that this modernist privileging of time 
over space becomes folded into spatialized techniques of neutralization. This occurs 
through a double hermeneutic (Giddens, 2013), that is, both academic ontology and 
common sense, with the actors involved in land-use governance evincing a geo-
graphical imagination. In this quasifolk knowledge of coastal governance, actors 
recount space as time-indifferent. Regardless of its unique and relational spatial 
histories, actors viewed coastal space primarily as physical space to be remade for 
immediate or future uses. A pro-development LGA councillor summarizes this 
time-space ethos:
… is the world going to stop because [coastal development] happens? No. So why worry 
about what way the sea-level is going to do! It becomes insignificant on a day-to-day basis 
of what’s happening in my life and what may happen in the next generation. After that we 
don’t care enough about the following generation.
In contrast, historical development and private interests sees a coastal engineer 
call upon future levels of expertise and public funding to defend the coast. Time 
saves space:
… you only have to do a quick calculation of the value of the waterfront property and then 
come to the conclusion—and these places are worth over a million dollars for every 15 m 
of frontage—once you’ve (got a government implementing a retreat from SLR strategy) 
buying those up what about the next row? The sea doesn’t stop there. So hundreds of hect-
ares of land behind the first row are subject to flooding if you give up on the front properties. 
You are not talking one or two rows of houses, you’re talking about going back a couple of 
kilometres of flood-prone land on the coast—it is ridiculous to think we would even retreat. 
It doesn’t even stack up economically. From a structural point of view you protect, you need 
to protect. We will just be following what the Dutch have always done for the last 100s of 
years; really you don’t need to be a clairvoyant to work that one out.
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Time is summoned to neutralize coastal risks in “place” by using claims to an 
unknown spatial future. Notwithstanding, the growing sophistication of computer- 
aided actuarial modelling, and the temporal logics of the money economy, planning 
systems cannot factor in all future spatial effects. SLR and climate change is an 
unknown, for it is based on projections (Whatmore, 2009); therefore, why put off 
what you can do today until tomorrow? There is no absolute certainty over the envi-
ronmental or sociopolitical future, so this future cannot be privileged over the pres-
ent. Moreover, in South Australia’s context, planners and politicians do not have 
time to wait for economic development; action needs to be taken now. If coastal 
space is threatened by SLR, this was to be acted upon when equipped with yet-to- 
manifest levels of human ingenuity and finance, underpinned by new modes of con-
sensual coastal management. Fixed space is neutralized by fluid time. Echoing 
Massey (2005):
This kind of space of modernity, in other words, doesn’t see space as emerging from inter-
action, nor as the sphere of multiplicity, nor as essentially open and ongoing. It is the taming 
of the challenge of the spatial. This is a far deeper victory of time over space than the often- 
referred- to deprioritisation. (p. 71)
Here, such spatialized techniques of neutralization are not just cognitive rational-
izations but political tools (Fooks et al., 2013). They are a performance of power to 
control the responses and actions of others (Dahl, 1956). These techniques can neu-
tralize in public domains as well by recasting the political-economic pressures of 
scale and place. In a modernist narrative where governance actors cannot control the 
past but can control the future, the privileging of time instantaneously appeals to 
specific communities, bearing the promise of wider social good and immediate and 
future material benefits, and implies coastal space is tameable regardless of future 
geophysical processes. Yet research shows growing belief (and experience) in the 
effects of climate change, and growing concern that action needs to be taken now 
(Giddens, 2009). Closer to the spirit of Sykes and Matza (1957), actors employing 
such appeals to time neutralize the concerns of wider society without questioning 
the legitimacy and authority of coastal land governance.
 Conclusion
This analysis of the spatialized techniques of neutralization evinces a methodologi-
cal problem. I conducted the interviews postfactum; following Bourdieu (2004), 
when interviewed actors create stories that are semitheoretical or seek to impress 
the interviewer, while presenting a particular image and identity of the participant—
one that conforms to their self-image. Whether these techniques and spatial meta-
phors are used in situ governance practices or only emerge as rationalizations in 
interviews following the event is an area for further research.
Nevertheless, in this chapter I have approached the theme of knowledge for gov-
ernance from the angle of knowledge of governance—how to articulate contests in 
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coastal development. Bringing techniques of neutralization from the sociology of 
deviance to governance contexts, I have foregrounded different—and subversive—
forms of knowledge. Cosituated within the formal, technical, and rational process of 
land development is a tacit knowledge of how to legitimate planning decisions. 
Actors use spatial imagery and metaphors to create neutralizing narratives: denying 
responsibility in the political-juridical domain; denying injury and victims to legiti-
mate the coast as economic space; using competing ideologies of space to frame the 
condemning of condemners and appeals to higher loyalties; and a metanarrative 
privileging time over space. Such ritualistic efforts in neutralizing opponents’ 
claims emerge not from a need to directly protect individuals or coastal space, but 
to deflect attention from planning arrangements and governance processes that 
enable—with a dull inevitability—environmentally and socially risky coastal devel-
opment to occur. Hopefully, this initial dialogue between techniques of neutraliza-
tion and the human geography of land governance may open new avenues for 
researchers in other governance settings, allowing them to explore how the tech-
niques of neutralization circulate at the nexus of knowledge of, and knowledge for, 
governance.
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It is well known that in recent years, the scientific community’s consensus about 
man-made climate change has not only become more robust but that a number of 
recent studies point to far more dramatic and long-lasting consequences of global 
warming than previously assumed. Although commonly referred to simply as 
“global warming,” the consequences to expect are increasing average global tem-
peratures, rising sea levels, and more frequent occurrences of extreme weather. 
Given the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, their retention time 
of hundreds or more years and, despite many efforts to reduce emissions, enhance 
resilience, and implement new technologies, the relationship between society and 
the climate is bound to change in novel and unpredictable ways (see Stehr & 
Machin, 2019).
Under the circumstances, how is it possible, many scientists now ask, that robust 
science-based evidence does not motivate and encourage major political action in 
society as a whole and change the conduct of civil society members worldwide? 
How is it possible that democracies in particular have done so little to effectively 
combat the risks of climate change and simply failed to pay attention to the dangers 
In my discussion of the relation between knowledge, expertise, and democracy, I am drawing on a 
couple of earlier reflections, such as Stehr (2016a, 2016b). I am grateful to Michael Handke for his 
comprehensive and constructive review of my manuscript. I thank Scott McNall for his helpful 
comments.
N. Stehr (*) 
Karl Mannheim Chair for Cultural Studies, Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen, Germany
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of global warming?1 After all, the nature of the future present is very much predi-
cated on decisions taken now.
Being disenchanted with the workings of democracy and blaming democracy for 
a host of social, economic, and political ills is not a new complaint: “Lamenting the 
failings of democracy is a permanent feature of democratic life, one that persists 
through governmental crises and successes alike” (Runciman, 2013). However, the 
referent of the expression “climate change” is a novel reason for a fundamental 
concern about the fate and future of democracy.
 Blaming Democracy
Climate scientists, social scientists, and the media as well as environmental activist 
groups (NGOs) concerned with climate change refer to a “future present” of excep-
tional circumstances2 and protest that “evolution did not design us to deal with such 
problems” (Jamieson, 2014, p. 61; di Paola & Jamieson, 2018).3 Members of the 
same groups assert impatiently that no one is listening to the diagnosis of histori-
cally unprecedented risks and dangers.4
In important respects, therefore, the discourse of climate science having estab-
lished the fact of anthropogenic climate change has by necessity become forward 
looking. The focus has shifted to how will it be possible to govern societies in the 
not too distant future under the massive impact of global warming. How will it be 
1 I am using the concepts of “risk” and “dangers” not as overlapping terms, but in the sense in 
which Niklas Luhmann (2005, p. 23) introduced them as contrasting concepts. The risks of climate 
change can be attributed human-made decisions, while humanity is exposed to the dangers of cli-
mate change. An example of risk-taking decisions related to climate change can be studied in 
today’s State of California: People are moving into high fire-risk zones, that is, the population of 
California grew by 3 million between 2000 and 2010, and, “in 2017 over a quarter of the state’s 
population lived near moderate or high-risk fire corridors. With this increase in population comes 
a higher possibility of a human-made wildfire. And as people move into these high-risk areas, more 
buildings are in harm’s way: structures generally burn longer than vegetation, allowing fire more 
time to spread” (cf. Adolphe, 2018).
2 The useful concept of a “future present” is Niklas Luhmann’s (1976, p. 140) terminology: “If we 
characterize processes or activities as beginning or ending, we use a terminology which belongs to 
the present. If we use these expressions to refer to distant dates—for example: The Roman Empire 
began to fall—we refer to a past present or to a future present.”
3 An incessant amplification in the discourse of imminent threats (many may recall the 1986 
SPIEGEL title with Cologne cathedral underwater) can paradoxically turn out to be supportive of 
the opposite virtue, namely, as a defense of the present and encouraging skepticism toward sce-
narios of impending dangers. This represents a psychological mechanism not unlike the everyday 
attitude toward weather extremes widely interpreted as an affirmation of the normal course of the 
climate (cf. Stehr, 1997; Stehr & Machin, 2016b, 2019).
4 As Bill McKibben (2018), for example, notes: “Over and over we’ve gotten scientific wake-up 
calls, and over and over we’ve hit the snooze button. If we keep doing that, climate change will no 
longer be a problem, because calling something a problem implies there’s still a solution.”
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possible to govern a future present that is anticipated to be altogether different from 
the societal context in which democratic systems originated and flourished in the 
past? In the cases which I will identify, strong opinions promoting the need to sup-
press political liberties in the wake of profound future environmental changes are no 
longer unusual, yet have not received systematic attention in social science.
In this essay, therefore, I will bring this disenchantment with democracy, espe-
cially in its currently dominant liberal version, under the spotlight. My essay is 
about the struggle to align politics and policy with science. I will critically probe the 
argument that policy makers are going to have to act, even without a broad public 
mandate and legitimacy. Time is very short before a future of disastrous damage 
becomes locked in. But rather than lamenting the inconvenience of democratic gov-
ernance, it is important to reflect upon ways of enhancing democracy, not despite 
but especially in light of the massive challenges of a changing climate. Coping with 
major environmental challenges is best accomplished, as history shows and as I will 
argue, within the bounds of democratic rather authoritarian political systems. In this 
essay, I reframe our changing climate as an issue of political governance and not as 
merely an environmental or as an economic issue.
I will advance my argument in a number of steps. First, I will address the grow-
ing assertion that social science contemporary democracies face exceptional cir-
cumstances. Second, I will reflect on the classical and present-day social science 
discourse on the erosion of the foundations of democracy. Third, I will describe the 
growing sentiment of an inconvenient democracy among climate scientists, other 
scholars, NGOs, and the media. Climate scientists propose overcoming modern 
democracies’ inability to cope with the disastrous consequences of climate change 
by abolishing democracy. The alternative, of course, is to strengthen democracy. 
Fourth, I will consider the proposed shift in role for climate scientists as policy mak-
ers. In the final section, I will examine the serious deficiencies in the assertion of 
contemporary society as an inconvenient democracy.
 The Rise of Exceptional Circumstances
As never before, the continuity from past to future is broken in our time. Niklas 
Luhmann (1998, p. 67).
In the past, actors typically used war-like conditions and major disasters to jus-
tify the abolition of democratic liberties, if only temporarily. The present appeal to 
exceptional circumstances from the critics of dominant government climate policies 
around the world echoes this sentiment, demanding the elevation of a single socio- 
political purpose to ultimate political supremacy.5
5 For a discussion of exceptionalism in political theory, critical security, and citizenship studies, see 
Best (2018).
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With climate change, the world is confronted with a historically novel situation 
and future present. Climate change within historical times is locked in. Most of the 
scientific discourse has been devoted to establishing that anthropogenic climate 
change exists. Researchers have settled the issue of whether climate change is 
anthropogenic, and it has become clear that unless increasingly vigorous political, 
economic, and societal measures are implemented, the planet will continue to expe-
rience warming “greater than it has been for more than half a million years” 
(Nordhaus, 2013, p. 325). What scientists have not settled is a range of important 
questions such as the speed of global warming, or the nature of the consequences of 
climate change on various significant attributes of human existence and in different 
regions of the world.
Governing the consequences of climate change must include a time scale and 
anticipated societal transformations that are clearly beyond human imagination and 
current political institutions. Except for reference to singular historical events, such 
as war, revolution, economic collapse, or the struggle for national liberation, there 
are no large-scale human experiences within historical times to which the climate 
science community can appeal as it begins to reflect on a future present in which 
massive impacts of climate change have set in. This relates to all levels of society 
and its relations abroad, such as how the world makes and uses energy, the virtue of 
the nation state, migration patterns, the global economy, and civil societies. In such 
contexts, crisis conditions promote the creation of emergency powers, the delegiti-
mation of the previous political order, the abolition of liberty and justice, and the 
installment of revolutionary governance. The past is by no means a foolproof guide 
to the future—it is, however, often the only guide we have.
Appeal is therefore made to extraordinary circumstances or a war-like footing 
(Lovelock, 2009; McKibben, 2016) that necessitates the suspension of freedoms 
and climate scientists’ political ascent. As the French political scientist Pierre 
Rosanvallon (2013, p. 184) stresses: “The central nation state is seen as the only 
source of security in the face of radical risk. It is the hope that an appeal to extraor-
dinary circumstances, that is, to a threat to the very existence of civilization if not 
humankind alone might be able to give capacity and … energy back to a failing or 
hampered [political] will.” Frank Fischer (2017, p. 54) complements this in criticiz-
ing that “current political-economic efforts on part of contemporary democratic sys-
tems to deal with problems such as global warming … [are] little more than limited 
symbolic gestures, especially given the pressing constraints of time.” The problem 
of global warming and its consequences does not merely pertain to contemporary 
democratic governance and a missing commitment of citizens to change their ambi-
tions and behavior. Above all, a future perspective is needed (Lovelock, 2009). The 
future perspective imposes its own norms on the present (cf. Jonas, 1984, p. 143).6
6 Hans Jonas (1984, p. 143) interrogates the Baconian idea (executed, e.g., within Marxism) of 
dominating nature by increasing the humanity’s power over it in his search for an ethic of the 
technological age. Jonas designates the Baconian ideal as the source of an ethic aimed predomi-
nantly at the future and therefore imposes its norms on the present.
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But how does one govern well under exceptional circumstances? This question 
encounters two countervailing forces: that of an inconvenient mind7 and of inconve-
nient social institutions. The former relates to a public that is assumed to be “present- 
centric” (Skidelsky & Skidelsky, 2012, p. 130), in other words, comfortable with the 
status quo, and that justifies imposing one’s own (superior) ideas on those of future 
generations citizens (because should one really need to care whether the future pub-
lic cares?). The latter relates to a strong state in the form of a command society. In 
other terms, good governance of society based on citizen participation must be sub-
ordinated by almost any means to the defeat of the exceptional circumstances.
It is the single purpose of defeating those exceptional circumstances that legiti-
mizes the temporal suspension of liberties (Hayek, 1944, p. 189). However, is any 
massive absorption of powers in the hand of the state and its representative’s revers-
ible, in the long run? And are the potential consequences of climate change the 
equivalent of (abrupt) war-like conditions? How can one pinpoint the onset of 
exceptional circumstances?
Democratic governments’ deficiencies are many and far exceed the issue of cli-
mate change and its societal consequences; but is it therefore justified to reach a 
conclusion as disparaging as the diagnosis of an inconvenient democracy? After all, 
authoritarian and totalitarian governments do not have a record of environmental 
accomplishments; nations that have followed the path of “authoritarian modernizat
ion/environmentalism” such as China or Russia cannot claim to have a better 
record.8 Nonetheless, the disenchantment with democracies continues to be 
advanced, and perhaps is becoming even more vocal as entrenched climate policies 
fail to live up to their promise.
 Inconvenient Democracy
Those who assert exceptional circumstances and the concomitant promotion of the 
need to overcome an inconvenient democracy derive their intellectual sustenance 
from a range of new and classical considerations, which lead to different forms of 
blaming with different addressees.
7 The reference to the inconvenient mind is of course a play on words rooted in the better-known 
metaphor “an inconvenient truth.” A fairly straightforward example of an inconvenient mind in the 
case of climate change is to suggest that the science of climate change is much too complicated for 
the average citizen to comprehend. A less “neutral” version of the inconvenient mind would be to 
suggest that the public is intellectually incapable of grasping the idea of global warming and its 
consequences.
8 As Bruce Gilley (2012, p. 287) explains, “authoritarian environmentalism” is used to refer to “an 
emerging theory of public policymaking in the face of severe environmental challenges. It has been 
discussed both as a prescriptive model of how countries should effectively respond to such chal-
lenges, and as a descriptive model of how they are likely to respond.”
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 The Erosion of Democracy: The Classical Perspective
In the classical social science literature, many observers believe that the threat to 
democracy that issues from an uneven access and distribution of knowledge in soci-
eties, for example, on social inequality formation in society (see Stehr & Machin, 
2016a), has radically displaced earlier, optimistic enlightenment views regarding 
the resilience and even the possibility of a democracy based on a general circulation 
of knowledge in society.9 Numerous authors, from Max Weber to Robert Michels, 
have explicated these and other threats to representative democracy.
Given the unstoppable advance of bureaucracy in modern societies, Max Weber 
(1918/1994), for example, feared a kind of pacifism of social impotence of the citi-
zenry, for in the face of a 
growing indispensability and hence increasing power of state officialdom … how can there 
be any guarantee that forces exist which can impose limits on the enormous, crushing 
power of this constantly growing stratum of society and control it effectively? How is 
democracy even in this restricted sense to be at all possible? (Weber, 1918/1994, p. 159)
Robert Michels (1915), in his classical study of the undemocratic tendencies in 
the social democratic party, a political organization that actually aspires to and 
fights for democratic goals, refers to an almost “natural” state of incompetence and 
immaturity of the mass of people in modern democracies. And because those of 
rank and file are incapable “… of looking after their own interests, it is necessary 
that they should have experts to attend to their affairs” (Michels, 1915, p.  93). 
Seldom is the rank and file willing to throw off the authority of the expert leaders 
and dismiss them from control.10 Numerous of the classical concerns about the via-
bility of democratic governance find an echo in contemporary reflections about the 
fragility of democracy.
9 There is good reason to be skeptical of the idea that either the notion or the realities of the knowl-
edge gap or the information overload, however defined, are genuinely new. One has only to refer 
to the convergence of societal diagnoses proposed, at the dawn of the last century, by thinkers such 
as Georg Simmel, Sigmund Freud, and Walter Benjamin, of a cultural age displaying severe over-
stimulation, discontinuities, and overload.
10 Whether the disillusioned conclusion Robert Michels (1915, p. 95) draws in light of the tenden-
cies he observes, namely that “social democracy is not democracy, but a party fighting to attain 
democracy” is inevitable, that is, universally applicable as a kind of iron law, is surely contestable, 
although many observers are prepared to concede that Michels has discovered one of the few law-
like relations in social science. For more recent studies by economists, sociologists, and political 
scientists who take Michels’s challenge about the inevitability of oligarchic tendencies in organiza-




 The Erosion of Democracy: The Modern Perspective
A deep-rooted pessimism about the psychological make-up of human beings, the 
temporality of human thought, the failure to mobilize individuals for the cause of 
effective climate policies, the inability of government given constitutional con-
straints to attend to long-term goals, the fragility of the political order, the influence 
of vested interests on the political agendas of the day, and in the case of anthropo-
genic climate change, the addiction to fossil fuel, as well as, last but not least, the 
ineffectiveness of the climate science community itself insure that their message 
does not fall on deaf ears.11
 Blaming the People
Daniel Kahneman sums up the growing skepticism regarding citizen motivation 
when he states:
The bottom line is that I’m extremely skeptical that we can cope with climate change. To 
mobilize people, this has to become an emotional issue. It has to have the immediacy and 
salience. A distant, abstract, and disputed threat just doesn’t have the necessary characteris-
tics for seriously mobilizing public opinion. (Cited in Marshall, 2014, p. 57, emphasis added)
The mass of citizens, it seems, simply cannot be won over to endorse and follow 
the course of scientifically based policy options. The large majority of citizens is 
basically inclined to act irrationally (cf. Schumpeter, 1942, pp. 262–263). The cli-
mate scientist Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber (Elger & Schwägerl, 2011, p.  29)12 
gloomily relates why climate change communication does not reach civil society: 
“[M]y own experience and everyday knowledge illustrate that comfort and igno-
rance are the biggest flaws of human character. This is a potentially deadly mix.” 
However, to view democracy and politics in terms of the competence of the indi-
vidual citizens is to argue in favor of a micro-sociology without a macro-sociology. 
The reference to the public perceptions of science and expert knowledge goes 
beyond the implicit or explicit assumption that the public has basically deficient 
information and knowledge, is perhaps even reactionary, and tends to respond to 
complexity with trepidation (cf. Gauchat & Andrews, 2018).
The apparently widely shared ability to avoid knowing what the future could 
bring can of course also be interpreted as a psychological “incentive” to live with 
11 Efforts in climate change communication are predicated on the conviction
that if the public only knew the facts about climate change and began to understand just how 
serious the problem is, they would raise their voices and demand that our governments and corpo-
rations do something (Revkin, 2014).
12 The climate scientist Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, in an interview with DER SPIEGEL (Issue 12, 
March 21st,  2011, p.  29) in response to the question of why science’s messages do not reach 
society.
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the knowledge about the limited knowledge on the outcome of events that are 
located in the future (cf. Gigerenzer & Garcia-Rettamero, 2017). Meanwhile, politi-
cal scientists, who have in many ways been concerned about the voters’ lack of 
information, have begun to stress that the democratic-political system works in spite 
of citizens’ ignorance (Kuklinski, 1990). Or, as Petersen and Aarøe (2013, p. 289) 
have more recently documented, despite the widespread lack of extensive political 
knowledge, “citizens readily form opinions on what constitutes the best and most 
efficient policies.”
Seymour Martin Lipset and his colleagues (1962) advance an appraisal more in 
support of the political virtue of knowledgeable citizens: lack of information, pas-
sivity, and lack of interest of rank-and-file members in the affairs of an organization 
is in the interests of the powerful and supports their capacity to perpetuate power 
advantages. It seems that it is not so much the volume of knowledge or information 
that citizens command that impacts the relation between democracy and knowledge, 
but rather the importance of democracy-enhancing individual and collectively 
shared value-orientations; or, as Robert Dahl (1977, p. 1) argues: It is “the ways in 
which we think about ourselves as a people” that support the existence and the sta-
bility of democracy. Of course, value-orientations and educational achievement are 
connected: “Education presumably broadens men’s outlook, enables them to under-
stand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and 
monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices” 
(Lipset, 1959, p. 79).
 Blaming the Political Class
In the eyes of many from the climate science community, not only citizens but also 
politicians are not ready to pursue policies that effectively address climate change. 
Climate activist, climate scientists, some politicians, and many other observers 
agree that the recent climate summits in Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban, and Warsaw 
were failures. The summits did not result in a new global agreement to cope with the 
emissions of greenhouse gases. The subsequent 2015 Paris Agreement, widely 
regarded as an historical achievement, seemingly marks a general scientific and 
public consensus that anthropogenic climate change is a very serious threat to 
human civilization and its environments. The treaty, however, is non-binding. There 
are no formal sanctions if a country should fail to live up to its commitments regard-
ing the efforts in terms of mitigation, adaptation, or finance, and there is no guaran-
tee how far reaching the Paris Agreement will be. This problem came to the fore on 
June 1st, 2017, when the United States, led by President Donald Trump, announced 
their formal withdrawal from the treaty, rejecting the scientific consensus that 
greenhouse gas emissions are warming the planet.
Although under the terms of the Paris Agreement the U.S. cannot formally begin 
the process of withdrawal until November 2019, the current administration is 
already embarked upon a strong anti-environmentalist agenda. In his 
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announcement, Trump was fulfilling his campaign pledge to “end the war on coal” 
and his purported aim to reclaim sovereignty for the American people and put 
“America first.” But as has been much remarked upon, shortly after his announce-
ment in which Trump emphasized that he was elected to represent “the people of 
Pittsburgh and not Paris,” the mayor of the state of Pittsburgh, Bill Peduto, voiced 
his criticism of the withdrawal and proclaimed the state’s commitment to the treaty. 
Indeed, a number of American states and cities will continue to follow its announced 
climate policies, offering “a profound counter to Trump’s anti-environmental cru-
sade” (Bomberg, 2017, p. 5). What this scenario illustrates is the high degree of 
politicization of the issues of climate and climate change in the contemporary world.
The nature of the relation between temporality and democracy indeed justifies 
doubts about the effectives of democratic governance in the face of longer-term 
future risks and dangers of climate change. Issues of temporality refer to at least a 
couple of significant matters driven by distinctive but related systemic conditions of 
democratic governance. On the one hand, democratic governance is captivated by 
the immediacy of frequently changing events that often come and go rapidly, as 
much as it is affected, on the other hand, by constitutional rules of representation 
that prescribe relatively short frames of temporality. The public perception of the 
urgency of political issues is dynamic and relative. The attention that actors give to 
climate change very much depends on their perception of the importance of other 
political issues at any given time, especially on the perception of pressing eco-
nomic issues.
Are democracy and societal institutions constrained by short-term constitutional 
frames and governed by principles of liberty, such as the market, capable of dealing 
with harms and risks to society that are located in the future? How can democracies 
sustain interest in a future present that is a couple of decades away and thereby 
escaping the typical media issue attention cycle (Downs, 1972; McDonald, 2009) 
of events?
There is a parallel discourse in social science to which I now turn, in which sci-
entists express strong doubts about the “sustainability” of modern democracies. 
They highlight symptoms of a crisis that is not only triggered by major environmen-
tal problems but also by various structural and secular challenges faced by present- 
day democratic governance.
 Are Democracies Dying?
The climate science community’s discussions about democratic governance’s inad-
equacies converges with assessments of the present state and future of democracy in 
the social sciences. It was only a few years ago that political scientists proclaimed 
the end to history (Fukuyama, 2018) and with it the ultimate victory of democracy. 
Today, political scientists—Francis Fukuyama (2018) included—are much more 
likely contemplating the dissolution of democracy. Even titles like “The Future of 
Freedom” (Zakaria, 2003), “The Retreat of Western Liberalism” (Luce, 2017), 
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“How Democracy Ends” (Runciman, 2018), “How Democracies Die” (Levitsky & 
Ziblatt, 2018), “The People vs. Democracy” (Mounk, 2018), and “Can Democracy 
Survive Global Capitalism? (Kuttner, 2018) give an indication of it. The dispute 
about climate change and climate policies plays a central role in the contemporary 
shift of the debate about the well-being of democracy. In response to multiple soci-
etal changes underway, the arguers concludes, democracy loses its legitimacy in the 
eyes of its citizens.
The conclusion of social science observers must therefore be that contemporary 
democracy—in many ways whether by design or at the outcome of structural eco-
nomic, political and moral changes—is on its way to autocratic forms of gover-
nance. For instance, the erosion of democracy manifests itself in processes of 
de-politicization, the substitution of politics by techniques of management or the 
restriction of the public sphere, or (cf. Rosanvallon, 2006, p. 228; also Swyngedouw, 
2011) “in a hollowing out of citizenship, the marketization of the public sector, the 
soul-destroying targets and audits that go with it, the denigration of professionalism 
and the professional ethic, and the erosion of public trust” (Marquand, 2004, p. 172). 
Democratic governance is increasingly muted by the rapid abolition of democratic 
principles of political equality, and even replaced by autocratic forms of governance 
that echo Robert Michels’s (1915) century-old iron law of oligarchy.
What distinguishes the discussion about the poor health of democracy among 
social scientists and climate scientists is the remedy that both sides advocate. On the 
one hand, social scientists discuss efforts that could restore democracy, such as 
rebuilding “a society of similar individuals” (Rosanvallon, 2013) through the active 
participation of a large number of citizens that shaping the agenda of public life. On 
the other hand, climate scientists and other observers of global climate change dis-
parage democratic governance’s very capacity to cope effectively with the large- 
scale environmental problems and therefore call for a more authoritarian state and/
or a state where decision making by technical experts is given weight. But then 
democracy is allegedly dismantling itself.
Colin Crouch (2004, p. 4), for example, describes democracy’s transition to post- 
democracy in the following terms: “Under the conditions of a post-democracy that 
increasingly cedes power to business lobbies, there is little hope for an agenda of 
strong egalitarian policies for the redistribution of power and wealth, or for the 
restraint of powerful interests.”
Post-democracy is also accompanied by the swift erosion and disavowal of dem-
ocratic rights and values, as Richard Rorty (2004, p. 10) argues: 
At the end of this process of erosion, democracy would have been replaced by something 
quite different. This would probably be neither military dictatorship nor Orwellian totali-
tarianism, but rather a relatively benevolent despotism, imposed by what would gradually 
become a hereditary nomenklatura. 
In some of the images of post-democracy as a state of the state, a return to aris-
tocratic society has already been achieved. Self-appointed elites claim to carry out 
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the wishes of the masses.13 In short, as Pierre Rosanvallon (2006, p. 228) empha-
sizes, politics has been replaced, “leaving room for one sole actor on the scene: 
international society, uniting under the same banner the champions of the market 
and the prophets of the law.” This marks a political development that representatives 
of the climate science community very much welcome.
The radical conclusion some observers draw, especially those who favor and 
promote the role of experts and expertise as a form of enlightened leadership, is that 
democracy itself is inappropriate, that the slow procedures for the implementation 
and management of specific, policy-relevant scientific knowledge leads to massive, 
unknown risks and dangers. Civilization-as-we-know-it may come to an end. 
Assuming it is not already too late, appropriate environmental governance must 
look very different. To create a globally sustainable way of life, the world immedi-
ately needs, in the words of German climate scientist Hans Joachim Schellnhuber 
(cf. WBGU, 2012), a “great transformation.” Part, if not the core of the required 
great transformation appeared to be a new political regime and forms of gover-
nance. For example, as expressed by the Australian scholars David Shearman and 
Joseph Wayne Smith (2007, p. 12) in their book The Climate Change Challenge and 
the Failure of Democracy: “We need an authoritarian form of government in order 
to implement the scientific consensus on greenhouse gas emissions.” Mark Beeson 
(2010, p. 289) argues in the same vein when he brings into play the notion of good 
authoritarianism: 
[G]iven the unprecedented and unforgiving nature of the challenges we collectively face … 
forms of ‘good’ authoritarianism, in which environmentally unsustainable forms of behav-
ior are simply forbidden, may become not only justifiable, but essential for the survival of 
humanity in anything approaching a civilised form.
Another proposal is for a distinctively political role of climate scientists. In most 
countries, climate scientists are successful in equipping governments with the 
authority of the correct point of view about climate change. However, climate sci-
entists fail to ensure that governments act on the authority of science.What is the 
alternative? One alternative is an exchange of leadership and the rule of the knowl-
edgeable class. The idea to exchange political leadership is not only to put science 
and scientists at the center of governance, but also to depoliticize the issue of cli-
mate change (cf. Aitken, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2010).
13 Hans Jonas’s (1984, p. 147) sober response to such a claim is quite appropriate and worth citing 
in this context: “[I]f … only an elite can assume, ethically and intellectually, the kind of responsi-
bility for the future which we have postulated—how is such an elite generated and recruited, and 
how is it invested with the power for its exercise?”
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 Enlightened Leadership?
Within the broad field of climatology and climate policy, one is able to discern 
growing frustration with the virtues of democracy and a mounting appeal to excep-
tional circumstances and the promotion of the role of scientists and experts in policy 
making. The impatience with democracy and the shifting understanding of the role 
of scientists can be observed with a change in the function of the International 
Panel of Climate Change (IPCC). IPCC no longer considers itself a scientific orga-
nization with the mandate to offer alternative policy options for political discussion 
and decision, but a body of experts demanding that the options for political action it 
identifies be rapidly realized.
Robert Stavins, the director of Harvard’s Environmental Economics Program 
and a co-author of the IPCC Working Group 3 report, notes a 
bottom up demand which normally we always want to have and rely on in a representative 
democracy, is in my view unlikely to work in the case of climate change policy as it has for 
other environmental problems … It’s going to take enlightened leadership, leaders that take 
the lead.14
The social scientist Evelyn Fox Keller (2017, p. 107) makes the strong case for 
an immediately effective, practical political role of climate science, given the seri-
ousness of the problem of global warming:
There is no escaping our dependence on experts; we have no choice but to call on those (in 
this case, our climate scientists) who have the necessary expertise … Furthermore, for the 
particular task of getting beyond our current impasse, I also suggest that climate scientists 
may be the only ones in a position to take the lead … [and] given the tacit contract between 
scientists and the state which supports them on the other, I … also argue that climate scien-
tists are not only in a position to take the lead, but also that they are obliged to do so.
 Science, Knowledge, and Democracy
The strong desire to reach specific policy outcomes spelled out by the climate sci-
ence community lead many to believe that scientific knowledge is somehow imme-
diately performative or is an immediately persuasive form of knowing. Endorsers of 
such a conception of knowledge privilege knowledge as a policy instrument by 
ignoring the limits of the power of knowledge (Prewitt, 2010; Sarewitz, 2010; Stehr, 
1991). On this doubtful basis alone, it is unsurprising that climate scientists at least 
sympathize with the suspension of democratic process.
However, the inconvenient democracy position contains a number of obvious 
weaknesses that I will enumerate now in some detail. I have organized my observa-
tions into five counterarguments.
14 As quoted in Andrew Revkin, “A risk analyst explains why climate change risk misperception 
doesn’t necessarily matter,” New York Times, April 16th, 2014.
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First, and importantly, one encounters a flawed understanding of scientific 
knowledge and its potential role in political contexts. Scientific knowledge is nei-
ther immediately performative (knowledge equals control and represents practical 
reason) nor immediately persuasive (that is, knowledge convinces unencumbered). 
Knowledge alone does not generate a profit or score goals (cf. van Dijk, 2014). One 
of the fundamental flaws in the portrait of an inconvenient democracy is the failure 
to recognize the social character of knowledge in general and the contested and 
often ambivalent nature of political knowledge in particular. Recognizing the proper 
function of knowledge assures a premature political closure, in other words, the 
depoliticization of the issue of climate change and climate policies.
It is more appropriate to characterize knowledge not as “something that is so,” 
but as a generalized capacity to act on the world, as a model for reality, or as the 
ability to set something in motion (Grundmann & Stehr, 2012; Stehr, 1994; Stehr & 
Adolf, 2018). The German term that best describes knowledge as a generalized 
capacity to act would be Handlungsvermögen. The verb vermögen signals “to be 
able to do,” whereas the noun Vermögen, in this context, is best translated as “capac-
ity” (rather than “fortune” or “wealth”).15 The capacity to act—the ability to put 
something into motion—extends to the capacity to generate “symbolic action.” For 
example, symbolic action may involve the ability to formulate a hypothesis, carry 
out a ritual, find a new metaphor for an established term,16 assess “facts,” organize 
the literature on a topic, or defend a thesis against “new facts.” The capacity to act, 
in other words, refers not merely to the possibility of accomplishing something in 
terms of a material and physical performance such as, for example, making fire or 
driving a car. Capacities to act also refer to intellectual abilities as well as the pro-
duction of meaning, such as may be found in the detailed description of the bundle 
of skills that I call knowledgeability (cf. Stehr, 2016a). This is most likely also the 
reason why Norbert Elias (1984, p. 252) defines knowledge as “the social meaning 
of human-made symbols, such as words or figures, in its capacity as means of ori-
entation” (emphasis added).
Knowledge, as a generalized capacity for action, acquires an “active” role (that 
is, is put to work) in the course of social action only under certain circumstances, 
namely where social action does not follow purely stereotypical (effortless) patterns 
(Max Weber), or is strictly regulated in some other fashion. Under conditions of 
ritualized social conduct, a break in the continuity between past and future will not 
occur. Past and future are securely looked in through taken-for-granted sequences 
of events.
Niklas Luhmann’s observations about the conditions for the possibility of mak-
ing decisions in the first instance perhaps allows for an even broader understanding 
of the use of knowledge but also confirms my description of the likely usefulness of 
15 Georg Simmel (1890, p. 276), in his discussion of money as a generalized code, uses the concept 
Vermögen to describe the fact that money is more than merely a medium of exchange; his defini-
tion of money thus transcends a merely functional understanding of its social capacities.
16 I refer in this context, for example, to Donald Schon’s (1963) reflections in Displacement of 
Concepts (cf. also Haldane, 2013).
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knowledge only under conditions of degrees of openness of the circumstances of 
action. Decision making, Luhmann (1998, p. 67) writes, “is possible only if and 
insofar as what will happen is uncertain.”
The circumstances of action that I have in mind may also be described as actors’ 
capacity to alter or stabilize a specific reality. However, the capacity “to get things 
done,” to alter and affect reality, as well as the ability to intervene in a context that 
otherwise would change, is not symmetrical with the capacity to act (knowledge). 
Knowledge and control should not be symmetrical: “Foresight and control is highly 
fragile in reality, it can be shown that a persistent progress of knowledge neither 
leads necessarily to an improvement of foresight nor to an improvement of control” 
(Tenbruck, 1977, p. 223). One’s ability to do something is dependent on one’s con-
trol over the conditions of action. The lack of control over the political conditions of 
action is an apt description of the societal role that fits the position of climate scien-
tists today and will continues to be the case as long as they have not appropriated 
political power.
Second, one of climate science critics’ leading assumptions of democracy is a 
misunderstanding of the climate problem and a misleading framing of the policy 
process.17 The result of this misunderstanding of the climate problem and of the 
climate policy process is a fundamental framing error, its perpetrators representing 
climate change as a conventional environmental “problem” that is capable of being 
“solved.” It is neither of these.
Rather than being a discrete problem to be solved, climate change is better 
understood as a persistent condition that must be coped with and can only be par-
tially managed more or less well. The climate issue is one part of a larger complex 
of such conditions encompassing population, technology, wealth disparities, public 
values, resource use, and so on. Hence, it is not straightforwardly an “environmen-
tal” problem either. It is axiomatically as much an energy problem, an economic 
development problem, or a land-use problem and may be better approached through 
these multiple avenues than as a problem of managing the behavior of the Earth’s 
climate by changing the way that humans use energy.
This makes climate change a “wicked” problem.18 A wicked problem is the 
impossibility of giving the policy issue a definitive formulation: the information 
needed to understand the problem is dependent upon one’s idea for solving it. 
Furthermore, wicked problems lack a stopping rule: One cannot know whether one 
has a sufficient understanding to stop searching for more understanding. There is no 
end to causal chains in interacting open systems of which the climate is the world’s 
prime example. Climate change policies are best embedded in comprehensive pol-
icy perspectives whose holders attack climate change indirectly, accepting, for 
17 In my critique of the dominant framing of the climate problem, I draw on our Hartwell Paper 
(Prins et al., 2010).
18 Wicked problems are embedded in multiple social systems. Originally described by C.  West 
Churchman (1967) and later explicated more comprehensively by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber 
(1973) in the context of urban planning, wicked problems are issues that are often formulated as if 
they were susceptible to a simple, unilinear solution when in fact they are not.
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example, that decarbonization will only be achieved successfully as a benefit con-
tingent upon other goals that are politically attractive and pragmatic.
Third, in a related manner, proponents of the dominant political approach con-
centrate almost exclusively on a single effect that governance ought to achieve, 
namely a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and perhaps necessary measures of 
adaptation to climate change. In doing so, they exclude other, more complex forms 
and conditions of action. By focusing on the goals of political action rather than its 
conditions, they reduce the contentious issue of climate change to scientific or tech-
nical issues. Sociopolitical issues are neglected. The politicization of climate sci-
ence leads to a depolitization of climate changes. Matters relevant to the public are 
being permanently removed from politics (see also Jasanoff, 2012).
Equally deficient in this context is the focus on a single approach to attack cli-
mate change, namely a reduction of greenhouse gases, especially CO2. Those 
exclusively framing climate policy as directed toward a reduction of emissions 
ignore what Roger Pielke Jr. (2010) calls the “iron law” of climate policy. The iron 
law merely states that although people are often willing to pay a certain price for 
environmental policy goals, their willingness has its limits. That exact limit, of 
course, varies from place to place and household to household. The massive resis-
tance of the “Yellow Vest” protests in France against the government’s plans to 
implement regular fuel tax increases to fight global warming in the early winter of 
2018 is a perfect example of Pielke’s law. The protests of the Yellow Vest movement 
forced the government to cancel the tax increase. Public support for climate policies 
declines as a function of the impact of such policies on the household costs. A con-
vergence of ecological and economic policies is not impossible. However, such a 
convergence likely tilts toward the economic part of the equation when emission 
reduction policies collide with economic growth or labor market policies.
Fourth, the generally pessimistic assessment of the ability of democratic gover-
nance to respond to, cope with, and control exceptional circumstances is linked, if 
only implicitly, to the then peculiar optimistic assessment of the potential of large- 
scale planning in the sense of social engineering. Planning on any scale is hardly 
straightforward. Not only the capacity of governments but also the general possibil-
ity to plan for the future present of societies is rather limited, perhaps absent (see 
Tenbruck, 1977, p.  138). Economic and social planning conceptions widely dis-
cussed in the affirmative decades ago have fallen into disrepute (see Giddens, 2009, 
pp. 94–100). Certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed, James 
Scott (1998) demonstrates case-by-case in his book Seeing like a State. The once 
active academic program of, and enthusiastic support for, futurology about desir-
able futures has vanished (Seefried, 2015). Modern de-centered, functionally dif-
ferentiated societies preclude de-differentiated, society-wide social planning in 
principle (Luhmann, 1976, 1998).
Fifth, in the reasoning of the impatient critics of democracy, one notes an inap-
propriate fusion of nature and the nature of society. The uncertainties (related to 
climate) that the sciences of the natural processes claim to have eliminated and the 
authoritative consensus that the sciences have thereby acquired are simply trans-
ferred to the domain of societal processes. Consensus on the evidence, it is argued, 
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should motivate a consensus on political action. What becomes desirable is a ratio-
nal design of social order “commensurate with the scientific understanding of natu-
ral laws” (Scott, 1998, p. 4), for instance, a comprehensive engineering of human 
settlement and production. Designing society top-down is schematic and ignores 
the essential realities of any truly existing social order: The constitutive uncertain-
ties, fragility, and complexity of social, political, and economic events, the difficulty 
of anticipating the future present are treated as minor obstacles that can be encircled 
as soon as possible—of course by a top-down approach—by implementing policies 
that the faith in scientific knowledge prescribes. This undermines the dignities, plu-
ralities, and conflicts that are immanent features of contemporary knowledge 
societies.
Finally, there is the remarkable resilience of advanced capitalist democracies 
confronted with major “shocks” from their beginnings in the early twentieth century 
through one of the most turbulent modern centuries. Democracy is a more effective 
adaptive organism than other forms of governance (Luce, 2017, p. 87) Although the 
past is not necessarily a solid foundation for anticipating the future state of affairs, 
there is “a near-zero probability of rich democracies reverting to authoritarianism” 
(Iversen & Soskice, 2019; see also Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). Obviously, 
exceptions exist. But one cannot yet know whether the exceptional circumstances of 
climate change in the future present will be of such magnitude that the past indeed 
can be no guide to the future health of democracies.
 What Is to Be Done? Enhancing Democracy?
What is good governance under exceptional circumstances? Is democratic gover-
nance effective governance? And why should a more democratic as well as egalitar-
ian society be beneficial as the socio-political foundation for coping with extreme 
circumstances?
In their disenchantment with democracy, the discourse of the impatient scientists 
privileges hegemonic players such as world powers, states, transnational organiza-
tions, and multinational corporations. Participatory strategies are only rarely in evi-
dence. Likewise, global mitigation has precedence over local adaptation. “Global” 
knowledge triumphs over “local” knowledge. However, societal trends appear to 
operate into the opposite direction. The ability of large societal institutions to 
impose their will on citizens is declining (Stehr, 2001). As a result, people mobilize 
around local concerns and efforts, including those of the consequences of climate 
change—thereby enhancing the democratic in democratic governance.
The discussion of options for future climate policies supports the impression that 
the same failed climate policies must remain in place and are the only correct 
approach; it is simply that these policies have be become more effective and “ratio-
nal.” It follows that international negotiations must lead to an agreement for con-
crete, but much broader, emission reduction targets. Only a super-Kyoto can still 
help. But how the noble goals of a comprehensive emission reduction can be 
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practically and politically enforced remains in the fog of general declarations of 
intent and only sharpens scientists’ political skepticism.
The still dominant line of attack to climate policy shows little evidence of suc-
cess, whether at the state level or on the global scale. On the contrary, everything 
that actors continues to set in motion worldwide is aimed at a persistent economic 
growth, which prevents emissions from declining. An alternative model is needed—
a model in which action under ambivalent, uncertain and unexpected circumstances 
can be compelled. A model whose utilizers recognize, moreover, that climate change 
is a wicked problem that can only be attacked indirectly and requires persistence 
over a longer period of time. That kind of model will only be found through revital-
ized rather than less democratic interaction.
Climate policy must be compatible with democracy, or the threat to civilization 
will be much more than just changes to the world’s physical environment. Climate 
change demands complex solutions that require worldwide empowerment and 
knowledgeability of individuals, groups, and movements that labor on environmen-
tal issues. More democracy combined with political efforts to move toward a more 
equitable society could be the key toward sustainable climate policies. By defini-
tion, more democracy comes with greater political participation, especially among 
those now typically standing on the sidelines of political participation, such as the 
young and the economically disadvantaged strata.19
A more egalitarian society “would not necessarily maintain rational ecological 
policies, but it would be more likely to do so” (Best & Connolly, 1975, p. 59). When 
life chances are more equally distributed, assuring that no one can escape the ben-
efits and costs of a resolution of a serious public problem,20 one should expect that 
“the political system is very likely to generate collective responses to common dan-
gers and burdens” (Best & Connolly, 1975, p. 59). The English political scientist 
David Runciman (2013, p. 316) spells out two further distinct, practical advantages 
of democracies over authoritarian governments faced by extraordinary circum-
stances: „The first is their ability to pull together when the threat becomes too big to 
ignore … The second is their ability to keep experimenting and adapting to the chal-
lenges they encounter.“.21
A war-like footing, in contrast, has exactly the opposite effect. A war-like 
approach reduces the complexity of social and political life in as much as war 
“nationalizes people’s life. Private activities … [are] largely shaped by collective 
constraints” (Rosanvallon, 2013, p. 183), as would be the case under authoritarian 
rule. Under modern conditions, the heightened cognitive and social abilities of ordi-
nary citizens especially predicates successful policies and good governance on their 
political participation.
19 Concrete advice on how to avoid oligarchic tendencies in organization may be found, for exam-
ple, in Robert K. Merton’s (1966) essay “Dilemmas of Democracies in the Voluntary Association.”
20 The systematic reduction of patterns of social inequality in modern societies enhances demo-
cratic governance and political participation (Soci, Maccagnan, & Mantovani, 2014, p. 46).
21 Hans Jonas (1984, p. 146) advances a similar observation about systematic inability of authori-
tarian governments to transcend policy mistakes.
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Moreover, a further denationalization of governance will assist in producing 
new, multiple forms of social solidarity and obligations, strengthen local/regional 
responses to climate change, and enhance the understanding of social interdepen-
dence. In addition, social institutions’ self-sufficiency must be guaranteed and—if 
necessary—re-created in order to transcend boundaries, joining allegedly distinc-
tive motives and practices of different social institutions, for example, joining eco-
nomic and moral incentives and enhancing the complexity of needs.
The tendency to overestimate and overreach in assigning a crucial role to the 
singularity of knowledge (and information) in social conduct is evident as one con-
siders how much knowledge is needed to carry a specific task, let alone how deeply 
and subtly one needs to know it. Curiosity about how much one needs to know also 
extends to the question of what one does not need to know. In the first instance, this 
happens to be an issue that is rarely systmatically examined. Second, the inclination 
is prevelant to assume that the resource of knowledge is somehow sufficient to carry 
a specific transaction. A more adequate conjecture would be to expect that actors 
carry out most decisions and actions with rather limited knowledge and information 
(cf. Akerlof, 1970; Smith, 2015) about future conditions of action and that they are 
cognizant of how little knowledge they are typically able to mobilize in many situ-
ations. The pressure to act that characterises everyday life ensures that, despite the 
limited knowledge and information of most actors, decisions are taken and action 
taken. The fact that actors are often forced to act with limited knowledge is not a 
constitutive deficiency of democracy. “Life cannot wait” (Durkheim, 1965, p. 479; 
see also Gehlen, 1988, pp. 296–297). In most social contexts, the need to act takes 
precedence over the need to know.
The erosion of democracy may seem “convenient” to some, such as populists, 
but surely is an unnecessary suppression of social complexity. Friedrich Hayek 
(1960, p.  25) pointed out a paradoxical development: As science advances, the 
observation that we should “aim at more deliberate and comprehensive control of all 
human activities” tends to strengthen. Hayek pessimistically adds: “It is for this 
reason that those intoxicated by the advance of knowledge so often become the 
enemies of freedom.”
That democratic governance is slow compared, for example, to the speed at 
which with decisions are made in the modern economy (see Stehr & Voss, 2019) 
cannot be denied. In the eyes of many citizens, naturally including climate scien-
tists, the slowness and the deliberateness of decision making generates permanent 
discontent. Climate scientists, with their escalating warnings about imminent risks 
and dangers of climate change repercussions and their communication of politi-
cians’ failures to heed these forewarnings do nothing to stem such civil restlessness. 
Democratic actors therefore face the major challenge of speeding up political deci-
sion making as well as enhancing opportunities for participation in democratic deci-





Certain kind of states, driven by utopian plans and an authoritarian disregard for the values, 
desires and objections of their subjects, are indeed a mortal threat to human well-being. 
James Scott (1998, p. 7)
As an editor of Nature (December 4, 2014, p. 8) editorializes: “The magnitude 
of … climate change is worryingly uncertain. Even more uncertain are the physical, 
social and economic side effects of global warming. There is every reason to believe 
that, by and large, they will be harmful.” The central issue is no longer whether is 
climate change occurring. It is rather what should be done about it. Climate change 
is the biggest threat humanity has faced in historical times. Suspending democratic 
debate and decision making including extensive citizen participation in order to do 
what is necessary would either demand elevating experts to become decision mak-
ers or delegating power to policymakers (who happen to believe a certain group of 
experts). Neither the first, the technocratic or social engineering vision, nor the idea 
of a more authoritarian environmentalism has appeal.
I have collected and advanced arguments that speak to the need to enhance rather 
than abolish democracy as the best political foundation for policies suited to 
addressing climate change as a wicked problem. It is important to push back against 
simplified solutions to climate change. In debating, researching, and understanding 
climate and climate change, actors would do well to heed the complex interconnec-
tions of the climate system, but also the societal processes, practices, and tensions 
through which science, society, nature, and climate permeate, accompany, cover, 
and envelop each other (for such a theoretical perspective, see Stehr & Machin, 2019).
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Chapter 5
Risk Governance: From Knowledge 
to Regulatory Action
Ortwin Renn
 Governance Requirements for Complex Risks
In today’s world of globalized trade, travel, and communication, an ever-larger 
number of risks have a transboundary impact, crossing national and regional fron-
tiers: Large-scale electricity blackouts, chemical accidents, and risks related to 
emerging technologies have all affected various parts of the world. Even these risks 
seem limited, however, when compared to those that affect our living conditions 
globally. A highly topical example is that of cyberattacks. Other examples include 
pandemics, global energy security, the financial collapse, and the impacts of cli-
mate change.
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) has developed a framework 
for risk governance designed to assist societies in generating the necessary inter- and 
transdisciplinary knowledge to address and respond to such global risks (IRGC, 
2005). To this end, the IRGC’s framework maps out a structured approach that guides 
its user through the process of investigating global risk issues and designing appro-
priate governance strategies. The designers of this approach combine scientific evi-
dence with economic considerations as well as social concerns and societal values 
and, thus, ensure that any risk-related decision draws on the broadest possible view 
of risk. They also state the case for an effective engagement of all relevant stakehold-
ers. The idea is that governance comprises more than government: It includes all the 
actors and institutions that play a role in assessing, managing, communicating, and 
regulating risks. The IRGC framework is inspired by the concept of adaptive institu-
tional learning (Armitage, Marschke, & Plummer, 2008). Such a learning process is 
based on both solid knowledge about risk reduction measures as well as flexible 
responses with feedback incorporation in complex situations. The role of risk knowl-
edge in such a process is to provide interdisciplinary, inclusive, and integrative 
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expertise for the various actors involved (Rosa, Renn, & McCright, 2013, pp. 99, 
196): “Our risk knowledge … must be traced to an amalgam of actors and institu-
tions, as well as to the outcomes of exercising individual reflexivity in terms of mak-
ing intuitive sense of conflicting knowledge claims and evaluation criteria” (p. 197).
The IRGC framework has been tested for efficacy and practicability—for exam-
ple, can the framework help ensure that all relevant issues and questions are being 
addressed, and does it support the development of appropriate risk governance strat-
egies (IRGC, 2005)? Researchers conduct tests in the form of short case studies, 
applying the framework to different risks, including those related to genetically 
modified organisms, stem cells, nature-based tourism, and the European gas infra-
structure (all case studies are described in detail in Renn & Walker, 2008a). The 
results from these tests have given input to several revisions to the framework (Renn 
& Klinke, 2014).
The framework offers two major innovations to the risk field: the inclusion of the 
societal context and a new categorization of risk-related knowledge (Renn, 2008).
Inclusion of the Societal Context: In addition to the generic elements of risk 
assessment, risk management, and risk communication, the framework adds two 
other phases to the risk governance cycle: preassessment and evaluation. The preas-
sessment phase highlights the risk topic’s framing and boundaries, for example 
what kind of risks and consequences to include in an analysis of genetically modi-
fied organisms (GMOs). Should analysts focus only on health and environmental 
impacts, or should they also consider risks of economic concentration or the cre-
ation of dependencies on large suppliers of GMOs? Risk evaluation is a process by 
which to determine the acceptability of a given risk (or risk education strategy). This 
is the place where plural values, multiple evaluation criteria, and social preferences 
play a large role in defining what acceptability means to whom. Linking the social 
and cultural context with risk evaluation, the framework reflects the important role 
of stakeholder involvement and the need for resolving risk-risk trade-offs.
Categorization of Risk-Related Knowledge: The framework also proposes a cate-
gorization of risk that is based on the different states of knowledge about each par-
ticular risk, distinguishing between simple, complex, uncertain, and ambiguous risk 
problems. The characterization of a particular risk depends on the degree of diffi-
culty of establishing the cause-effect relationship between a risk agent and its poten-
tial consequences, the reliability of this relationship, and the degree of controversy 
with regard to both what a risk actually means for those affected and the values to 
be applied when judging whether or not something needs to be done about it. 
Examples of each risk category include, respectively, known health risks such as 
those related to smoking, the failure risk of interconnected technical systems such 
as the electricity transmission grid, atrocities such as those resulting from the 
changed nature and scale of international terrorism, and the long-term effects and 
ethical acceptability of controversial technologies such as nanotechnologies. For 
each category, the researcher then derives a strategy for risk assessment, risk 
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 management, as well as the level and form of stakeholder participation, supported 
by proposals for appropriate methods and tools.
In the following sections, I will first introduce the characterization of risk knowl-
edge according to the three components complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. 
This opens the path for explaining the various phases of the IRGC risk governance 
framework and its further development by Klinke and Renn (2012). I will then con-
clude by addressing the issue of stakeholder involvement and public participation, a 
major element of inclusive governance.
 Three Characteristics of Risk Knowledge
Risk governance faces specific challenges raised by three risk characteristics that 
result from a lack of knowledge and/or competing knowledge claims about the risk 
problem: complexity, scientific uncertainty, and sociopolitical ambiguity (Klinke & 
Renn, 2010, 2018; Renn, Klinke, & van Asselt, 2011).
 Complexity
Complexity refers to the difficulty of identifying and quantifying causal links 
between a multitude of potential candidates and specific adverse effects. A crucial 
aspect here concerns the applicability of probabilistic risk assessment techniques. If 
the chain of events between a cause and an effect follows a linear relationship (as, 
e.g., in car accidents, or when a building collapses due to a hurricane), simple sta-
tistical models are sufficient to calculate the probabilities of harm. Such simple 
relationships may still be associated with high uncertainty, for example, if only few 
data pieces are available or the effect is stochastic by its own nature (e.g., an earth-
quake). If the relationship between cause and effects becomes more complex, more 
sophisticated models of probabilistic inferences are required (Renn & Walker, 
2008a). The nature of this difficulty may be traced back to interactive effects among 
these candidates (synergisms and antagonisms, positive and negative feedback 
loops), long delay periods between cause and effect, interindividual variation, inter-
vening variables, and others. It is precisely these complexities that make sophisti-
cated scientific investigations necessary, because the cause-effect relationship is 
neither obvious nor directly observable. Complexity requires sensitivity to both 
nonlinear transitions and scale (on different levels). Examples of highly complex 
risk include nested chemical facilities that may threaten nearby settlements, syner-
gistic effects of potentially toxic substances in urban air, the failure risk of large 
interconnected infrastructures such as water and electricity grits, and the risks that 
critical loads pose to sensitive ecosystems within human settlements.
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 Scientific Uncertainty
Scientific uncertainty may result from unresolved complexity, in particular if the 
cause-effect models show large confidence intervals. It relates to the limitedness or 
even absence of scientific proof for a causal or functional relationship that makes it 
difficult to exactly assess the probability and possible outcomes of undesired effects 
(cf. Filar & Haurie, 2009). In the context of risk assessment, it is essential to 
acknowledge that human knowledge is always incomplete and selective, and, thus, 
contingent upon uncertain assumptions, assertions, and predictions (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz, 1992; Renn, 2008, pp. 75–77). It is obvious that the modeled probability 
distributions within a numerical relational system can only represent an approxima-
tion of the empirical relational system that helps elucidate and predict uncertain 
events. It therefore seems prudent to include additional aspects of uncertainty (van 
Asselt, 2000, pp. 93–138). Uncertainty may be linked to lack of reliable data, to 
imprecision in the analytical model, in the statistical treatment of the use of induc-
tive statistical tools, or in the interpretation of ambiguous results (Funtowicz & 
Ravetz, 2008). Examples of high uncertainty include many natural disasters, such as 
earthquakes, possible health effects of air-borne pollutants below the threshold of 
statistical significance, acts of violence—such as terrorism and sabotage—and 
long-term effects of high social mobility on personal wellbeing and social cohesion.
 Sociopolitical Ambiguity
While more and better data and information may reduce scientific uncertainty, more 
knowledge does not necessarily lessen ambiguity. Ambiguity thus indicates a situa-
tion of ambivalence in which different and sometimes divergent streams of thinking 
and interpretation about the same risk phenomena and their circumstances are 
apparent (cf. Zahariadis, 2003). Renn and Klinke (2015) distinguish between inter-
pretative and normative ambiguity, which both relate to divergent or contested per-
spectives on the justification, severity, or wider “meanings” associated with a 
given threat.
Interpretative ambiguity denotes the variability of (legitimate) interpretations 
based on identical observations or data assessments results, for example an adverse 
or nonadverse effect. Variability of interpretation, however, is not restricted to expert 
dissent. Laypeople’s perception of risk often differs from expert judgments because 
it is related to qualitative risk characteristics such as familiarity, personal or institu-
tional control, or assignment of blame. Moreover, in contemporary pluralist societ-
ies diversity of risk perspectives within and between social groups is generally 
fostered by divergent value preferences, variations in interests, and very few, if any, 




This leads to normative ambiguity, which alludes to different concepts of what 
can be regarded as tolerable, referring to aspects such as ethics, quality of life 
parameters, or distribution of risks and benefits. A condition of ambiguity emerges 
where the problem lies in agreeing on the appropriate values, priorities, assump-
tions, or boundaries to be applied to the definition of possible outcomes. Dealing 
with ambiguities requires governance approaches that emphasize mutual learning 
across different academic and practical communities as well as promote the cocre-
ation of joint knowledge and practical applications. Examples for high interpreta-
tive ambiguity include exposure to low dose radiation (ionizing and non ionizing), 
low concentrations of genotoxic substances, food supplements, and—in the social 
domain—the gentrification of urban quarters or the loss of social cohesion in a 
disaster-prone community. Normative ambiguities can be associated, for example, 
with passive smoking, restricted mobility regimes in highly congested cities (such 
as congestion pricing), zoning laws for hazard-prone areas, or busing of schoolchil-
dren from different social classes.
Most risks are characterized by a mixture of complexity, uncertainty, and ambigu-
ity. Passive smoking may be a good example of low complexity and uncertainty, but 
high ambiguity. Nuclear energy may be a good candidate for high complexity and 
high ambiguity, but relatively little uncertainty. The use of IT in smart urban environ-
ments could be cited as an example for high complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity.
 Adaptive and Integrative Capacity of Risk Governance
The ability of risk governance institutions to cope with complex, uncertain, and 
ambiguous consequences and implications has become a central concern to scien-
tists and practitioners alike. Adaptive and integrative governance on risk can be 
broadly understood as the ability of politicians and society to collectively design 
and implement a systematic approach to organizational and policy learning in insti-
tutional settings that are conducive to resolving complexity, uncertainty, and ambi-
guity in various risk arenas.1
This dynamic governance process is characterized by continuous and gradual 
learning and adjustment. Adaptive and integrative capacity in risk governance pro-
cesses encompasses a broad array of structural and procedural mechanisms by 
which politics and society can handle collectively relevant risk problems. The main 
task is to collect robust knowledge about potential risk management measures by 
integrating systematic, experiential, and tacit knowledge (Renn, 2010) and by initi-
ating a well designed but flexible learning process by which systematic collection of 
feedback and responses inform the adaptive processes of adjusting to new situa-
tions, surprises, or unforeseen events (Kerzner, 2017, pp.  613–620). In practical 
1 To the definition and understanding of adaptive capacity, see, for example, Webster,  Gasser, 
Young, & Choucri (2008).
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terms, adaptive and integrative capacity is the ability to design and incorporate the 
necessary steps in a risk governance process that allow risk managers to reduce, 
mitigate, or control the occurrence of harmful outcomes resulting from collectively 
relevant risk problems in an effective, efficient, and fair manner (cf. Brooks & 
Adger, 2004).
In 2005, the International Risk Governance Council proposed a process model of 
risk governance based the authors’ work (IRGC, 2005; Renn, 2008; Renn & Walker, 
2008a). With this framework, its designers structure the risk governance process in 
four phases: preassessment, appraisal, characterization/evaluation, and risk man-
agement. They conceptualized communication and stakeholder involvement as con-
stant companions to all four phases of the risk governance cycle. Based on this 
framework and informed by many comments on the original framework (i.e., the 
edited volume by Renn & Walker, 2008b), Klinke and Renn (2012) modified the 
original IRGC proposal. The new framework the two authors suggested consists of 
the following steps: preestimation, interdisciplinary risk estimation, risk character-
ization, risk evaluation, and risk management, all related to risk governance institu-
tions’ abilities and capacities to use resources effectively (see Fig. 5.1).
Appropriate resources include institutional and financial means as well as social 
capital (e.g., strong institutional mechanisms and configurations, transparent deci-
sion making, allocation of decision making authority, formal and informal networks 
that promote collective risk handling, education), technical resources (e.g., data-
bases, computer soft- and hardware, etc.), and human resources (e.g., skills, knowl-
edge, expertise, epistemic communities, etc.). Therefore, the adequate involvement 
of experts, stakeholders, and the public in the risk governance process is a crucial 
dimension to produce and convey adaptive and integrative capacity in risk gover-
nance institutions.
 Preestimation
A systematic reviewer of the preestimation stages would begin with screening as an 
exploration of a large array of actions and problems, searching for those with a 
specific risk-related feature. It is important to explore what major political and soci-
etal actors such as governments, companies, epistemic communities (e.g., the com-
munity of risk analysis specialists, associations for toxicology or epidemiology, or 
communities for disaster management), nongovernmental organizations, and the 
general public identify as risks and what types of problems they label as problems 
associated with risk and uncertainty. This is called framing and it specifies how 
society and politics rely on schemes of selection and interpretation to understand 
and respond to those phenomena that are socially constructed as relevant risk topics 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 2009; Reese, Gandy Jr., & Grant, 2001). Interpretations of 
risk experience depend on the frames of reference. The process of framing corre-
sponds with a multiactor and multiobjective governance structure, since govern-
mental authorities (national, supranational, and international agencies), risk and 
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opportunity producers (e.g., industry), those affected by risks and opportunities 
(e.g., consumer organizations, environmental groups), and interested bystanders 
(e.g., the media or an intellectual elite) are all involved and often in conflict about 
the appropriate frame to conceptualize the problem. What counts as risk may vary 
among these actor groups. Whether an overlapping consensus evolves about what 
requires consideration as a relevant risk depends on the legitimacy of the selection 
rule (Renn & Klinke, 2014).
 Interdisciplinary Risk Estimation
Interdisciplinary risk estimation requires the cooperation of all disciplines that are 
necessary to generate a common understanding of all risk consequences (physical, 
monetary, social, cultural). The estimation process is comprised of two stages (cf. 
IRGC, 2005; Renn & Walker, 2008a):
 1. Risk assessment: Experts of the natural and technical sciences produce the best 
estimate of the physical harm that a risk source may induce. Such harm could be 
Fig. 5.1 Adaptive and integrative risk governance model. Adapted from Klinke and Renn (2012, 
p. 276). Copyright 2012 by the Journal of Risk Research. Adapted with permission of the Journal 
of Risk Research. (The adaptive and integrative risk governance model is based on a modification 
and refinement of the IRGC framework (IRGC, 2005, 2017))
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the collapse of buildings; discontinuation of central services to residents such as 
water, electricity, or information; breakdown of traffic; or inadequate infrastruc-
tural support.
 2. Concern assessment: Experts of the social sciences, including economics, iden-
tify and analyze the issues that individuals or society as a whole link to a certain 
risk. This portfolio includes dysfunctional social services, risks of economic 
subsistence, but also risks based on perceptions of crime or insecurity. To iden-
tify and explore these risks, an analyst may use the repertoire of the social sci-
ences such as survey methods, focus groups, econometric analysis, 
macroeconomic modeling, or structured hearings with stakeholders.
The second step in risk estimation is including the concerns and expectations of 
those involved in managing or governing risks. The main idea is here to collect the 
necessary knowledge from stakeholders and affected citizens about their prefer-
ences in terms of risk reduction and risk handling. Although analysts often forget 
this step, it is essential in order to match physical risk assessments with human 
perception (van Asselt & Renn, 2011). The instruments to perform such a concern 
assessment might include Group Delphi processes or hearings (Renn, 2008, 
pp. 336–337.).
 Risk Evaluation
Actors in the risk governance process heavily dispute how best to classify a given 
risk and justify an evaluation about its societal acceptability or tolerability (see 
Fig. 5.2). In many approaches, they rank and prioritize risks based on a combination 
of probability (how likely is it that the risk will occur) and impact (the consequences 
should this take place). In the so-called traffic light model, analysts locate risks in 
the diagram of probability versus expected consequences and identify three areas: 
green, amber, and red (Renn, 2008, pp. 149–154.).
A risk falls into the green area if its occurrence is highly unlikely and its impact 
negligible. No further formal intervention is necessary in this case. Analysts view a 
risk is as tolerable when serious impacts might occur occasionally (amber area). 
The benefits are worth the risk, but risk reduction measures are necessary. Finally, 
they view a risk as intolerable when the occurrence of catastrophic impacts is most 
likely (red area). The risk’s possible negative consequences are so catastrophic that 
they cannot be tolerated, despite the potential benefits.
Drawing the lines between acceptable (green area), tolerable (amber area), and 
intolerable (red area) is one of the most controversial tasks in the risk governance 
process. The UK Health and Safety Executive developed a procedure for chemical 
risks based on risk-risk comparisons (Löfstedt, 1997). Some Swiss cantons such as 
Basle County experimented with Round Tables as a means to reach consensus on 
drawing the two demarcation lines, whereby participants in the Round Table repre-
sented industry, administrators, county officials, environmentalists, and 
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neighborhood groups. The Round Table was facilitated by a professional mediator 
charged with reaching a consensus between the various groups. Although such a 
consensus was difficult to achieve, all parties ultimately agreed to a solution by 
which the demarcation lines were only determined for a limited time, with the clear 
understanding that standards would be tightened if more risk reduction measures 
were to become available and further developed (RISKO, 2000).
Irrespective of the means selected to support this task, the judgment on accept-
ability or tolerability is contingent on making use of a variety of different knowl-
edge sources. One needs to include the data and insights resulting from the risk 
assessment activity and additional data from the concern assessment.
 Risk Management
Risk management analysts begin by reviewing all relevant data and information 
generated in the previous steps of interdisciplinary risk estimation, characterization, 
and risk evaluation. The systematic analysis of risk management options focuses on 
still tolerable risks (amber area) and those where tolerability is disputed (light green 
and orange transition zones). The other cases (green and red area) are fairly easy to 
deal with. Intolerable risks demand prevention and prohibition strategies as a means 
of replacing the hazardous activity with another activity leading to identical or simi-
lar benefits. The management of acceptable risks is left to private actors (civil soci-
ety and economy). They may initiate additional and voluntary risk reduction 
Fig. 5.2 Risk areas: intolerable (red), tolerable (amber), acceptable (green). Slightly modified 
version from the original illustration published in  IRGC (2005,  p. 37). Copyright 2005 by the 
International Risk Governance Council.  Adapted with permission of the International 
Risk Governance Council
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measures or seek insurance to cover possible but rather minor or negligible losses. 
If risks are classified as tolerable, or if experts disagree as to whether they are in the 
transition zones of tolerability, public risk managers must design and implement 
actions that make these risks either acceptable or at least tolerable by introducing 
reduction strategies. Based on the distinction in complexity, scientific uncertainty, 
and sociopolitical ambiguity, it is possible to design general strategies for risk man-
agement that can be applied to four distinct categories of risk problems, thus simpli-
fying the process of risk management (Renn, 2008).
The first category refers to linear risk problems: They are characterized by their 
low scores across the dimensions of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. They 
can be addressed by linear risk management because they are normally easy to 
assess and quantify. Routine risk handling within risk assessment agencies and reg-
ulatory institutions is appropriate for this category, since the risk problems are well 
known, sufficient knowledge of key parameters is available, and there are no major 
controversies about causes and effects or conflicting values. The management 
includes risk-benefit analysis, risk-risk comparisons, and other instruments of bal-
ancing pros and cons.
If risks are ranked high on complexity but rather low on both uncertainty (i.e., the 
complexity can be widely resolved by adequate scientific models) and ambiguity, 
they require the systematic involvement and deliberation of experts who represent 
the relevant epistemic communities that produce the most accurate estimate of these 
complex relationships. It does not make much sense to integrate public concerns, 
perceptions, or any other social aspects for resolving complexity unless specific 
knowledge from the concern assessment helps to untangle complexity. Complex 
risk problems therefore demand risk-informed management, which scientists and 
experts can offer by applying methods of expanded risk assessment, determining 
quantitative safety goals, consistently using cost-effectiveness methods, and moni-
toring and evaluating outcomes.
Risk problems that are characterized by high uncertainty but low ambiguity 
require precaution-based management. Because sufficient scientific certainty is 
currently either unavailable or unattainable, expanded knowledge acquisition may 
help to reduce uncertainty and, thus, to revert the risk problem back to first stage of 
handling complexity. If, however, uncertainty cannot be reduced by additional 
knowledge, risk management should foster and enhance precautionary and 
resilience- building strategies and decrease vulnerabilities in order to avoid irrevers-
ible effects. Appropriate instruments include containment, diversification, monitor-
ing, and substitution. Because the focal point here is to find the adequate and fair 
balance between being overly cautious and overly reckless, a reflective processing 
involving stakeholders is necessary to ponder concerns, economic budgeting, and 
social evaluations.
Finally, if risk problems are ranked high on ambiguity (regardless of whether 
they are low or high on uncertainty), discourse-based management is required, a 
process that demands participative processing. This includes the need to involve 
major stakeholders as well as the affected public. The goals of risk management are 
to produce a collective understanding among all stakeholders and concerned 
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members of the public on interpretative ambiguity or to find legitimate procedures 
of justifying collectively binding decisions on acceptability and tolerability. It is 
important to achieve a consensus or compromise between those who believe that the 
risk is worth taking (perhaps because of self-interest) and those who believe that the 
pending consequences do not justify the potential benefits of the risky activity or 
technology.
 Risk Communication
All four phases must be accompanied by intensive risk communication efforts. 
Communication should not be limited to sharing information but must include an 
effort to create both a common understanding of the problems and challenges as well 
as a joint agreement on the most acceptable risk reduction solutions. Such a concept of 
communication requires a transdisciplinary approach to problem solving that involves 
the strong participation of all relevant stakeholders in the creation of knowledge and 
risk reduction options and a mutual learning process in which all actors share their 
knowledge and insights (Hirsch-Hadorn et al., 2008; Newig, Kochskämper, Challies, & 
Jager, 2016). In this understanding, communication should already have begun during 
the preestimation phase. It should convey the basic concepts and what these concepts 
entail in terms of opportunities and risks. Analysts can arrange feedback channels on 
the internet as to evaluate the responses of stakeholders and affected citizens. During 
the risk estimation phase, the communication process should emphasize the process by 
which the research and planning team conducts the risk assessments. The main goal 
here is to promote trust in the risk-handling authorities (Löfstedt, 2005).
It might be helpful to ask stakeholders and citizens for additional knowledge that 
public officials may not possess. More input from the public is to be encouraged 
during the evaluation phase. First of all, the process of how tradeoffs are assigned 
and justified must be made transparent to all stakeholders as well as the general 
public. Furthermore, depending on the degree of ambiguity, it might be useful to 
have procedures in place that systematically collect feedback and concerns with 
respect to the planned urban risk management measures. During the management 
phase, it is essential to familiarize all affected persons with the chosen or deliber-
ated risk reduction measures, in particular those that rely on the cooperation of the 
affected public (such as evacuation or sheltering plans). Instruments for making risk 
reduction plans known to the public are open meetings, brochures, websites, TV 
shows, and other popular forms of information transfer (Earle & Cvetkovich, 1994).
Although risk communication implies a stronger role for risk professionals to 
provide information to the public rather than vice versa, it should be regarded as a 
mutual learning process. Concerns, perceptions, and experiential knowledge of the 
targeted audience(s) should thus guide risk professionals in their selection of topics 
and subjects: It is not the task of the communicators to decide what people need to 
know, but to respond to the questions of what people want to know (this is normally 
referred to as the “right to know” concept). The step from risk communication to 
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stakeholder and public involvement is only gradual and should be seriously consid-
ered any time that risk communication addresses issues of major concerns and con-
testing claims.
 Inclusive Governance: The Need for an Effective Involvement 
of Experts, Stakeholders, and Civil Society
The effectiveness and legitimacy of the risk governance process depends on the 
management agencies’ capacity to resolve complexity, characterize uncertainty, and 
handle ambiguity by means of communication and deliberation. In the following, I 
introduce a particular procedural mechanism of communication and deliberation to 
address each of the specific challenges raised by complexity, scientific uncertainty, 
and sociopolitical ambiguity. I illustrate the various steps of involvement of larger 
stakeholder groups in Fig. 5.3.
 Instrumental Processing Involving Governmental Actors 
(Linear Mode)
Dealing with linear risk issues, which are associated with low scores of complexity, 
scientific uncertainty, and sociopolitical ambiguity, requires hardly any changes to 
conventional public policymaking. The data and information of such linear (routine) 
risk problems are provided by statistical analysis, law or statutory requirements 
determine the general and specific objectives, and the role of public policy is to 
ensure that all necessary measures of safety and control are implemented and 
enforced. The aim is to find the most cost-effective method for a desired regulation 
level. If necessary, deliberators may include stakeholders, as they have information 
and knowhow that may provide useful hints for increased efficiency.
 Epistemic Processing Involving Experts and Stakeholders 
(Complex Mode)
Resolving complex risk problems requires dialogue and deliberation among experts 
and representatives of stakeholder groups with special knowledge and experience. 
Involving members of various epistemic communities who demonstrate expertise 
and competence is the most promising step for producing more reliable and valid 
judgements about the complex nature of a given risk. Epistemic discourse is the 
instrument for discussing the conclusiveness and validity of cause-effect chains 
relying on available probative facts, uncertain knowledge, and experience that can 
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be tested for empirical traceability and consistency. The objective of such a delib-
eration is to find the most cogent description and explanation of the phenomenologi-
cal complexity in question as well as a clarification of dissenting views (i.e., by 
addressing the question of which environmental and socioeconomic impacts spe-
cific community action plans are expected to produce). The deliberation among 
experts might generate a profile of the complexity of the given risk issue on selected 
intersubjectively chosen criteria. It may also reveal more uncertainty and ambiguity 
hidden in the case than the initial appraisers had anticipated. It is advisable to 
include natural as well as social scientists in the epistemic discourse, in order to 
anticipate potential problems with risk perception. If this were done, fewer unsus-
pected controversies would occur.
Fig. 5.3 The risk management escalator. Modified version from the original illustration published 
in IRGC (2005, p. 53). Copyright 2005 by the International Risk Governance Council. Adapted 
with permission of the International Risk Governance Council
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 Reflective Processing Involving Stakeholders 
(Uncertainty Mode)
Characterizing and evaluating risks as well as developing and selecting appropriate 
management options for risk reduction and control in situations of high uncertainty 
pose particular challenges. How can risk managers characterize and evaluate the 
severity of a risk problem when the potential damage and its probability are unknown 
or highly uncertain? Scientific input is therefore only the first in a series of steps 
during a more sophisticated evaluation process. It is crucial to compile the data and 
information relevant to the different types of uncertainties to inform the process of 
risk characterization. The risk characterization’s outcome provides the foundation 
for a broader deliberative arena, which out to include not only policy makers and 
scientists, but also directly affected stakeholders and public interest groups includ-
ing representatives of the affected public, in order to discuss and ponder the “right” 
balances and trade-offs between potential over- and under-protection. This reflec-
tive involvement of stakeholders and interest groups is aimed at finding a consensus 
on the extra margin of safety that potential victims would be willing to tolerate and 
potential beneficiaries of the risk would be willing to invest in order to avoid poten-
tially critical and catastrophic consequences. The reflective involvement of policy 
makers, scientists, stakeholders, and public interest groups can be accomplished by 
a spectrum of different forms, such as negotiated rule making, mediation, round 
table or open forum, or advisory committee (cf. Beierle & Cayford, 2002; Rowe & 
Frewer, 2000; Stoll-Kleemann & Welp, 2006).
 Participative Processing Involving the Public (Ambiguity Mode)
If risk problems are associated with high ambiguity, it is not enough to demonstrate 
that risk regulation addresses the issues of public concerns. In these cases, the evalu-
ation process must also be open to public input and new forms of deliberation. This 
begins with revisiting the question of proper framing. Is the issue really one of risk, 
or of lifestyle or future vision? Often, both the benefits and risks are contested. The 
debate about smart cities may illustrate the point that observers may be concerned 
not only about technical risks of network failures or privacy issues being violated by 
information transfer, but also about the acceptability of the desired goal to reduce 
choices for individuals by means of paternalistic design of choice situations 
(Kahneman, 2012; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Thus, the controversy is often much 
broader than simple risk management. The aim here is to find an overlapping con-
sensus on the dimensions of ambiguity that must be addressed in comparing risks 
and benefits and balancing pros and cons. High ambiguity would require the most 
inclusive strategy for involvement, because both directly affected and indirectly 
affected groups should have an opportunity to contribute to this debate. Resolving 
ambiguities in risk debates necessitates the public’s participatory involvement to 
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openly discuss competing arguments, beliefs, and values. The set of possible forms 
to involve the public includes citizen panels or juries, citizen forums, consensus 
conferences, public advisory committees, and similar approaches (cf. Abels, 2007; 
Beierle & Cayford, 2002; Hagendijk & Irwin, 2006).
 Wider Governance Issues
When considering the wider environment of risk handling in modern societies, 
many classes of influential factors come into play. I can mention only a few here. 
For example, the distinction between government and governance I introduced in 
the first section of this document can be helpful in describing and analyzing cases 
of risk handling in different countries and contexts (Zürn, 2000). In addition, ana-
lysts must address the interplay between economic, political, scientific, and civil 
society actors when looking beyond just governmental or corporate actions. 
Furthermore, looking at organizational capacity opens a new set of wider risk 
governance issues that relate to the interplay between the governing actors and their 
capability to fulfill their role in the risk governance process.
In Fig. 5.4, I present external influencing factors that I cannot place within the 
risk framework itself, and have additionally placed illustrations for each level within 
this figure. I have selected four cases: listeria, gas transportation, acrylamide, and 
genetically modified organisms (for each case, see Renn & Walker, 2008b). The 
listeria case concerns the risk of nonpasteurized milk, which is traditionally used by 
local cheese manufacturers, specifically in France and Mexico. This risk can be 
resolved completely within the core risk governance framework, as it is well man-
ageable within the four phases outlined above. The case of gas transportation from 
Russia to Western countries involves additional aspects such as the risk of political 
dependence on Russia or the possibility of terrorist attacks on the pipelines 
(Vatansever, 2017). Managing the risk of gas pipelines requires governing institu-
tions to wield specific skills, assets, and strategies that go beyond risk assessment 
and management. The case of acrylamide is an example of how strongly an issue 
can depend on the cooperation of different societal actors. Acrylamide is a natural 
carcinogen that has been found in baked food items such as French-fried potatoes 
and crispbread. Food regulators, producers, NGOs, and various science communi-
ties have extensively negotiated to define the risks and adopt appropriate risk reduc-
tion measures (Bonneck, 2017). Finally, the case of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) underlines how the social and political culture influence the debate about 
the role of GMOs have to play in the future.
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 Conclusion
One of the main functions of a comprehensive risk governance framework is to 
assist risk or concern assessors and managers in exploring and handling risks and to 
promote effective and fair approaches for improving, and enhancing the visibility 
of, the present risk governance processes. With the framework I present here, I aim 
to offer guidance and advice on how to approach the complexities, uncertainties, 
and ambiguities of risk issues and to promote a wider understanding of their inter-
connectedness and transgressional nature, particularly in relation to newly emerg-
ing systemic risks. To this end, the framework integrates different sources of 
knowledge that include scientific, experiential, anecdotal, and tacit aspects and 
includes effective and appropriate engagement of stakeholders—not least to ensure 
that both risk appraisal and risk management strategies command the widest possi-
ble acceptance and support.
Fig. 5.4 Wider governance issues. Source: Design by author
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I have designed the framework, on the one hand, to include enough flexibility to 
allow its users to do justice to the wide diversity of risk governance structures and, 
on the other hand, to provide sufficient clarity, consistency, and unambiguous orien-
tation across a range of different risk issues and countries. I do not intend the frame-
work to serve as a recipe or a checklist that can guarantee that analysts have 
considered all relevant aspects when analyzing a risk and its governance process 
and structures. However, by building into conventional risk analysis and manage-
ment such “soft” issues as societal values, concerns, and perceptions of risk, and by 
taking into account the interactions between the various actors involved in the pro-
cess, the risk governance framework can contribute to the development of more 
inclusive and effective risk governance strategies and the enhancement of decision 
making under uncertainty.
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Chapter 6
Knowledge and Governance: Can Systemic 
Risk in Financial Markets Be Managed? 
The Case of the Euro Crisis
Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor
In Masters of the Universe, Slaves of the Market, Bell and Hindmoor (2015) portray 
a highly “structuralist” account of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that orig-
inated in the Wall Street and London markets. Such an account implies that struc-
tural influences, here defined as material forces in financial markets, are important 
not only as a result of action by relevant agents, but also as subsequent influences of 
agents’ options and behavior, especially in driving forced asset fire-sales and credit 
freezes. A structural account of this kind can be contrasted with an institutional 
account, in which an agent’s behavior is shaped by institutional factors—primarily 
rules, norms, or operating procedures in formal or informal organizational or insti-
tutional settings. Hence, structures and institutions are somewhat similar in that they 
both shape behavior, but the sources of incentives or constraints (emanating from 
either structures or institutions) are different in each case.
Prior to and during the 2008 crisis, bankers in the key New York and London 
markets faced institutional pressures from within their own organizations for high 
returns, linked also to remuneration packages and professional prestige. Bankers 
were also influenced by wider structural forces, such as growing competitive pres-
sures for high short-term returns in financial markets. The favored strategy to 
achieve such returns was highly leveraged trading in mortgage-backed financial 
assets, all of which finally ended in calamity. Other structural dynamics were also at 
work. One was the growth of “systemic risk.” Here, agents (largely unknowingly) 
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had constructed a fragile system of highly complex independencies between finan-
cial institutions that enhanced the prospect of contagion effects in markets that 
would rapidly escalate into panic and the domino-like collapse of global credit mar-
kets and many major banks and financial institutions. This was essentially a struc-
tural characteristic of the system. Systemic risk of this kind gradually built up 
during the 2000s, eventually “crystallizing” into a full-blown crisis of panic-selling 
and a global credit crash in the wake of the Lehman Brothers’ collapse in late 2008. 
All this was driven, most proximately, by the behavior of bankers who were struc-
turally ensnared in a context of their own making that left them little choice but to 
ultimately pursue collectively destructive behaviors: a malign form of structural 
power, mutually exerted.
In recent decades, social scientists participating in the long-running debates on 
agency and structure have tended to give a greater focus to agency. Yet the above 
account of the GFC is grimly structuralist, suggesting little room for agency or at 
least for agent choice (see also Bell & Hindmoor, 2018a, b). This raises the question 
of whether such situations of structural exigency can be prevented or managed. The 
question is important given the prevalence and costs of financial crises in recent 
decades.
A key question is then whether it might be possible to shape or manage banker 
behavior in order to try and avoid the panicked herding and fleeing behavior, asset 
fire sales, and withholding of credit that are typical during the crystallization of 
systemic risk amidst a full-blown financial crisis. Our response is tentatively affir-
mative, based on the experience of the Euro crisis, whose actors have thus far 
avoided both the crystallization of systemic risk and a banking crisis, despite the 
ongoing fragility of the large European banks (Bell & Hindmoor, 2018a, b). We 
argue that the key to such an outcome hinges on the relationship between agency, 
knowledge, and governance arrangements. In particular, we argue from this case 
that if agents are knowledgeable and aware of the potential for catastrophe, they 
may illicit institutional responses and governance arrangements that may serve to 
build resolution strategies. The aim here is to stabilize market sentiment, thus help-
ing to avoid the (unwanted) crystallization of systemic risk via the mutual exertion 
of structural power by key agents in financial markets that proved so destructive 
during the GFC.
In this chapter, we therefore focus on the Euro crisis, which is, thus far, quite 
unlike the GFC. The latter saw bankers and key agents stumble blindly into disaster, 
with little knowledge or forewarning of the complex chain of events that awaited 
them (Bell, 2017). By contrast, key agents of the Euro crisis (bankers, regulators, 
and policy makers) have proven far more aware of the potential for the crystalliza-
tion of systemic risk and a banking crisis. As we argue more fully below, this kind 
of knowledge has been central, and cognizant agents have proved capable of using 
institutions and governance strategies to (thus far) forestall a potential debt and 
banking collapse in Europe.
We use the resources of political science to explore these issues, unpacking the 
concepts of systemic risk and structural power in more detail. We then examine the 
relevant governance and historical institutionalist literature in political science to 
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find useful tools and concepts to help us probe the knowledge, relational, and con-
textual issues in question in order to better understand if or how systemic risk in 
financial markets might be managed.
Authors of governance literature have focused on the role of both the state and 
non-state actors in forging governance partnerships to develop solutions to complex 
collective action problems. As we shall lay out below, private actors and state- 
supported networks prevented the crystallization of systemic risk amidst the Euro 
crisis and thereby played an important role in managing systemic risk, essentially 
by arranging a form of collective action amongst financial interests, supported by 
states, that helped contain the crisis. As we shall argue, however, the governance 
literature contains only a limited account of agency and agential knowledge. It is 
here that the historical institutionalist literature is better able to analyze how agents 
use ideas in institutional settings to forge change or reform strategies; in this case 
with a focus on how relevant agents dealt with the unfolding Euro crisis. We will 
begin, however, by unpacking concepts such as systemic risk and structural power 
in financial markets.
 Systemic Risk and Structural Power in the GFC
In the run-up to the GFC, bankers and financiers produced a very complex asset- 
and- debt structure that was fragile in the extreme and difficult to understand and 
ultimately control. Market actors thus produced systemic risk, leading to a struc-
tural context of fragility that was marked by complex and highly leveraged securi-
ties trading and myriad other intricate and often opaque interdependencies in the 
financial system (Bell & Hindmoor, 2015). How should scholars theorize this inter-
action between agents and structure? Archer (2000, p. 465) argues that “structures 
only exert an effect when mediated through the activities of people. Structures are 
only ever relational emergents and never reified entities existing without social 
interaction.” How, then, did agents actualize and mediate such structural effects?
In the context of the GFC, agents were unaware of the full complexity and fragil-
ity of the system they had created (Bell, 2017). Yet they became increasingly aware 
of at least some of the relevant dangers when the US mortgage market saw a down-
turn from mid-2007, threatening the value of mortgage-backed assets that formed 
the basis of what would later be known as the toxic securities trading at the center 
of the crisis. As the crisis mounted through 2008, bankers and financiers sought 
more funding whilst selling assets, which saw further falls in asset values and grow-
ing concerns about debt exposures and risk. The panic really set in when Lehman 
Brothers collapsed in September 2008, leading to a global freeze in credit markets 
and further bank runs and failures. In this structural context, panic and herding 
fuelled the liquidity crisis and greatly increased the scale of the overall financial 
crisis. Agents thus actualized the structural impacts of the context they had estab-
lished. This was not a matter of structure over agency (cf. Kim & Sharman, 2014), 
but one of the mutual constitution of structures and agents.
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The crystallization of systemic risk thus involved a structural power context in 
which bankers exerted mutually generated power over other bankers, forcing them 
into unwanted fire sales and the withholding of credit, which essentially defined the 
crisis. “Bankers and financiers were thus caught in a series of severe collective 
action problems stemming from an institutional and structural environment they had 
helped create and eventually could not control” (Bell & Hindmoor, 2015, p. 69). 
Concepts of power are central here because agents were forced by other agents to 
act against their will. Power is often thought of as a resource that is deployed or used 
by agents, usually in a strategic manner. But there is another category of power, in 
which agents mutually exert power over one another, through the way they interact 
in a structured context. In the case we are examining, bankers were subject to a form 
of power that they themselves had created and exerted collectively, though unwill-
ingly. They did not wish to withhold credit or engage in asset fire sales, but were 
forced to do so by the structural pressures and incentives they confronted. This was 
not about power being exercised by those in a structurally privileged position 
(Lindblom, 1977). Nor was it about exerting power through controlling discourse 
(Foucault, 1979). Instead, this was about agents exerting power over each other in a 
structured context that brought on collective ruin. Agents thus produced large struc-
tural effects that they did not anticipate and could not ultimately control. Prior to the 
crisis, bankers and financiers thought the institutions and relationships they had 
created were built on sound risk management and rational contracting. But as Bell 
and Hindmoor (2015, pp. 70–71) argue:
Prevailing ideas and assumptions concealed the true nature of the structural dynamics con-
fronting agents. In this sense, ideas and structures proved to be dangerously congruent. 
Only as the crisis was breaking did bankers come to realize what they had created. They 
ceased being ‘true believers’ in financial markets at precisely the moment that it became too 
late to escape.
 Solutions?
Because the crystallization of systemic risk stemming from mutually exerted forms 
of structural power arises from the behavior of bankers and financiers in financial 
markets, any solution to these problems must ultimately involve modifying the 
behavior of these actors. To avoid the crystallization of systemic risk, they must 
attempt to collectively mold or shape their behavior to avoid such an outcome. The 
relevant behavior here is shaped by actors’ knowledge, ideas, and motives, as well 
as by the governance, institutional, and structural terrains in which they operate. We 
explore these factors below, starting with the contribution of authors of governance 
literature.
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 The Governance Literature
In recent decades, the authors of the burgeoning governance literature have high-
lighted the interactions of public and private actors in the governance of public affairs. 
Much of this literature has a society-centred perspective, in the sense that it empha-
sizes relatively horizontal forms of governance networks, which are said to have mar-
ginalized government (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009). As Sørensen and Torfing (2007, p. 3) 
put it: “[T]he sovereign state … is losing its grip and is being replaced by new ideas 
about pluricentric government based on interdependence, negotiation, and trust.” 
Hence, this literature’s authors have allegedly shifted from “government to gover-
nance,” involving interactions between a wide range of actors in formal and informal 
“self-organising networks.” For Stoker (1998, p. 17), “the essence of governance is its 
focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and 
sanctions of government.” Sørensen and Torfing (2007) similarly emphasise the cen-
trality of “non-hierarchical forms of governance” (p. 3), the “absence of top-down 
authority” (p. 44), and the “role of horizontal networks of organised interests” (p. 3). 
Bevir and Rhodes (2003, pp. 55–56) argue that “networks are the defining character-
istics of governance,” and offer a “coordinating mechanism notably different from 
markets and hierarchies.” In this account, key dynamics in politics, such as hierarchy, 
power, and conflict, tend to recede, to be replaced by more horizontal forms of nego-
tiation, networking, mutual dependence, reciprocity, and trust relations.
Bell and Hindmoor (2009) argue that this approach, although useful in highlight-
ing multiple actors in governance, downplays the role of the state and of hierarchy 
that are typically found in politics and in governance practices. Indeed, even when 
governments choose to govern in alternative ways, in using markets for example, 
governments and state agencies typically remain important players in establishing 
and operating the agendas and rules for such strategies, in sanctioning the role of 
key players, and in providing resources and support. Indeed, the relational aspects 
of governance can often be seen as a way of strengthening state capacity. As 
Andersen (2004, p. 7) argues:
Many researchers have claimed that the restructuring of governance is a general retreat of 
government and the state … yet there is no reason to assume that the rise of governance 
necessarily leads to a decline of government … the main reason for the rise in state capacity 
through restructuring is … the fact that the state is now able to influence hitherto non- 
governmental spheres of social life through partnerships, in other words, an enlargement of 
state competencies.
In this view, posing a choice between society-centred and more state-centric 
approaches to governance is misleading because both sets of dynamics are often 
involved. Moreover, this approach sees governance as an extension of traditional 
forms of public policy, with the state as a key actor but utilizing a wider variety of 
governing strategies and actors, often involving non-governmental actors, including 
business, unions, associations, NGOs, or communities.
The governance literature’s strength, then, is its focus on the role of both the state 
and non-state actors in forging governance partnerships aimed at working out 
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solutions to complex collective action problems. As we shall see below, in prevent-
ing the crystallization of systemic risk amidst the Euro crisis, the role of private 
actors and networks working in tandem with the state has been of central importance.
Although useful, the governance literature in general and the society-centred 
governance literature in particular have several limitations. First, their authors fail 
to adequately deal with questions of knowledge and agency. At the extreme, there is 
a highly interpretivist account within the society-centred literature that focusses 
almost exclusively on agents and their ideas (e.g., Bevir & Rhodes, 2003). This, 
however, fails to adequately account for the dialectical interaction between agents 
and wider institutional or indeed structural contexts in which agents operate, largely 
because researchers view such contexts as the artefacts of an agent’s interpretation. 
State-centric governance accounts harbor almost the opposite problem, as their 
authors focus on the dynamics of state-society relationships but spend little time 
dealing with detailed questions of agency. Admittedly, the authors of certain works 
in this approach have discussed how states use persuasion as a governance strategy, 
leveraging the ideas and cognition of relevant actors in reshaping behavior (Bell & 
Hindmoor, 2009; Bell, Hindmoor, & Mols, 2010). Yet even this approach’s propo-
nents does not delve deeply enough into how agents themselves actually operate in 
ideational terrains and appraise and respond to the knowledge and information they 
confront.
Second, scholars advocating the society-centred version of governance litera-
ture, in particular, with its emphasis on horizontal networks, largely ignore the role 
of hierarchy, not only in relation to the role of the state, but also within societal 
networks themselves. As we illustrate in the case below, the collective action 
responses that European bankers and financiers were able to achieve were orches-
trated not by horizontal networks but by organized hierarchies within such net-
works, centred, in particular, around the associational role of the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF), the international bank lobbying organisation, which 
represented the major global banks and financial institutions and which worked in 
tandem with relevant state actors.
These gaps in relation to agency and hierarchical organisation within the gover-
nance literature are significant. The agency issue is especially important because a 
key issue that emerges from both the GFC and the Euro crisis is that key agents’ 
knowledge, ideas, and perceptions crucially shape their role and actions in financial 
markets (Bell, 2017). Knowledge and ideational factors matter in relation to whether 
systemic risk is perceived and whether it eventually crystalizes, and they also matter 
in forging governance strategies and responses. Researchers must therefore know 
how agents think and respond in a cognitive and ideational sense to the situations 
they confront.
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 The Institutionalist Literature
Arguably, contemporary institutionalist scholars are better able to flesh out the 
interactions between the cognitive and ideational realm of agency and the institu-
tional and structural terrains in which agents operate.
Agents do not operate in a vacuum, but shape and are shaped by their institu-
tional and wider structural contexts. As Karl Marx once famously observed, “men 
make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it 
under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing, already given, 
and transmitted from the past” (quoted in Tucker, 1978, p. 575). Institutional con-
texts are important in this respect. As Scharpf (1997, pp. 41–42) argues, “once we 
know the institutional setting of interaction, we know a good deal about the actors 
involved, about their options, and about their perceptions and preferences.” 
Institutions are primarily about the rules and norms (formal or informal) that shape 
actor behavior. Institutions matter because they shape actor identities, interpreta-
tions, and preferences, the norm and rule-based scope of agents’ discretion, and the 
resources and opportunities available to agents within organizations or institutions. 
As Farrell (2018, p. 26) puts it: “Institutions are not historical constants; rather, they 
are themselves the product of human agency, and as humans enact institutions, they 
correspondingly transform them.”
In political science, one of the main versions of institutional theory is historical 
institutionalism (HI). There has been a problem, however, because proponents of 
various strands of institutional theory, including strands of HI, have tended to 
emphasize highly constraining notions of institutions. Prominent theorists such as 
North (1990, p. 3) define institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” (our emphasis). This is a sticky form of institutional theory. It 
has a limited account of agency and is better at explaining institutional continuity 
than change. Blyth (1997, p. 230) is among many critics who argue that institutional 
theorists view institutions as largely “constraining rather than enabling political 
action.” Weyland (2008, p. 281) similarly argues that “institutionalism has empha-
sised inertia and persistence,” offering a static view of institutional life. Schmidt 
(2008, p. 314) also sees established theorists as “subordinating agency to structure,” 
whilst Crouch and Keune (2005, p. 83) argue that “institutional configurations are 
often presented as a straitjacket from which endogenous actors cannot escape.” We 
are sympathetic to such criticisms and wary of subscribing fully to overly sticky 
versions of HI theory (Bell, 2011). For example, the sweeping institutional changes 
that constituted the revolution in banking institutions and practices with the rise of 
highly leveraged trading during the 1990s and 2000s in the core financial markets of 
the US and UK suggest there is something wrong with such accounts (Bell & 
Hindmoor, 2015). Thelen (2004) similarly finds a pattern of agent-driven institu-
tional change in the German vocational training system, whereby incremental 
changes led to more profound changes over time.
In recent years, scholars have made a number of revisions to HI. The authors of 
more flexible accounts within HI have shifted to a more agency-centred, 
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“post-determinist” (Crouch, 2007) analysis, recognizing that institutions are subject 
to endogenous, agency-driven change and that dialectical interactions between 
agents and institutions are central to institutional life and in driving institutional 
change (see Bell, 2011; Bell & Feng, 2014; Campbell, 2004; Steinmo & Thelen, 
1992). A major step in this direction was Thelen’s work with various colleagues, 
pointing to sources of agency-based discretion as a basis for incremental institu-
tional innovation and change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; 
Thelen, 2004). Proponents of this approach recognize that agents operate with vary-
ing degrees of initiative and discretion, in a context in which institutions are both 
constraining and enabling (Bell, 2011). Hence, agents both shape and are shaped by 
institutions:
Institutional and/or structural environments can exert potential, though always agency- 
actualised effects, by imposing costs or benefits on agents, by shaping actor interpretations 
and preferences, the scope of bounded discretion, and the resources and opportunities avail-
able to actors. (Bell, 2011, p. 892)
Glückler and Lenz (2016, p.  257) add that agency is manifest when “legitimate 
mutual expectations” about rules and behavior help reinforce stable patterns of 
interaction within institutions.
In recent work, constructivist institutionalists also argue that agents can actively 
interpret institutional rules and norms, again creating at least some room for agency 
(Blyth, 2002; Hay, 2007; Schmidt, 2010). Actors use ideas and typically rely on 
agreed understandings to interpret and navigate such institutional terrains. 
Importantly, however, institutions and structures are also “distinct strata of reality” 
that are not simply reducible to the actors that inhabit them. Bell (2011) has there-
fore cautioned that ideational accounts must ground agents squarely and dialecti-
cally within institutional and wider settings.
 Knowledge and Ideas
As noted, institutions and structures only exert an effect when mediated through the 
activities of people (Archer, 2000). This suggests that people’s ideas, knowledge, 
and basic behavioral biases shape how they interact with institutions and wider 
structural forces. Hence, an “agency-based HI approach can easily integrate con-
structivist notions of interpretive agency and give full recognition to the fact that 
ideas, knowledge, language and inter-subjective discursive processes provide the 
crucial building blocks for establishing meaning and understanding and thus of pur-
poseful action in politics and institutional life” (Bell, 2011, p. 893).
Amidst the GFC, for example, most of the participants in the financial system 
were not simply responding to skewed incentive structures such as highly competi-
tive pressures for profits or bank remuneration schemes that rewarded risk taking. 
They were also on the whole “true believers.” The assumption made within many 
banks was that their trading activity and leverage were largely risk-free. Bank 
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traders, bank CEOs, regulators, investors, and even many politicians were “bound-
edly rational,” operating on incomplete information, myopia, group think, herding, 
and over-optimism (Bell, 2017). This led them to discount or neglect inconvenient 
or complex information as well as warning signals. Such ideas and motives mat-
tered because in an uncertain environment the assumptions key actors made about 
how markets work, how other actors would behave, and how governments would 
respond, shaped their perceptions and actions (Bell, 2017; Hindmoor & 
McConnell, 2013).
A further important and related finding from behavioral studies comes from 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Its 
proponents argue that agents subjectively define value in terms of gains or losses 
from a given (often current) reference point rather than in terms of final gains or 
overall wealth positions. A finding of relevance to systemic risk issues is that indi-
viduals thus tend to be loss averse; they will worry about downside risks, and will 
take bigger risks (compared to securing a gain) to avoid losses, which helps explain 
market panics and asset fire sales.
Overall, the literatures above provide key elements with which to analyze agent 
behavior within institutional, structural, and governance settings in financial mar-
kets that feature the potential for systemic risk. From the above, it is clear that 
researchers must be attentive to the role of agency, as shaped by the knowledge and 
cognitive and ideational drivers of behavior and how agents use them to understand 
and react to the situations in which they find themselves. From the institutionalist 
literature, we also need to factor in the way in which agents are shaped and in turn 
shape the institutional and structural contexts in which they operate. Important here 
also is the notion that agents are not only pressured by institutional and structural 
contexts, but that they also have some scope to shape and manage these contexts. 
Finally, the authors of the governance literature emphasize the possibility that 
agents might band together in hierarchical networks capable of dealing with collec-
tive action and governance challenges and that, more often than not, the state is an 
important part of such arrangements. In the next section, we probe the basic ele-
ments of the Euro crisis and show how the explanatory elements outlined above can 
help reveal how relevant institutionally-situated agents used knowledge and ideas to 
ascertain the nature of the systemic risks they confronted and then forged collective 
action solutions that thus far have prevented the crystallization of systemic risk.
 The Euro Crisis
One key institutional context pertinent to the unfolding Euro crisis was the estab-
lishment of the European Central Bank (ECB), a body charged with overseeing 
European monetary integration. The introduction of a common currency in 1999 
was a further key institutional development. These institutional contexts shaped the 
behavior of major banks and debt markets and effectively meant that the markets 
treated all members of the Euro area in broadly similar ways. Crucially, this form of 
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monetary integration and the ideas held by lenders meant that the less productive 
economies on Europe’s periphery—the likes of Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and espe-
cially Greece—were able to borrow freely at lower interest rates than might have 
been the case otherwise. These countries subsequently piled on debt to fund what 
would turn out to be real estate bubbles in Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, as well as a 
sovereign debt crisis in Greece. Lenders viewed these economies as part of the EU 
monetary system, assuming that Irish or Greek debt, and so forth, would be treated 
similarly to German debt. Lenders also assumed that member states and the EU 
would support the major banks if troubles developed.
If the peripheral economies had their own national currencies, financial market 
agents might have imposed a degree of discipline on borrowing. But because the 
countries in question were members of the Euro, external market pressures were not 
effective in bringing about change in economies that would normally have been 
judged to be “living beyond their means,” potentially facing a market-driven cur-
rency depreciation. For example, before Greece joined the European Monetary 
Union, its large and rising public debts would have probably initiated rising interest 
rates and/or falling exchange rates as markets reacted to the rise in perceived risk. 
This would have helped to stem debt increases. However, the EMU system largely 
eliminated such market constraints on debt, and the EU’s own policy and adminis-
trative monitoring regarding debt and fiscal balances also clearly failed.
The periphery’s various and growing private and sovereign debt problems were 
exacerbated by the GFC from 2008 onwards and would become a key structural 
problem for the Eurozone. In Ireland, for example, debt helped fuel the “growth 
miracle” that developed into a massive property bubble, which eventually collapsed, 
exposing Irish and European banks. Indeed, the huge burden of public and private 
debt at the center of the Euro crisis was largely held by German, French and UK 
banks. The German banks, for example, were “structurally hugely vulnerable to 
crisis,” according to Thompson (2015, p. 856), whilst the French banks’ exposure 
was even larger. It is estimated that the French, German, and UK banks’ combined 
exposure to peripheral European debt at the height of the crisis was as high as two 
trillion US dollars (Kalaitzake, 2017, p. 396; Thompson, 2015, p. 857). Any default 
on such would place enormous pressure on these banks, risking a bank-run and 
banking insolvency, in turn forcing national governments to try and bail the banks 
out. This posed a major systemic risk to the European banking system, not only 
because of the debt exposures and highly fragile nature of the large Euro banks in 
question (Bell & Hindmoor, 2018a, b), but also because of these banks’ sheer scale 
relative to the national GDPs involved. This posed the question of whether bailouts 
would even be fiscally feasible for the relevant governments and authorities. The 
scale and uncertainties surrounding these potential problems thus constituted an 
acute context of systemic risk and raised wider institutional questions about the 
design of the Euro system and its capacities for crisis management and adjustment. 
For the debt-laden peripheral economies the problem was that they were locked into 
a relatively inflexible institutional system that was never designed for such crises 
and that, for example, foreclosed currency depreciation as an adjustment mechanism.
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 Preventing the Crystallization of Systemic Risk Amidst 
the Euro Crisis
As noted above, agents tend to be loss averse and will often take drastic action in the 
face of impending losses and instability. In this context, the challenge was to try and 
prop up European debt markets and prevent a run on the major European banks. In 
other words, the challenge was to prevent the crystallization of systemic risk 
whereby financial market actors could potentially bring on collective ruin by exert-
ing a form of structural power, mutually exercised, thus presenting market actors 
with a severe and urgent collective action problem.
In the literature on structural power, researchers often treat the structural dimen-
sions of such power separately from so-called instrumental dimensions of business 
power, with the latter based on overt business activism, organization, and lobbying. 
But these two forms of power should not for the most part be analytically separated 
and can in fact interact. Indeed, structural power need not be deterministic or auto-
matic and can be mediated through agency, ideas, and collective organization 
(Bell, 2012).
Kalaitzake (2017) uses this framework to analyze the response to the Greek crisis 
and the way in which European and international bankers, and especially the leaders 
of the IIF, understood the challenges and risks they confronted and used ideas, 
knowledge, and experience regarding the dynamics of previous banking crises and 
debt resolution strategies in a range of developing countries to help chart a way 
forward in this new European situation. The IIF thus emerged as an important 
enabling institution that was knowledgeable, expert, and well-connected with 
European leaders and officials. Over the course of the crisis, the IIF was able to 
frame the key issues, articulate clear response strategies, and use associative means 
to help organize collective action responses. The IIF also worked closely with 
European state leaders and officials in the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank, and the IMF, and was valued by the authorities as a knowledgeable 
and organizationally capable partner. All of these actors had a key knowledge 
advantage compared to those involved in the GFC, who were essentially over-
whelmed by a more complex and completely unexpected chain of events, starting 
with the collapse of mortgage-backed assets and ending with the meltdown in global 
wholesale funding markets (Bell, 2017). In contrast, European actors were con-
fronted with a more conventional and more clearly understood debt and potential 
bank run type of crisis. As noted, the IIF leaders were well versed in such crises, and 
this was in contrast to the level of experience and knowledge held by many European 
leaders and officials who “had little grasp of the technical issues involved” (quoted 
in Kalaitzake, 2017, p. 399). Above all, it was well understood that it was essential 
to uphold market confidence and prevent panic and contagion and that the only way 
to do this was to organize responses that would stabilize the debt situation and 
above all convince relevant market actors that the situation was in hand. According 
to one private sector participant, the European authorities thus recognized the IIF 
“as a valuable platform to coordinate policy objectives with the majority of 
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bondholders as a unified block [and] foster stronger policy communication to finan-
cial markets more broadly, allowing officials to better manage policy expectations 
and market reactions” (Kalaitzake, 2017, p. 399).
In the case of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, tough medicine in the form of fis-
cal restraint and other austerity measures were imposed as the condition for liquid-
ity assistance from the European authorities and the IMF. As the crisis worsened in 
May 2010, a 110bn Euro bailout was announced to facilitate Greek debt servicing. 
This was largely aimed at buying time and reassuring markets that the situation was 
in hand. Policymakers initially directed their efforts at avoiding a debt write down 
and a private sector debt haircut in order to avoid market panic and the potential for 
contagion in other stressed markets in the Euro periphery. As Kalaitzake (2017) 
notes, it was initially feared that “a creditor write-down in Greece would trigger a 
‘Lehman-type event’ resulting in bank runs and rising borrowing costs.” The Euro 
leaders also developed an emergency bailout or lending fund—the European 
Financial Stability Facility. ECB President Mario Draghi’s famous promise in 2012 
to do “whatever it takes” to resolve the crisis was also intended to both reassure 
skittish financial markets and to justify buying “unlimited” quantities of sovereign 
bonds. As the IMF (2013, p. 28) argued, the imposition of pain on Greece but not 
initially on creditors “provided a window for private creditors to reduce exposures 
and shift debt into official hands.” This process saw almost 100 billion Euros of 
Greek debt pass from the private to the state sector between the initial bailout and a 
further debt restructuring deal announced in 2012, the latter prompted by the con-
tinuing instability of the Greek debt situation. Having bought some breathing space 
with the first bailout, the IMF began to insist that any further official assistance 
would need to be supported by a private sector bail-in or haircut in which creditors 
would be exposed to losses. In this context, the IIF worked to organize a collective 
banking response and forged agreement with Euro leaders that by March 2012 was 
focused on a second Greek bailout, though this time with a substantial degree of 
private sector bail-in, amounting to an over 50% write down for bond holders. Yet 
policymakers sweetened the bail-in with generous offsets, including swaps for cer-
tain amounts of Greek debt for official bonds of various maturities. Overall, these 
arrangements benefited the banks and private sector creditors by avoiding a disor-
derly default, and reduced the risk of panic and contagion, the threat of more coer-
cive government measures to restructure debt markets, and market exposure to the 
Greek crisis—all based on essentially voluntary, collective private sector responses 
and organization, backed and supported by the EU authorities. In contrast to Woll 
(2014), who argues that private financial sector disorganization forced governments 
into more generous banks bailouts in some countries after the GFC, this case illus-
trates the advantages of private financial sector knowledge and organization in cases 
of sovereign debt crises.
This episode shows that systemic risk in financial markets can be managed even 
in the face of a potential Lehman-type event, but only if market and state actors are 
able to perceive the looming threat and act in an organized manner with sufficient 
institutional back-up and resources to avoid the crystallisation of systemic risk. 
Ideas, financial expertise, experience, the willingness and capacity to act 
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collectively, all supported by appropriate institutions and public-private partner-
ships and effective governance strategies were all involved in this case. The key 
contrast here, compared to what happened in the case of the GFC, is that bankers 
and state leaders in the Euro situation were able to clearly understand and perceive 
the potential for the crystallisation of systemic risk and act to avert it.
Finally, it is true that the bailouts and actions taken to assuage market actors 
exposed the states and authorities in question to moral hazard—a form of reassur-
ance and an outcome that is likely to reduce risk perceptions and embolden market 
actors going forward. This situation always puts states and the authorities in a bind, 
but the reality is that financial markets are now so large that systemic financial col-
lapse cannot be countenanced. This essentially structural market shift now means 
that the potential crisis-induced collateral damage to wider economies and even to 
the fate of nations is now so great in most cases of large, complex, and inter- 
connected financial markets that concerns about moral hazard now take second 
place to the need to avoid a financial meltdown.
 Conclusion
Knowledge, collective capacity, and governance can clearly matter in understanding 
and managing complex human interactions amidst financial markets that are struc-
turally prone to systemic risk and its crystallization. This occurred in a dramatic and 
damaging way during the 2008 GFC, but thus far at least the Euro crisis has not 
morphed into a Euro banking crisis, although many Euro banks remain fragile and 
vulnerable (Bell & Hindmoor, 2018a). As we have demonstrated, at the crisis’s peak 
around 2010, the Euro authorities and states managed to avoid the crystallization of 
systemic risk through collective action, with the help of a knowledgeable and orga-
nized private sector.
We have argued that various strands of research and theory in political science 
offer useful tools for understanding such dynamics and outcomes. The authors of 
governance literature point to the importance of the state and the orchestration of 
public-private cooperation in meeting governance challenges. But we have argued 
that institutional analysis also offers a way of locating agents in relevant institu-
tional and structural contexts, through tracing dialectical relations of mutually shap-
ing interactions over time. This approach also offers a way of bringing in deeper 
insights about agents’ cognitive and ideational processes in shaping the way agents 
use knowledge to help appraise and react to situations and in building institutional 
and collective responses to risk environments. Future researchers must bring 
together these elements in wider studies of how knowledge and governance strate-
gies have been deployed, studying other cases of financial market dynamics or in 
broader settings.
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Chapter 7
Explaining Subnational Governance: 
The Role of Governors’ Codified 
and Uncodified Knowledge
Claudia N. Avellaneda, Ricardo Andrés Bello-Gómez, and Johabed G. Olvera
Scholars, donors, and practitioners worldwide search for the tools and means to 
improve governance. Throughout this search, stakeholders recognize the impor-
tance of bringing actors together from public, private, and non-profit sectors for 
problem solving. The cross-sector effort is expected to lead to effective governance, 
which in turn should result in improved management, effective implementation of 
instruments, improved service delivery, and higher outcomes. “Governance com-
prises the legal, social, political, economic, environmental, and administrative 
arrangements put in place to ensure the intended outcomes for stakeholders are 
defined and achieved”1 (CIPFA & IFAC, 2013, p. 8). In Latin America, for example, 
decentralization has been one of the adopted governance arrangements. By increas-
ing autonomy and assigning more responsibilities to subnational governments, 
decentralization is expected to improve service delivery and peoples’ lives. Despite 
the generalized increase in the role of subnational governments, considerable per-
formance variation exists across regions, leading us to question what factors explain 
subnational governments’ performance.
Although the terms of subnational governments are very broad, encompassing 
second-level (state or province) and third-level government (municipalities) 
(Herrera Gutierrez, 2015), we here refer to the second level of government as 
states/provinces/departments/regions. In explaining governance performance, 
1 Based on this definition, governments are a component of the variety of arrangements needed for 
public action to happen. So, in this paper, when referring to governance, we are talking about the 
different arrangements to pursue national goals and when using the term government, we refer to 
the organizations and branches/levels that comprise the public sector.
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scholars have stressed the role of political factors, such as partisanship2 (Brollo & 
Nannicini, 2010; Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro, 2008), 
party ideology (Strøm, 1990; Wittman, 1990), electoral competitiveness (Holbrook 
& van Dunk, 1993; Key, 1949), and electoral cycle (Ames, 1987; Buchanan & 
Tullock, 1962; Nordhaus, 1975). Others explain performance as a function of 
resources (Sharkansky, 1967), oversight mechanisms (Blair, 2000), intergovern-
mental/interorganizational networks (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998, 2003), popula-
tion size and nature (Durant & Legge, 1993), and organizational capacity (Collins 
& Gerber, 2006; Hall, 2008; Terman & Feiock, 2015). Finally, another branch of 
research identifies collaborative arrangements as key drivers of governance perfor-
mance (Meier & O’Toole, 2001; Page, 2008).
Without denying their explanatory power, we find the above factors neglect the 
potential role of government CEOs’ knowledge. In this second level of govern-
ments, the CEO/manager of the state/province/department is a directly elected gov-
ernor or an appointed intendent (as in Chile), who performs both political and 
administrative functions and who enjoys managerial autonomy and discretion. 
Given his/her significant autonomy and discretionary power, his/her knowledge 
influences decision-making, and, in turn, governance performance. A top manager’s 
individual traits are thus expected to contribute to her decision-making in setting 
strategic and tactic goals, selecting middle-level managers, rearranging organiza-
tional structure, risk taking, adopting innovation, networking with other levels of 
government, and/or adopting a participatory process.
In this study, we consequently specifically seek to assess the effect of governors’ 
knowledge (codified and uncodified) on performance at the subnational level. In 
doing so, we rely on data derived from 32 Mexican states and 32 Colombian 
departments/provinces during the 1995–2010 and 2004–2013 periods, respectively. 
We assess subnational performance in terms of two objective indicators—enroll-
ment in secondary education and infant mortality rate (IMR)—that are mainly the 
responsibility of both Mexican states and Colombian departments.
Identifying the drivers of governance performance at the subnational level is 
relevant for several reasons. In some countries, half the national budget is currently 
allocated to subnational governments (Herrera Gutierrez, 2015). Moreover, as 
delivery of health, education, and development programs happens at the subnational 
level, long-term development is a function of governance performance at this level. 
Finally, subnational performance is vital for strengthening democracy, transpar-
ency, and citizens’ trust of government. Moreover, most researchers studying sub-
national governance performance focus on the United States and/or the United 
Kingdom. However, both countries enjoy highly developed, post-industrial econo-
mies, as well as fully democratic systems. Therefore, it is unknown whether the 
identified drivers of performance in these developed settings apply to 
2 In political science, partisan and partisanship refer to strong adherence and loyalty to a political 
party or group (see, e.g., Allan & Scruggs, 2004, or Bartels, 2000).
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underdeveloped and new democracies, such as Mexico and Colombia, where exist-
ing institutions might generate different incentives.
In the following section, we present the theoretical underpinnings that link 
knowledge to governance performance. In the chapter we then offer the rationale for 
alternative explanations, which we will also test in the empirical analysis. In the 
next section, we provide a brief background of the Mexican and Colombian estates, 
as well as a description of the data collection and variable operationalization. 
Afterward, we present the empirical analysis, interpret and discuss the results, iden-
tify some of the limitations, and develop our conclusions.
 Explaining Governance Performance
As mentioned above, several factors seem to contribute to governance performance. 
Although no clear drivers seem to explain variation in performance, at risk of sim-
plifying, researchers have paid considerable attention to seven drivers: resources, 
market competition, accountability, organizational structure, political/environmen-
tal/internal context (O’Toole & Meier, 2015), collaborative arrangements (Meier & 
O’Toole, 2001; Page, 2008), and management (Boyne, 2003; Lynn, 2003; Meier & 
O’Toole, 2002). According to O’Toole and Meier, (1999), management (i) provides 
organizational stability and structure, (ii) coordinates achievement of organizational 
goals, (iii) exploits opportunities, and (iv) buffers the organization from exter-
nal shocks.
For some, public management makes the difference between the success and 
failure of policy implementation (Avellaneda, 2009; Lynn, 1987; Meier & O’Toole 
2002; O’Toole & Meier, 1999). Under this view, qualified management—the 
“management- quality” hypothesis—facilitates program success, contributing to 
overall organizational performance. The notion is that managers are expected to rely 
on structure, craft, and institutions (Lynn, 2003, p. 2) to direct routine activities in 
purposeful organizations. However, managerial influence works through different 
causal pathways (Meier & O’Toole, 2002), as management influences performance 
through multiple mechanisms: goals, material and human resources, regulation, 
representation, workforce diversity, organizational strategy, and leadership. 
Nevertheless, “it is increasingly clear that (individual) managers can improve pro-
gram effectiveness, sometimes in substantial ways” (Boyne,  Meier,  O’Toole,  & 
Walker, 2005, p. 634). For it is “[a]t the higher levels of the bureaucracy and among 
the elected officials, for example, that important decisions on what services to 
deliver or how to deliver them are made that limit a street-level bureaucrat’s ability 
to affect service distributions” (Meier, Stewart, & England, 1991, p. 158, see also 
Avellaneda, 2009). Or as Lynn (1987, p. 103) posits, “[i]n its most concrete and 
observable sense, the activity of government agencies is the product of the behavior 
of identifiable individuals who occupy responsible positions.” However, how do 
individual managers/leaders contribute to governance performance?
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 Governors’ Codified Knowledge and Subnational Governance
Although education is codified knowledge, experience is uncodified knowledge. 
The mechanisms by which codified knowledge contributes to performance and gov-
ernance can be explained at the macro- and micro-level. At the macro-level, Adam 
Smith highlighted the role of education as a contributor to the process of the produc-
tion of assets and services (Sen, 1997). Specifically, technical formation and learn-
ing contribute to production (Sen, 1997, p.  70). Codified knowledge, that is 
education, is part of human capital. Solow’s (1956) theory of economic growth 
stresses the importance of human capital on a country’s growth and development 
(see also Besley, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2012; Jones & Olken, 2005). Since 
Solow (1956), many others have highlighted the role of human capital in production 
(Lucas, 1988; Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992), encouraging empirical research that 
reports a positive relationship between school years and growth rate (Bassanini & 
Scarpetta, 2001).
At the micro-level, codified knowledge also contributes to governance perfor-
mance through several mechanisms. Education brings recognition, leads to better 
choices and empowers leaders to argue and communicate strategies. Hence, 
“[c]ognitive resource theory assumes that more intelligent and knowledgeable lead-
ers make better plans and decisions than do those with less ability and knowledge” 
(Fiedler, 1986, p. 533). Knowledgeable leaders are expected to be more innovative 
and more direct in communicating plans, decisions, and strategies. As Dearborn and 
Simon (1958) posited, “[w]hen presented with the same problem, executives with 
different functional areas defined the problem largely in terms of the activities and 
goals of their own areas.” Therefore,
H1: The higher a governor’s codified knowledge, the higher the state/province 
performance.
 Governors’ Uncodified Knowledge and Subnational  
Governance
Besides the codified, scientific, and technocratic knowledge, the uncodified, intui-
tive, and artistic knowledge of managers also influences performance (Lynn, 1996, 
pp. 112–113). Hence, “[k]nowledge is, by no means, the only cognitive resource 
expected to influence a leader’s performance” (Avellaneda, 2009, p. 289). Leaders 
acquire scientific knowledge at the university and/or workshop level. On the con-
trary, uncodified, intuitive knowledge is obtained through mentorship and job expe-
rience (Avellaneda, 2009; Lynn, 1996). This is considered learning though 
experience and practice (Arrow, 1962). According to Fiedler (1986, p. 32), experi-
ence likely affects a leader’s performance in several ways: “by (a) providing useful 
and job-related knowledge, (b) enhancing the ability to cope with stressful 
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conditions, and (c) engendering a feeling of greater self-confidence and control of 
the leadership situation.” That is, experience helps governors anticipate technical 
and administrative obstacles and allows them to search for previous adopted strate-
gies to overcome them. Experience should also help governors cope with task 
difficulty.
According to the resource-based view, experience and expertise are rare, valu-
able, inimitable, and non-substitutable organizational resources, which contribute to 
its competitive advantage (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Riccucci (1995), Doig and Hargrove (1990), and Avellaneda (2009, 2012, 2016) 
have examined the experience-performance relationship and find that political lead-
ers’ experience positively influences their organizational effectiveness. Others, 
however, report no empirical support for the experience-performance relationship 
(Fernandez, 2005; Fiedler, 1966; Fiedler & Chemers, 1968). The use of different 
indicators for qualitative and quantitative dimensions of experience may explain the 
inconsistent results (Olvera & Avellaneda, 2019). Nevertheless, the uncodified 
knowledge-performance relaxations deserve to be tested in underdeveloped set-
tings. Therefore,
H2: Governors’ uncodified knowledge (experience) is positively correlated with 
state performance.
 Alternative Explanations of Subnational Governance  
Performance
Governance performance may also be influenced by elected officials’ ideological 
alignment with other elected officials at higher or equal levels of government. 
Researchers have mainly tested this partisan alignment hypothesis in studies to 
explain grant approval. Proponents of this hypothesis specifically posit that due to 
risk aversion, grants tend to be allocated to co-partisan jurisdictions (Cox & 
McCubbins, 1986). There is some empirical evidence supporting this claim. Brollo 
and Nannicini (2010) find that Brazilian municipalities in which the mayor is affili-
ated with the coalition of the president received 36 to 43 percent larger transfers 
than non-aligned municipalities in the final 2 years of the mayoral term. Likewise, 
Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) find that, in Spanish municipalities, grants 
to co-partisans led to some political support, but grants to opposition parties did not 
bring in more votes. However, a number of studies also support a contrary hypoth-
esis that grants tend to be directed toward jurisdictions with a high number of swing 
voters as a means of winning support (Dahlberg & Johansson, 2002; Dixit & 
Londregan, 1998; Johansson, 2003; Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987; Mejía 
Guinand, Botero, & Rodriguez Raga, 2008). The plausibility of both hypotheses 
calls for further testing at the subnational level in understudied contexts. Therefore,
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H3: States whose governors are ideologically aligned with other elected officials at 
the state and national level tend to have higher performance.
Besides partisanship, government ideology also has been suggested as a driver of 
governance performance. Downs (1957) suggested that party competition takes 
place along a left-right ideological spectrum, suggesting that political parties are 
policy seekers, rather than just vote seekers (Strøm, 1990; Wittman, 1990). Although 
some question the validity of this one-dimensional scale, researchers have used left- 
right continuum to test several theoretical propositions. Regarding social policies, 
for example, the debate centers on whether or not parties of the left spend more 
money than parties of the right (Blais, Blake, & Dion, 1993; Solano, 1983; Swank, 
2002). Greater social spending, in turn, may enhance program coverage. Blais et al. 
(1993) and Swank (2002) found that parties make a difference, whereas Solano 
(1983) and Avellaneda (2009) report no party ideology effect at all. The potential 
explanatory power at the state level in developing settings justifies testing party 
ideology. Here, the expectation is that states led by governors affiliated with rightist 
parties tend to expend less, resulting in lower performance.
Finally, others link program implementation and performance to electoral com-
petitiveness (Holbrook & van Dunk, 1993; Key, 1949). Proponents of the electoral 
competitiveness hypothesis suggest that when elections are tight, candidates and 
incumbents tend to provide more services in order to gain political support from 
many segments (Key, 1949). Party competition hypothesis has received some sup-
port (Holbrook & van Dunk, 1993), but others report no support or little impact 
(Dye, 1966). This inconclusiveness calls for additional tests of the competitiveness 
hypothesis at the subnational level in new democracies.
We will test the generated hypothesis and expectations in a data set derived from 
the Mexican states and Colombian departments/provinces. In the next section, 
therefore, we provide a brief background of these subnational governments.
 Case Analysis: Mexican States and Colombian Departments
Since the adoption of decentralization in the 80s, Mexican states and Colombian 
departments have expanded their fiscal, political, and administrative autonomy. 
Despite having the same responsibilities, considerable variation exists across 
Mexican states and Colombian departments in terms of several indicators and 
dimensions of performance. Understanding the drivers of this variation is central to 
this study, and we suggest that governors’ knowledge explains this subnational vari-
ation. Beside cross-state variation, both Mexican and Colombian states have expe-
rienced violence. Nevertheless, Mexico is a federal system, but Colombia is a 
unitary system. In addition, their party systems also exhibit variations. Mexico has 
a highly institutionalized three-party (PRI, PAN, and PRD) system versus 
Colombia’s multi-party system (11 parties represented in the 2018 Senate elec-
tions). Although the common features serve as controls, differences justify testing 
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our propositions to understand their impact on governance performance at the sub-
national level.
 Mexican States
We test our hypotheses using data derived from the 32 states in the Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos (United Mexican States) and the 32 departments of Colombia (Fig. 7.1). 
In this section, therefore, we provide a background on both Mexican and Colombian 
subnational governments. The Constitution of 1917 formally established Mexico as 
a federal republic. However, the country was highly centralized until 1980. From 
the early 1980s to late 1990s, the federal government initiated a process of admin-
istrative, political, and fiscal decentralization, delegating many governmental 
responsibilities, including health and education services, to states (Rowland & 
Ramírez, 2001). Consequently, Mexican states have attained a high degree of politi-
cal, administrative, and budgetary autonomy (Falleti, 2010).
State autonomy also has increased governors’ power (Falleti, 2010;  Modoux, 
2006), enabling governors to block federal policies (Rodríguez, 2003) and control 
decisions for municipalities’ resource allocation (Alvarado, 1996). This significant 
expansion of responsibility has inspired numerous studies addressing the role 
Mexican governors play in federal and local politics (e.g., Figueras Zanabria, 2009; 
Fig. 7.1 Mexican States. Source: Design by Volker Schniepp, Department of Geography, 
Heidelberg
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Hernández Rodríguez, 2008; Langston, 2010; Modoux, 2006; Montero Bagatella, 
2014; Morales y Gómez & Salazar Medina, 2009; Oikion Solano, 2012; Rodríguez, 
2003). However, no systematic study has examined the effects of governors’ char-
acteristics on state performance.
Mexican governors are democratically elected for a six-year term, with no re- 
election allowed. They head the executive branch, perform political and administra-
tive functions, and are accountable to state legislatures. State legislatures are 
unicameral and populated by directly and indirectly elected representatives, who 
serve three-year terms. Consequently, each governor serves alongside two legisla-
tive bodies. According to the Ley General de Educación, the federal government 
defines the general principles and goals of Mexico’s education policy. However, 
states are responsible for designing and implementing necessary programs to ensure 
federal education goals are reached (DOF, 2013). For instance, the governor through 
the State Government Plan determines strategies to achieve education enrollment 
levels established by the federal government.
Mexican states have two kinds of revenues: (1) their own revenues, and (2) fed-
eral transfers. Their own revenues are comprised of state taxes (e.g., vehicle- 
ownership tax, purchase or sale of used cars, lotteries, etc.), social security fees, 
provision of public services to individuals (e.g., expedition of driver’s licenses), 
public works that differentially benefit particular individuals, sale of state-owned 
real estate, and any other revenue derived from the execution of the state’s faculties 
(e.g., traffic ticket fines). Around 8% of states’ revenues come from these sources 
(Ramírez-Cedillo & Lopez-Herrera, 2016). Federal transfers resulted from the Ley 
de Coordinación Fiscal (Law of Fiscal Coordination) enacted in 1978 (Ley de 
Coordinación Fiscal, 1978). Under this law, states agreed to yield some of their 
tributary faculties to the federal government in exchange for a share of federal taxes. 
The two types of federal transfers are participaciones (participations) and aporta-
ciones (contributions). Participaciones are determined according to a formula 
incorporating these elements: (1) level of tax collection, (2) population, and (3) 
compensations to less advantaged states. States can spend money from this source 
at their discretion. For the average Mexican state, participaciones account for 31% 
of revenues (Ramírez-Cedillo & Lopez-Herrera, 2016). Aportaciones are earmarked 
funds dedicated to education, health, social infrastructure, municipalities strength-
ening, etc. On average, this type of federal transfer represents 52% of states’ reve-
nues (Ramírez-Cedillo & Lopez-Herrera, 2016).
Governors can implement different strategies to increase revenues from any 
source. For example, to increase its own revenues, the Mexico City government 
installed cameras across the city to detect drivers going over the speed limit and 
fined the speeders. Governors also might apply actions to improve tax collection. 
For example, a state government may require a tax payment for an individual to use 
a vehicle. In particular, Mexico City’s government may request vehicle owners to 
pay vehicle ownership taxes to obtain environmental verification needed to travel 
across the city (Reglamento de Tránsito de la Ciudad de México, 2016).
In terms of health care, states manage primary-care hospitals and are responsible 
for nutrition, epidemiology, maternity care, and visual and hearing health. 
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Decentralization reforms made states responsible for providing medical attention to 
most uninsured populations (Martinez Fritscher & Rodriguez Zamora, 2016). Some 
argue decentralization of health services allowed governors to use administrative 
and technical posts as political currency (Gonzalez-Block, Leyva, Zapata, Loewe, 
& Alagon, 1989). To expand health and education services, governors may seek to 
increase states’ education and health budgets assigned by the federal government. A 
special federal commission reviews budget requests related to education and health 
issues from different actors, including governors, mayors, ministries, and associa-
tions. Consequently, lobbying strategies and political networks are essential assets 
for governors seeking resources for education and health.
 Colombian Departments
Colombia is a unitary but decentralized republic (Const. 1991, art. 1). According to 
the 1991 Constitution (art. 311), Colombia’s entire territory has been divided into 
32 departments and the capital district of Bogotá.3 Colombian departments coordi-
nate and mediate between the national state and the municipalities, which are the 
main service providers and fundamental territorial authorities (Fig. 7.2). In the last 
two decades, Colombia has implemented changes over its territorial structure in 
order to advance fiscal, political, and administrative decentralization (Falleti, 2005).
Fiscal decentralization started with the institution of the “Situado Fiscal,” the 
first attempt of intergovernmental transfers in 1968. The 1991 Constitution strength-
ened the transfers system and vested the territorial entities with the responsibility of 
providing social services, such as education, health care, and basic sanitation. These 
changes furthered administrative decentralization. In 2001, Congress adopted the 
Participations General System (SGP), which modified the transfer allocation method 
to achieve fiscal sustainability and improve equality (Bello & Espitia, 2011).
The first mayoral and gubernatorial elections took place in 1998 and 1992, 
respectively, giving way to political decentralization. Since then, mayors and gover-
nors were first elected for a three-year period, increasing to a four-year period on 
Jan. 1, 2004. An elective body, called the Department Assembly (Const. 1991, art. 
299), oversees the subnational executives, approves state budgets, determines size 
and structure of the departmental government, and creates or suppresses municipali-
ties, among other functions (Const. 1991, art. 300).
Departments raise revenue mainly from three categories of sources: taxes, trans-
fers, and royalties, representing around 85% of their total revenue from 2000 to 
2012.4 During the same period, transfers’ share of departments’ revenue has 
3 Even though other districts exist and enjoy greater autonomy than municipalities, they relate to 
specific issues (tourism, cultural affairs) and for most purposes, they are part of the respective 
departments.
4 The remainder corresponds to capital projects co-financed by the national government, and other 
non-tax revenues.
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fluctuated between 45.7% and 56.8%, taxes have ranged between 23.2% and 27.5%, 
and royalties have shifted between 10.0% and 16.4%.5 Levies on beer, liquor, and 
tobacco constitute most of the tax revenue collected by the departments, even 
though the central government determines the respective tax rate. Royalties are 
directly related to the exploitation and transportation of natural resources, such as 
oil, gas, metals, and minerals. Nevertheless, the Participations General System 
(SGP) determines the way the central government transfers resources to each 
department, district, and municipality. The system allocates a total amount indexed 
to inflation, the variation of the national current revenue, and the target population 
for the provision of public services. The resources assigned are earmarked to the 
provision of education (58.5%), health care (24.5%), basic sanitation (17%), and 
5 Percentages calculated from Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2013).
Fig. 7.2 Colombian departments. Source: Design by Volker Schniepp, Department of Geography, 
Heidelberg
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other minor purposes (4%) (Barón & Meisel, 2003; Bello & Espitia, 2011; 
Ley 715, 2001).
Resources are assigned to departments for their administration and distribution, 
according to municipalities’ needs. When municipalities obtain certifications to 
administer their own education and health resources, transfers bypass the depart-
ment and go directly to the municipality (Bello & Espitia, 2011). To obtain the 
National Education Ministry’s certification, municipalities must demonstrate they 
satisfy certain conditions of administrative capacity (Ministerio de Educación 
Nacional, 2004). In 2002, 46 municipalities were certified, and in 2008, 16 more 
were certified, bringing the total to 62 localities certified to directly provide second-
ary education without state involvement. After excluding the certified localities, 
Colombian departments are still in charge of providing secondary education to 
about 42% of the potential target population in Colombia (see Table 7.2). The edu-
cation ministry considers children between 11 and 16  years old as the potential 
target population for secondary education (Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 
2014). By 2013, more than 1.1 million Colombian teenagers still did not have access 
to secondary education. In Fig. 7.3, we summarize the process of education provi-
sion in Colombia, highlighting the role of the departments.
In the case of the provision of health, municipalities can be certified by either the 
department or the Public Health Ministry (Ley 60, 1993). However, departments 
still exercise a monitoring role and can subject a municipality to a performance 
management regime if the municipality fails to maintain a certain level of service 
Fig. 7.3 High school enrollment for Mexican States (1995–2010). Source: Design by authors
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provision and capacity (Ley 60, 1993). Indeed, between 2002 and 2013, depart-
ments recentralized health provisions in 92 municipalities.6 In other words, depart-
ments influence the achievement of public health outcomes in their territory either 
by direct administration of the health system or by close monitoring of decentral-
ized municipalities.
 Data and Variable Operationalization
The unit of analysis in this study is state-year. Based on data availability, we built 
two panel data sets—one with information from 32 Mexican states over a 16-year 
period (1995–2010)—and another panel for 32 Colombian departments from 2004 
to 2013. The period for the Mexican states includes three gubernatorial administra-
tions for most states (1994–2000, 2000–2006, and the first 4 years of the 2006–2012 
administration), but some states have shifted electoral cycles. The period for the 
Colombian department covers three gubernatorial administrations (2004–2007, 
2008–2011, and the first 2 years of the 2012–2015 administration).
 Assessing Governance Performance
Objectively assessing performance has become central in the public management 
literature. Walker, Boyne, and Brewer (2010) summarized the models used to mea-
sure performance. According to them, academics and practitioners have basically 
followed either the economy-efficiency-effectiveness (3Es) model or the inputs- 
outputs- outcomes (IOO) model. Proponents of both models try to capture perfor-
mance as the ability of the organization to (i) acquire resources from the environment 
(system-resource approach), and (ii) to achieve the organizational goals (goal 
approach).7 However, as Walker et al. (2010) recognize, these models lack insight 
about the organization’s internal stakeholders, as well as several “responsiveness 
values” (Rainey, 2014, p. 105), such as human rights and accountability.
Another perspective to assess performance focuses on the different dimensions 
of organizational performance that aim to complement the 3Es and IOO models 
(Boyne, 2002, 2003). In this case, performance is assessed in terms of accountabil-
ity, effectiveness, efficiency, democratic outcomes (representation, participation, 
etc.), equity, justice, responsiveness, quantity, and quality of outputs and outcomes. 
In this study, we opt to assess performance in terms of outputs—enrollments in 
secondary education—and one outcome—infant mortality rate. Although outputs 
refer to the direct products generated by an organization, outcomes denote the final 
6 From original data collected by Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (2018).
7 See Rainey (2014) for more detail on the alternative approaches to organizational performance.
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effect a product has on society (Boyne, 2003). For instance, in reducing infant mor-
tality rate (the final policy goal, i.e., outcome), a governor might promote children 
vaccination (output) across her state. Although no single indicator is perfect, these 
two indicators are objective and fully measure a state’s performance, as they are 
implemented at the state/provincial level. Assessing performance in terms of school 
enrollment and infant mortality rate seems appropriate because Mexico and 
Colombia face a considerable gap between potential and actual enrollees in second-
ary education and considerable variations in IMR within the countries.
For Mexico, we obtained high school enrollment data through the Secretaría de 
Educación Pública (Federal Ministry of Education). This rate measures the percent-
age of eligible children who enroll in high school in a given state in a particular year. 
Infant mortality rates are defined as deaths in the first year of life per 1000 live 
births. We obtained data to measure this variable from Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Geografia (INEGI), the National Center for Statistics and 
Geographical Data.
The Panel Municipal del CEDE (Acevedo & Bornacelly, 2014) collected a wide 
range of socioeconomic variables for all municipalities in Colombia. We aggregated 
the number of high-school enrollees in non-certified municipalities for each depart-
ment, thus obtaining a total enrollment figure at the department level. We also cal-
culated the total number of children between 11 and 16 years old in such non-certified 
municipalities, as a measure of the total targeted population for secondary education 
in each department. The high-school enrollment rate is the ratio between the num-
ber of enrollees and the targeted population in each given year. The Panel Municipal 
del CEDE (Acevedo & Bornacelly, 2014) also reports figures of infant mortality at 
the municipal level. By aggregating these figures at the department level and deter-
mining a ratio of the total number of births in a given year, we obtain infant mortal-
ity rates for each department in a given year (Figs. 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6).
In order to test H1, we obtained governors’ codified knowledge via background 
and biographical information of the governors as subnational chief executives. 
Besides collecting information on their age and place of birth, we originally calcu-
lated the number of years of formal education. However, given the large number of 
governors with pre-graduate education in both countries, we opted to create a 
dummy variable receiving “1” if the governor has postgraduate education and, oth-
erwise, “0,” to test the effect of governors’ codified knowledge on state perfor-
mance. As noted in Fig. 7.7, only 2.63% of Mexican governors have less than a 
college education, yet 10.31% of Colombian governors do not have college educa-
tion. In addition, most Mexican governors obtained college degrees (66.67%), but 
only 29.06% of Colombian governors have college degrees. On the other hand, the 
majority of Colombian governors (60.62%) have some kind of postgraduate degree 
(specialty, master or Ph.D.), yet only 30.7% of Mexican governors attained post-
graduate degrees.
To test the effect of governors’ uncodified knowledge (H2), we also collected 
information on the years of experience in both the public and private sectors. 
Moreover, we classified governors’ experience at the local, state/department and 
national levels. As we can see in Fig.  7.8, the distributions of public sector 
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Fig. 7.4 High school enrollment for Colombian departments (2004–2013). Source: Design 
by authors
Fig. 7.5 Infant mortality rates for Mexican States (1995–2010). Source: Design by authors
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Fig. 7.6 Infant mortality rate for Colombian departments (2004–2013). Source: Design by authors
Fig. 7.7 Codified knowledge of Mexican and Colombian Governors, by level of education. 
Source: Design by authors
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experience in both Mexico and Colombia are negatively skewed. In particular, most 
Colombian governors have less than 20  years of experience, and most Mexican 
governors have less than 40 years of public sector experience. Of years spent in the 
public sector, Colombian governors dedicated 32.78% and Mexican governors ded-
icated 10.96% to local governments. At the state/department level, Colombian gov-
ernors dedicated 35.8% of their time, and Mexican governors invested 35.79% of 
their time. Finally, of the total time spent in the public sector, Colombian governors 
committed 31.42% of their time to the national government, but Mexican governors 
gained 53.27% of their experience at that level (Fig. 7.9).
In the Colombian case, to test for the effect of partisanship, we obtained data 
from the National Registry, which reports electoral information. Governor-state leg-
islature partisanship is assessed as the percentage of members in the subnational 
assembly who belong to the governor’s party. This measure, however, does not take 
into account the informal alliances and partnerships that governors tend to build to 
achieve working majorities in the assembly. The alignment between governors and 
the national level of government in Colombia is measured by a regional-ties 
approach, which is consistent with this concern over informal partnerships. 
Governor-national representatives’ alignment equates to the number of senators, 
representatives, and cabinet members who are native to the department. Meanwhile, 
to measure governor-ministry of health/education alignment, we created a dummy 
variable receiving “1” if the respective ministry was native to the department; oth-
erwise it is “0.” For Mexico, governor-national representatives’ partisanship equates 
to the percentage of both senators and representatives ideologically aligned to the 
governor’s party. Finally, to measure governor-ministry of health/education 
Fig. 7.8 Uncodified knowledge of Mexican and Colombian Governors: by total years of public 
sector experience. Source: Design by authors
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partisanship, we created a dummy variable receiving “1” if the governor and respec-
tive ministry belonged to the same party; otherwise it is “0.”
In Mexico’s case, given its three-party system, we created two dummy variables 
to assess governors’ party ideology: PRI and PRD, with PAN indicating the excluded 
category. The PRI category receives value of “1” if the governor belongs to the PRI; 
otherwise, it is “0.” Likewise, the PRD category receives a value of “1” if the gov-
ernor belongs to the PRD; otherwise, it is “0.” These two categories will be com-
pared to the excluded category, PAN.  In Colombia’s case, given its multi-party 
system, it becomes difficult to classify all small parties within the left-right contin-
uum. Historically, Colombia maintained a two-party system. But in the last two 
decades, dissidents from the traditional parties have created many small and new 
parties, numbering 59 in the Congressional elections held in March 2006. Therefore, 
we created a dummy variable for the conservative category and compared it with the 
base category, in which we group liberal and leftist parties. For both countries, we 
assessed margin of victory in the gubernatorial as the difference in percentage 
points between the winner and the runner-up.
For both countries, we also controlled for other economic, fiscal, and sociodemo-
graphic factors. For the Colombian case, we specifically controlled for GDP per 
capita, and state royalties and total state revenues, both of which are reported per 
capita to make these measures comparable across units. We also controlled for the 
percentage of rural population per state. Given Colombia’s long-lasting armed con-
flict, we included a proxy of violence as the number of internally displaced people 
per 1000 inhabitants. These data were obtained by aggregating municipal figures 
from the Panel Municipal del CEDE (2014).
Fig. 7.9 Uncodified knowledge of Mexican and Colombian Governors by level of public experi-
ence. Source: Design by authors
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For the Mexican case, we control for four factors. First, we created a dummy 
variable, receiving “1” if the governor was a substitute, rather than an elected offi-
cial. Given the Mexican experience with violence derived from drug wars, we con-
trol for the rate of homicides per capita. We obtained these data from INEGI. Finally, 
we control for state income per capita and percentage of rural population, data we 
also obtained from INEGI. In Tables 7.1 and 7.2, we provide descriptive statistics 
for Mexico and Colombia, respectively.
 Results
We used a two-way fixed effects model to elicit the effect of our independent vari-
ables on secondary education provision and infant mortality rate (IMR). This 
method allows us to control for inherent, unobservable differences among the states/
Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics for Mexican States (1995–2010)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Independent variables
  High school enrollment 52.52 11.70 22.40 99.90
  Infant mortality rate 12.70 4.55 3.00 33.18
Governors’ codified knowledge
  Postgraduate degree (dummy) 0.26 0.44 0 1
Governors’ uncodified knowledge
  Local experience (years) 2.06 2.56 0 11
  State experience (years) 6.62 5.68 0 27
  Federal experience (years) 9.84 9.03 0 38
  Private sector experience (dummy) 0.35 0.48 0 1
Political factors
Partisanship
  Governor-State Deputies (%) 0.44 0.10 0.05 0.81
  Governor-Federal Deputies (%) 0.39 0.15 0.10 0.62
  Governor-Minister of Health (dummy) 0.10 0.30 0 1
  Governor-Minister of Education (dummy) 0.36 0.48 0 1
Party ideology
  PAN (dummy) 0.23 0.42 0 1
  PRD (dummy) 0.13 0.34 0 1
  PRI (dummy) 0.64 0.48 0 1
Margin of electoral victory (%) 17.88 17.57 0.53 81.32
Controls
  Substitute Governors 0.05 0.22 0 1
  Homicides/capita (absolute number) 2.64 2.29 0.31 24.31
  State revenues/capita (in millions) 6.58 3.85 0.54 20.20
  Rural population (absolute number) 761,426.60 693,358.30 22.85 2,976,060
Note. Source: Design by authors
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departments, as well as for general shocks over time. The standard errors are robust 
and clustered at the state/department level. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) sug-
gests that multi-collinearity is not an issue.
In Table 7.3, we report estimations for our two measures of performance in the 
32 Mexican states from 1995–2010. Observations number 512 in each model. In 
explaining high school enrollment (model 1), postgraduate degree (codified knowl-
edge) does not reach statistical significance. From our measures of uncodified 
knowledge, only private sector experience is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
and in the expected direction. States whose governors come to office with previous 
private sector experience tend to exhibit 1.47 percentage points less in high school 
enrollment than states whose governors do not have that experience. In model 1, 
none of our measures of partisan alignment reaches statistical significance. Of our 
control variables, homicides and state income per capita are statistically significant 
at the 0.10 and 0.05 level, respectively.
Model 2 of Table 7.3 shows results for our health outcome. According to these 
results, the governor’s codified knowledge does not explain IMR. Governors’ previ-
ous experiences in  local, state, and federal government achieve statistically 
Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics for Colombian departments (2004–2013)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
  High school enrollment (%) 64.83 14.50 27.66 91.82
  Infant mortality rate 16.90 7.40 6.91 47.29
Governors’ codified knowledge
  Postgraduate degree (=1) 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Governors’ uncodified knowledge
  Local experience (years) 3.24 4.06 0.00 20.00
  State experience (years) 3.50 4.83 0.00 25.00
  National experience (years) 3.11 5.06 0.00 24.00
  Private experience (years) 2.75 6.92 0.00 40.00
Political factors
Partisanship
  Governor-State Deputies (%) 24.12 17.33 0.00 87.50
  Governor-National Representatives (%) 7.49 6.65 2.00 36.00
  Minister of Education (=1) 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
  Minister of Health (=1) 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Ideology
  Conservative Governor (=1) 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Margin of victory (%) 15.41 15.84 0.05 81.09
Controls
  Displaced people (per 1000) 8.76 8.28 0.31 51.18
  Revenue/capita (millions of COP) 0.72 0.55 0.19 3.09
  GDP/capita (millions of COP) 7.16 4.33 2.24 25.18
  Rural population density (per sq. km) 31.26 79.41 0.33 480.39
Note. Source: Design by authors
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Table 7.3 Explaining state performance in Mexican States (1995–2010)
(1). School Enrollment (2) IMR
Governors’ codified knowledge’
  Postgraduate degree (dummy) −0.800 −0.016
(0.532) (0.040)
Governors’ uncodified knowledge’
  Local experience (years) 0.076 −0.011*
(0.155) (0.006)
  State experience (years) 0.074 −0.010**
(0.055) (0.003)
  Federal experience (years) −0.045 0.006**
(0.039) (0.003)
  Private sector experience (dummy) −1.470* 0.110**
(0.735) (0.037)
Political factors: Partisanship
  Governor-State Deputies (%) −0.477 0.196
(2.844) (0.148)
  Governor-Federal Deputies (%) 2.744 −0.260*
(2.395) (0.142)
  Governor-Minister of Health (dummy) −0.098*
(0.050)
  Governor-Minister of Education (dummy) −0.871
(0.755)
Party ideology
  PRD −0.620 0.134*
(1.572) (0.076)
  PRI −0.809 0.149**
(1.049) (0.043)
Margin of electoral victory −0.014 0.002
(0.023) (0.002)
Controls
  Substitute Governor 1.095 0.033
(1.052) (0.062)
  Homicides/capita (lg) −1.658* 0.095**
(0.837) (0.033)
  State revenues/capita −0.967** 0.015
(0.299) (0.010)
  Rural population (lg) −0.068 0.015*
(0.124) (0.008)




Note. Source: Design by authors
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p<.001 
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significant effects on IMR at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively. Holding all else 
constant, experience at the local and state government decreases IMR. One addi-
tional year of experience at the local level decreases IMR by 0.011, and one addi-
tional year of experience at the state level decreases IMR by 0.010. In contrast, one 
additional year of experience at the federal level increases IMR by 0.006. Likewise, 
private sector experience is associated with worse health outcomes. Specifically, 
states whose governors took office with private sector experience have an IMR 
higher by 0.11 IMR on average than states whose governors arrived without private 
sector experience. Governors’ partisanship with federal deputies exhibits statistical 
significance at the 0.10 level. A 1% increase of federal deputies aligned with gover-
nors’ party decreases IMR in 0.26. Similarly, partisan alignment with the minister 
of health at the federal level decreases IMR in 0.098 and this coefficient is statisti-
cally significant at the 0.10 level. Another political factor that affects our health 
outcome is political ideology. Compared to PAN (conservative) governors, states 
with governors representing PRD (left) and PRI (center) ideologies have on average 
higher levels of IMR. Of our controls, homicides per capita and rural populations 
are both associated with higher levels of IMR, as their coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.
In addition, Table 7.4 reports estimations for our two measures of performance 
in the 32 Colombian departments during 2004–2013. Observations number 273 in 
each model. In explaining high school enrollment (model 1), neither governors’ 
codified nor uncodified knowledge (postgraduate) reach statistical significance. 
Moreover, none of the political factors serves to explain variation in high school 
enrollment. Two control factors, GDP/capita and rural population, do reach statisti-
cal significance with the expected direction. Specifically, states with higher GDP/
capita and lower rural population exhibit higher enrollment in high school, holding 
everything else constant.
In explaining the IMR health outcome for Colombian departments, according to 
Table 7.4, model 2, governors’ codified knowledge fails to reach statistical signifi-
cance. From our measures of uncodified knowledge, only experience at the state 
level is statistically significant at the 0.10 level and in the expected direction. That 
is, states whose governors come to office with previous state-level experience tend 
to exhibit 0.07 percentage points more in high school enrollment than states whose 
governors come to office without state experience. None of the political factors 
explains variation in high school enrollment in Colombian departments. Finally, 
none of our control measures reaches statistical significance. Of our control vari-
ables, homicides and state income per capita are statistically significant at the 0.10 
and 0.05 level, respectively.
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Table 7.4 Explaining subnational performance in Colombian Departments (2004–2013)
(1) High School Enrollment (2) IMR
Governors’ codified knowledge
  Postgraduate degree (=1) 0.745 0.0466
(0.757) (0.486)
Governors’ uncodified knowledge
  Local experience (years) −0.00973 −0.0218
(0.0962) (0.0799)
  State experience (years) 0.121 0.0757*
(0.0768) (0.0411)
  National experience (years) −0.0222 0.0109
(0.0640) (0.0318)
  Private experience (years) 0.0121 0.0553
(0.0394) (0.0444)
Political factors – Partisanship
  Governor-State Deputies (%) −0.0247 −0.0267
(0.0291) (0.0246)
  Governor-Nat. Representativas 0.0444 −0.00637
(0.290) (0.118)
  Minister of Education (=1) −1.557
(2.466)
  Minister of Health (=1) −0.601
(1.236)
Political factors – Ideology
  Conservative Governor (=1) 1.469 0.203
(1.470) (0.654)
Electoral competitiveness
  Margin of victory (%) 0.000896 0.0312
(0.0281) (0.0261)
Controls
  Displaced people (lg) 0.397 −0.198
(0.388) (0.826)
  Revenue/capita (millions COP) 1.404 −2.447
(1.269) (2.607)
  GDP/capita (millions COP) 0.570** 0.140
(0.248) (0.198)
  Rural population (lg) −24.03* −2.333
(12.03) (12.03)




Note. Source: Design by authors
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.001
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 Discussions and Conclusions
This chapter seeks to explain governance performance at the subnational level in 
terms of educational output (high school enrollment) and a health outcome (IMR). 
In doing so, we suggest states CEOs’ codified and uncodified knowledge contribute 
to state/province performance. We test the explanatory power of governors’ knowl-
edge against political factors, such as partisanship, electoral competitiveness, and 
government ideology, while controlling for other state-level factors. The suggested 
explanations tested are two data sets derived from the 32 Mexican states and the 32 
Colombian departments.
Results are inconsistent across both countries and the two indicators of state/
department performance. For instance, although few factors seem to explain high 
school enrollment across both countries, some differences are still worth mention-
ing. In the Mexican case, governors’ prior experience in the private sector is nega-
tively correlated to high school enrollment. On the other hand, in the Colombian 
case, neither governors’ education nor their experience type is statistically corre-
lated to high school enrollment. The lack of statistical significance suggests other 
factors, not taken into account in this study, may explain state/department variation 
in high school enrollment.
In explaining the IMR health outcome, results show large inconsistencies across 
both countries. Specifically, although IMR is positively correlated with governors’ 
federal and private-sector experience in the Mexican case, none of these drivers is 
statistically correlated with IMR in the Colombian case. Likewise, although gover-
nors’ local and state experience seems to be negatively correlated with high school 
enrollment in the Mexican case, governors’ state experience is positively correlated 
with IMR in the Colombian case. This inconsistency in results calls for caution 
when interpreting results. Although the operationalization of variables is consistent 
across both countries, intra-country variation in terms of aggregation of data and 
other standard mechanisms may still be an issue.
The results seem to provide more support for the role of political factors in 
explaining state/department performance, but only for the Mexican case. Hence, 
scholars have emphasized the power of partisanship, especially in settings where the 
distribution of resources is contingent on political ties. Our results suggest that 
political factors play no role in explaining high school enrollment or IMR in the 
Colombian case. However, in the Mexican case, as expected, governors’ partisan-
ship with federal deputies and with the minister of health tends to reduce 
IMR.  Moreover, party government also serves to explain state performance, but 
only in the Mexican case. States whose governors are ideologically affiliated with 
the PRD and PRI tend to report higher IMR, compared to governors affiliated to the 
PAN, considered a right-wing party. In the Colombian case, conservative governors 
do not perform statistically differently from governors affiliated to other parties in 
terms of education or health. Given the lack of party discipline and the multi-party 
system, party ideology in Colombia does not seem to be a good predictor of gover-
nance performance.
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Our study has limitations. First, more indicators of performance are needed to 
fully assess the role of governors’ knowledge on performance. Implementation of 
different policies/programs require different skills, knowledge, and experience. 
Therefore, future studies should assess state performance in other policy areas. 
Secondly, our study disregards the role of organization capacity, in terms of human 
resources, on state/department performance. Data unavailability impedes us from 
testing the explanatory power of organizational capacity. Finally, our study is lim-
ited to two countries. Although our study is one of the first comparative studies in 
governance performance, future research should replicate this study across other 
countries in the region.
The two-country study presented here conveys three broad lessons. First, what 
drives performance in one country may not hold the same explanatory power in 
another country. Hence, what serves to explain performance in Mexican states dif-
fers from the reasons boosting performance in Colombian departments. This finding 
highlights the importance of refraining from extrapolating conclusions to different 
contexts. Second, what boosts performance in one policy area may not do so in 
another policy area. Although governors’ uncodified knowledge (experience) does 
explain health performance in Mexican states, leaders’ uncodified knowledge fails 
to improve educational outputs. Third, although political factors (e.g., partisanship 
and party ideology) help explain performance in Mexican states, demographic and 
socioeconomic factors (GDP and rural population) do so in the Colombian 
departments.
In sum, with this study we provide one of the few comparative tests of the role of 
chief executives’ knowledge on governance in an understudied region. We are cau-
tious about generalizing results based on our findings. What works in a country in a 
particular policy area may not work in another country in the same policy area. 
Indeed, additional research should explore the contingences to governors’ traits- 
performance relationship. Although governors are the decision-makers at the subna-
tional level, implementation of their decisions is outside of their control, for it takes 
place outside of their realm. In such case, characteristics of administrative personnel 
and street-level bureaucrats may moderate the performance-governors’ codified and 
uncodified knowledge relationship. In addition, given the considerable differences 
between Colombian and Mexican governors’ education attainments and experi-
ences, future studies should explore whether party system, electoral rules, and/or 
campaign rules contribute to explain the type of politicians’ traits in a particular 
country. The above research is needed to gain a better understanding of the work-
ings of subnational governments, for they are important actors in service delivery in 
regions where performance improvement is desperately needed.
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of Geographical Knowledge in Forest Fire 
Risk Management in Chile as a Challenge 
for Governance
Michael Handke
With their annual reports, large and integrated forestry companies and insurance 
companies in Chile signal specific knowledge and a sophisticated language on the 
value of risk to the financial markets (Kalthoff, 2005). In the course of this, they 
have developed their own way of risk communication, which decouples risk from its 
geographical context. This is remarkable in that forestry activities are initially 
deeply rooted into physical space and socially embedded in regional communities.
In January 2017, Chile experienced the worst forestry calamity in recent history. 
More than 120 simultaneous wildfires in the O’Higgins, Maule, and Biobio regions 
affected nearly 467,000 hectares of native forest and tree plantations (CONAF, 
2017). While the real ecological and economic damage caused by the fires was sig-
nificant and had far-reaching social consequences for many people, the associated 
financial losses on the timber markets proved to be manageable. Economic players 
spread it among themselves on several shoulders. Empresas CMPC S.A., for exam-
ple, a multinational holding company of Chilean origin, a paper manufacturer, and 
also the country’s second largest forestry company, announced that the plantation 
property affected by the fires reached approximately 19,000 hectares, equivalent to 
US$73 million of economic damage. However, CMPC also assured that the timber 
supply for plant operations remained unaffected and that the financial stability of 
the company was not at risk  (CMPC, 2018). In retrospect, insurance companies 
with whom CMPC had signed insurance policies compensated up to US$17 million 
of the damage. The Chilean insurance sector reported similar outcomes. HDI 
Seguros S. A., for example, the fourth-largest insurance company in Chile and an 
innovator in forest fire insurance policies, recorded losses due to the catastrophe 
amounting to US$20.2 million, of which 17.2 million (or 85%) were still covered 
by reinsurance contracts (HDI, 2018). Statements like these make clear that from an 
economic point of view it is possible to decouple the physical dimension of the risk 
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(i.e., the occurrence of forest fire events in space) from its economic (i.e., the losses 
of forested areas) and financial dimension (i.e., profit warnings).
The risk management of the Chilean forest companies combines hierarchical 
orders with abstract market mechanisms: On the one hand, forestry companies reduce 
the probability of wildfire occurrence and the magnitude of losses with modern stan-
dards of tree-plantation management that include, among other things, the mainte-
nance of watchtowers and the employment of fire brigades. With their sophisticated 
forest logistics, they are able to extract timber resources even from burnt trees. 
Hierarchical orders are executed in space trough corporate routines (see also Perrow, 
1986, 1972; or Becker & Knudsen, 2005). On the other hand, they apply a market 
solution of risk management as they purchase insurance policies and other services 
from the financial markets that allow them to individual hedge the risk of economic 
losses (Chichilnisky & Heal, 1998). Insurance transforms risk into a commercial 
good. The insured pays an insurance premium to compensate the insurer for assuming 
the risk. In other words: The insured gives up part of his profits and turns incalculable 
uncertainties into calculable stability (Dean,  Doyle, & Ericson, 2003; Freeman & 
Kunreuther, 1997). Insurance markets as an instrument of risk management to reduce 
the economic vulnerability of social actors have gained importance in Chile in recent 
years (Cifuentes, Desormeaux, & González, 2002; Loewe, Corti, Ruiz, & Lobo, 2017).1
The strategies and practices of dealing with forest fire risks in Chile are a proper 
object of conceptual and empirical research (Úbeda & Sarricolea, 2016)—espe-
cially from an economic geographical perspective. When aggregated figures that 
primarily contain economic indicators express the magnitudes of risks decoupled 
from their geographical context, it is no longer easy to understand how wildfires 
occurred in first place and what additional socio-economic consequences they might 
have for the people living in forestry regions. Quantification is useful for the eco-
nomic control of risks, but it restricts knowledge about risk (Beck, 1992; Luhmann, 
1991/1993; Viscusi & Magat, 1987). A society that relies mainly on economic risk 
management practices consequently loses its ability to respond appropriately to 
changing causes and consequences of risk (Rosa, Renn, & McCright, 2014).
The devastating forest fires in Chile in early 2017 have certainly increased the 
society’s overall sensitivity to this kind of risk scenario. They uncovered the vulner-
ability of various stakeholders in society and their powerlessness in making real 
decisions about risks. While the risk management of forestry and insurance compa-
nies mainly takes place behind closed doors, whereby annual balance sheets signal 
that forest fires are economically controllable, other affected stakeholders are strug-
gling to deal with the consequences. This not only raises the question of how a 
society should deal with risk in appropriate ways; simultaneously, there is a growing 
interest in opening the black box of the companies’ internal risk management 
systems to screen them for unintended negative external effects (Bottaro, Roco, 
Pettenella, Micheletti, & Vanhulst, 2018; van Dam, 2006).
1 As Chile is frequently hit by natural disasters, the country’s insurance industry is required by law 
to make use of reinsurance. This regulation aims at both stimulating the national insurance market 
and making it more predictable and financially stable.
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The extent to which markets and hierarchical types of risk management (and the 
corresponding risk knowledge) are suitable for improving forest fire risk prevention 
in the Chilean society as a whole or, generally speaking, for increasing society’s 
resilience to risk, which is the concern of the broader concept of risk governance, 
remains an open question that motivates the following analysis. How can actors 
utilize hierarchical and market approaches to risk management jointly in the process 
of risk governance?
Risk management and risk governance are not the same. The differences lie not 
only in the perspective of the involved actors (individual versus collective risk han-
dling) or in the time horizon underlying the risk practices (short-term versus long- 
term orientation), but above all in the production and usage of sophisticated risk 
knowledge: Risks arise in knowledge, and therefore in knowledge they can be 
reduced, enlarged or simply eliminated from consciousness (Beck, 1992). A per-
spective of risk knowledge, therefore, not only promises to clarify the differences 
between management and governance but also the interrelations between different 
risk management practices.
By revealing the strengths and weaknesses in the interaction between hierarchi-
cal and market forms of forest fire risk management in Chile and focusing on the 
epistemological challenges related to the geographical (de-)contextualization of 
risks, in this paper I contribute to a better understanding of the societal benefits and 
challenges of explicitly regional risk governance approaches. Those approaches, 
however, have yet to be put in practice in Chile.
I proceed in four parts. Following this introduction, I use the first section to 
explain and justify the relevance of the research problem concerning the challenges 
of different knowledge perspectives in dealing with risks. I make an explicit distinc-
tion between risk management and a risk governance perspective. In the second 
section, I analyze the different characteristics of forest fires in Chile. Applying the 
risk governance approach of Rosa et al. (2014, see also Chap. 5 by Renn), I argue 
that the relationships between wildfires’ causes and effects are epistemologically 
complex, ambiguous, and uncertain. I make it clear that a deliberate spatiotemporal 
view is needed to understand these relationships and to be able to react to evolving 
risk situations. In the third section, I then contrast these findings with an analysis of 
the management practice of forestry and insurance companies in dealing with wild-
fire risks in Chile. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with forest owners and 
executives of insurance companies conducted between 2014 and 2019, I examine 
how hierarchical and market-based forms of risk management complement each 
other and, in parallel, limit the use of risk knowledge. It becomes clear that where 
specific knowledge is lacking or too expensive to produce, actors adopt risk avoid-
ance strategies rather than investing in collective learning processes. In the fourth 
section I interpret these risk management practices as a decontextualization of risk 
and risk knowledge that stands in the way of a more collective and regional approach 
of forest fire risk governance. The paper concludes with a call for a broader and 
explicitly geographical perspective of wildfire risk governance in Chile.
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 The Challenges of Governing Economic Uncertainties
Researchers use the notion of risk to describe the contrast between reality and possi-
bility (Hacking, 1990) and refer to a future that is visible only through the eyes of the 
present. People who take risks know that their decisions are accompanied by several 
possible consequences, but only when the risk actually turns into losses are they aware 
of its true characteristics and consequences. In the meantime, actors use discursive 
risk knowledge to shape (and strategically manipulate) the ideas and perceptions of 
risk that circulate in society (González-Hidalgo & Zografos, 2017; Martin, Martin, & 
Kent, 2009). Risks are real phenomena that are simultaneously socially constructed 
and discursively amplified. Actors must therefore grasp, assess, and manage the use of 
sophisticated and interdisciplinary knowledge (Rosa et al., 2014), which also places 
high demands on knowledge for governance (Glückler, Rehner, & Handke, 2019).
From an economic point of view, the future’s unpredictability is nothing to be 
intimidated by. Risks are part of entrepreneurial ventures and promise above- 
average returns. Whoever succeeds in controlling risks better than others will be 
prosperous in the market (Clark, 2018; Knight, 1921). With this line of argument, it 
is easy to ignore that individual decisions about risk in the economy most often 
coincide with external effects for other social stakeholder. Forest fire risks are no 
exception. Certain tree-plantation management practices, for example, which are 
associated with varying degrees of accident probability, can trigger forest fire 
events, which, under certain climatic conditions, can quickly spread from their loca-
tion of origin to neighboring areas and even endanger human settlements as they 
burn through the landscape (Bottaro et al., 2018). Many may suffer losses, even if 
they did not originally take any decisions on risk. While risk managers can easily 
justify economic losses due to risk in retrospect—by simply referring to the limited 
knowledge of risk that was available at the time of the decision and assure the best 
possible precautionary handling of it (Luhmann, 1991/1993)—other social stake-
holders have greater difficulties in explaining and enforcing their positions. Social 
responsibilities in risk taking often remain unclarified.
Incomplete knowledge about risks, unintended side effects, and other “unknown 
unknowns” (Beck, 2006, p. 335), which can be summarized under the term systemic 
risk, are fundamental challenges for risk governance (Rosa et al., 2014). Ultimately, 
the way knowledge of risk is communicated determines the success or failure of 
management and governance practices. Yet, what exactly are the differences 
between them?
In general, risk management aims at objectively defining probable outcomes of 
decision making in order to reduce uncertainty to a list of probable events (follow-
ing Beckert, 2016). More specifically, organizational risk management guides and 
legitimizes decision-making processes at the management level of a corporation and 
helps coordinating the available resources in pursuit of strategic objectives 
(Lundqvist, 2015; Soin & Collier, 2013). Risk from the point of view of an enter-
prise is technically regarded as a cost factor, where the probabilities of harmful 
events’ occurrences are offset against the value of expected losses (Knight, 1921). 
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Risk managers calculate risks by making use of historic and quantifiable data. 
Nowadays, sophisticated risk models allow risk management to be based on indi-
vidual decisions made by experts who aim at maximizing profit or—to put it differ-
ently—reducing the company’s vulnerability. Risk management is short- to 
medium-term in nature depending on the forecasting capability of the available 
risk models.
The perspective of risk governance broadens the scope of the actors involved in 
risk management and their relations towards each other. From a societal perspec-
tive, governance in general terms serves to coordinate the collective actions of 
legally independent stakeholders toward the achievement of consensual goals. It 
extends beyond the scope of a single authority and requires negotiation between 
vested interests (Glückler et al., 2019). Risk governance, in particular, covers pro-
cesses that lead to collectively binding decisions and the establishment of legiti-
mized risk-management standards and practices that help to regulate, reduce, or 
control collective problems of risk (Crouch & Keune, 2012; Renn, 2008; van Asselt 
& Renn, 2011). In this sense, researchers of risk governance analyze the institu-
tional structures, power constellations between various stakeholders, and political 
processes in society. Governance is a collective learning process with a long-term 
time horizon. It focuses on context-specific collective solutions aimed at increasing 
the resilience of societal stakeholders (Young, 2010).
The challenges of risk governance are clearly associated with the complexity, 
ambiguity, and/or uncertainty of knowledge about risk (Rosa et  al., 2014). Only 
rarely can actors comprehensively describe and calculate risk via linear correla-
tions. Complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty are attributes of risks that—if empiri-
cally distinguishable—imply different governance mechanisms. Therefore, risk 
governance uncovers and negotiates dissimilar risk interpretations and creates new 
knowledge to deal with inconclusive and unknown risk correlations.
How can risk management and risk governance practices beneficially comple-
ment each other in the context of forest fire risk? Perhaps they stand in each other’s 
way because of their incommensurable handling of knowledge about risk? In the 
following I draw attention to these unanswered questions and apply them to the 
empirical case of Chile‘s risk-laden forestry sector.
 Methodology
In order to address the aforementioned questions, I process the findings from several 
empirical studies on risk in the Chilean forestry and timber industry. These studies 
were conducted between 2014 and 2018 as part of different seminar courses in the 
M.Sc. Governance of Risk and Resources Master’s program at the Heidelberg 
Center for Latin America. The courses contrasted theoretical insights into risk gov-
ernance with the practical efforts of economic actors in dealing with real risk phe-
nomena. From the outset, the empirical investigations aimed at recording the 
context-related risk perceptions of different actors exposed to wildfires and 
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analyzing their influence on joint efforts in dealing with them regionally. 
Interestingly, the many surveyed actors rarely perceived forest fires in Chile as a 
collective risk. Individual efforts to minimize economic losses predominate.
Since wildfires cannot be assessed by deterministic or probabilistic hypotheses 
alone, a triangulation of different methods of qualitative social research proved to be 
appropriate for the collection of the empirical data (Flick, 2018): (i) First and fore-
most, I based this contribution on an extensive evaluation of scientific literature on 
forest fire risks in Chile. In this way, I was able on the one hand to shed light on the 
fundamental interdisciplinary complexity of the relationships between causes and 
effects in wildfires. On the other hand, I could get familiar with the way in which 
scientific knowledge on wildfires is reduced and generalized in contemporary risk 
models. (ii) I supplemented the literature review with a content analysis of discur-
sive arguments on the causes and effects of forest fires, as they are discussed in 
Chilean trade journals such as Lignum, Revista Mundo Forestal, and Revista CIFOR, 
or in the general press.2 I included more than 250 newspaper articles and reports on 
forest fires in Chile that occurred between 2008 and 2018 in my analysis. This not 
only provided additional insights into the region-specific particularities of forest fire 
risks, but also confirmed the wide spread of strongly generalized explanations of the 
phenomenon of forest fires. Both indicate the discursive use of knowledge on risk 
(van Dijk, 2014). (iii) Thirdly, I have included an analysis the official Chilean forest 
fire statistics (CONAF, 2018) as well as an evaluation of the annual reports of the 
large Chilean forestry companies in the present study to highlight the regional diver-
sity and temporal variability of risk. The statistics clearly reveal the quantitative 
extent of individual catastrophic wildfire events, which vary greatly from year to 
year and from region to region. They also differentiate between different affected 
parties (owners of natural forests versus owners of plantation forest of different 
size). (iv) Finally, I based this contribution on 25 expert interviews with risk manag-
ers from insurance companies in Santiago de Chile and economic actors at risk in 
the Chilean forest regions (primarily in the Maule and Biobio regions). I conducted 
the interviews as open, guideline-based interviews.
Precisely because different economic actors perceive forest fire risk differently—
depending on their contextual experiences—and evaluate and communicate it dif-
ferently—depending on the use of risk-calculating methods—it is necessary to 
survey these risk experts and their interactions with each other as an additional 
object of investigation. Contextually differentiated risk knowledge influences the 
risk behavior of these actors in many ways (Müller-Mahn, Everts, & Stephan, 2018). 
Ultimately, it determines the possibilities to develop a collective view on risk as the 
result of governance efforts.
2 These include national newspapers such as www.elmercurio.com; www.latercera.com; www.
elmostrador.cl; www.cnnchile.com, but also regional media such as www.diarioelcentro.cl; www.
redmaule.com; www.diarioconcepcion.cl; www.biobiochile.cl. Only online articles from these 
newspapers were analyzed. Critical online news portals such as www.terram.cl; www.mapuex-
press.org; www.laizquierdadiario.cl were also included in the research.
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Qualitative research does not end with a comparison of the collected data with 
the aim of explaining similarities between the units of research. Rather, it uncovers 
phenomena and associated variants for which case-specific explanations have to be 
developed (Crang, 2002). With my qualitative research approach, I was able to 
uncover contradictions and decode the relationship between realities and interpreta-
tions of risk (see also Eisenhardt, 1989). Contradictions in knowledge and practices 
are manifold when it comes to forest fire risks in Chile.
 Complexity, Ambiguity, Uncertainty? Forest Fire Risks 
in Chile
Wildfires are typical for Mediterranean climate zones that are characterized by mild 
and rainy springs that are followed by dry summers. They are also a natural phe-
nomenon in several regions in south-central Chile (McWethy et al., 2018). Wildfires 
are eminently spatial: They have an unmistakably definable place of origin from 
which they extend by geophysical laws to nearby spaces. However, nowadays they 
are mainly man-made phenomena. In many cases, they are caused by carelessness, 
accidents, or even arbitrary arson (O'Flanagan, 1997). In this sense, wildfires repre-
sent negative externalities of the expansion of human activities.
In Fig. 8.1, I provide an overview of the frequency of wildfire events in Chile 
since the 1990s. On average, almost 6,000 forest fires occur in the course of a year 
and around ten hectares of forested land are lost per event. Two thirds of the affected 
areas are natural landscapes such as natural forests, shrubs, and grasslands. However, 
plantation forests are also affected, and this trend is rising (Julio, 2014). Most 
recently, a drought phase that lasted several years led to the biggest forest fires in 
Chilean history (González, Gómez-González, Lara, Garreaud, & Díaz-Hormazábal, 
2018). The overall dimension of destructiveness of the latest “firestorm” (Gobierno 
de Chile, 2017) in terms of burned areas stands out in Fig. 8.1.
To some extent, researchers can assess the risk of wildfires with linear correla-
tions that refer to physical-geographical conditions (Castillo,  Molina- 
Martínez, Rodríguez y Silva, & Julio, 2013). In the jargon of forestry authorities, 
who monitor the wildfire risk, one speaks for example of the rule of 30-30-30. The 
rule says that temperatures above 30 °C, gusts of wind of the order of 30 km/h or 
more, and a relative humidity of less than 30% raises the risk of wildfires signifi-
cantly. It is undisputed that under extreme weather conditions wildfires are hard to 
control and can quickly expand into neighboring spaces. On the basis of these find-
ings, authorities then may publish timely risk warnings to raise public awareness of 
the potential hazard. Topography has another direct effect on the speed at which 
forest fires spread. The steeper the slope, the greater the flames’ inclination, which 
increases heat development on the ground and allows biomass to burn faster and 
more intensively. This knowledge is of practical importance in firefighting 
(Vélez, 2009).
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However, natural factors alone cannot fully explain the extent of forest fires in 
Chile (Gómez-González et al., 2019). They may explain the size and spread of the 
flames and therefore the damage dimension of the risk. The occurrence and causes 
of fires, however, usually have an anthropogenic background. Risk analyses, for 
example, reveal the highest probabilities of forest fires occurring near settlements 
and along road networks (Martínez, Martínez, & Martín, 2004). There, man is reck-
less in treating nature. Land use forms and the compositions of tree species in 
Chile’s economically exploited forests plantations influence on the dimension of 
forest fire risk as well. This relationship, however, is anything but conclusively clar-
ified (see, e.g., the controversial debate published in Mundo Forestal by Goméz- 
González & Espósito, 2017). To be able to capture the phenomena of forest fires in 
Chile, researchers must consider both physical geographical and anthropogenic 
contextual factors jointly. Interdisciplinary research is indispensable, which, how-
ever, leads to challenges of complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty of knowledge 
about risk (Rosa et al., 2014).
It is very common in the risk management literature to describe risks as complex, 
ambiguous, and uncertain in order to differentiate them epistemologically (Brugnach 
& Ingram, 2012; Cabantous, 2007; Ericson & Doyle, 2004; Ilin & Varga, 2015; 
Johansen & Rausand, 2015; Knight, 1921; Müller-Mahn et al., 2018; Perrow, 1986, 
1972). In short, the three characteristics of risk can be distinguished as follows (see 
also Rosa et al., 2014): Complexity characterizes a condition where it is difficult to 
identify and quantify exactly the potential causal relationships between aspects of 
risk and possible adverse effects of decision making on risk. Ambiguity corresponds 
to the phenomenon that various actors know risk differently, resulting in a 
Fig. 8.1 The evolution of forest fire events and damage in Chile from 1994–2017. Source: Design 
by author. Data: Own calculations based on CONAF (2018)
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variability of legitimate risk interpretations with respect to observations and evalu-
ations of identical data. Uncertainty refers to unknown knowledge about certain 
causal relationships. That includes not knowing what one does not know.
One way of dealing with these challenges is through regulation. Standards and 
norms help actors reduce complexity, clarify ambiguities, and improve the reliabil-
ity of mutual expectations (North, 1990). In Chile, for example, in 2015 the National 
Institute for Standardization published the norm NCh3380 that aimed at uniformly 
measuring wildfire risks (INN, 2015). The norm establishes a terminology and clas-
sification of risks of forest fires in plantations, for which it defines and delimits 
spatially different levels of risks, based on the evaluation of probabilities of occur-
rence and the different impacts caused by wildfires. The norm consolidates interdis-
ciplinary knowledge and is considered “[…] applicable to any existing forest 
plantation in the country, regardless of the species it contains, size, location, among 
others” (INN, 2015, p. 2). This, however, raises a new challenge. Although the norm 
covers geographically correlated aspects of risk and makes them comparable, it 
misleads one to believe that the resulting risk models can be applied uniformly, that 
is independently of time and space. Such an approach in particular would mask and 
decontextualize the uncertain and ambiguous circumstances of the risk. Standardized 
models always entail the challenge of being able to capture evolving or systemic 
risks  (MacKenzie, 2011). Well, what exactly leads to complexity, ambiguity and 
uncertainty in relation to forest fire risks in Chile and how to deal with it?
 Complexity: Multidirectional Correlations Between Physical 
and Anthropogenic Factors
It is an obvious choice to start with the Chilean forestry sector with its specific ways 
of organizing economic activities in space (Clapp, 1995; Gatica, 2012) to illustrate 
how complex links between anthropogenic and natural factors of wildfire risks are 
created. Forestry companies, in first place, decide the composition of tree species in 
their forest plantations. They prefer exotic species such as eucalyptus or pine, as 
these are adapted to dry climatic conditions, grow rapidly, and are therefore eco-
nomically very profitable.3 However, as both species have a higher water consump-
tion than native trees, they can intensify droughts on a microgeographical scale and 
fuel the effects of fires (Little, Lara, McPhee, & Urrutia, 2009). At the same time, 
however, industrial measures of plantation management significantly reduce the 
magnitude of forest fire risk. In their quest for higher yields, forestry companies 
remove “interfering biomass” from forest plantations and thus control an important 
fire accelerator. By investing in watchtowers that they strategically place within 
their territories, they create and maintain an interconnected monitoring system that 
3 Currently, pines account for 58% of all plantation area in Chile, while eucalyptus represent 36% 
(CONAF, 2018).
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allows for wildfires being detected in time (Tapia & Castillo, 2014). The companies’ 
own fire brigades can quickly reach out to a fire’s source through laid forest paths. 
If the probability of the occurrence of fires remains constant, plantation manage-
ment measures reduce the damage dimension of risk—although this relationship is 
not linear. Many risk-increasing and risk-reducing factors cannot be measured 
simultaneously in an accurate way. This is how complexity is created, and—by the 
way—a methodological problem for many forecasting risk models (Castillo et al., 
2013). Normative assumptions on the weightings of individual factors must be cho-
sen for these models to work.
Table 8.1 summarizes regional forestry activities in Chile and illustrates the com-
plexity of the relationships between physical and anthropogenic factors of wildfire 
risks. In Chile, the probability of forest fire occurrence should actually decrease in 
the direction of the southern forest regions, as these are characterized by climatic 
conditions with lower average temperatures over the course of the year and gener-
ally record higher precipitation (Altamirano, Salas, Yaitul, Smith-Ramirez, & Ávila, 
2013). A glance at Table 8.1, however, reveals that forest fires in the south occur 
more frequently in absolute terms and measured in terms of available forest areas 
than in the northern forestry regions. It is also a fact that in the regions of Bio Bio 
and Araucanía, forest fires occur much more frequently in plantation forests than in 
natural forests. Simultaneously, however, plantation fires are significantly less 
destructive than fires that affect native forest.
The search for explanations of these findings leads to the question of who invests 
in firefighting in the first place and who decides which sources of fire are extin-
guished first when several fires occur simultaneously. Since firefighting in Chile is 
largely subject to a market in which private companies offer their services—and in 
which the economic value of the timber resources often determines the availability 
of fire brigades—it is understandable that wildfires in Chile provoke critical inter-
pretations of the country’s neoliberal forestry model (Barton & Román, 2012; Reyes 









Forested areas 2014 [hectares] 586,615 833,227 1,695,082 1,447,635
Forest plantations 2014 [hectares] 127,306 448,513 926,530 483,482
Annual fire events (annual average 
2003–2016) [absolute number]
222 437 2,499 1,006
Forest fires per 1000 hectares 0.38 0.52 1.47 0.69
[%] of events affecting plantations 1.4 15.5 59.1 56.0
Annual damage (all forests) (annual 
average 2003–2016) [hectares]
7,927 7,001 13,487 5,996
Damage to native forests [hectares by 
fire]
35.1 17.7 11.1 9.3
Damage to plantations [hectares by fire] 38.6 17.4 1.9 3.3
Note. Personal elaboration with statistical data from CONAF (2018)
M. Handke
171
& Nelson, 2014). In relation to these interpretations, the ambiguous characteristics 
of risk come into play.
 Ambiguity: The Coexistence of Several Equally Logical 
Explanations for Forest Fires in Chile
“Risks only gain influence in the social world to the extent that they are communi-
cated” (Renn, 2008, p. 57). Therefore, it is through discursive knowledge (van Dijk, 
2014) that risks are socially constructed. Those who have experienced flames that 
directly affected their livelihoods describe and explain wildfire risks differently than 
those who only look at them from a distance. Geographical knowledge of complex 
risk relationships gives profound explanatory substance to these discourses. 
However, with geographically founded, context-dependent explanations actors can 
quickly confront the distanced with supposed ambiguity.
In Chile, many different discursive explanations circulate about the origins and 
the hazardous effectiveness of forest fires. They certainly feed on the heterogeneity 
of the society’s risk knowledge. The ambiguity of risk discourses, on the one hand, 
reflects the perceived threats by different social actors (Mermoz,  Kitzberger, & 
Veblen, 2005), and on the other hand, is due to linguistic difficulties in articulating 
risk. Those who have experienced risk at first hand, often describe their experiences 
in an opportunistic way, for example, to maximize the influence on distanced politi-
cal decision makers who they want to win over to their cause (Farré, 2005). This 
may lead to interpretations related to forest fires that are artificially exaggerated and 
intentionally false. Ambiguity can thus be understood as a function of conflict over 
preferences, intersubjectivity of discourse, and uncertainty over the technical 
aspects of risk communication (Hanson & Kysar, 1999; Johansen & Rausand, 
2015). The consequential ambiguity of the discourses does not refer so much to an 
uncertain future as to the uncertainty related to past and present experiences.
Across all Chilean regions, the main causes of wildfires are accidents and the 
carelessness of man (58%). However, almost one in three fires is caused by delin-
quency, in other words, intentionally caused ignitions, while 15% of the causes of 
fires remain in the dark. It is above all the unknown and intentional causes of wild-
fires that are reported and speculated on in detail in the Chilean press (Millones, 
2017; see also the review of Aylwin, 2017).
Based on the statistics by the Chilean National Forest Cooperation (CONAF, 
2018), Table 8.2 reveals a regionally unequal distribution of the causes of the wild-
fires in Chile—especially related to fires that are intentionally started. This is also 
strongly reflected in the causal explanations one gets when asking experts and 
affected parties about the background of the arsons in Chile:
 1. Some argue that wildfires are caused by forest owners themselves in order to 
circumvent existing land-planning regulations (Caviedes, 2017). In the proxim-
ity of urban areas, for example, landowners speculate that burnt areas may be 
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designated as urban developing land that awaits construction permits. This is a 
reality in many parts of the world (Salvati & Ranalli, 2015). In Chile, these 
causes are only narratively discussed in public, since hasty accusations can have 
legal consequences.
 2. Intentional forest fires are also interpreted as a deliberate strategy of forestry 
expansion. Such interpretations, in particular, arise in communities where land-
owners subsequently reforest burned natural forests as forest plantations (Gerber, 
2011). In Chile, since the new “law on native forest recovery” (CONAF, 2008) 
came into force in 2008, forest owners are prohibited from converting natural 
forests into forest plantations with exotic tree species. However, after a fire event, 
reforestation is allowed, for example, in the form of plantations with endemic 
species. In this way, the natural forests are made accessible and transformed for 
industrial exploitation (Moreno del Valle, 2015).
 3. It is further argued that forest owners themselves burn their forests in order to 
benefit from forest fire insurances that they have purchased beforehand (Focacci, 
2017). This argument in its simple form might seem plausible but most often 
turns out to be misleading and requires detailed and contextualized explanations: 
Insurers are generally very aware of the problem of the so-called moral hazard 
(Stiglitz, 1983), in other words, the possible deliberately caused burn of an 
insured forest. Therefore, insurance companies design contracts in such a way 
that the insured always assumes part of the risk (Agroseguro, 2018). High 
deductibles, for example, lower incentives to carry out fraud. Those incentives, 
however, can be quite different for forest owners who are on the verge of ruin, for 
example, in cases where an insect calamity significantly reduced the value of a 
standing forest so that reforestation becomes necessary. Was this the case in 
2017  in certain parts of Chile’s forest regions (see, e.g., the case-specific fact 
check in Mapuexpress, 2017)? As long as the contractual conditions that forest 
companies negotiate with the insurance sector are not publicly transparent, dis-
cursive and ambiguous speculation about this kind of motivation for arson 
will last.
 4. In some cases, intentional fires in Chile are the product of deep social discontent. 
A widespread public opinion is that specifically in the Araucanía region, members 
of the Mapuche people intentionally set fires to protest against socioeconomic 









Annual fire events (annual average 
2003–2016) [absolute number]
222 437 2,499 1,006
Causes: Accidents [%] 67.5 69.3 27.7 37.6
Causes: Agricultural and forestry activities 
[%]
14.3 15.5 8.4 12.0
Causes: Arson [%] 14.4 11.0 35.7 46.5
Unknown causes [%] 3.8 4.2 28.2 3.9
Note. Personal elaboration with statistical data from CONAF (2018)
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disparities and political exclusion. Wildfires seem to have become the symbol of 
their conflict with the Chilean state (Montalba-Navarro & Carrasco, 2003; Rojas 
& Miranda, 2015). It also seems that wildfires are directly targeted against large 
forestry companies that mark land uses with their tree plantations and dictate the 
regions’ main economic activities (van Holt, Binford, Portier, & Vergara, 2016). 
As late as after colonization by the Spanish, with the country’s nationalization, 
Southern Chile experienced a capitalist appropriation and valorization of land that 
created vulnerable people and is still ongoing today (Latorre & Rojas, 2016). 
Though the accusations are made very quickly, the circumstances of wildfires in 
the Araucanía region are not at all clear. Some of them turned out to have been 
caused by the private sector and even by public officials in order to blame the 
Mapuches for the crime and thus keep the conflict over land usage alive in a dis-
cursive manner (Seguel, 2018; Sepúlveda, 2013). In this way, fires serve to justify 
forest expansion (retrospectively) (González-Hidalgo & Zografos, 2017).
The coexistence of these different discourses confronts political and economic 
actors with decision-making problems. They obscure the true motives of the actors 
behind the arsons, which leads to the uncertain characteristics of forest fire risk in 
Chile. For the insurance sector in particular, arson represents an uncertainty, in other 
words, risk that is impossible to calculate.
 Uncertainty: Hidden Self-Reinforcing Social Amplification 
of Forest Fire Risk
Unknown and uncertain risks are induced by scientific uncertainty. While in the 
case of unknown risks researchers are aware that they do not know enough, for 
example, to predict the frequency and severity of catastrophic events (Chichilnisky 
& Heal, 1998), uncertain risks remain hidden from the society’s radar for a long 
time (Beck, 1992; O’Malley, 2004). This is partly due to the fact that the causes of 
modern risks—but also their effects—are no longer confined to one place. Often 
there is also no legally identifiable entity as the perpetrator of risk. Risk decisions 
can have a long latency period before they materialize. For political actors, this is 
the main source of uncertainty: “[I]t is precisely unknown unknowns which provoke 
far-reaching conflicts over the definition and construction of political rules and 
responsibilities with the aim of preventing the worst” (Beck, 2006, p. 335).
Researchers also refer to uncertainty in risk to address processes of systemic, 
self-reinforcing risk amplification (Kaufman & Scott, 2003). Uncertain risks are 
systemic if they trigger unnoticed chain reactions. Accumulated negative externali-
ties can trigger devastating effects. In the following, I will focus on three examples 
of systemic aspects of uncertainties related to wildfire risk in Chile. They raise 
awareness of the fact that depending on the local and regional context, the occur-
rence of a forest fire in Chile can “ignite” subsequent fires and reinforce risk. The 
first example is certainly simplified, but it serves as a textbook example to illustrate 
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the underlying systemic effect empirically. In the second example I refer once again 
to the discussion of the ambivalent symbolic attributions of arson that I introduced 
in the previous chapter. In the third example I summarize a content-analytical inter-
pretation of interview statements from several empirical field studies in the Maule 
region conducted between 2015 and 2019.
 1. In individual and isolated cases in Chile, it turned out that wildfires were delib-
erately caused by young people “[…] to experience once again the spectacular 
use of airplanes or helicopters in the firefighting process” (interview with forest 
firefighters in Constitucion/Maule, 2015). This problem seems particularly rele-
vant in the transition zone between urban and forested areas. The legitimate con-
cern of this type of wildfire causes is also reflected in rulebooks that guide fire 
brigades (Vélez, 2009). Pragmatic rules stipulate that helicopter missions in the 
event of fire should be restricted to areas outside urban areas. This may be under-
stood as aimed at preventing the experienced spectacles of past fires from caus-
ing new fires in the future.
 2. Another systemic aspect of risk is evidenced in the strategic appropriation of the 
symbolic effects that fire and flames can create (Segovia, Basulto, & Zambrano, 
2018). As a social imaginary, forest fires acquire effectiveness for different 
groups in the Chilean society—even if they live far away from forested areas. 
Fires are lit repeatedly due to their medial efficacy and the sociocritical imagina-
tions originating from them, and as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
these imaginations are ambiguous in Chile. For some, they represent the struggle 
of the vulnerable against the neoliberal alliance between the state and the indus-
trialized forestry business. For others, they gain importance in justifying that the 
State takes sides and imposes even harsher control over resource peripheries 
(see also Chap. 16 by Hayter and Clapp). Different groups expect individual 
advantages from wildfires. The risk transcends the boundaries of systems when 
its effects extend from the forest landscape to the economic and political spheres 
(see also Beck, 2006).
 3. In the Maule region, where one might not expect it at first because there has been 
no open conflict over land use so far, forest fires have recently created a systemi-
cally heated atmosphere that has the potential to further increase the inherent 
risks. The explanations behind this case are as follows: Competition in the 
regional timber market in Maule is fierce. Within a radius of 30km of Constitución, 
about 60 small and medium-sized family owned sawmills compete with each 
other for access to raw timber resources. Some work as contractual suppliers for 
the large forestry companies in the region and thereby gain privileged access to 
their clients’ timber resources. Others have emancipated themselves from the big 
players in search of their own customers. In the course of time, they also have 
acquired their own forest property, which, however, is not sufficient to supply 
them with raw materials all year round. They experience that their expansion 
opportunities are limited by the supply of regional timber that turns out to be 
scarce and sensitive in price—a situation that has worsened since 2017 
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(Hechavarria, 2018). This is an important first detail in understanding the regional 
conflict and the subliminal systemic risk of forest fires that accumulates in the 
Maule region.
Speculation and mutual accusations on the causes of recent wildfires spread 
in the region: Large forest owners, for example, claim that their smaller neigh-
bors act as free-riders in the face of forest fire risk. In other words, “[…] they do 
not buy insurance and [instead] rely opportunistically on the fact that their forest 
property is observed and cared for by the large company and their fire brigades” 
(Interview  conducted with the manager of a medium-sized sawmill in San 
Ramón, March 10, 2016). This expectation would—according to the inter-
viewee—reduce smaller landowners’ incentives to actively monitor their planta-
tions. From the point of view of large forest owners, this increases the risk of a 
forest fire in their neighborhood and therefore “[…] through geographical expan-
sions, the risk of damage to our plantations is uncontrollably increased” 
(Interview conducted with the operational risk manager of a large forest com-
pany in Constitution, March 11, 2016). Implicitly, this deep concern of the large 
company gives rise to the carelessness of the small neighbors in the first place.
According to this logic, it is understandable that large forest owners in Chile 
have incentives to expand their forest ownership over a large area and in a coher-
ent manner: The less mixed the regional mosaic of forest properties, the more 
controlled the risk will be (Vergara-Díaz, Sandoval-Vásquez, & Herrera-Machuca, 
2017). In response to the discourses of the large companies that accuse small 
landowners of being opportunistic, these, in contrast, accuse the big players of not 
adequately protecting the property of their neighbors in the event of a forest fire. 
More precisely, in interviews with medium-sized forest owners in Maule in 2016, 
large forestry companies were accused of directing fire fronts towards the prop-
erty of small forest owners to avoid major damage to their own forest plantations. 
Still others claim that extensively insured forest areas stand in the way of the real 
efforts of large forestry companies to fight the flames. Of course, it is not possible 
within the framework of this contribution to resolve the absolute truth behind 
these testimonies or to confront it with the technical aspects of firefighting. It 
should be noted, however, that firefighting follows military hierarchical command 
structures and, depending on the situation, includes the right to subordinate pri-
vate property, which is otherwise very strongly protected in Chile. At least the 
narratives presented above give an idea of the subliminal conflict between small 
and large forestry actors in the Maule region. The fear of pyromaniac acts in the 
region in response to economic repression and exclusion is growing for years (see 
also the statements of economic actors quoted in Saavedra, 2017).4
4 In more recent interviews with forest owners in the Maule region, implications of the arsonists of 
the 2017 forest fires were collectively avoided. “We don’t want to make any false accusations, and 
in particular we want to hinder the discourses from Chile’s southern forest regions to reach the 
Maule region. We want to avoid the false interpretation that forest fires have become an inflicted 
result of the forest industry itself,” one sawmill owner openly admitted in an interview early 
in 2019.
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Systemic risks are uncertain until they materialize and therefore cannot be calcu-
lated ex ante (Ilin & Varga, 2015). To address them, a readjustment of risk percep-
tion is needed. In the first case, this was done, as described, by new firefighting rules 
that limit the use of actually effective helicopters to specific areas. In the second 
case, however, the systemic effect of risk remains out of reach for risk managers in 
forestry. At best, they have the option of relying on risk-avoidance strategies—that 
is to distance themselves from the neoliberal model of forestry—, which in this case 
could mean the end of their business model; and even that does not guarantee that 
other actors will not continually try to exploit the symbolic effect of forest fires. The 
interviews quoted for the third case show that regional economic actors at least 
develop a feeling for the accumulating systemic risk.
As should have become clear from the above, the epistemological challenges of 
the complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty of forest fire risk arise from the fact that 
all three characteristics are closely intertwined and lead to an obscuring of risk rela-
tionships. Against this background, it is understandable that risk managers usually 
aim at simplifying and separating the individual attributes of risk. This enables them 
to transform ambiguity or uncertainty into complexity that they can then structure 
and handle by making use of technical risk models (Ericson & Doyle, 2004). In the 
following chapter, I explain how this works in practice. While it becomes clear that 
risk management is not the same as risk governance, the chapter reveals the comple-
mentary aspects of different management practices and explores their possible uses 
in explicitly regional risk governance approaches.
 The Complementarity of Risk Management Practices
Advocates of theoretical insights from the New Institutional Economics (Furubotn 
& Richter, 2005), which are widely applied in financial risk management practices, 
proclaim markets and hierarchies as in a sense ideally opposed governance forms 
for the coordination of economic interaction. The characteristics of a transaction as 
well as the degree of asymmetrically distributed information between economic 
actors determine whether either hierarchical orders through company routines or 
market-based pricing processes under competitive conditions provide transaction- 
cost- efficient coordination. Interestingly, hierarchical and market-based forms of 
risk management are not necessarily opposed to each other, but rather mutually 
supportive. The case of risk-management practices in Chile’s forestry sector illus-
trates that a hierarchically organized risk management even can be the prerequisite 
for the emergence of and access to insurance market solutions.
To fully understand the complementary logic behind these practices, it is impor-
tant to note that forestry companies and insurers only slightly differ in their basic 
approach to risk and uncertainty. Both actors are able and willing to handle risk that 
they can calculate by themselves, and both reject uncertainty in risk management. 
Then, however: What can a market for forest fire insurances look like if the pre-
ferred and undesirable risks of both players are more or less the same? Of course, it 
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depends on the small differences in dealing with particular characteristics and 
aspects of risks. Additionally, one has to look at the uncertainty avoidance strategies 
of both actors to understand the complementary character of Chilean forest fire risk 
management practices.
For insurance companies, calculated risks undisputedly represent a core busi-
ness. Insurers are able to diversify them with the help of the law of large numbers, 
which states that the empirical reality (temporal and spatial) of risk can be aggre-
gated into mean values (Chichilnisky & Heal, 1998). Forestry companies take a 
positive view on risks as well. Correctly managed, risks promise above-average 
returns and competitiveness advantages (Lundqvist, 2015). In contrast to insurers, 
however, forestry companies have to find ways to handle causes and effects of forest 
fires individually and in context-specific ways.
Uncertainty, that is incalculable risk, is something that neither actor is looking 
for. Forestry companies and insurers alike are trying to externalize or completely 
avoid risks that are rare (and at the same time very destructive), highly specific, and 
uncertain. Large forestry companies in particular, as I showed in the previous chap-
ter with the example of systemic forest fire risks in Maule, are afraid of risks that 
“are taken” independently and opportunistically by others and that “endanger” the 
success of their own businesses in the sense of a negative externality (Luhmann, 
1991/1993). Insurance companies, in turn, do everything to avoid moral hazard 
behavior of their clients, which can even lead to the situation that there is no market 
supply for insurances at all (Hellwig, 1983; Stiglitz, 1983). This line of argumenta-
tion fits with the transaction-cost approach, whose advocates stipulate purely hier-
archical control for dealing with uncertain risks (see also Knight, 1921). How does 
the insurance market emerge when market participants share a common desire to 
waive or avoid uncertainty? The answer has to do with diverse risk management 
practices of standardization and categorization of risk in order to reduce its com-
plexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty characteristics.
 Risk Management in Chilean Forestry
In Chile‘s industrialized forestry sector, forest plantations are managed in a way that 
minimizes both the likelihood of a forest fire and the possibility of uncontrolled 
expansion. The homogenization of contextual conditions, the simplification of risk 
relationships, and the decoupling of certain risk elements go hand in hand and influ-
ence each other reciprocally: (i) The simplification of risk begins with the focus on 
certain causes of forest fires. In particular, the main cause of accidents can be mini-
mized through employee training and clear routine instructions. Routines are instru-
mental for the implementation of plantation management practices that aim at 
creating industrial economies of scale. Only a few specialists are needed to monitor 
the compliance of the routines. (ii) The decoupling of forest fires’ causes and effects 
is achieved through targeted infrastructure investments, such as the formation of 
firebreaks that slow down or stop fires that have broken out. Often, firebreaks are 
8 The (De-)Contextualization of Geographical Knowledge in Forest Fire Risk…
178
strategically created in the course of regular clear cuts. In this case, plantation man-
agement practices and infrastructure investments coincide. Furthermore, forest 
roads are a strategic investment that serves risk management purposes as they allow 
fire brigades quick access. (iii) Finally, the homogenization of the physical space 
complements the decoupling and simplification of risk relationships. The large for-
estry companies in Chile aim at a consolidated and coherent forest property. Over 
the past 40 years, they have achieved this largely through continuous acquisitions 
and forestation of tree plantations. Only few other private forest properties still sep-
arate the plantations of the large companies. Connected forested areas lead to econ-
omies of scale in forestry logistics. They can also be better monitored with fire 
protection watchtowers, which in turn further contribute to the decoupling of risks 
as fires can be quickly detected once they have broken out.
All these plantation management practices are based on combining centralized 
and decentralized risk management logics. In addition, multiple spatial references 
are evident: Complexity reduction via routines, for example, is planned and coordi-
nated hierarchically top-down from the companies’ headquarters (see also Perrow, 
1986). The site-specific implementation and monitoring of the routines, however, 
takes place in decentralized way. The watchtowers in the forest regions are an 
important node in the risk communication network. In case of a forest fire, their 
occupants communicate to neighboring units and the company headquarters alike 
so that responses can strategically be elaborated in a timely manner. In the event of 
a wildfire, military-like chains of command are activated and take control. 
Firefighters are coordinated centrally but can decide locally in order to be able to 
react quickly to changing conditions (Arnaldos, Navalón, Pastor, Planas, & Zárate, 
2004). With this combination of centralized and decentralized risk-management 
routines, actors in forestry enterprises are in a good position to react to ambiguous 
risk signals from forest regions and actively shape local practices of handling risk. 
However, through locally adapted action, they are also coresponsible for creating 
ambiguity in the interpretation of wildfire risks in Chile on a national scale.
 Risk Management in Insurance Companies
Insurance companies implement risk management practices that rely on standard-
ization and categorization based on quantification and mathematical procedures 
(Dean et al., 2003; Jarzabkowski, Bednarek, & Spee, 2015). Since quantification 
disconnects existing data from local narratives or general stories that stabilized the 
meaning of risk in the first place (Müller-Mahn et al., 2018), insurance companies 
must create their own meanings of risk. Prices in insurance markets, for example, 
are such a standard for risk quantification that also provides meaning for economic 
operations (Hayek, 1945; Kessler, 2015). Prices communicate the magnitude of the 
risk to third parties such as policyholders. Risk maps provide a similar communica-
tion frame (Dransch, Rotzoll, & Poser, 2010). Maps not only can be used to locate 
the origins of historical forest fires events and illustrate their propagation in space. 
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Loss statistics incorporated into the maps also provide insurers with a spatial over-
view of the risk’s frequency and extent. Risk maps, therefore, serve marketing pur-
poses. Insurance companies use them to signal to their clients why insurance 
policies in so-called high-risk areas contain a high insurance premium. Risk maps 
give meaning to prices. This kind of risk communication, however, first requires a 
sophisticated valuation process (Aspers, 2009). Risk valuation applied in insurance 
companies’ risk management practices is mainly based on mathematical models 
and correlation logics. Actors using these models are able to capture the complexity 
of individual aspects and conditions that cause or amplify forest fires and break 
them down into their individual components by means of multiple (and even spatial) 
regressions (Castro & Chuvieco, 1998). Spatially differentiated risk models allow 
insurers to simulate their values at risk.
The better the insurance company manages to break down the complexity of 
wildfires into modeled chains of linear causes and effects, the better it can design 
and offer different kinds of insurance contracts. On the one hand, insurance compa-
nies are always free to decide whether and where to offer an insurance policy to a 
customer. This means that they can exclude areas in which forest fires occur very 
frequently and for unknown reasons from accessing insurance. The market is sim-
ply rationed geographically (Hellwig, 1983). On the other hand, insurance compa-
nies have a strong contract design tool at their disposal: self-selection (Furubotn & 
Richter, 2005). By offering customers alternative contract designs that differ, for 
example, in the amount of the deductible in the event of a loss, insurers obtain 
detailed information about a customer’s risk exposure. By accepting certain con-
tracts and rejecting others, the insured reveals his risk attitude and self-assesses his 
exposure to risk. Self-selection is part of a bilateral negotiation process. In negotia-
tions, the customers themselves offer to fulfill certain conditions in order to lower 
the prices for insurance. For example, the better the forestry company itself controls 
the risk through simplification, homogenization and decoupling its effects, the 
cheaper the insurance premium offered.
 Mutually Complementary Risk Management Practices and Risk 
Avoidance Strategies
The hierarchical and market-oriented risk management practices of forestry compa-
nies and the Chilean insurance sector complement each other at least in two ways: 
On the one hand, this can be seen from the fact that forestry management practices 
stimulate innovation in insurers’ services. Without economies of scale from indus-
trialized plantation management, the market for forest fire insurance in Chile would 
have been too small, too transaction-intensive, and possibly nonexistent (see also 
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Chichilnisky & Heal, 1998).5 On the other hand, complementarity most obviously 
arises from how insurers influence the forestry management standards of forestry 
companies through self-selection and contract design. Insurers make it clear how 
important it is for them that hierarchically supervised forestry workers regularly 
thin out the plantations (= simplification of risk correlations), that the insured plan-
tations comprise a minimum size (= homogenization of risk), and that watchtowers 
and firebreaks cover areas at risk (= decoupling of risk correlations). These require-
ments are either specified directly in the insurance contracts, or the forestry compa-
nies are indirectly given incentives to fulfill them through promised premium 
discounts.
Self-reinforcing effects of hierarchical and market forms of risk management 
also derive from the uncertainty avoidance strategies of the actors. Forestry compa-
nies, for example, want to get rid of the unlikely but in principle possible scenario 
of a total loss of their assets in the event of a regional wildfire catastrophe. Although 
they view this total loss scenario as unacceptable, it is also incalculable and there-
fore incorporates the characteristics of uncertainty. Large forestry companies avoid 
this uncertainty by transferring it to the insurance sector. They buy insurance poli-
cies that include high deductibles. As a result, despite having invested in insurance, 
the forestry companies will cover many minor losses by themselves. This practice is 
confirmed by the operational risk manager of a large Chilean  forestry company: 
“Even in the disaster year 2017, the compensation payments of our insurers were 
below the expenses of the annual insurance premiums. All our contracts included 
high deductibles” (Personal interview conducted in 2018). The manager claimed 
that the firm’s shareholders explicitly wished to insure only the uncertainty of a 
total loss.
What forestry companies consider an incalculable and uncertain risk, caused by 
third parties and therefore understood as an external hazard, is, in the eyes of the 
insurer, complex and controllable. Insurance companies are able to absorb the 
uncertainty of a total loss of one of their customers because they can diversify it and 
convert it into a calculable and statistically low risk of a total loss across all their 
customers. However, insurers also retain much of their control over risk explicitly 
through their own uncertainty avoidance strategies: They avoid uncertainty by 
rationing the market. This strategy is geographically oriented in two ways: On the 
one hand, as already mentioned, they exclude insurance in municipalities with high 
potential for political tension, in other words, in territories where arson is a frequent 
cause of forest fires or where causes are simply unknown. On the other hand, they 
also exclude specific forest areas on a small scale that they declare to be uninsur-
able. In avoiding so called cluster risks and risks of geographical contagion, insur-
ers deny market access to forest owners located in the immediate geographical 
proximity of already insured forest property. During a 2016 interview, a Chilean 
insurance company’s sales executive referred to a map on the wall of his office, on 
5 This is illustrated, for example, by the fact that there are currently no insurance policies available 
for economically used natural forests.
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which the sites of the currently insured forest areas in his responsibility were marked 
with flags. These markings gave the sales executive an indication of the surrounding 
areas where he could (or should) not offer any further forest fire insurance. “I avoid 
selling here because a single forest fire could otherwise affect several of my custom-
ers at the same time,” he explained. In a market like Chile, which is characterized by 
a limited number of insurers (Loewe et al., 2017), this leads to the exclusion of for-
est owners willing to buy insurances. Rationing financial products is typical for 
oligopolistic insurance markets (Hellwig, 1983). However, for some clients of the 
insurance companies, exclusion may seem arbitrary. Even when exclusion is based 
on the principle of who comes first, for many it seems related to an exclusive rela-
tionship between the insurers and the large Chilean forestry companies. In some 
ways, geographically uneven access to insurance in Chile represents a negative 
externality of insurance-based risk management practice and can be interpreted as 
the result of the decontextualization of risk and risk knowledge, which I will explain 
in more detail in the following chapter.
 The Decontextualization of Risk and Risk Knowledge
Risk managers tend to analyze different risks in isolation (MacKenzie, 2011). In 
more general terms, risk-exposed actors epistemologically grasp and handle the 
causes and effects of risks as if they were separated from each other (Rosa et al., 
2014). Therefore, also conceptually it makes perfect sense to separate the material 
dimension of potential physical losses from the discursive dimension of how people 
originally perceive, communicate and socially construct risk. However, in the course 
of these management and academic practices, the knowledge of risks is easily 
decontextualized, also in a spatial sense (November, 2008).
Forestry and insurance companies in Chile design and work with economic mod-
els for decision making that are considered (and have been proven) to be useful for 
the handling of risk. In doing so, they clearly decontextualize the risk of forest fires 
in a spatial sense. Forestry enterprises, for example, decontextualize risk and risk 
knowledge in the course of their homogenization and standardization strategies in 
managing forested land. They homogenize space by purchasing adjacent areas, 
which they then use for reforestation, and they standardize space by anchoring the 
same risk management routines in their plantations. Actors using routines not only 
standardize risk knowledge, they also decouple risk from the unit of space, in the 
course of which plantation forests are transformed into assets that can be valued 
uniformly and according to economies of scale. A forest area managed as a mono-
culture decontextualizes specific site conditions. It ignores the fact that site-adapted, 
native tree species might be superior to exotic tree species in terms of reducing the 
local risk of forest fires. 
The decontextualization of knowledge related to forest fire risks can also be seen 
in the fact that large forestry companies even succeed in acquiring insurance for 
their plantations in politically unstable communities, in other words, in 
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communities in which insurance companies are actually planning a rationing strat-
egy for the market. Large forestry companies generally own and manage forest 
areas spread over several forest regions in Chile, and because these are homoge-
nized and managed in a standardized and comparable manner, they are able to 
acquire a package of insurance policies from the insurance companies that covers 
several separated plantations at once. Forest fire risks in high-risk areas are then 
contractually offset by risks in less endangered areas. The exact knowledge of the 
circumstances of the risk in the package becomes blurred and decontextualized. It 
no longer appears relevant due to the standardized price for the packaged risk.
By purchasing an insurance package with spatially dispersed forest ownership, 
also the insurer gains several advantages. Not only does a package of insurances 
enable  the application of the law of large numbers; the insurer is also given an 
opportunity to spread the risks spatially, which reduces his risk of total failure. His 
accumulated overall risk is no longer determined by the conditions at a given site. 
This reduces his interest in surveying context-specific knowledge about the exact 
causes and effects of individual forest fires. The same is true for a high number of 
deductibles that policyholders accept in individual insurance contracts. Finally, the 
decontextualization of risk increases its quantifiability, which enables the insurer to 
translate it into the language of the financial markets, which in turn opens up oppor-
tunities for the insurer to resell parts of the risk to reinsurance companies.
Despite all these obvious advantages for corporate risk-management practice, 
the widespread practice of decontextualizing risk and knowledge on forest fire risks 
in Chile, coupled with reduced incentives to generate new knowledge, for example 
about the causes and effects of forest fires, can prove to be a step backwards in gov-
erning risk from the point of view of a resilient society. Uncertainties and ambigui-
ties require a broadening of the risk debate and should include as many stakeholders 
in the evaluation process as reasonable: “Participants should be asked to find a con-
sensus of the extra margin of safety in which they would be willing to invest in 
exchange for avoiding potentially catastrophic consequences” (Rosa et al., 2014, 
p.  144). Risk assessments that are based on economic considerations alone are 
accompanied by disparities. If the initial conditions for decision making on risk are 
not equally distributed among societal actors  they open the window for self- 
reinforcing processes of systemic risk accumulation.
 Conclusion
Forest fire risks in Chile have different spatiotemporal origins and consequences. 
They prove to be epistemologically complex, ambiguous, and uncertain depending 
on the socioeconomic and sociopolitical context of their appearance. Different 
physical and anthropological causes and effects of forest fires cannot be clearly 
attributed (= complexity). Unexplained causes give rise to various logical explana-
tions, which run counter to each other (=ambiguity) and hamper collective efforts to 
deal with the risk. In many cases, actors also demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to 
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their own risk unawareness (=uncertainty). In sum, the knowledge about the causes 
and effects of wildfires in Chile is heterogeneous and geographically dispersed 
among societal actors. Empirically it becomes evident that wildfire risks in Chile 
are socially constructed. They depend on how findings from natural and social sci-
ence are interpreted and being implemented in standards of risk management prac-
tices. These practices also communicate risk, as in the present case via prices and 
access to insurance markets.
Focusing on economic-geographical explanations, in this study I have not only 
made it clear that forest fires are a profoundly geographical risk, but also that they 
represent a fundamentally collective challenge for Chilean forest regions. A single 
fire—regardless of its origin—can affect and destroy the forest property of neigh-
boring actors. Accordingly, neighborhood relationships, in other words, cooperative 
and collective approaches to risk management practices, could have been expected. 
However, it turned out that forestry enterprises prefer to organize risk management 
on an individual basis, applying hierarchical company routines. In parallel, they buy 
insurance policies to transfer part of the risk to the financial markets. Their relation-
ships with insurance companies are based on bilaterally negotiated contract designs 
and market prices for risk.
Forestry companies and insurance companies in Chile seem to have found a 
complementary way of dealing with risk by sharing jointly created technical risk 
knowledge as part of their routine risk-management practices. Both choose a man-
agement approach that reduces complexity, decouples risk, and decontextualizes 
risk knowledge to make forest  fire risks calculable and manageable in mutually 
beneficial ways. They agree, on the one hand, on price mechanisms for insurance 
contracts as a standardized language, which has the consequence that detailed geo-
graphical knowledge on forest fire risks in Chile is explicitly decontextualized and 
reduced. On the other hand, they follow complementary risk-avoidance strategies 
whenever risks are characterized as ambiguous or uncertain.
The catastrophic forest fires in 2017 revealed the limits of standardized risk man-
agement practices. The law of large numbers and therefore the calculability of risk, 
in general terms, becomes less effective when large and unlikely events occur or 
when the causes of the risks are systemically interdependent. The latter is the worst 
case for the insurance business. Systemic interdependencies of risks can hide behind 
characteristics of ambiguity or uncertainty. In addition, there is a great danger that 
if actors only follow their own dominant risk discourses and ignore observations 
and interpretations that are due to different conditions of the spatiotemporal context 
of risk, the dynamic changes in the relationships between environmental and anthro-
pogenic risk factors of forest fires in Chile remain invisible to decision makers. The 
catastrophic extent of the forest fires of 2017 can certainly be attributed first and 
foremost to the extreme climatic conditions. However, there are also numerous indi-
cations that the fires were ignited by arson across a broad front. Unfortunately, their 
exact background remains unknown to this day (Saavedra, 2017).
This calls for a coordinated effort of risk management that gives regional knowl-
edge an explicit edge and is designed as a long-term learning process. Risk manage-
ment primarily covers individual views of risk. In contrast, risk governance offers a 
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holistic approach that assigns the social responsibilities of risk takers and also con-
siders negative externalities for other societal stakeholders in spatiotemporal varia-
tion. Of course, this does not mean that risk management has no value at all. The 
risk governance concept of the International Risk Governance Council, an interna-
tional think tank that aims at improving the understanding and assessment of risk 
and the ambiguities involved, integrates risk management into a larger process of 
risk governance. Risk communication, which includes the transmission of risk data, 
but also the transfer of sophisticated risk knowledge forms the connecting link in the 
governance process, which is circular and reflexive by nature (Renn, 2008, p. 374). 
Risk governance practices take the attributes of ambiguity and uncertainty in risk 
knowledge into account and open debates on risk that invite many societal stake-
holders to take part in risk evaluation and risk assessment processes. In particular, 
risk governance is about transparency, which enables collective learning for a more 
resilient risk society.
Researchers must take the complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty of knowledge 
on forest fire risks in Chile seriously. These attributes originate from social science 
perspectives on risk. Empirically, one cannot always separate them from each other, 
which is why they cannot have the objective of structuring risk governance uni-
formly. However, their transparent application in risk management or risk gover-
nance has consequences. The comparative clarification of the attributes 
communicates to society how risk is defined and legitimized in the future (see 
Bustos, Lukas, Stamm, & Torre, 2019, for a similar argument related to regional 
crisis management in Chile). A lack of societal participation and acceptance of nor-
mative settings can lead to adverse reaction and resistance (see, e.g., the case study 
on forest fires in California by Simon & Dooling, 2013).
Since forest fires are immanently spatial, the regional level promises to be a suit-
able scale for initializing the organization of related risk governance processes. At 
the regional level, changing interrelationships in risk formation can be observed and 
interpreted early on (Müller-Mahn et al., 2018). However, as I have shown with my 
statements and empirical analyses in this contribution, forest fire risks can be tech-
nically detached from the spatial dimension, especially in terms of their economic 
effects. Decontextualization is what makes it possible to deal with risk financially in 
first place. In Chile, it gave rise to a reciprocal complementary relationship between 
hierarchy and market forms of risk management. Are these complementarities valu-
able for risk governance approaches as well? Some of the knowledge and guidance 
on certain risk management practices on the regional scale come directly from the 
insurance sector. Insurers utilize contract design and negotiations to offer direct and 
indirect incentives to decouple wildfire risks and learn how to manage them in a 
routinely manner. However, the extent to which different forms of risk management 
practices complement each other in a regional context of risk governance and lead 
to a higher level of local-global knowledge that strengthens the resilience of the 
society in the long term remains a pending issue that requires additional research 
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Chapter 9
Carbon Markets, Values, and Modes 
of Governance
Janelle Knox-Hayes, Jarrod Hayes, and Erik-Logan Hughes
 Market Governance at the Interface of Competing Logics 
and Modes of Organization
Market governance of climate change is situated at the interface of two competing 
logics: universalistic governance predicated on technocratic norms, and the particu-
larities of politics embedded in local cultures. Here, local refers to subglobal politi-
cal units that are internally constructed as political entities. The issue of how 
global-level ideational frameworks are translated into local contexts has formed an 
important part of discussions on the green economy and environmental governance. 
A particular focus within these debates is whether and the extent to which green 
economy concepts and practices constitute a post-political project. The term “post- 
political” here references the idea that political problems surrounding environmen-
tal futures and resource allocation are removed from political discourse and recast 
in technical language (Garsten & Jacobsson, 2007; see also Chap. 4 by Stehr).
To this end, markets represent a universalistic or technocratic logic whose propo-
nents contend that global problems can be solved with the application of one-size- 
fits-all solutions derived from science and economics (Bailey & Wilson, 2009). 
Interwoven into this logic is the idea that markets can be made to work more effec-
tively for environmental and social equity through the recalibration of economic 
valuations aimed at making environmental investments more desirable not just on 
moral grounds or as responses to practical problems, but also because they offer 
profitable investment options (Newell & Paterson, 2010). This logic is reductionist, 
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operates at scale, and is built from codified knowledge that exists independent of the 
particularities of location.
Treating climate change as a problem of internalizing economic externalities 
through the pricing of greenhouse gases gives authority to a particular set of eco-
nomic principles. The technocratic prescriptions for resolving climate change rely 
on metrics to measure the effects of climate change, establishing quantitative base-
lines, pricing emissions that exceed quantity limits, and building a market-based 
governance institution to control emissions quantities through price. The role of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is to build and disseminate the univer-
salistic solution. Carbon markets will be more successful to the extent that they 
operate on a global scale, so proponents craft the architecture to achieve fluidity and 
permeate other spheres of economic activity. In theory, a global market would also 
allow emissions reductions to be achieved in the places of least cost by the actors 
who can most afford to pay for emissions reductions.
The universalistic assumptions underlying global climate policy are similar to 
the high-modernist logics in centrally planned state projects (Scott, 1998). These 
projects often fail because they are based on presumptions about the effectiveness 
of state coordination and do not take into account local or practical knowledge 
(metis) that arises from everyday life. Proponents of Community Based Conservation 
similarly argue that centralized conservation planning, by failing to engage local 
knowledge, sets development and conservation programs up for disaster (Goldman, 
2003). The application of technocratic approaches to climate governance highlights 
both the universalistic assumptions about market financialization (cf. Hayek, 1945) 
that underlie the post-political consensus and how those holding them fail to appre-
ciate the ways scale and place impact on political and economic behavior. The 
Kyoto Protocol’s requirement for commoditization, standardization of measure-
ment, and homogenization matches well with high-modernist ideology.
The Kyoto Protocol’s authors set out the trade of certified emissions reductions 
as a principal policy response to climate change. The Protocol’s framework thus 
positions commodification through the expansion of carbon trading systems as cen-
tral to resolving the problem of climate governance. As institutions, carbon markets 
can be expected to transfer and develop with a degree of isomorphism. Indeed, to 
some extent the hope of building global governance through interconnection of 
regional schemes relies on the compatibility of markets in each jurisdiction. 
However, by focusing on market mechanisms, the Protocol’s authors marginalize 
other policies (taxation, command-and-control, technology transfer) that may be 
more effective in some political economies (Knox-Hayes, 2012). Although govern-
ments have mobilized a primarily techno-economic fix to address climate change, 
this is not necessarily indicative of the solutions desired by various societal stake-
holders (Owens & Cowell, 2011).
Furthermore, carbon markets must be translated from the global scale into the 
particularities of each operating jurisdiction. Here the universalistic logic encoun-
ters different sociopolitical and cultural governance logics and values operating on 
the ground. Variations in political-economic cultural contexts—understood as 
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socially established norms, rules, and expectations that define how social actors 
operate and interact (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 6)—play a key role in shaping how soci-
eties respond to global imperatives. Culture influences the conduct of economic 
interactions within specific societies as well as the role of economic processes in 
policy and society. As the markets are constructed, everything from the nature of the 
legislation that is developed, to the organizations used to operationalize the markets, 
to the way in which various polities respond to the idea of market-based gover-
nance, are affected. The dynamics on the ground affect not only the shape that the 
markets take, but also the ways in which they perform.
The variability in market form causes problems for efforts to establish climate 
governance arrangements that rely on universalistic assumptions about socioeco-
nomic systems. Cultures are not monolithic, of course, and vary as the scale and 
location of analysis shift, and care is needed in drawing conclusions about the influ-
ence, causal or otherwise, of culture. Nonetheless, there is value in looking at the 
influence of culture at different scales as a means by which to draw attention to 
differences and the reasons for these differences. Moreover, by examining links 
between culture and climate governance we recognize that climate policy is funda-
mentally political in nature.
Another important point of analytical concern is the issue of scale. Subnational 
governments, nongovernment organizations, corporations and government agencies 
in “hybrid” (combining state and non-state actors), and transnational environmental 
governance networks play an increasingly important role in climate governance 
(Andonova, Betsill, & Bulkeley, 2009; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2007; Hoffmann, 2011). 
One of the effects of this dispersal of governance is a resistance to efforts to estab-
lish universalistic environmental governance arrangements as regional/local gov-
ernments, businesses, and communities reinterpret governance concepts through the 
particular lenses of their beliefs, traditions, circumstances, and dilemmas (Krueger 
& Gibbs, 2010). The creation of standards and agreements through which carbon 
management occurs can similarly vary (Ocampo, 2011). As a consequence, the 
institutional landscape of carbon governance is highly variegated across initiatives, 
actors, and countries. The translation of international commitments into action 
remains reliant on and imbedded within territorially bound politics (While, Jonas, 
& Gibbs, 2010). Thus, this plurality of approaches can in part be seen as a response 
by the various actors involved in promoting and implementing the carbon gover-
nance to integrate—and potentially challenge—neoliberal capitalist attempts to fit 
environmental problems within prevailing political-economic paradigms (Pattberg, 
2007; Redclift, 2012).
The organizational terrain of policy further complicates the carbon governance 
landscape. Specifically, political economic culture interacts with modes of network 
governance. Provan and Kenis (2008) provide a useful typology for mapping net-
works: participant-governed networks (shared governance), lead organization- 
governed networks (lead organization), and network administrative organizations 
(NAOs). These network governance types are informed by their position along two 
dimensions. The first addresses centralization. For networks governed internally by 
participant organizations, those that exhibit a centralized broker are classified as 
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lead organizations. Those in which governance is decentralized across participants 
are classified as shared governance. The second axis of classification deals specifi-
cally with centralized modes of governance. Here, the distinction lies between those 
that have a centralized broker that is internal to the network (lead organization) 
versus those in which the broker is an organization external to the network (network 
administrative organization/NAO).
Taken together, logics of governance and modes of governance represent two 
important axes along which climate policy can be mapped and assessed. In this 
chapter, we seek to assess how policy intersects with these axes and in the process 
provide a broad-based qualitative and quantitative assessment of how geographi-
cally specific sociocultural factors shape intersubjective understandings of markets 
in general and carbon markets in particular. To do so, we adopt a cross-national 
perspective, examining and evaluating the intersubjective meanings of carbon mar-
ket formation drawn from interview data of market makers across the United States, 
Australia, China, the EU, Japan, and South Korea. In the next section, we address 
the role of technocratic norms, and in so doing provide an extensive overview of our 
methodology.
 Technocratic Norms and Political Context
 Methods of Analysis
Drawing on 245 interviews with actors from various institutions involved in climate 
policy and market development, including professional service firms, legal firms, 
and regulatory agencies in the EU, US, Australia, South Korea, China (including 
Hong Kong), and Japan, we utilize techniques from grounded theory to explore 
perspectives on market-based climate governance. The interviews were semi- 
structured to guide the conversations while allowing respondents to address topics 
they considered significant (Clark, 1998) and lasted between 45  min and 2  h. 
Individuals were asked about the nature of their firms, practices, network relation-
ships, perspectives on climate policy and market-based governance, and the impor-
tance of various types of expertise in developing climate policy and markets. We 
then triangulated the responses with each other and with relevant policy and organi-
zational documents.
We coded interviews to generate insights into the relationship between techno-
cratic norms and politics in climate policy, and to identify attributes of market-based 
governance in each geographic region. We deployed two coding techniques. First, 
we treated the interview transcripts as data and analyzed them in a coding pattern 
from raw text to first-order concepts, and then to analytic categories (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). Specifically, we coded two questions to generate insights into how 
market-based governance is perceived in each region: What are the advantages or 
disadvantages of using markets to govern climate change and what are the 
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opportunities and challenges of the creation of carbon markets? We used our analy-
sis of these questions to gauge positive and negative associations of market-based 
climate governance, as well as to identify governance concepts that are positively 
associated with market-based governance in the form of opportunities and 
challenges.
Second, following Gioia (1998), we treated interlocutors as “knowledgeable 
agents,” people who know what they are trying to do and can explain their thoughts, 
intentions, and actions. This grounds the study in accounts of the informants’ expe-
rience (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). The knowledge provided by key infor-
mants informs our understanding of the ways in which each region has negotiated 
tensions between technocratic governance norms and place-specific politics. We 
have used anonymized quotations to support key observations and combine them 
with relevant policy, organizational, and press material where appropriate.
 Coded Concepts of Market-Based Governance
Through the coding of the interview data, we identified seven prominent percep-
tions of the advantages and opportunities of carbon emissions markets (efficiency, 
technology investment and innovation, global scale, flexibility to participate, politi-
cal viability, and capacity to reduce emissions) and six prominent disadvantages and 
challenges (reliance on governance cohesion, political uncertainty, technical com-
plexity, time to translate, prevalence of economics, and intangibility).
 Advantages and opportunities
The concept of governance efficiency refers to the fact that markets are a more effi-
cient form of governance. Respondents often identify efficiency with the ability to 
resolve climate change using economic techniques that would not require signifi-
cant behavioral changes, particularly by bringing about technological development. 
Similarly, the concept of efficacy is described as providing transparency for govern-
ment and industries to make production decisions through the carbon price. There 
was an associated belief that the price is useful in identifying and distributing the 
“real” value of low-carbon production.
Some participants identified the benefits of markets as being associated with the 
flexibility they give various actors to participate in the governance of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Unlike taxes and command and control types of regulation (such as effi-
ciency standards or renewable energy portfolios), the market generates a profit 
incentive and allows a range of organizations from banks to professional service 
firms to participate. Many individuals also expressed the belief that the market is 
more flexible as a governance mechanism in that it allows actors to purse a variety 
of strategies to reduce emissions rather than having the government mandate a set 
course of action. For these reasons and others, participants also identified political 
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viability as an advantage of emissions markets. In many jurisdictions there is less 
political resistance to emissions trading than to other forms of governance. Some 
interlocutors argue that a market is the only palatable solution for industry. This is a 
popular perspective in the United States as well as in China, where there is consider-
able resistance to the idea of taxes.
The emphasis on investment and innovation reflects a belief that through the 
creation of a price signal carbon markets effectively distribute revenue to the “best” 
developers of technology. Respondents additionally identify the ability to operate 
on a global scale as a market advantage, suggesting that carbon markets can provide 
liquidity, and the potential for offshoring (of finance) and offsetting (of financial 
credits) in ways other governance mechanisms cannot. This argument primarily 
rests on the idea that markets are transnational and do not respect national boundar-
ies, which stands in contrast to other approaches like command and control or taxa-
tion where the generative force of action lies firmly within states. Also note the 
emphasis of scale and how it is seen as generating ease and affordability. Finally, 
several respondents (thought fewer than might be expected) identify the ability to 
reduce emissions as an advantage of market-based governance. Not surprisingly, 
they view the pathway to emissions reduction through the lens of technological 
development rather than behavioral change. Participants express confidence that a 
price for carbon will give renewable energy technologies an advantage.
 Disadvantages and challenges
Participants identify six primary disadvantages and challenges of market-based 
governance. Although markets have the ability to operate at the international level, 
participants identified reliance on governance cohesion, or the idea that markets 
need to operate according to common rules in order to be effective, as an associated 
disadvantage. As witnessed by the challenges in achieving binding targets under the 
UNFCCC, this is a major challenge for climate governance. Additionally, partici-
pants identify domestic political uncertainty as a major challenge, because carbon 
markets are derived from and reliant upon politics for their existence. Here the 
belief seems to be that carbon markets are efficient except for political contestation, 
which is thought to destabilize them.
In addition, participants identify the technical complexity required for markets to 
operate effectively. In addition to the basic rules and regulations of the capping of 
emissions and distribution of allowances, to be effective the markets require a sys-
tem of standards and infrastructure to measure and monitor emissions as well as 
enforcement mechanisms for the actors under the cap. There is considerable techni-
cal complexity required to build such a system, and unless the policy details are 
correct, there is strong potential for the system to fail. Many interlocutors point to 
the early phases of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) as an example of the 
technical complexity required to build an emissions trading system as well as what 
happens (e.g., price collapse) when the technical details are incorrect.
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Associated with this concept is the idea that it takes time to translate markets into 
new jurisdictions and that they are a slower form of governance. The concept is 
particularly raised by participants in Asia, with recognition that to be effective, the 
markets not only have to be built to operate according to a technically high capacity, 
but that they must also be translated to fit different sociopolitical and cultural norms 
in the jurisdictions where they are being built.
One of the drawbacks identified is that markets give prevalence of economics 
over the environment and often achieve economic gains without environmental ben-
efits. In particular, markets treat climate change as though it were purely an eco-
nomic problem, with economic concerns. Many actors join the markets not to 
reduce emissions but to pursue the profit incentive. This concept is associated with 
concern that markets do not reduce emissions because of the inability to price the 
intangible. Here there is recognition that the absence of carbon dioxide is an intan-
gible commodity, and considerable skepticism over the concept of additionality of 
offsetting (the requirement that allowances and offsets produce emissions additional 
to what otherwise would have occurred). The difficulty in pricing carbon dioxide 
and associated negative and positive externalities generates doubt as to whether 
emissions reductions are real.
We have summarized these concepts with exemplary quotes in Tables 9.1a and 
9.1b (Knox-Hayes, 2016, p. 53). Quotes in the first section of the table exemplify 
universalistic conceptions of markets as solutions to climate change. The second 
section embodies counter-conceptions that underline the political nature of markets 
and doubts about their universality. Importantly, many of the comments in the sec-
ond section of the table stress the role of scale and cultural difference in shaping 
how universal, technocratic norms are interpreted and applied, such as the difficul-
ties of developing common global rules for carbon markets. The two sets of obser-
vations in turn provide a basis for synthesizing these cultural variances.
 Comparisons Between East and West
We identified the coded concepts as common responses to the questions of market 
advantages/disadvantages and opportunities/challenges. Given that there were 245 
responses to the data recorded, it was possible to do statistical analysis of the data 
to look for macro trends across the regions. In Table 9.2 we provide a count sum-
mary of the identified concepts according to location, dividing the region of resi-
dence into six categories: the United States, the European Union, Australia, China, 
Japan, and Korea (Knox-Hayes, 2016, p. 59). It should be noted that to maintain 
statistically comparable sample sizes, respondents from Hong Kong have been 
grouped into the China category. Hong Kong serves as one of the financial centers 
for the trade of carbon out of China, and these interlocutors were asked questions 
specific to the developing Chinese carbon markets. London was likewise coded as 
part of the EU. It is one of the financial centers of the EU ETS and respondents were 
asked questions specific to the EU ETS. Table 9.2 shows that neither conceptions of 
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Table 9.1a Summary of positive concepts of market governance from coded interview data




Markets are a more efficient form of 
governance. It is possible to have 
minimal impact on the operation of 
business and industry and still achieve 
environmental objectives because 
markets are efficient. Efficiency is often 
associated in the data with the belief in a 
carbon price to solve climate change by 
driving investment into clean technology. 
Market efficiency suggests that technical 
solutions rather than behavioral change 
will solve climate change. The market is 
perceived to be the ultimate driver of 
technical efficiency.
Cap and trade makes sure the things 
we take for granted, lifestyle, 
transportation, etc. are not affected. 
With the cap and trade approach the 
biggest benefit is the ability to resolve 
the problem while maintaining 
business as usual! Cap and trade 
helps lubricate energy transaction. 
With the cap and trade approach you 
drive up the price of coal and support 
renewables. You could burn coal 
50 years from now with the price 
today. There is a huge shift in 
renewable and other areas. The 
market adjusts; that is the beauty of 
it. (Managing Director, Market 
Technology Provider, New York)
Efficacy of a 
carbon price
The carbon price provides the 
transparency for government and 
industries to make efficient production 
decisions. Unlike the price generated by 
a tax or command and control 
mechanism, a market price represents the 
“real” value of reducing emissions. 
Markets, and particularly market actors, 
provide the transparency and liquidity in 
the market to transmit the price as widely 
as possible. The efficacy of the carbon 
price is often identified in in conjunction 
with issues of scaling up market 
activities.
The market provides a strong 
advantage of price transparency. 
There is liquidity in the market, 
which advantages everyone. They can 
do activities to manage their actions 
etc. That is why the banks are in this 
market, to create transparency and 
liquidity. (Environmental Products 






Through the creation of a price signal 
carbon markets effectively distribute 
revenue to the best developers of new 
technology. This is often described as a 
normative and objective process that 
allows the “best,” “brightest,” or most 
efficient to win. The perspective fits with 
the notion that markets provide 
individual justice in contrast to the social 
justice provided by governments.
That’s where you get your innovation 
and your development and your new 
ideas. If you incentivize the private 
community—What you are 
effectively doing with a market-based 
mechanism is you’re saying that the 
smartest person wins. And that’s what 
drives the way to innovation. Now 
that might be big corporates, it might 
be small one-man bands; it might be 
the next Google in the environmental 
world. You’re just incentivizing the 
smartest person at the table to be 
rewarded. And that’s all the 
market-based mechanism does. 
(Managing Director, Brokerage, 
Melbourne)
(continued)
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Table 9.1a (continued)




Two issues stand out under global scale. 
The first is the perception that markets 
are capable of functioning on a global 
scale, where other systems of governance 
cannot. Global scale is often associated 
with liquidity and greater market 
capitalization. These are assumed to be 
positive attributes of markets. The other 
issue of scale is the ability to dislocate 
emissions reduction activities through 
offshoring and offsetting, presumably to 
places where least-cost reductions can be 
made.
It’s part of the solution, and it’s the 
only mechanism we have that can 
mobilize resources and allocate them 
at scale, at speed. (CEO, Carbon 
Aggregator, Sydney)
The cost structure for emissions 
reduction in domestic are actually 
quite high that there may well be 
better opportunities for emissions 
reduction offshore in the initial years 
…. A tonne of carbon is a tonne of 
carbon. Whether the reduction is here 
or international, it shouldn’t matter. 
(CEO, Business Council, Melbourne)
Flexibility to 
participate
The markets allow more individuals to 
participate because they are not specific 
only to the entities who have obligations 
under the cap. The markets generate a 
profit incentive and allow a range of 
organizations to participate in both the 
construction and operation of the market. 
Wide-scale participation is thought to be 
important to generating shared belief in 
the operation of markets, as well as 
making the markets function efficiently. 
The markets are additionally seen as a 
more flexible mode of governance; 
giving actors the flexibility to structure 
emissions reductions with the means 
they see best.
We appreciate cost reducing aspects 
of markets including flexibility and 
the opportunity to bring other players 
in. They link well and are adaptable 
systems that bring the cost effective 
emissions as well. Markets are 
valuable for reductions. For example 
with the US the market with offsets, 
unregulated international players can 
participate via offsets. It provides 
funds for others to get involved. 
(Senior Research Associate, 
Environmental Think Tank, 
Washington, DC)
I think it’s my personal opinion but 
the market approach has more 
advantage than recommending 
control, or carbon tax, or other 
options. That’s what the research 
results said and that’s what I think 
too. The company would have more 
flexibility to comply with carbon 
regulation if that’s an Emission 
Trading Scheme rather than 
recommending control, or carbon tax. 
(Head of Climate Change Division, 
Accountancy, Seoul)
(continued)
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Table 9.1a (continued)
Concept Manifestation in the data Illustrative quote
Political 
viability
Compared to other options like taxes and 
command and control regulation (energy 
portfolios, emissions standards, etc.), 
markets are more politically viable. This 
is in part because they operate with a 
profit incentive. Even if the results are 
theoretically comparable to those under a 
tax, individuals feel less penalized by a 
market system and that flexibility gives 
them greater tenure over the system. The 
approach also allows governments to 
popularize other associated green 
initiatives.
Low-carbon, green-growth was the 
national agenda of the former 
government of President Myung-bak 
Lee. ETS and Carbon-tax were 
considered as regulation tools for 
GHG reduction, but because the ETS 
was more symbolic, representative 
and popular than carbon-tax, in the 
political aspect, they decided to 
introduce an ETS in 2012. The main 
reason was it could be a significant 
signal that all business entities must 
be part in developing green 
technology or patents for GHG 
reduction for new green market from 
K-ETS. (Climate Change Leader, 
Government Ministry, Seoul)
There are a couple of advantages of 
carbon trading schemes. They’re 
probably harder to implement, but 
they’re not as much viewed as a tax. 
It’s also an issue like in the US, 
because we don’t like taxes. Instead 
of taxing, you do a carbon-trading 
scheme. Then I guess there’s also the 
possibility of linkages you know with 
other carbon trading schemes. I mean 
that’s definitely a big trend that we’re 
trying to go towards. (Climate and 





Respondents express a belief that carbon 
markets reduce emissions. Faith in 
markets to reduce emissions is often 
attached to a technology pathway. 
Markets create a carbon price, which 
should drive investment in clean energy 
technology and generate emissions 
reductions. Associated with this 
perspective is often the belief that 
climate change is simply a problem of 
failing to price externalities.
As a more widespread approach, the 
market approach drives down cost to 
society, and allows the private sector 
to seek out the least cost methods of 
reducing emissions. It allows and 
focuses the economy on finding the 
least cost emissions reductions and 
creates investments into new 
technologies. We are reducing 
emissions by putting a price on 
carbon capture as an externality. The 
market decides the price. If we had a 
100 per tonne price, we wouldn’t 
have a climate change problem. 
(Director, Carbon Asset Developer, 
New York)
Note. Reprinted from Knox-Hayes (2016, p.  53). Copyright 2016 by Oxford University Press. 
Reprinted with permission
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Table 9.1b Summary of negative concepts of market governance from coded interview data





To be effective markets need to operate 
according to common rules and 
standards. Many participants identify 
the construction of a cohesive system 
of governance (at various scales) as 
one of the major challenges to the 
operation of market-based governance 
of climate change. Here universal 
logics of efficiency, efficacy and global 
scale compete with the messy reality of 
implementing policy on the ground. 
Even if guided by a coherent 
universalist perspective, policy is 
transformed as it is moves from region 
to region, leading to differences in 
outcome that can restrict the cohesion 
of markets.
I love carbon pricing and I love the 
notion of a budget and I love the 
notion of letting the free market 
determine the lowest cost way of 
doing it. Where we’ve been naive was 
that thinking the world would unite on 
a common set of rules. That was 
extraordinarily brave, and we have 
never done that on anything of any 
kind, ever. Why would this be 
different? We’ve built a system that 
was bound to fail from day one, which 
was a united global, common 
language. And if you just pull back for 
a moment, look at free trade and 
currency and everything else; they are 
geocentric, idiosyncratic, negotiated, 
debated. So why would carbon be any 





Political uncertainty is associated with 
the fact that the markets are derived 
from and reliant upon politics for their 
existence. This is seen to be 
problematic both at the international 
scale, and in domestic politics, 
particularly in Australia. Respondents 
often express a belief that markets are 
efficient except for the political 
instability that underlines them. The 
efficacy of a carbon price, signaling 
low-carbon investment, only holds so 
long as the markets also have a 
long-term stable policy platform to 
underlie them.
The biggest problem in Australia with 
these market mechanisms is really the 
political uncertainty. Now we have a 
carbon price but you know of course 
today’s carbon price is not what 
effects investments decisions it’s the 
expected carbon price over the 
lifetime of an investment. And so, if 
half of your industry experts think the 
carbon price will be dead and buried 
in three years’ time, and the other half 
thinks it will actually keep rising, then 
you’ve really got a problem for 
decision-making in investments, and 
that’s what ultimately matters. 
(Professor of Economics, Sydney)
(continued)
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Table 9.1b (continued)
Concept Manifestation in the data Illustrative quote
Technical 
complexity
To be effective, markets require 
considerable technical complexity to 
operate. Everything from the systems 
and technologies of monitoring, 
verifying, and reporting emissions to 
the rules and standards of how 
emissions markets operate must be 
built. There is considerable technical 
complexity and interlocutors express 
doubt whether the markets will 
function unless the technical details are 
correct. This is particularly a concern 
expressed among interlocutors in Asia. 
Many point to the example of the first 
phases of the EU ETS where lacking 
technical specificity (over allocation of 
credits for example) led to a price 
collapse. Additionally, from a 
bureaucratic standpoint, there is a sense 
that markets have a single correct form, 
and must be engineered to a correct 
standard in order to function 
effectively. This is at odds with the 
complexity and diversity of the types 
of industries that operate under a cap 
and require different standards and 
methodologies of reduction.
The disadvantages are that it is very 
difficult to have a fair cap setting. That 
is the difficult part, very difficult, the 
allocation of allowances and emission 
are theoretically impossible, so there 
is room for lobbying, huge room for 
lobbying, which actually happened in 
the EU and there is plenty of evidence 
that such fair allocation of allowances 
is impossible. So it is a government 
failure. It is a perfect system if 
allocation is done fairly. However, it is 
in reality impossible to allocate fair 
distribution of our caps, of our 
allowances, so therefore, it doesn’t 
happen today. (Manager Market 
Mechanism Group, Government 
Think Tank, Tokyo)
The ability to speculate on price is not 
actually achieving reductions …. We 
are in the process of learning how we 
measure, how we verify the amount of 
carbon footprint and how we more 
importantly, how we estimate the 
capacity or capability of companies to 
reduce greenhouse gases. That is 
critical to calculate the allowance …. 
If you are a government, how can you 
put allowance to each company that 
has different instruments, different 
processes, and different businesses? 
(Managing Director, Consultancy 
Seoul)
(continued)
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Table 9.1b (continued)






Climate change is treated as 
predominantly an economic problem. 
The solution of using markets to 
govern greenhouse gas emissions also 
creates an economic logic for solving 
the problem. While the profit motive 
brings participants into the markets, 
there is concern that the markets 
accomplish only economic and not 
environmental gains. Also present are 
concerns that economic logics of 
market governance take precedence 
over environmental concerns and 
benefits. The predominance of 
economics can be at odds with the need 
to generate material changes in order to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and 
to transform energy supplies.
I feel like there’s a lot of enthusiasm 
for carbon trading, but not necessarily 
as much concern about whether the 
actual emissions reduction with 
normal impact would be there, and 
how do you ensure the integrity of it. 
Carbon trading, like any kind of stock 
trading bond trading, it’s a profit 
incentive. And I think people are 
really looking at carbon trading as a 
profit, as a business. But I think before 
you get to that point, you need to go 
into these things about the institution 
and data, and all that. (Climate and 
Energy Policy Director, NGO, 
Beijing)
We should focus on the market, of 
course, but we should focus on good 
market, or technological market. We 
are not focused on, I don’t know, cap 
and trade system, with its financing, 
we don’t think so. In order to reduce 
the CO2 emissions, we have to 
improve the energy efficiency or we 
have to reduce the carbon intensity of 
the energy. Then, in order to realize 
these two things we need renewed 
technologies. Technologies are really 
the key to saving this planet. [Cap and 
trade] system will not be an incentive 
to make research and development 
because [companies] are just buying 
credits. It seems they do not have any 
material impact or any real impact on 
emissions reductions. (Vice Chairman, 
Industry Association, Tokyo)
(continued)
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Table 9.1b (continued)
Concept Manifestation in the data Illustrative quote
Time to 
translate
It takes time to build a market, and it 
particularly takes time to translate a 
market institution across socio-political 
boundaries. Many interlocutors, 
particularly in Asia, identified the time 
to operate as a drawback of the market 
system. They expressed the belief that 
to be effective the markets, while 
initially adapted from the model of the 
EU ETS, would have to be translated to 
take on different “cultural” norms and 
expectations. As part of this process, it 
is important that companies acculturate 
to the idea of market governance. Such 
a process takes more time than simply 
implementing a tax or even setting up 
command and control legislation.
The advantage and the disadvantage of 
this are because the emission trading 
is a totally new idea for China. So, we 
need a long time to develop this 
carbon market, to develop all the 
institutions that will be involved in 
this market, also the regulations and 
the regulators, or the governance of 
this market. It’s like the stock market. 
The first challenge will be the 
registration of the permits of the 
market. We define the emission rights 
as a commodity rather than financial 
instruments due to the fact that in 
China the market is restricted, 
regulated by the financial security 
commission. That’s one of the 
challenges we are facing at this 
moment. The second one is how to 
develop this new carbon market in 
China. We have to get the companies 
to accept the idea. We also need to 





There are challenges both in pricing 
carbon dioxide because it is an 
intangible asset, as well as 
inadequately pricing the associated 
positive and negative externalities 
attached to the carbon. The 
intangibility of externalities creates 
doubts as to whether or not emissions 
reductions are real. Associated with 
this concern is recognition that the 
value markets trade is a reduction in 
the range of social values that give 
meaning to environmental assets.
The disadvantages, I think, are some 
of the things that we haven’t priced 
correctly over time—Ever—Are the 
hardest things to measure. And it’s 
very, very difficult to include or to put 
a price on something that’s difficult to 
measure …. For example, there might 
be local employment benefits if it’s an 
indigenous project in the middle of 
Australia. There might be water 
quality or biodiversity benefits, which 
are hugely valuable in and of 
themselves but aren’t—At the 
moment—Priced into the carbon 
market. So, we and other 
organizations around the world are 
currently trying to figure out how 
would you attract a price premium or 
place a value on these additional 
co-benefits. That’s a market-based 
mechanism, and it’s incredibly 
difficult and controversial. (Senior 
Associate, Consultancy, Melbourne)
Note. Reprinted from Knox-Hayes (2016, p.  53). Copyright 2016 by Oxford University Press. 
Reprinted with permission












































































































































































































































































































































































































cultural difference nor conceptions of the technocratic/political nature of markets 
are universally held, thus highlighting the fundamentally contingent nature of cli-
mate policy in different national contexts despite the underlying norms that inform 
it at the global level.
In total, the data contain 270 identifications (some participants’ responses are 
coded for more than one concept) of positive constructs of market-based gover-
nance and 189 identifications of negative constructs. Additionally, over half of the 
respondents (139 out of 245) directly identify efficiency and or the efficacy of a 
carbon price as advantages of market-based climate governance. The overwhelming 
majority of positive responses regarding the utility of carbon markets give some 
validity to the notion of a post-political consensus around market-based climate 
governance. Some interlocutors voiced support for markets even when recognizing 
the difficulties involved in pricing environmental externalities:
[We] believe in a market-based instrument, a carbon price. That said, markets have a history 
of creating externalities and mispricing things that should have a price. So, I mean, creating 
a market to fix a problem that was caused by the market is ironic and I guess we understand 
that. But, we would say, yes, it’s positive. I mean, how else can you possibly address envi-
ronmental issues that are otherwise not a part of our daily economic and social life? (Senior 
Associate, Consultancy, Melbourne)
Surprisingly, however, only twenty respondents (8.1%) directly suggested that car-
bon markets have the positive benefit of reducing emissions. Many of these respon-
dents suggested that the way in which a carbon price has a positive impact is by 
generating technological innovation and investment.
When the respondents are categorized as either Anglo/European (US, EU, 
Australia) or Asian (China, Japan, South Korea), differences in perspective are even 
more surprising. The respondents from Anglo/European countries produced 
213 identifications of advantages and opportunities of market-based governance of 
climate change and only ninety-six disadvantages and challenges (a positive-nega-
tive ratio greater than 2:1). In general, respondents from these regions are much 
more likely to have a positive perspective of how the markets operate. In contrast, 
individuals from Asian countries are much more likely to have a skeptical perspec-
tive of the use of market mechanisms to govern climate change. Individuals from 
China, Japan, and South Korea generated fifty-seven identifications of advantages 
of market- based governance, in comparison with ninety-three identifications of dis-
advantages (2:3 positive-negative ratio).
We explore the reasons for the skepticism in Asia in greater detail below. In 
short, however, the differences between Anglo/European and Asian countries reflect 
underlying differences in beliefs regarding the role that markets play in governance, 
the role of different institutions and sources of authority in generating policy, as 
well as different aspirations and values. To better distinguish the nature of these dif-
ferences, we statistically tested the significance of differences in responses across 
regions (Table 9.3).












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Statistical Analysis of Regional and Occupations Difference
We used logistic regression and correlation analysis to evaluate differences across 
the regions (Table 9.3) as well as across industry sectors (Table 9.4). As with region 
of residence, we coded occupational background to maintain statistically compara-
ble sample sizes. We distinguished five categories: financial services (banks, bro-
kerages, hedge funds, exchanges), professional services (accountancies, legal firms, 
news wire, consulting), industry (energy companies, manufacturing companies, 
project developers, industry associations), government (regulatory agencies, policy-
makers, staffers, legislators), and NGOs (environmental advocacy, think tanks, 
academics).
We report statistically significant correlation coefficients in Table  9.3 (Knox- 
Hayes, 2016, p. 60) for region of residence tests and in Table 9.4 (Knox-Hayes, 
2016, p. 61) for occupational sector analysis, and we tested responses from each 
category against all others. The results can be interpreted as follows: In Table 9.3, 
the positive 0.33 under efficiency for Australia signifies that compared to respon-
dents in all other geographies, individuals from Australia are 33% more likely to 
identify governance efficiency as an advantage of market mechanisms to govern 
carbon emissions. The triple asterisk beside 0.33*** signifies that the difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.99% confidence interval. In contrast, the negative 
0.23 in China’s row under efficiency indicates that respondents from China are 23% 
less likely than respondents in all other geographies to identify governance effi-
ciency as an advantage of market mechanisms.
Respondents in the United States are more likely to identify global scale and the 
ability to reduce emissions as advantages or opportunities of using emissions mar-
kets to govern climate change. In general, participants in the United States have a 
more positive perspective about the potential of market-based governance. There is 
strong belief in the utility of market-based governance in the US, which has clear 
linkages to the perspective that the markets can succeed in reducing emissions. The 
focus on global operation, particularly among individuals from the financial ser-
vices industry, relates to logic that markets operate best at a global scale. Thus, 
carbon markets can be effective at a global level, and in the process would also 
displace some of the burden of reducing emissions from the United States, which is 
one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. Respondents from the United States 
are less likely to identify technical complexity, time to translate, and prevalence of 
economics as disadvantages of emissions markets. This fits with the generally neo-
liberal perspective and lack of concern over economic or incentive-based regulatory 
mechanisms.
Australian respondents are more likely to positively identify governance effi-
ciency and efficiency of a carbon price as advantages of market-based governance. 
This reflects the strong emphasis on technical competence in Australian governance. 
Across all sectors, respondents from Australia demonstrated a high degree of tech-
nical (particularly economic) competence. By contrast, Australians are less likely to 
identify flexibility and global scale as advantages of market-based governance. In 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































general, the focus of Australians seems to be much more domestic, even if there is 
recognition that efforts to address climate change come from an obligation to be a 
good global citizen. With respect to disadvantages, Australians were more likely to 
identify the challenges of political uncertainty. This perhaps reflects the tumultuous 
political experience Australians have had with emissions trading. Finally, Australians 
are less likely to express concern over the time it takes to translate markets into local 
context, and less likely to identify the disadvantage of the fact that markets privilege 
economics over the environment (interview respondents across occupational sectors 
in Australia demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of, and comfort with, the 
application economics).
Respondents from the EU were much more likely to identify global scale as an 
advantage of market-based governance with a correlation coefficient of 0.28. Many 
respondents expressed the idea that climate change is a unifying policy because it 
cannot be addressed by any nation-state acting on its own. As such, it helps consoli-
date policy authority at the EU level. Furthermore, the EU has taken global leader-
ship on the issue of climate change, which is a source of pride amongst policymakers 
and market makers. EU responses were also strongly correlated with the disadvan-
tage of carbon markets requiring governance cohesion, with a correlation of 0.43. In 
line with the global focus, EU respondents acknowledge that to be effective markets 
must be international and interconnected, which requires a strong degree of gover-
nance cohesion that does not yet exist in the international system. The EU remains 
one of the strongest proponents for a binding agreement under the UNFCCC. Finally, 
respondents from the EU are less likely to identify technical complexity and time to 
translate as disadvantages of market-based governance. This aligns with the fact 
that the EU ETS was one of the first established systems as well as the fact that the 
EU, and particularly the Commission, has strong technical capacity.
Reflecting a divergence in values vis-à-vis other regions, Chinese respondents 
are less likely to identify efficiency, global scale, and the ability to reduce green-
house gas emissions as advantages of market-based systems. The only advantage 
Chinese respondents are more likely to identify is political viability. Many inter-
locutors suggested that, despite the fact that the Chinese government uses many 
command and control measures for regulation, they are also concerned about mini-
mizing unrest among industry and society. Markets are seen as a more politically 
viable approach to climate change than taxes or command and control. Chinese 
respondents are less likely to indicate governance cohesion as a negative aspect of 
market-based governance. Chinese emissions markets are in some ways more flex-
ible because they are being tried in different regions with an experimental approach. 
This generates a more local focus.
The Chinese are also less likely to indicate the inability to price the intangible as 
a negative aspect of market-based governance. This may reflect the fact that China 
was the largest host country of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, 
and most concerns about pricing the intangible relate to offsetting in the 
CDM. Several respondents identified the large number of operating CDM projects 
as a reason the government should use markets rather than taxes or command and 
control to address climate change. Finally, respondents from China are more likely 
J. Knox-Hayes et al.
213
to identify the time to translate and the preference for economics over the environ-
ment as disadvantages of market-based governance. The respondents were con-
cerned that markets be better tailored to cultural expectations once they are scaled 
to the national level and begin to have greater effect on industry. They also expressed 
concern that the markets would be focused more on economic benefit (i.e., profit- 
taking), for although the environment is increasingly a concern in China, develop-
ment is still the greatest priority.
In Japan, respondents express a far more negative perspective over emissions 
markets than in any other region. Japanese respondents are less likely to identify 
efficiency, technology innovation and investment, global scale, and capacity to 
reduce emissions as advantages or opportunities, and more likely to identify techni-
cal complexity, time to translate, and economic prevalence over the environment as 
disadvantages of the markets. The Japanese place strong emphasis on the need for 
technological development to resolve climate change, but express considerable 
skepticism that carbon markets work efficiently and effectively to generate environ-
mental impact. There is also a recognition that Japan is culturally different from 
other regions like the EU, where markets have been trialed, and that it would take 
considerable time to develop a market approach that would work in Japan. To some 
extent, this is the solution the Japanese have identified with their Bilateral Offset 
Credit Mechanism/Joint Crediting Mechanism (BOCM/JCM). Finally, the responses 
from Japan are negatively correlated with concern over governance cohesion, which 
reflects the fact that there is a much greater domestic than global focus. For exam-
ple, the Joint Crediting Mechanism is designed to allow each host country that part-
ners with Japan to independently tailor the program to their needs.
Korean respondents are more likely to identify flexibility and political viability 
as positive advantages of market-based governance and more likely to identify tech-
nical complexity and time to translate as disadvantages. Several interlocutors sug-
gested that the government tends to be focused on command and control, so markets 
would generate a welcome change. Additionally, as in Australia there is strong tech-
nical competence in Korea, where the ministries are very influential, and therefore 
a high degree of concern for the creation of technical policy. Korean respondents are 
more likely to see technical complexity as a challenge, in part because the carbon 
markets are managed by the ministries, particularly the Ministry of Environment 
and Ministry of Trade, Energy, and Industry, and treated as technical devices. 
Respondents also expressed more concern with the time it would take to translate 
and operationalize the markets.
With respect to the occupational sector (Table 9.4), there are only a few statisti-
cally significant differences among the groups. Unsurprisingly, individuals from 
financial services are more likely to identify efficiency, global scale, and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions as advantages or opportunities of market-based gover-
nance and less likely to identify technical complexity as a disadvantage of market- 
based governance. Members of the financial services are among the strongest 
proponents of market-based governance and are comfortable with the technical 
requirements of structuring carbon as a commodity. In contrast, individuals from the 
professional services are less likely to believe markets have the capacity to reduce 
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emissions, and more likely to see technical complexity as a disadvantage. These 
firms also stand to gain from servicing emissions markets, but in contrast to the 
financial services industry they benefit from the markets regardless of whether or 
not the markets are successful because their revenue is generated from service fees. 
For example, legal firms generate revenue from writing contracts for carbon credits, 
structuring products, and litigating disputes regardless of whether or not the price of 
emissions is high. They are consequently more familiar with the technical complex-
ity required for markets to operate efficiently, and more skeptical of the ability of 
markets to reduce emissions.
Individuals from industry are less likely to see price efficacy as an advantage of 
emissions markets. Even if the markets are a more flexible means of governance, 
they still place a burden on the industry sectors subject to a cap. Individuals from 
government are more likely to recognize political uncertainty as a disadvantage of 
emissions markets. These individuals operate most closely and are most familiar 
with the political tensions involved in markets. Whether or not respondents were in 
favor of the markets, they recognized that they operate only if they have political 
support. The markets require a consistent and stable regulatory framework to be 
effective. However, as in the case of Australia, the regulatory framework is subject 
to change every time there is an election. The political turnover creates market 
uncertainty. Finally, NGOs are unsurprisingly less likely to identify reducing emis-
sions as an advantage of emissions trading. NGOs tended to be more concerned 
with the environmental impacts of governance and more skeptical of market-based 
approaches.
In sum, statistically significant regional variations around the idea of market- 
based climate governance belie the apparent consensus in the Anglo/European 
space regarding markets as a basis for managing climate change. European respon-
dents emphasize global-scale coordination and governance beyond the nation-state. 
US respondents hold a stronger belief in the efficacy of markets as a means of 
reducing emissions, and Australian respondents demonstrate a more internal focus 
and a stronger emphasis on technocratic norms. Australian’s associate market-based 
governance with fairness but recognize the limitations.
In the East there is much greater skepticism in general about the use of market 
mechanisms for governance. The respondents who favor markets tend to demon-
strate different priorities. The perspective from respondents in China is perhaps at 
odds with the government rationale for pursuing market-based governance. In 
China, markets are associated with modernity and China’s international standing 
relative to other great powers, but more importantly as the path to ecological mod-
ernization through which economic growth will be connected with environmental 
preservation. Nevertheless, market participants express skepticism about where the 
markets come from, the technical complexity involved in creating them and how 
they will relate to a Chinese institutional setting of governance.
In South Korea, there is a similar association with development and international 
standing through the construction of markets. To the extent that they provide flexi-
bility, the actors who have considerable expertise (particularly within the ministries) 
see the markets as an advantage. Nevertheless, there is also recognition of the 
J. Knox-Hayes et al.
215
complexity involved in building effective carbon markets, and concern over the time 
it will take to properly operationalize them. Japan is the country most skeptical of 
emissions trading, with individuals across occupational sectors voicing strong con-
cerns. Some of the most vocal critics come from within the industrial and financial 
service sectors. The strong negative associations of market governance, particularly 
regarding the technical complexity of the markets and prevalence of profit over 
environmental impact, are derived from cultural norms and values that differ from 
those of the Anglo/European context.
 The Role of Politics in Shaping Political Norms
The differences in how markets are conceptualized between regions highlight the 
importance of intersubjective coherence in perspective within regions. The idea of 
market-based governance resonates in different ways in different geographies, but 
there is also a surprising degree of coherence in concepts within and even between 
places. In countries like Australia and the United States, efficiency is a major goal. 
In Europe, the ideas of economic opportunity and global leadership predominate in 
discussion of markets. The term “modernization” is common in both China and 
South Korea. In Japan, respondents associated their skepticism of financial markets 
by describing emissions markets with the term “money game.” Although these dif-
ferences in conception and in the language used to describe markets are interesting 
in and of themselves, what is particularly interesting is the way markets permeate 
the social conscious and resonate with their own language in different places. This 
suggests that scholars and policymakers cannot speak of “the market” because pro-
cesses of syncretism driven by local sociopolitical factors produce multiple permu-
tations of “the market,” each with greater or lesser degrees of divergence from the 
abstracted ideal. This has potentially significant ramifications for using markets to 
manage climate change, which requires markets to have an extremely high degree 
of interoperability and thus low tolerances for divergence.
Consequently, in addition to communicating particular economic values about 
energy use and efficiency through a price signal, markets also communicate a range 
of other concepts and social values. The language that permeates the markets in 
each region reflects common understandings of what the markets are expected to be 
as well as who has the authority to govern and shape them. As Donald MacKenzie 
(2009) suggests, material agencements (combinations of human beings, material 
objects, and technical systems) structure markets. It is a combination of human 
agency, organizational structure, and systems of meaning that constitutes markets.
The global imperative to address climate change through technical framing as 
generated by the UNFCCC provides both a logic of action as well as an infrastruc-
ture of organization. It suggests, and relies upon, institutional isomorphism of the 
markets, in particular giving a common basic framework: a cap, the allocation of 
permits, a commodity of trade, and comparable organizations of monitoring, verify-
ing, and reporting. The agencies with expertise in navigating these roles take on 
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market authority. And yet, the global imperative and isomorphic form (markets cop-
ied from the structure of the EU ETS for example) competes with economic metis 
grounded in sociocultural and political norms. For example, in China private 
accountancies, consultancies, and legal firms do not have the same authority as the 
National Development and Reform Commission to perform the functions of moni-
toring, verifying, and reporting. Conversely, in the United States the construction 
and functioning of the market lies largely in the hands of private sector accountan-
cies, consultancies, and legal forms. The basic shape and function of the market is 
therefore translated through different infrastructures and the isomorphism disap-
pears as the markets are built and enacted through different cultural logics.
 Network Governance in the Context of Market Cultures
Linking network governance to market culture allows for additional insight into the 
dynamics that underpin climate policy. Because climate policy requires coordina-
tion across multiple organizations within the complexity of contemporary political 
economies, the concept of network governance can provide important analytical 
leverage. Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 231) define a network as three or more legally 
autonomous organizations working collaboratively toward a common goal. By 
emphasizing multiple nodes of agency, this approach allows for a more realistic 
engagement with climate policy, in which multiple organizational actors must be 
harnessed into collaborational networks to produce the profound shifts in energy 
production and use required to reduce carbon emissions.
All networks are not the same, however. Provan and Kenis (2008) identify two 
cleavages. First, networks vary by the degree of centralization. At one end—called 
shared governance—are completely decentralized networks in which all the partici-
pants interact and governance direction is equally shared. The underlying market 
cultures shape their function and organization. At the other end of the spectrum—
termed lead organization—are networks in which one or a small number of organi-
zations take the lead directing governance and contact between the other 
organizations in the network is limited. A second cleavage concerns the source of 
leadership. At one end are networks that are governed by their own members. At the 
other are networks that are governed by organizations external to the network. These 
external governors are called network administrative organizations (NAO) (Provan 
& Kenis, 2008, pp. 233–234). In their comprehensive review of the network gover-
nance literature, Dal Molin and Masella (2016, pp. 497–498) identify an additional 
set of six factors: trust in others to take account of interests, size of network, goal 
consensus, leadership that support governance, embeddedness of goals in network 
relations, and diversity of network members. Table 9.5 below combines the typol-
ogy identified by Provan and Kenis with the factors outlined by Dal Molin and 
Masella and applies them to the United States, Japan, European Union, China, 
South Korea, and Australia. Clearly, these polities differ quite dramatically. Much 
of this difference is due to differences in the market cultures.
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In Fig. 9.1, we present the differences in network governance mapped onto mar-
ket culture.
With this figure, we clearly demonstrate the relational position of the various 
polities with respect to climate policy. The United States, more than any of the other 
countries surveyed, indicated a strong positive correlation with the idea that the 
capacity of market governance to reduce emissions is an advantage. The United 
States’ positioning on the y-axis is due to the dynamics created by the two-party 
system and the profusion of political lobbying. Although the United States bears 
potential to demonstrate characteristics more akin to that of a lead organization, the 
checks and balances system of the US system along with strong party polarization 
are indicative of a form of shared governance. As such, goal consensus within the 
parties is high, but goal consensus within the federal government is low. Similarly, 
trust between the parties is low, but within each party is moderately high. 
Additionally, lobbyists from a variety of business industries have a large presence in 
American governance. Campaign contributions from wealthy individuals and spe-
cial interest group have reached historical highs since the Citizens United decision, 
adding more voices to the American political process.
As evidenced by the figure, Australia’s culture is moderately state oriented and 
network is moderately lead oriented. Australia respondents were of the opinion that 











Fig. 9.1 Form of network governance plotted against market culture. Source: Design by authors
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optimal solution due to how markets incentivize innovation, it is unlikely that con-
sensus on a global market structure will ever be reached. The Australian view is that 
pricing within a carbon market is fraught with challenges due to the uncertainty of 
pricing environmental impacts and the challenges of maintaining stable, long-term 
projections amidst that uncertainty. The uncertainty surrounding pricing and the 
unlikelihood of global consensus places Australia in favor of more state-controlled 
responses to climate change. In relation to governance, Australia is dominated inter-
nally by a strong private sector and is host to a similar lobbying presence like the 
US. However, the party in power in Australia has control over the ministries, indica-
tive of a lead-organization style of governance.
By contrast, the EU demonstrates characteristics that align well with the NAO 
form of network governance. The number of member states is moderately high, 
with moderate trust density between member states and the EU itself and between 
member state dyads. The leadership style is an external network organization, the 
EU, overlooking participant member states. Additionally, because of the separation 
of the member state governments from the EU, lobbying does not affect EU gover-
nance in the same way that lobbying impacts the United States: Member-state poli-
ticians are not the same politicians as those who represent the member state at the 
EU level. The EU respondents indicated a strong correlation with the reliance on 
governance cohesion as a disadvantage for global climate markets—EU respon-
dents acknowledged that markets must be international and interconnected to be 
effective, but the international governance cohesion necessary does not yet exist. 
The aforementioned response is reflected in their positioning towards the center of 
the x-axis, with a slight preference for markets.
Japan differs from the rest of the study polities in that the Japanese respondents 
indicated a strong preference for domestic solutions to climate change through tech-
nological development. The Japanese BOCM/JCM is structured to allow each host 
country to partner independently with Japan, creating highly specialized partner-
ships as opposed to facilitating participation in a general, global system. Goal con-
sensus among Japanese ministries and industries is high with a low diversity of 
opinions, indicative of a shared form of governance. Finally, Japan’s position on the 
x-axis is reflective of the respondents’ consensus across different occupational sec-
tors that the faults of market governance are high, coupled with their emphasis on a 
“good” or “technological” market as the solution to emissions reductions.
Korea sits with Australia and China in the State and Lead quadrant. Although the 
Korean respondents appreciate the flexibility and viability that carbon markets offer, 
they do not see carbon markets as a mechanism for combatting climate change that 
can be easily implemented at a global scale because of the differences between 
industries in terms of the instruments and processes that are used. The leftward 
positioning on the x-axis is complemented by a more lead-organization style of 
network governance, as the Korean ministries are highly influential within the gov-
ernment and contribute to a single national agenda.
Finally, China most strongly demonstrates the characteristics of a lead organiza-
tion as its form of network governance, with a substantial emphasis on state gover-
nance for climate change solutions. Chinese respondents indicated a negative 
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correlation with the idea that markets are a more efficient form of governance than 
the state, especially considering the amount of time it would take to develop the 
necessary institutions and regulatory agencies within China to monitor a carbon 
market. The preference towards a state solution is indicated by China’s left leaning 
position on the x-axis. Additionally, applying the Provan and Kenis typologies of 
network governance while using the expanded Dal Molin and Masella characteris-
tics, we have determined that the size, embeddedness, and leadership qualities of 
China are most like those of a lead organization, with the remaining characteristics 
of trust, diversity, and goal consensus indicating state cohesion and cooperation due 
to the highly centralized nature of the Chinese government.
 Market Perceptions: From General Claims to Specific Cases
Market-based governance is driven by assumptions that climate change is a techno- 
economic rather than a sociopolitical problem and is thus amenable to universalistic 
neoliberal-economic policy prescriptions. However, these prescriptions interact 
with political and social systems in different scalar contexts, producing variations in 
how the market is understood and operates. With our analysis presented here, we 
show that climate policies cannot neglect the ways in which differences in scale and 
place—local, national, and regional—impact on how international mandates trans-
late into action. Shortcomings in the global effort to address climate change can thus 
in part be traced to failures to appreciate how economic metis shapes economic 
practice at different scales and in different places. As suggested in this chapter, cul-
ture at the national and regional levels plays a crucial role in determining the enact-
ment of international imperatives. Markets do not exist in institutional vacuums and 
failure to account for local economic knowledge means that efforts to establish 
governance on the basis of universalistic economic behavior are unmoored from the 
ways states and societies practice economics. These variations also play out across 
different network governance forms, making for a complex climate policy landscape.
The mix of social and governance contexts and motivations behind policy sug-
gests that greater flexibility is needed at the international level to enable states to act 
on climate change. The arrival of different polities at different policy solutions 
reflects the distinctive sociopolitical systems in which they are formulated. In the 
EU, the market has been implemented quickly but has struggled to make even slight 
adjustments. In the US, global and popular discourses have generated periods of 
heightened concern over climate change, only for these to be destabilized by “eco-
nomic realism.” Nonetheless, well-established bureaucratic systems to manage air- 
quality- control problems in the 1970s and 1980s in California enabled the 
establishment of a technocratically managed system, albeit years after the EU 
ETS. In Australia, a strong bureaucratic culture propagated carbon-pricing policies 
only for political turmoil to threaten to unravel the system a few years later.
In China, the emissions markets have been established as political compromise 
to mitigate climate change but in a less stringent manner than the usual command 
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and control approach. Although the strategy of trialing different forms across seven 
regions has lent greater flexibility to the system, it to a degree has also marginalized 
the impact of emissions trading. In Japan, attempts by the Ministry of Environment 
to institute regional and domestic emissions trading systems have been met with 
strong resistance from industry. Cultural norms dictate that markets must have a 
material impact. The compromise has been to adapt the basic idea and structure of 
emissions market or offset trading and apply it to the transfer of technology to 
developing regions. Although the approach is beneficial for both energy and emis-
sions gains, it has pulled Japan from international negotiations. In South Korea, the 
markets adapt well to the strong technical capacity and existing authority of various 
ministries. And yet, the South Koreans have struggled to scale the markets to a size 
and form that best fits the conditions of their relatively consolidated industrial 
groups. As we have demonstrated in this chapter, the idea that climate change can 
be addressed through a single, unified techno-economic prescription does not hold 
against empirical reality.
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Chapter 10
The Fight Against Corruption in Brazil: 
A Case of Good Governance?
Markus Pohlmann and Elizangela Valarini
Since the start of Operation Carwash (Operação Lava Jato)1 in March 2014, politics, 
senior executives, and the judiciary have been in great turmoil in Brazil. Having 
ensnared the construction industry and Petrobras, the state-run oil company, the 
specter of corruption is now threatening to envelop other state-owned enterprises, 
such as the nuclear energy industry, with the construction of nuclear power plants as 
well as further Brazilian federal entities, such as the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), a Brazilian federal bank, the Caixa Econômica Federal, etc. Operation 
Carwash became the largest ever ongoing criminal investigation in Brazilian his-
tory. In special, the criminal process against the former President Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva and his political party, the Workers’ party (Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)), 
detonated a political tinderbox. Not only have the accusations against ex-President 
Lula, the impeachment against his successor Dilma Roussef, the arrest of the 
President of the Parliament, Eduardo Cunha of the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB)), and current pro-
ceedings against roughly 279 politicians robbed the Brazilians of their sleep, the 
sheer multitude of corruption scandals in the economy also keeps them in suspense.
What is going on in Brazil? And what is behind these scandals? It seems that 
tolerance of corruption in Brazil reached a turning point. Whereas criminal pro-
cesses and sentences were once slight and rare, and only pronounced with the exclu-
sion of the general public, they are now coming fast, hitting hard, and reaching the 
1 The name Operation Carwash have been giving from Brazilian Federal Police to the uncovered 
scheme of money laundering that was linked to a chain of gas stations and car wash systems. Later, 
the data showed that this case was linked to the Petrobras corruptions scheme.
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news. With the enacting of the Freedom of Information Act no. 12.527/2011,2 any-
one who is curious enough can easily follow the trials on official sites of the justice 
system, but also in the media. Also, punishment became harsher. For example, the 
federal court of Paraná sentenced Marcello Odebrecht, the president of one of the 
biggest business groups in Brazil, and a descendant of a German immigrant family, 
to 19.4 years on the charges of bribery, participating in organized crime, and money 
laundering.
In our article, we will investigate the unlawful practices of the Brazilian con-
struction companies involved in the Petrobras plot and their relationship with the 
public sector. In our analysis of criminal trials, inquiries, testimonials, and examina-
tion of the Brazilian context, we attempt to demonstrate that good governance is 
related to the interaction of various types of institutions (cognitive, normative, and 
regulative), as well as embedded belief patterns shared in a society. For this purpose, 
we analyze the institutionalized patterns in a deviant environment and the competi-
tive pressure in which enterprises are embedded. Furthermore, we examine internal 
organizational incentives and the profits from illegal practices, the hierarchical pres-
sure, as well as the legitimation of unlawful activities, rationalization, and socializa-
tion in Brazilian organizations.
Relying on a multilevel analytical approach, we begin our analysis by describing 
the current Petrobras scandal and the main actors involved. Furthermore, we run our 
observations on the institutional level, and we analyze the change of regulations, 
laws, and the efforts of law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute cor-
ruption in Brazil. We aim to find out what kind of institutional and regulative 
changes were realized in Brazil and how the switch from defective to more effective 
regulations took place. In the next chapter, we argue that the defective regulation in 
the fight against corruption was one significant background and reason for the “nor-
malization of corruption” on a corporate level. Dealing with the actors in charge of 
running the companies, we analyze how subcultures or social “cocoons” emerged 
inside the companies, providing frames of action for organizational wrongdoing. 
We ask whether and how so many high-ranking officials and senior managers took 
part in the corrupt setup. One of the stunning facts revealed by Operation Carwash’s 
investigators is how closely cartel building and bribe paying by important members 
of Brazil’s big business was intertwined with illegal party financing and political 
corruption. We thus dedicate the sixth chapter to the analysis of political corruption 
in Brazil as the other side of the coin. Moving back to the actor level, we then ask 
how many and what kind of political actors have been involved and which 
2 According to the Freedom of Information Act, enacted in November 2011, all public agencies, 
members of the direct administration of the Executive, Legislative, including the Audit Courts and 
Judiciary and Public Prosecution as well as all municipalities, public foundations, state-owned 
enterprises, mixed-capital-companies and other entities directly or indirectly controlled by the 
Federal Government, States, Federal District and Municipalities must to divulge all information 
related to their administration, such as income and expenses as well as produced and guarded 
information that are of collective interest (http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_
ato2011-2014/2011/lei/l12527.htm).
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framework of political wrongdoing has been established. Could Operation Carwash 
destroy the pattern of political corruption? In our subsequent conclusions, we will 
address whether the Brazilian case is just one of effective changes in law enforce-
ment or a case of “good governance” as well.
 The Brazilian Petrobras Plot
The Petrobras plot unveiled a complex and profound corruption scheme in Brazil. 
The number of political parties, enterprises, high-ranking politicians, executives, 
and managers as well as the sophisticated modus operandi discovered in the context 
of Operation Carwash was unprecedented in Brazilian society. The case’s magni-
tude, but also the change in the methods and procedures applied on Operation 
Carwash, makes it a crucial case for social scientists.
Since Operation Carwash was launched in March 2014, its investigators have 
discovered US$2 billion of bribery payments from private companies to Petrobras 
senior executives, politicians, and political parties. More than 760 cases are now in 
court, involving politicians, senior executives, owners of Brazil’s largest enterprises, 
and other actors. 182 people have been convicted, penalties add up to 1809 years.3
To understand the Petrobras case, we shall pay attention to four core investigated 
groups. The first core group consists of senior executives occupying key positions at 
three of Petrobras’s business units: Supply, International, and Corporate and 
Services. Petrobras’s executive directors, supported by political parties, ensured 
access to the expensive Petrobras contracts for a distinct group of Brazilian private 
construction companies. In return, the construction companies paid them some-
where between 1% and 3% on top of the contract’s value. In this context, it is also 
important to account for the composition of the executive boards at Brazilian state- 
owned enterprises. Generally, the directors are appointed by government officials, 
the President, and/or members of the political parties. In the case of Petrobras, the 
directors of the executive board were supported by political parties of the current 
ruling coalition: PT, PMDB, and PP (Progressive Party/Partido Progressista). The 
second main group in the Petrobras case was the so-called black market dealers. 
These intermediaries served as a link between Petrobras executives and managers of 
the construction companies, as well as between the government and party members. 
Furthermore, they were responsible for finding means to launder the money from 
bribery payments. The third group involved in this bribery scheme consists of the 
largest Brazilian construction companies. They were organized in a cartel to obtain 
Petrobras’s major public bids related to their business areas and allocate the con-
tracts internally. The cartel dealt with Petrobras directors and makes it possible to 
restrict and exclude new bidders interested in Petrobras projects. Thanks to their 
“agreement” with Petrobras’ senior managers, they ensured that the bid winner 
3 See http://www.mpf.mp.br/grandes-casos/lava-jato (accessed 23.02.2018).
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always came from within the cartel. The fourth main group of suspects uncovered 
by Operation Carwash investigators is made up of politicians, government officials, 
and political parties, in other words: the bribe takers.4 Leaders of political parties, 
politicians, such as state and federal deputies, senators, and ministers financed their 
political parties, campaigns, and political alliances through payment of bribes. Even 
the former republic President Michel Temer is suspected of receiving bribes from 
large enterprises,5 as was the former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who was 
sentenced to 12 years in prison.6
According to Petrobras’s internal audit (Petrobras, 2014), perpetrators violated a 
series of the company’s internal rules and general laws about public bids.7 The gov-
ernment has regulated public bids for hiring a service provider through strong leg-
islation: Lei No. 8.666/1993. For the success of the bribery scheme, the participation 
of the business unit “Corporate and Services” was strategic, because its members 
were in charge of the bid procedures and regulations, project price calculation, as 
well as selection and accreditation of partner companies. The board of Corporate 
and Service alone could not approve new contracts, because the bid process 
demanded several business units, departments, and the monitoring of board mem-
bers, but according to the former Petrobras president between 2012 and 2015, Maria 
das Graças Foster,8 the expertise and professional competence of the director of this 
unit was appreciated. In this respect, the business units’ directors had a large scope 
to influence or even “manipulate” the results of bid proceedings in favor of their 
interests.
4 See trials for administrative improbity: 500662892.2015.4.04.7000/PR; 
5006717-18.2015.4.04.7000/PR; 5006695-57.2015.4.04.7000/PR; 5006675-66.2015.4.04.7000/
PR; 5011119-11.2016.4.04.7000/PR; 5006694-72.2015.4.04.7000/PR; and criminal trials: 
5083351-89.2014.4.04.7000/PR; 504524184.2015.4.04.7000/PR; 508325829.2014.4.04.7000/
PR; 5083401-18.2014.4.04.7000/PR; 5083376-05.2014.4.04.7000/PR; 503652823.2015.4.04.7000/
PR; 508336051.2014.4.04.7-000/PR; 501233104.2015.4.04.7000/PR; 507344138.2014.4.04.7000/
PR; 5027422-37.2015.4.04.7000/PR; 502698037.20-16.4.04.7000/PR).
5 Inquiry number 4.483/DF, documents 162339/2017/GTLJ-PGR and 162973/2017/GTLJ-PGR.
6 Criminal trial 5046512-94.2016.4.04.7000/PR. The sentence and result of the appeal court deci-
sion has not yet been issued.
7 Public bid is the set of laws to regulate the contracts between public and private sector, but also is 
used to administer contracts for purchasing materials and supplies by public entities. The public 
bid law aims to ensure that public entities receive the best possible price for the supplies or pub-
lic works.
8 Maria das Graças Foster’s testimony https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9TkDOJZlLOg
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 Institutional and Regulative Changes in Brazil: 
From Defective to Effective Institutions and Regulations?
On the institutional level, we are analyzing the changes in legislations and law 
enforcement over the last two decades, concerning political and economic corrup-
tion in Brazil. We are focusing mainly on the constitutional reality and the policy 
outcome, that is, on the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement in Brazil. 
Not long ago, there was a lack of law enforcement and monitoring systems for pri-
vate and public corruption (Chaves, 2013), creating an institutional environment 
prone to deviance and corruption. For example, Brazilian legislation does not yet 
cover private corruption9 (Pascolati Junior, 2016), some politicians have legal 
immunity, and thus, under the constitution, due this legal status they can be just 
investigated and prosecuted in special courts, such as the supreme court. According 
to the Carwash’ prosecutors, although the penalties for corporate crime and political 
corruption have become more severe, the probability of being detected and incarcer-
ated remained low (Dallagnol, 2017). What we call “defective institutions and 
defective regulations” have been part of the Brazilian reality concerning the fight 
against corruption.
In our discussion, we differentiate between institutions and regulations. We 
define institutions as cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and/or activities 
that run on stability, but also constrain, regularize, and give meaning to social 
behavior, but assume an impersonal and objective form of reality (Scott, 2014). 
They incorporate both symbolic systems and regulative processes that orient social 
action and organizational behaviors in a defined social group and/or society (Bathelt 
& Glückler, 2014; Scott, 2014). Furthermore, institutions are determined by local-
ity, cultural patterns, social conditions, etc., and constituted and reproduce by ongo-
ing social interaction existing in a specific social context (Glückler, Suddaby, & 
Lenz, 2018). “Although institutions may represent the intentions inherent in rules” 
(Bathelt & Glückler, 2014, p. 356), they differ from rules, laws and regulations. 
These can regulate social interaction from organizations and actors independently if 
those behind social beliefs or a common knowledge. In that sense, rules, laws and 
regulations can regulate social practice through their sanction systems (Bathelt & 
Glückler, 2014). Thus, introduced laws, rules and regulations can lead to different 
outcomes, depending the existing institutions, with them the new regulation will be 
interact (Glückler & Lenz, 2016).
Institutions and regulations are defective when laws and directives, such as anti-
corruption laws, do exist but these either fail to set sufficient standards or the admin-
istrative enforcement thereof is patchy or inadequately guaranteed. In this case, the 
constitutional legal bases are not undermined, but the purpose of the regulation is 
largely missed. The fight against corruption may be only “nice to have,” as one has 
9 Bill 236/2012 has been in process since 2012 in the Brazilian Federal Senate to implement the 
penal legislation with legal instrument to define and punish private corruption (Pascolati Junior, 
2016, p. 148).
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repeatedly witnessed over the past years. We believe that such a defective regulation 
creates important preconditions for the emergence of forms of deviant self- regulation 
at the level of enterprises. And that is exactly what happened in the case of the fight 
against corruption in Brazil. Defective regulations and institutions are, in this sense, 
functional for the maintenance of a system that systematically and legally subverts 
the purposes of statutory regulation. We call this “systemic corruption.”
In the 1990s, the global diffusion of regulatory agencies (Braithwaite, 2008; de 
Rugy & Warren, 2009; Jordana, Levi-Faur, & Fernández i Marín, 2011) also spread to 
Brazil, a country which a long-lasting tradition of a regulatory state and regulatory 
capitalism (Braithwaite, 2008). Although impeded by a self-sustaining pattern of cro-
nyism, a new phase of regulation emerged in Brazil as well, leading to the detection 
and prosecution of big corruption scandals. In the last decades, Brazil has committed 
itself, through several international agreements,10 to fighting against corruption 
(Barkemeyer,  Preuss, & Lee, 2015; Dantas de Araujo, 2012; de Sanctis, 2015; 
Richard, 2014). To do so, Brazil has implemented a national strategy against corrup-
tion, organized crime, and money laundering, the National Strategy for Combating 
Corruption and Money Laundering (Estratégia Nacional contra a Corrupção e a 
Lavagem de Dinheiro (ENCCLA)) (de Sanctis, 2015). This initiative is not only a new 
paradigm to combat corruption and economic and financial crimes, but it is also 
responsible for concrete changes aimed at involving the judicial system more strongly 
in the execution and investigation of corruption cases. The new Anti- Corruption Act 
n. 12.846/2013 is a result of the support of the ENCCLA’s strategies. Its significant 
change consists in the accountability and punishment of Brazilian and foreign compa-
nies as legal entities. They can be addressed by the penal code and have obligations to 
install compliance systems (Chaves, 2013; Correia, 2015; Wohlnick & Correia, 2016).
The diffusion of international anticorruption policies in Brazil has fomented a 
series of changes related to new regulation, such as enacting of laws and rules to 
regulate and control the public administration and to generate more transparency of 
public spending and public activities (Lei No. 8.112/1990; Lei No. 8.429/1992; Lei 
Complementar  No.  101/2000; Lei Complementar No.  131/2009; Lei 
No. 12.527/2011), the business relation between the public and private sector (Lei 
No. 8.666/1993; Lei No. 10.520/2002), and so forth. (Filgueiras & Araújo, 2014). 
Some authors have also pointed to changes related to the perception of Brazilian 
society about corruption. With the redemocratization process, the corruption scan-
dals have also become public. Most recent changes on the institutional level in Brazil 
related to laws and regulations, such as the Anti-Corruption Act, may be the product 
of civil society pressure (Filgueiras & Araújo, 2014). Even if the perception about 
corruption in Brazilian society over time seems to be changing, small and large cor-
ruption is still affecting the relation between actors, organizations, and government.
10 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Offices in International Business Transactions (OECD); Convention on 
Combating Bribery (UK) (2003); United Nations Convention against Corruption (Mérida 
Convencion); Inter-American Convention against Corruption; and so forth.
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The regulative changes have been impressive and well acknowledged all over the 
world as good governance in the fight against corruption. Yet it is more precise to 
call it “good law enforcement” and to keep open whether it leads to a mode of good 
governance, in which various interest groups and societal actors engage in the fight 
against corruption.
 The “Normalization of Corruption” on a Corporate Level
In our view, defective regulations in the fight against corruption are one important 
precondition for the “normalization of corruption” on a corporate level. By analyz-
ing the cartel of construction companies, we discovered that only 30% of these 
enterprises had a code of conduct to regulate the business relations in- and outside 
of the company before Operation Carwash began. Our analysis revealed that 
although these enterprises do have a code of conduct, the terms and clauses pre-
scribing rules of doing business ethically and those declaring illegal and unlawful 
behavior to be punishable are phrased vaguely. Furthermore, in the code of conduct 
was lacking a precise description of no acceptable practices and behaviors inside of 
the organization, in its relationship with the political field and with other enterprises 
as well as a concretely description of sanctions and penalties against the wrongdo-
ers was missing. Thus, in the code of conduct, this is considered a first step to estab-
lishing a compliance system. Most of the companies under investigation by the 
Operation Carwash had no compliance measures installed. They only started to 
establish a compliance system when they moved into the spotlight of law enforce-
ment. Only those companies with major business activities abroad or with interna-
tional investors ran an internal compliance system. However, lawyers and compliance 
professionals have strongly challenged the legitimacy and effectiveness of the inter-
nal compliance (Pizarro, 2015). If we extend our analysis beyond Brazil to the Latin 
America context, we verify that the introduction of compliance systems to regulate 
corporate behaviors are a relatively young practice in Latin American countries. 
According to Passas and Kleinhempel (2016), although 35% of the existing compli-
ance systems were introduced between 2005 and 2010, more than 50% were imple-
mented in the last few years. These authors have pointed out that there is a gap in 
employee awareness about the importance of such programs. An average of 19% of 
employees did not know about the introduction of a compliance program in their 
company (p. 82).
Far more important is that companies like Odebrecht ran departments dedicated 
to carrying out illicit activities, such as the department Odebrecht called “departa-
mento de operações estruturadas” (department for structured operations) which had 
existed for decades. According to the former senior manager Hilberto Mascarenhas, 
the chief officer of Odebrecht’s “departamento de operações estruturadas,” the com-
pany had also established an internal bonus system that provided incentives for 
paying bribes. In his case, the annual bonus was as high as one third of his annual 
salary of US$1.2 million and was part of a provision system for bribe payers.
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What was agreed was this: I will pay you a bonus on the basis of your outcomes. And we 
will negotiate it annually. So, you may do anything that you need to achieve it [bonus]. So 
if you ask someone who wants to increase the revenue of his project, but this requires the 
approval of an ‘aditivo’ [additional investments] that is still on the table of someone who 
does not want to approve of it, this person may do everything for the approval of his ‘adi-
tivo’ to increase the value of his project. (Hilberto Mascarenhas, Odebrecht former senior 
manager, 2017 testimony11)
Moreover, the paid bribes were subtracted from individual bonuses gained through 
the project, so that the responsible manager had autonomy to fix the sum of the 
bribe. The existence of a permissive code of conduct and the lack of a working 
compliance system that may prevent the unlawful activities inside of the organiza-
tion, therefore, were both elements that gave rise to internal incentives for resorting 
to illegal practices; both contributed to the establishment of an organizational cul-
ture in which such practices were accepted and normalized. In their testimonies, the 
executives displayed a self-image as professionals that achieved sound perfor-
mances. In other words, “they did their job.”
Of course, by now all these companies have changed their policies concerning 
the illicit dimensions of their business activities. The “departamentos de operações 
estruturadas” have been wound up, and the bonus systems terminated. The company 
Odebrecht repented by running apologies in the print media for its wrongdoing.12
 The Corporate Level Actors: Entrepreneurs 
and Top Managers
The number of entrepreneurs, managers, chief executives, and middle managers 
involved in Operation Carwash increased with every new discovery in the investiga-
tion. We concentrated our analysis only on the construction companies, which were 
accused and convicted of crimes related to cartel formation and their illegal access 
to the Petrobras contracts. To date, prosecutors have opened eleven criminal trials 
against sixteen construction companies and 64 executives at the Federal Court of 
Paraná,13 investigating crimes against the state-controlled company Petrobras. Just 
five of these criminal trials were concluded; the other six are still under  investigation. 
Presently, 33 executives and owners have been convicted of corruption, cartel build-
ing, and money laundering, and only nine managers have been absolved, due to lack 
11 https://g1.globo.com/politica/operacao-lava-jato/noticia/executivos-da-odebrecht-superfatura-
vam-obras-para-ganhar-bonus-da-empresa.ghtml
12 See: https://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,odebrecht-fecha-acordo-de-r-6-8-bilhoes-e- 
pede-desculpas-ao-pais-por-pratica-de-corrupcao,10,000,091,979.
13 The eleven criminal trials against executives, owners, and managers of the construction compa-
nies that participated in the price-fixing cartel: 5036528-23.2015.404.7000; 
5036518-76.2015.4.04.7000; 5027422-37.2015.4.04.7000; 5025847-91.2015.4.04.7000; 
5083351-89.2014.404.7000; 5083376-05.2014.404.7000; 5083360-51.2014.404.7000; 
5083401-18.2014.404.7000; 5083258-29.2014.404.7000; 5011926-65.2015.4.04.7000.
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of evidence. On average, the convicted executives were sentenced to 15 years in 
prison on top of substantial fines.14
The results of the fight against corruption show that the case involves not just a 
few people, but a large number of entrepreneurs and chief executives in top posi-
tions of the construction companies. Both the rank and number of those who per-
petuated price-fixing, money laundering, and bribery indicate the institutionalization 
of a strong subculture or a social cocoon. In the cartel case, the establishment of a 
deviant subculture can be self-sustaining. For decades the companies have devel-
oped a common modus operandi with the public sector: They decide which projects 
to pursue and at what price to run them, but they also decide, on the basis of the sum 
of their campaign donation, if their business activities can be perpetuated.
The analysis of court documents, especially the testimonies, not only provided 
strong evidences for the development of a social cocoon, as well as a subculture 
inside the organizations, but also gave us an insider’s look at the cartel and the rela-
tionship among these companies. The social cocoon can be considered as part of the 
organizational culture, because it thrives and shapes the managers’ and employees’ 
values, norms, and attitudes in support of the corrupt practices. The social cocoon 
differentiates itself from a negative social perspective about corruption, which group 
members consider as common practices that are necessary for the organization to 
achieve its objectives (Campbell & Göritz, 2014). This subculture within the orga-
nization is developed over time through three main mechanisms: institutionalization 
of systematically used corrupt practices; rationalization by plausible social justifica-
tion for the use of these practices; and socialization of the unwritten rules and infor-
mal interpretations within the organization.
Operation Carwash investigators have revealed that the cartel’s activities were 
supported by the top management at the enterprises involved. The senior executives 
and managers who sustained these practices were on average 69 years old and had 
worked at the company for 23 years. Thus, socialization and insider recruitment 
became important factors in establishing and perpetuating the subculture. Moreover, 
the ways in which illegal practices were normalized, so that the actors involved did 
not question them, supply strong evidence for the establishment of a social cocoon. 
The majority of actors questioned during the investigation avoided the official defi-
nition of their practices—such as bribery, fraud, and price-fixing—and preferred to 
use words such as “commission” or “toll” to explain how, when, and why they 
decided to act corruptly.
Another important element in understanding the corrupt action from the organi-
zational culture’s perspective is the benefits for the organization. According to avail-
able court documents, the managers and entrepreneurs participating in the Petrobras 
plot were aiming primarily at the success of the organization. In one case, a senior 
executive at a construction company explained that the paid bribes may cause dis-
advantages in the final project costs and consequently this would decrease his 
14 Not included here are the 77 executives of Odebrecht who entered into plea bargains.
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bonus.15 This case is of course not common, but at the same time it is not common 
either among the cartel companies to identify personal gains as the rule of the game. 
More than 80% of the construction companies’ implicated senior executives and 
managers were paying bribes to the Petrobras senior executives, because that was 
the rule of the game. The unwritten rules were widely known in the construction 
industry, rather than limited to the entities that participated in the cartel.
Achieving organizational goals may also satisfy personal interest. The high- 
ranking managers may get promoted to higher positions, thus ensuring better status 
and better remuneration. Bonuses and careers play an important role in this case, not 
just on a personal but also on an organizational level, which awards loyal managers 
who are pulling the company to a better market position.
Illegal practices related to personal gains are not mentioned in the court docu-
ments, because these crimes are not charged in the indictment. But in the course of 
the investigation investigators also revealed that some managers and senior manag-
ers of the investigated enterprises indulged in private deviations. In this case, the 
managers kept a part of the bribes that were to be delivered to a “black market 
dealer” or to a politician. Sometimes, they received offers from politicians and other 
public agents to “help” [pay bribes] in the political campaigns and in retour; they 
may receive a percentage of the sum. Other executives also misappropriated part of 
bribes that should be payed to politicians. The number of executives who have 
owned up to these practices is very low.
These managers’ individual deviations were in part supported by the organiza-
tion, because the bonus system could be understood here as a strong incentive for 
paying bribes. Even if they pursued personal gains, these actors were still conform-
ing to the informal rules of the organization. Thus, the individual deviance, which is 
driven by the organization, is an individual expression of collective practices.
But Operation Carwash has changed this landscape. At present, investigators 
have discovered bribery payments of US$2 billion. One-hundred-and-eighteen sus-
pects have been arrested, and fifteen top managers and entrepreneurs were given an 
average sentence of 15 years. A total of 77 criminal prosecutions against 289 indi-
viduals, as well as eight corruption charges against sixteen major construction com-
panies and 50 individuals, are being processed. These accusations are directed 
against the top management of the largest private construction companies and the 
state-owned oil company Petrobras. Their presidents, managers, and employees 
face charges of corruption (article 33, penal code,  § 4), money laundering with 
document forgery (article 1, caput, inciso V, Lei No. 9.613/1998), and the participa-
tion in a criminal organization (article 2, Lei No. 12.850/2013).
15 Executive sentenced in the criminal procedure no. 5036518-76.2015.4.04.7000.
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 The Normalization of Political Corruption
Teori Zavascki, one of the eleven Ministers of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, 
died on January 19th, 2017, in an aircraft crash. Teori Zavascki was the justice pre-
siding over the trials resulting from Operation Carwash. He was in charge of the 
legal proceedings of the Petrobras scandal and the intertwining relations between 
economic and political corruptions in Brazil it helped to unearth. His successor, 
Luiz Edson Fachin, has assumed the mantle.
One of the first testimonies under the framework of the “Leniency Agreement” 
with Odebrecht came from Claudio Melo Filho,16 a senior manager at the construc-
tion’s groups department for “institutional relations.” His testimonies—whatever 
judicial value they may turn out to have—suggest that in Brazil, the relations 
between big companies and politicians who hold the lever of state power go far 
beyond bestowing simple favors and minor legal backings. According to Melo 
Filho, Odebrecht and other companies were able to ensure that certain laws were 
bended in their favor. Melo Filho argues that, as part of this Brazilian favoritism in 
politics and legislation, companies such Odebrecht returned favors from influential 
politicians, candidates, and parties in their clique by serving their political interests 
and fulfilling personal wishes. Claudio Melo Filho described how, over a 12-year 
period, his company managed to build a network of inroads to cover many high- 
ranking politicians.
Melo Filho listed payments by the Odebrecht construction group to various poli-
ticians who are now the subject of many investigations and legal proceedings. 
According to his testimonies, these payments, to the tune of millions of US dollars, 
were supposed to change certain laws in favor of Odebrecht and other companies. 
This included, for example, a modification to the legislation on tax preferential 
treatment of corporate profits of Brazilian companies operating abroad (MP 
627/1317). Claudio Melo Filho also mentioned nine other legislative reforms and 
legislative proposals that have been influenced by political donations and payment 
of bribes over the last decade.
These testimonies against political corruption in Brazil, among others, make it 
clear that all major political parties have systematically used this method of funding 
politicians and parties. According to the current investigation, 51% of the accused 
and convicted come from the Partido Progressista (PP) party, 22% from the PMDB 
party, 18% from the PT party, around 3% from the Partido da Social Democracia 
Brasileira (PSDB), and 6% from other parties. Admittedly, these results are now 
changing on a daily basis18 (Netto, 2016). It is now known that Odebrecht 
16 Inquiry document of Odebrecht’s Leniency Agreement: Anexo pessoal from Claudio Melo Filho.
17 The provisional measure (MP 672/13) was enacted in 2014 and converted into the law 
12.973/2014. It regulated the tax payment of Brazilian enterprises that operate abroad (see: http://
www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2014/Lei/L12973.htm)
18 The number of involved politicians per political party changes daily according to the 
investigation.
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 construction group handed out approximately US$14.4 million to 15 different polit-
ical parties during the 2014 presidential and gubernatorial elections alone.19 João 
Vaccari, a former accountant of the PT party, claimed that he had received roughly 
US$200 million for the PT party alone between 2003 and 2013.20 As evidenced by 
the previous investigations, the Petrobras bribery system paid out somewhere 
between US$3 and 6 billion as political donations and bribes over the last 
10–15 years.
So far, Operation Carwash investigators have shown that political corruption 
served various purposes in Brazil. It facilitated personal enrichment, funded elec-
tion campaigns and political parties, and influenced legislations. The case of José 
Dirceu of the PT party, who was the former presidential minister and has been sen-
tenced to more than 23 years in prison on charges of bribery, money laundering, and 
membership in a criminal organization, highlights the connections between per-
sonal enrichment and party interest. In one of these criminal trials, it became appar-
ent that Petrobras’s then-chairman of the board had bribed him to the tune of 
US$ 3.9 million, part of which he then handed over to the PT party. However, he 
retained around US$1 million for himself, which he then invested, for example, in 
real estate properties.21
Since the beginning of Operation Carwash, dozens of Brazilian politicians, 
members of government, and high-ranking officials, as well as top executives and 
entrepreneurs of many big companies, have been investigated. 193 inquiries, seven 
criminal processes against 100 people, and 212 agreements are currently going up 
in front of the Brazilian Supreme Court. Eight of President Michel Temer’s 
28 ministers have been investigated. Furthermore, twelve governors, 24 senators, 
and 39 deputies have been the target of investigations and legal proceedings in the 
Supreme Court and in the Electoral Tribunal. More than 200 politicians are involved 
in total.22 The Leniency Agreements and testimonies of implicated corporate man-
agers and executives are shedding more and more light onto the dubious entangle-
ments between politics and businesses in Brazil.
 The Political Actors: Political Leaders
Brazil’s corrupt political environment is neither associated with a single party, nor 
is grounded in particular family or social backgrounds. Politicians and members of 
the government who were investigated and arrested belong to different political 
19 http://meucongressonacional.com/eleicoes2014/empresa/15102288000182
20 See: criminal trials: 5045241-84.2015.4.04.7000, 5013405-59.2016.404.7000.
21 Criminal Process 5,045241-84.2015.4.04.7000/PR.
22 http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/noticias/sai-a-lista-de-fachin-ministro-do-stf-autoriza- 
investigacao-de-quase-100-politicos-na-lava-jato/
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parties and come from different interest groups, which in turn have different politi-
cal goals and social conceptions. However, all seem to use similar practices to main-
tain their political positions and the primacy of their parties. As soon as a good 
relationship and a possible “money source” appears on the horizon, they snatch to 
bankroll their campaign and party, as well as to line their own pockets.
But politicians and their parties alone cannot maintain this politically deviant 
environment in Brazil. Big business also plays an important role here. However, it 
is difficult to say who is driving the system or who began it. Is it the political system 
that fails to show the company any way to be economically successful without cor-
ruption? Or are companies exploiting the political system’s weakness in order to 
benefit themselves? In any case, it is the big companies that keep this system of 
corruption running. They not only have the necessary capital to fund the parties and 
politicians; they are also the ones who have the capacity to commit bribery and cor-
ruption schemes through government contracts. They are not only the means, but 
also the ends. As a quid pro quo, they received preferential treatment both in win-
ning fat contracts and benefitting from legislative amendments for their enterprises.
The investigations of Operation Carwash make it clear that the arrests of, and 
harsh penalties given to, companies and politicians have not prevented them from 
continuing their corrupt practices. Once new detection measures are adopted, actors 
devise new strategies for fraud, bribery, and money laundering. Sooner or later, 
however, most of them land in an investigation. This is exactly the case of former 
Republic President Michel Temer, who was vehemently committed to impeaching 
the former President Dilma Rousseff. He is charged with corruption, money laun-
dering, and the formation of a criminal organization. His “money source,” the big 
Brazilian company J&F Investimentos, which is currently being investigated in sev-
eral corruption scandals, has reached an agreement with the public prosecution 
authority and has testified against almost all of his accomplices.23
Joesley Batista, the now resigned president of the J&F Investimentos, presented 
the public prosecution authority with four pieces of what he claimed to be taped 
conservations with high-ranking politicians, including a conversation with former 
president Michel Temer.24 The recorded conversation clearly indicates that J&F 
Investimentos was trying to prevent, with Temer’s support, further investigations by 
the judiciary. To prevent Eduardo Cunha, the former President of the Chamber of 
Deputies, who has been arrested since October 2016, from testifying before the 
court, Joesley Batista takes care of the well-being and financial affairs of the Cunhas 
family.25 Batista also ensured that the testimonies from those currently in custody 
remained in tune with each other.
The Brazilian judiciary has, undoubtedly, been much more efficient in the inves-
tigation and prosecution of corruption cases in recent years. Not only have several 
regulative and institutional changes that have taken place over the last decades 
23 Testimony n. 7003.
24 Inquiry n. 4483/STF.
25 Inquiry n. 4489/STF.
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played a part, so have the Brazilians’ changed perception and tolerance of corrup-
tion. However, many politicians in Brazil still seem to believe that in the end it will 
remain business-as-usual. The conviction of former President Luiz Inacio Lula da 
Silva (in July 2017, sentenced to nine-and-a-half years in jail by the Federal Court 
of Paraná26), the indictment against President Michel Temer, the investigations of 
eight state ministers, 24 senators, 39 members of the Chamber of Deputies, and 
eight governors, as well as the convictions and arrests of dozens of other politicians 
and top managers, do not seem to be enough to stop the hidden political corruption.
 A Case of Good Governance?
Those who have hitherto been ignorant or have had no capacity to estimate the 
extent of political corruption are now being provided with more and more evidence 
by the Brazilian judiciary: A system of political corruption existed in Brazil, the 
extent of which is becoming increasingly evident with each additional legal pro-
ceeding. It is striking that none of Brazil’s political leaders is willing to take the 
political responsibility. All are looking on and protesting their own innocence, until 
they are either taken to court or happily escape condemnation. This is also part of a 
political system which, as is now becoming more and more apparent, is character-
ized by organized irresponsibility and graft.
Joesley Batista and former president Michel Temer did not stop their conversa-
tion at the obstruction of justice, but showed clearly that the bribery system remains 
valid despite all the excitement and attention of the media, authorities, and the gen-
eral populace. In this sense, the fear of being uncovered seemed to have been much 
lower than the fear of leaving the deeply institutionalized old corrupt patterns. 
Those transforming a political system characterized by corruption, such as Brazil’s, 
must take time to consolidate the effect of institutional changes in its structure. 
Although policymakers have completed major regulative changes and institutional 
changes over the last decades, which have made an enormous difference in terms of 
improving transparency in public administration and strengthening press freedom 
and justice, they have not (yet) been able to eradicate systemic corruption. However, 
all these changes have contributed to the fact that the previous corruption scandals 
are now accessible online to all and well-publicized in the press. It is not enough to 
stop systemic corruption, but it is a first and important step in a long-term process. 
Further institutional changes on the political level are just as important. The intro-
duction of new regulations and the law enforcement create a new possibility for 
changing attitudes in Brazilian business and politics, and they can also support the 
creation of new informal institutions, such as new expectations, beliefs, and percep-
tion, of ethics and good governance in Brazilian society. In that sense, our analysis 
has made clear that regulations alone cannot generate good governance attitudes, 
26 Criminal trial n. 5,046512-94.2016.4.04.7000/PR, sentence 948, July 12th, 2017.
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but require the institutionalization and legitimation of a new belief system, that 
should be shared in different groups such as business people, politicians, citizens, 
and organizations in a social and economic context. To conclude, the new era of law 
enforcement may be characterized as effective, with significant regulative and insti-
tutional changes. Law enforcement has been “good,” shoving powerful interest 
groups aside. However, it remains unclear to what extent various interest groups and 
societal actors really engage in the fight against corruption. Parts of civil society 
have been influenced by the political parties and their interests. Most political par-
ties are still in a state of shock and are not supporting the new era of law enforce-
ment in Brazil If good governance is based on significant participation by various 
interest groups and societal actors in the fight against corruption, it is still missing 
in Brazilian society.
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 The Puzzle of Governing Networks
When firms organize themselves into interorganizational networks, they need to 
agree on common goals and a viable way of working with each other. How should 
networks be designed and governed to help partners achieve their common goals 
efficiently? This question is particularly salient for organizations that make an effort 
to surmount collective action dilemmas at the local level as well as across geo-
graphical scales to establish legitimate practices of cooperation and compliance in 
diverse contexts, such as in environmental (Bulkeley, 2005; Liverman, 2004; Scott, 
2015) and regional governance (Feiock, 2007; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; 
Montero & Chapple, 2019), the governance of local commons (Hardin, 1968; 
Ostrom, 1999), and in new—often local—organizational arrangements of so-called 
diverse economies (Gibson-Graham, 2008) and alternative economic practices 
(Sánchez-Hernández & Glückler, 2019; Seyfang, 2006). Here, research on human 
geography, organization studies, the political, social, and environmental sciences, as 
well as network analysis intersects, with researchers working to conceive solutions 
for successful governance among diverse sets of actors. Although scholars have 
established an understanding of networks as an alternative mode of governance vis- 
à- vis markets and hierarchies (Powell, 1991; Williamson, 1985), little is known 
about how network organizations should actually be governed. More accurately, 
what is needed is an understanding of which forms of network governance are suit-
able in which contexts of interorganizational cooperation: “We are thus left with an 
understanding of why networks may be a superior mode of governance but not of 
how they are themselves governed” (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007, p. 504).
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It is premature to call the field of inquiry into network governance1 a coherent 
research framework (Ansell & Torfing, 2016; Glückler,  Dehning, Janneck,  & 
Armbrüster, 2012; Jung, Krebs, & Teubner, 2015; Keast, 2016; Maggetti & Gilardi, 
2014; Prota, 2016), even more so because the term governance has been used rather 
broadly across the social sciences, such as in political science (Ansell & Gash, 2008; 
Crouch, 2005; Rhodes, 2007), institutional economics (Williamson, 2005), sociology 
(Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell, 1991; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000), and 
human geography (Allen & Cochrane, 2007; Charron, Dijkstra, & Lapuente, 2014; 
Macleod & Goodwin, 1999). The dearth of concepts of and empirical insights into 
network governance stems primarily from the egalitarian aspirations of partners coop-
erating in lateral networks. For unlike so-called strategic networks (Sydow, Schüßler, 
& Müller-Seitz, 2016) or vertically structured networks such as global value chains 
(Crang, Hughes, Gregson, Norris, & Ahamed, 2013; Gereffi, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 
2005; Glückler & Panitz, 2016; Grabs & Ponte, 2019) or global production networks 
(Coe, Dicken, & Hess, 2008; Levy, 2008; Yeung & Coe, 2015), in which governance 
functions are often assumed by a focal lead firm, lateral networks consist of members 
who see themselves as autonomous and equal to everyone else. Therefore, members 
of lateral networks are often wary of outside control: “[T]here is little empirically 
grounded work researching how organizations without permanent bosses and follow-
ers, in which all members ultimately have formally equal say in running operations or 
exercising control, are able to operate” (Lazega, 2001, p. 1).
In this article, I would like to advance the concept of lateral network governance 
in a specific empirical context of interorganizational networks that has received only 
limited attention in governance research: the organized network. An organized net-
work is a voluntary and deliberate association of members that directs multilateral 
cooperation between a limited number of legally and economically independent 
organizations towards a shared economic goal (Glückler & Hammer, 2015). 
Expectations of autonomously exercising control in partnership with each other are 
either inconsistent with rigid decision-making hierarchies or impossible to meet, for 
weak governance cannot ensure compliance. This article centers on the paradox of 
having equals commit themselves to coordinating their actions. To solve this funda-
mental problem, I propose analyzing network governance as a structure for the 
legitimate delegation of decision-making. The lateral governance that arises through 
such transfer takes account of both the contextuality and the malleability of net-
works and allows one to give formal and informal governance mechanisms equal 
and simultaneous consideration. The structure for legitimate transfer of decision- 
making, as the empirical analysis will illustrate, builds the foundation for efficient 
and legitimate governance of organized networks.
In the first section, I propose a framework of four elements—context, object, 
mechanism, and agency of governance—that together account for the empirical 
variation in governance forms. In the second section, I build on the notion of rela-
tional distributions of legitimacy to develop the concept of lateral network 
1 In this article, I use the term network governance as a superordinate term to include both network 
control and network regulation.
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governance. It helps to identify legitimate agents of governance by capturing the 
delegation of discretionary authority among equals. In the third section, I develop a 
method for empirically assessing the legitimate transfer of decision-making author-
ity by drawing on concepts from social network analysis. In the fourth section, I 
explore two organized networks of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)—
one in the area of management consulting, the other in dental technology—to 
empirically show how sharply the actually observed relational distribution of legiti-
macy can diverge from the formal governance structure. A concept of lateral net-
work governance and the analysis of relational structures of legitimacy suggest a 
more holistic understanding of network governance that integrates formal positions, 
offices, and contracts with informal social relations of authority and legitimacy.
 The Governance Challenge
One reason for the diversity of research on network governance is the large variation 
in empirical contexts and phenomena researchers usually study. A more general 
theory of network governance, therefore, requires consistent terminology and needs 
to capture the particular empirical context that distinguishes networks from hierar-
chical organizations such as corporations or bureaucracies. Forms of network gov-
ernance vary according to at least four key elements that together constitute the 
complex of network governance: These are (i) the context of governance, that is, the 
conditions framing collaboration among actors; (ii) the object of governance, in 
other words, the common interest and goals of collaboration; (iii) the mechanisms 
of governance, such as contracts, power, trust, and so on; and (iv) the agency of 
governance, in other words, actors and bodies granted the authorization or legiti-
macy to exercise governance.
 The Context of Governance: Network Cooperation
Generally, the process of governance is intended to reduce variance in an existing 
system and to exert more than just piecemeal influence on autonomous dynam-
ics, events, and interactions (Sydow, 2000). When it comes to organized net-
works as defined above, some of the most important contextual factors are the 
expectations of legally independent and equal partners in a voluntary group 
(Staber, 2000). This is all the more germane in the context of horizontal net-
works, in which business firms operate at equal or similar stages of the value 
chain. Horizontal networks represent arenas for potential or actual competition 
between the members on their respective factor and commodity markets. Legal 
autonomy, potential competition, and mutual independence regarding each oth-
er’s resources constitute a highly distinct context. This constellation of factors 
poses a great challenge to network governance as it precludes hierarchical 
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principles as control mechanisms (Lazega, 2000; Lazega & Krackhardt, 2000). 
The voluntary and autonomous basis of action makes it difficult to issue hierar-
chical directives, which the members can accept but by no means must. The same 
goes for sanctions. Even if it is contractually agreed that undesirable behavior in 
the network may be sanctioned, applying these formal sanctions may jeopardize 
the network insofar as members could leave it, an exit that could eventually 
destabilize it (Glückler & Hammer, 2017; Lazega, 2000). Voluntary membership 
is based on the benefit a person expects from it (Windeler, 2001). Network mem-
bers tie the extension of their membership to their assessment of whether the 
benefits it bestows can outweigh its costs. The will to have a say is thus relatively 
high, and the network’s objective must undergo constant discussion in which 
members build consensus. Ring and van de Ven (1994) argue that network mem-
bers must develop a common, not an individual, concept of their motivation, their 
feasible investments, and the likely uncertainties—a process typical of the nego-
tiations stage in maturity models of network evolution. Although empirical stud-
ies do not necessarily substantiate the validity of such a maturity model (Melot 
de Beauregard, Németh, & Glückler, 2012), negotiation of consensus on objec-
tives and governance have an important bearing on the understanding of the 
network.
 The Object of Governance
The second element of network governance is the object to be collectively gov-
erned. In their review of the literature, Park and Ungson (2001) conclude that coop-
eration is more likely to fail than to succeed in the long run. Accordingly, they are 
interested in the factors leading to a network’s breakdown and failure, not in those 
facilitating successful group cooperation. By calling attention to the “don’ts” more 
than the “musts”, the reasoning that these two scholars pursue in their conceptual 
model considerably enriches the literature. They confine their discussion to bilateral 
alliances, but it is both eminently possible and helpful to apply their arguments to 
multilateral networks. Park and Ungson (2001) see the main challenge of coopera-
tion as lying in the rivalry between the participating partners and in the complexity 
of what is to be governed amid the uncertainties and vagueness of the management 
strategies involved. For them, the most important objects of network governance are 
the controlling (the monitoring of costs and benefits accruing from interfirm coop-
eration), the balancing of interests, and the coping with dissimilar management 
styles of the member firms. Governance is hampered by the necessity of minimizing 
its costs so as to avoid eating into either the savings or the gains of cooperation 
(Park & Ungson, 2001). Sydow (2000) and Windeler (2001) discriminate more pre-
cisely between the objects of governance in the context of what they call network 
regulation. Focusing on the modalities of the governance framework for conducting 
business within networks, they delineate six objects: selection, allocation, evalua-
tion, systems integration, position configuration, and boundary-setting. This 
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framework represents a detailed typology of the range of governance objects in 
network governance. Its authors focus particularly on the selection of members and 
the delimitation of the network vis-à-vis its environment; the allocation of resources 
and the distribution of benefits; the definition of common goals, process control, and 
the evaluation of their achievement. Network regulation is thus geared to various 
strategic and operational matters, and its total cost must never exceed the savings or 
benefit that the network partners reap from their cooperation. So-called network 
coordinators are in charge of network regulation, and their legitimacy entitles them 
to act on behalf of the network.
 The Mechanisms of Governance
The third element of a network governance framework is the mechanisms through 
which the objects of governance are actually achieved in a context of collective 
action. Conventionally, scholars distinguish two types of mechanisms: Whereas for-
mal regulations stipulate nominal bodies and offices for the persons enforcing them, 
informal control mechanisms are rooted in social institutions such as trust, reciproc-
ity, or reputation (Glückler, Suddaby, & Lenz, 2018). Informal governance is con-
ceived of as socially practiced governance, in which social mechanisms such as 
power, trust, sympathy, and the exercise of influence are regarded as primary instru-
ments of control. This perspective rests on voluntary integration, which predicates 
at least some degree of familiarity among the partners in the network. In this case, 
control of the network is assumed by actors whose legitimacy for this function orig-
inates not in formal, legal offices but rather in social practice. Social mechanisms 
such as trust, reputation, conventions, and the formation of a macro or network 
culture, predominate as forms of coordination in networks and guide the economic 
behavior of the actors (Glückler & Armbrüster, 2003; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 
1997; Keast, 2016). In addition, Bachmann (2001) notes the relevance of power and 
trust as controlling mechanisms capable of affecting each other and of coordinating 
the actions at various levels of a network.
Researchers studying formal governance usually focus on justiciable rules and 
contracts on which network members agree in writing. Cooperation agreements and 
association statutes are examples. Formal rules lay down what rights, obligations, 
and sanctions are applicable in the network. They vary depending on the objectives 
and context of the network in question and range from rather loose articles of asso-
ciation—for instance, among medical practices to improve local health service 
delivery—to binding legal contracts in a joint-venture network. Drawing on the 
concept of state, Schäfer (2009) refers to a formal regulatory system within net-
works as a network constitution. Organizations, too, have their own regulations that 
describe the basic legal structure of their corporate governance. Although these 
instances of corporate governance can help regulate bilateral collaboration between 
an organization and its partner, they are not efficacious to rule an organized network 
as a whole and beyond the focal interest of one corporation. This is where network 
11 Lateral Network Governance
248
governance is necessary to close the gap between individual (corporate) and collec-
tive levels of collaboration. Schäfer intends to mitigate the problem of collective 
action by creating a legitimate entity capable of enforcing the rules agreed upon. 
The formal governance design of a network thus enhances its problem-solving 
capacity.
This conclusion underscores the need for research on the question of how orga-
nized networks can acquire legitimacy and clout. Unfortunately, researchers have so 
far studied formal and informal control mechanisms separately or have even distin-
guished between them as mechanisms typical of different maturity levels. According 
to maturity models of network governance, young and relatively small networks are 
characterized by informal governance mechanisms, whereas mature and larger net-
works draw on formal mechanisms such as contracts, organs, and nominal manage-
ment authorities (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Ring & van de Ven, 1994). As Provan et al. 
(2007) observe, “relationships between organizations in a network are either infor-
mally maintained, through the structure of the network and norms of reciprocity and 
trust, or formally maintained, through the existence of contracts, rules and regula-
tions” (p. 503). Rather than juxtaposing formal and informal mechanisms as a dual-
ism, I conceive relational structures of legitimacy to include the simultaneity and 
duality of formal and informal sources of lateral governance.
 The Agency of Governance
The fourth and final element of network governance refers to the locus of control 
and the organizational entities imbued with legitimate authority to rule. Provan and 
his colleagues propose a typology of governance forms based on where the formal 
agency of governance is located (Provan et al., 2007; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Provan 
& Milward, 1995). They distinguish self-governance by the members from external 
governance by a network administration organization (NAO). Self-governance can 
also be exercised centrally by a mandated representative of the network (an arrange-
ment called lead-organization governance) or decentrally through mutual coordina-
tion by many or all of the members (shared governance). This decentralized form of 
self-governance (also called a lateral control regime) is encountered in law offices, 
consulting firms, and other partnerships (Lazega, 2000, 2001; Lazega & Krackhardt, 
2000). The combination of these two dichotomies—self-governance versus external 
governance and lead-organization versus shared governance—is the basis for three, 
albeit not pure and exclusive, forms of governance. Provan and Kenis (2008) point 
out that an NAO can exist in both shared governance and in lead-organization gov-
ernance. Moreover, they suggest that network performance depends on the suitable 
choice of each form of governance in particular conditions, such as network size, 
the existence of trust and skills, and the degree of goal consensus among the mem-
bers. While self-governance is suitable for small networks with bedrock trust among 
its members, expanding membership and growing network competence may require 
a transition to the other two forms of governance. Other authors, including Ring and 
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van de Ven (1994), likewise attribute to networks a dynamic trajectory along which 
interactions per se and their quality change. Apart from the useful distinction of 
these governance forms, the model’s authors are rather vague about the sources of 
authority to exert control. Although Provan and Kenis (2008) focus on the networks’ 
formal design, any governance authority must be acknowledged as legitimate and 
representative by the other members to have the sway to coordinate a network effec-
tivley (Windeler, 2001). Such legitimacy is pivotal to the development of the theory 
of lateral governance in the next section. Few studies’ authors have delved into the 
special significance that the inception of legitimacy has for the success of a network.
 Lateral Network Governance
 The Logic of Negotiation and the Regime of Lateral Control
So far, the literature’s authors have set out from an isolated consideration of formal 
and informal governance mechanisms, without looking much at their empirical 
interdependence. Such dualism obscures the fact that organizations actually exploit 
both dimensions of network governance (Lazega, 2000). Forms of governance such 
as centralized network control (lead-organization governance) can operate formally 
and informally alike. Conversely, forms of contractually shared and informal gover-
nance are conceivable. In practice, there are forms of governance that cannot be 
called either purely informal or formal. For instance, an honor code, which in many 
corporate networks is agreed upon in writing, is not informal but is not readily 
actionable in legal terms. The empirical parallelism and interdependence of formal 
and informal forms of coordination therefore call for an alternative conception of 
network governance—one in which the two dimensions are not isolated but inte-
grated by an encompassing principle based on the legitimacy of influence and con-
trol. This is the objective guiding the concept of lateral governance.
Lazega (2001) has focused on the parallel existence of formal and informal con-
trol mechanisms in law firms of equal partners. This organizational context is simi-
lar to the governance context of organized networks, which is of key interest in this 
article. Equity partners of a law firm as well as business firms associated as partners 
in an organized network all have equal legal standing and responsibility for the 
common outcome. In his empirical study, Lazega (2001) found that in cases of con-
flict the partners of a law firm tended to avoid formal intervention in order to limit 
the risk of open confrontation or escalation. At the same time, however, they tried to 
minimize the costs of informal governance. A lateral control regime thereby emerges 
at the collective level (Lazega & Krackhardt, 2000), so formal mechanisms such as 
official meetings are definitely used as arenas of informal micropolitics. Although 
the strategic orientation in this context is shaped by the consensus of all the partici-
pants, micropolitical and, hence, informal strategies figure strongly in forging that 
consensus. Based on their status, prestige and trust, a particular type of actors, the 
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so-called oligarchs, figure prominently in facilitating the emergence of the consen-
sus. As a consequence, the network’s strategic questions are discussed by everyone 
involved but informally shaped by a few (Lazega, 2001). This insight appreciably 
advances our understanding of the interdependence of formal and informal pro-
cesses of network governance. They are “scarcely possible to determine or plan 
from the outset, not least because of the loose coupling of the system’s elements, 
and are instead always outcomes of (partly) autonomous processes that the initiator 
intentionally triggers but cannot totally control” (Sydow, 2002, p. 248).
An alternative access to conceiving an inclusive mechanism of network gover-
nance is found in the dominant logic of action. Equality before the law and the 
principle of voluntariness ordain that all members be regarded as equally warranted 
decision-makers (Lazega, 2000; Mayntz, 1993). Moreover, all decisions are to be 
made to the satisfaction of the network actors so as to preclude the departure of any 
member who feels disadvantaged against his or her will and to preserve goal con-
sensus. Writing from the perspective of actor-centered institutionalism in political 
science, Mayntz and Scharpf (1995) posit that negotiation is the logic of action in 
these situations. They see the superiority of negotiation in the fact that pure exchange 
leads to unintentional negative aggregate effects and that hierarchical control breaks 
down anyway because the members expect to have a voice in decisions. The logic 
of negotiation predicates the interest in a joint result and facilitates agreement that 
accommodates the wishes of all network members. Whereas the principle is defi-
nitely practicable and has proven in game theory to be effective in small networks, 
goal consensus and decision-making become ever more difficult as group size 
increases (Scharpf, 2006). The effectiveness and efficiency of decision-making are 
not all that suffers in large groups. There is also the growing danger that minorities 
will be outvoted and that the cohesion will diminish. In line with Provan and Kenis 
(2008), hence, shared governance becomes problematic beyond a certain network 
size (Mayntz, 1993).
 The Concept of Lateral Network Governance
How, then, can legitimate governance of relatively large networks be achieved? To 
answer the question, it is useful to look at other realms of society that face similar 
problems. Perhaps the most instructive case is the discussion of democratic systems 
in political theory. In democracies, which by definition comprise no hierarchical 
directives, decisions must be taken among independent peers, just as in networks. 
To make collective decisions feasible, the solutions vary on a continuum between 
symmetric and asymmetric ways to forge agreement. In symmetrical approaches, 
each individual’s vote has equal weight in the group decision, whereas in asym-
metrical approaches, discretionary authority is transferred to one or a few represen-
tatives to make binding decisions for everyone. Between these two extremes can lie 
schemes that define specific majorities, each arrangement having its merits and 
drawbacks. Whereas asymmetrical procedures offer the advantage of quick 
J. Glückler
251
decision-making, they suffer from the danger of minority boycott. Conversely, sym-
metrical procedures hold the promise of consensus-based decisions, but the neces-
sary negotiations referred to by Mayntz (1993) can drag on and on. To solve this 
dilemma, democratic systems delegate decision-making power, concentrating it in a 
small group of individuals who represent the interests of their electorate and enjoy 
authorization to negotiate decisions applying to everyone. Decisions can thereby be 
taken legitimately and efficiently by a small number of people. For all the dissimi-
larities between a public bureaucratic system and privately organized networks, the 
principle of delegating power offers a promising point of departure for responding 
to the question of dealing with governance issues in networks.
I assume that successful coordination in organized networks is based on the prin-
ciple of delegating decision-making power. Such delegation is a prerequisite and 
principal origin of the concept of lateral network governance, in which all members 
legitimately share. The perspective of lateral network governance can be situated 
within the four elements of the governance framework explained above. First, it 
does justice to a context of governance in which the members have an equal right to 
participate. Second, it can be applied to any object of governance within a network 
that pursues common goals or collective goods. Third, lateral governance is based 
on a form of legitimation that can be both formally and informally rooted, and these 
two mechanisms can be integrated and simultaneously observed. Concentrating on 
the intensity and sharing of legitimacy in a network overcomes the dualism of for-
mal and informal network governance both theoretically and empirically. Such a 
perspective is supported by Human and Provan (2000), who also stress the impor-
tance of the legitimacy of actors, actions, and structures, without separating their 
causes into informal and formal aspects. In addition, Weber (1978) also points out 
that legitimacy can come from informal practice such as tradition, feelings, or val-
ues as well as from formally accepted systems of legality. Therefore, I here adopt an 
approach with which I refrain from discriminating between formal and informal 
sources of legitimacy and aim to assess the relational distribution of legitimacy 
across the agents of governance within an organized network. Fourth, and conse-
quently, the agent of governance is explicable not in terms of formal or informal 
facets but rather in the degree of its legitimacy. Delegating legitimate decision- 
making power therefore theoretically satisfies both demands of network governance 
elaborated above: coordination based on a partnership of equals and the minimiza-
tion of transaction costs.
 Locally and Globally Legitimate Agents of Governance
Legitimate delegation of decision-making can be distributed across the network’s 
various interest groups. Depending on the relational structure of clusters of inter-
ests, subgroups might emerge that jointly grant themselves legitimate representa-
tion of their interests and might, in their mutuality, clearly set themselves apart from 
other subgroups. These subgroups structure the network into what I call legitimate 
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factions. Figure 11.1 depicts a hypothetical distribution describing the transfer of 
legitimate decision-making authority between the members of a network. In this 
model, four members each have at least three votes from the network and possess 
the greatest legitimacy as measured by the number of times he or she has been 
named. However, member types A and B differ in the structure of those votes. The 
votes for type A all come from one local faction; those for type B, from all factions 
of the network. Whereas type A members are locally legitimate, type B members 
are globally legitimate. With this example, I illustrate the import that the specific 
structure of legitimacy has when comparable degrees of legitimacy are conferred on 
individual members of a network by their colleagues. If a member receives many 
votes yet exclusively from one faction (type A), then that person has local legiti-
macy. By contrast, global legitimacy enables a member to contribute much more to 
decisions acceptable throughout the network. As far as a network logic of action is 
concerned, the actors enjoying that kind of legitimacy (type B) can enter into nego-
tiations and thereby make collective decisions more readily than the entire network 
can. Of course, whether type B actors succeed in achieving consent ultimately 
depends on the severity of conflict between the factions (as maintained by their type 
A representantives) and type B’s legitimacy and ability to mediate their interests and 
eventually reconcile their conflict.2
Efficient network governance depends on a particular distribution of legitimacy 
in the network. Relational distributions of legitimate decision-making power vary 
with the strength and fragmentation of delegated decision-making power. An 
2 Type A actors exclusively represent the interests of their own factions and will thus enter into 
negotiation with a clear stake. In contrast, as actors of type B draw legitimacy from several fac-
tions, they may run the risk of losing part or all of that legitimacy in cases of conflict if the indi-
vidual factions feel that their interests are not sufficiently supported. Therefore, a type B position 
per se is not a sufficient condition to solve conflicts within a network.
Fig. 11.1 Hypothetical 
network of the legitimate 
transfer of decision- 




empirical analysis of governance structures thus centers on the following research 
questions: First, and methodologically, how can relational structures of legitimacy 
be assessed? Second, and empirically, how do observed patterns of legitimate gov-
ernance relations (the empirical distribution of legitimacy) overlap with or diverge 
from the formal governance structures in an organized network? Third, and effec-
tively, how does an empirical distribution of legitimate delegation of authority affect 
the network outcome? I will address these questions in a comparative case study of 
two organized networks of small and medium-sized business firms in Germany.
 Research Design
 Two Organized Networks: Management Consulting 
and Dental Technology
My first case study was on ConsultingNet,3 a regional network of 23 management 
consultants that operated primarily to promote the professional exchange between 
its members by means of regular events and get-togethers. ConsultingNet was a 
registered association whose governance structure was written into its statutes 
(Table 11.1). The management board consisted of two members and was responsi-
ble for the management of the network activities. The association’s limit on the term 
of office and the election of the two members during the annual general meeting 
arguably render the board a rather weak formal agent of governance. Despite the 
rules laid down in such documents, there was, legally speaking, relatively little pro-
vision made for clout and division of labor in an association, especially if, as in this 
instance, no recourse to sanctions had been worked out. A member who would 
break the code of conduct could be expelled from the association, but other, less 
drastic ways and means to sanction behavior had not been formalized. The gover-
nance model within ConsultingNet therefore corresponded closest to the model of 
shared governance (Provan & Kenis, 2008).
My second case study was on Dentis,4 a network of 27 small and medium-sized 
dental laboratories located across Germany. Dentis was a limited liability company 
3 ConsultingNet is a pseudonym.
4 Dentis is a pseudonym.
Table 11.1 Formal governance of two corporate networks
Elements ConsultingNet Dentis
Legal form Registered association Limited liability
Control mechanism Management board NAO,* supervisory board
Electorate General assembly of members Shareholders’ meeting
Form of governance Shared governance Shared governance, NAO
Note. *Network administration organization. Source: Design by author
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whose charter stipulates the election of five company representatives to the supervi-
sory board at the shareholders’ meeting (Table 11.1). Responsibility for the net-
work’s operations falls to a management office, which functions as an NAO (Human 
& Provan, 2000). Because of the member firms’ geographic separation and the dif-
ferent, in some cases intense, multilateral cooperation between them, the network 
held quarterly shareholder meetings, at which the managing director, the members 
of the supervisory board, and the shareholders negotiate, decide on, and evaluate 
joint activities. High membership dues for individuals and the remarkable amount 
of work and time invested characterize Dentis as a very active and long- term net-
work. The objectives of Dentis were to achieve networked production and joint 
development of new concepts and solutions in marketing, distribution, IT, quality 
standards, training, and other areas. Its governance structure typifies shared gover-
nance with a jointly operated NAO (Provan & Kenis, 2008).
I researched both organized networks according to the research procedure 
SONA—situational organizational network analysis (Glückler & Hammer, 2015; 
Glückler, Panitz, & Hammer, 2020)—and evaluated them for an extended period. 
SONA includes qualitative observation during personal and group interviews as 
well as quantitative data gathered with a standardized network survey and evaluated 
with methods of social network analysis. I have based the following analysis of 
governance structure on numerous interviews and, for each network, a survey cov-
ering more than 70% of the members (see Table 11.2).
The two networks fit into the foregoing classification of network governance. 
The context was the same for both. Of course, the market situation varies from one 
member firm to the next because each firm is affiliated with a different economic 
sector, but in both networks  firms that were at least potential rivals had banded 
together to improve their competitiveness. The member firms in the two networks 
were legally autonomous and economically independent from each other. Regarding 
the object of governance, the divergence between the networks was greater because 
of what they did. Whereas ConsultingNet engaged in rather soft activities that were 
not capital intensive for its members (e.g., events), Dentis pursued more ambitious 
goals of collectively developing and investing in networked production and joint 
marketing and sales strategies. The ensuing complexity of governance in that net-
work was evident from its use of an NAO. The networks also had similar gover-
nance mechanisms and agents of governance. Their regulations were formal, as 
were the concomitant formal authorities of governance. In both networks, however, 
Table 11.2 SONA: mixed 
method research design and 
database
Instrument ConsultingNet Dentis
Preliminary discussion 1 1
Number of personal interviews 4 5
Network Survey response (rate) 19 (82.6%) 20 (74%)
Group discussion (validation) 1 1
Number of network members 23 27
Note. Source: Design by author
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the personal interviews indicated awareness of a parallel dimension of control that 
was not formally regulated, one without which neither network would have been 
feasible.
 Methodology: Measuring the Legitimate Delegation 
of Decision-Making Authority
Through preliminary discussions as well as the personal interviews with members 
of the two networks, I learned that the networks’ governance was repeatedly linked 
with critical decision-making situations at the network level. For purposes of empir-
ical observation, the delegation of decision-making power between the members of 
an organized network was operationalized with the following question item: 
Imagine that an important decision has to be taken in the network and that you cannot take 
part in it. What other network members would have to be present when the decision is made 
so that you could accept the outcome?
 This question item facilitates an independent measurement of each actor’s legiti-
macy as an agent of governance, for the multilateral assessment of a member by 
others cannot be affected by that member at the time of the survey. Although hypo-
thetical questions are more disputable than questions intended to reconstruct actual 
events, the instructive studies by Lazega (2000, 2001), for example, prove that 
hypothetical questions can indeed capture valid subjective representations of social 
structures of influence. With a network survey, I could thus collect the complete 
structure of all votes on the delegation of authority to make decisions. To character-
ize the resulting distribution of legitimacy, two parameters are important: the 
strength and the structure of legitimacy within the network.
Strength. The strength of legitimacy is measured by the indegree. The indegree 
d1 of a member n is the number of the votes (mentions), v that a member receives 
from the other members j so that he or her can participate in decisions as the legiti-
mate representative in their absence: d n vI i
j
ij    . The maximal indegree for each 
network of size N is n - 1.
Structure. The structural dimension refers to the specific distribution of the del-
egation of decision-making authority. Strong legitimacy can rest on votes from a 
unitary faction or in votes from members from various factions. To discover the 
specific distribution of decision-making delegations, I use the external-internal (E-I) 
index (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). It measures the ratio of legitimacy relations 
across factions (external legitimacy, or EL) to legitimacy relations within factions 
(internal legitimacy, or IL). The E-I index is calculated as follows: E-I = (EL - IL) ÷ 
(EL +  IL). However, because the E-I can be calculated only in symmetrical net-
works, the direction of the vote between the members cannot be dispensed with. The 
E-I thus does not reveal whether a transfer of decision-making authority goes from 
A to B or rather from B to A. It calculates only the extent to which each member is 
involved in internal or external factional relations of legitimacy. Theoretically, the 
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E-I varies between −1 (solely internal factional relations) and + 1 (solely external 
factional relations).5
I then use the strength and structure of the legitimacy distribution as dimensions 
of a model of lateral network governance. Together, they yield a matrix with four 
quadrants subdivided by the median value of the indegree and the null value of the 
E-I index. The model permits the formal definition of three types of an actor’s legiti-
macy (see Fig. 11.2):
Low legitimacy. Members with below-average indegree are less likely than mem-
bers with above-average indegree to gain sufficient acceptance of their decisions in 
the network.
Local legitimacy. Members in the upper-left quadrant have above-average legiti-
macy, but it comes mostly from their own faction. Like the head of a faction, they 
can gain acceptance for decisions within their factions.
Global legitimacy. Members in the upper-right quadrant have above-average 
legitimacy stemming from various factions. Speaking on behalf of several factions, 
these members have the greatest opportunity to win the acceptance of decisions in 
the entire network.
Consequently, the point of empirically analyzing the structure of legitimacy dis-
tribution in the ConsultingNet and Dentis networks is to ascertain how much that 
structure corresponds to the formal model of governance and how much it creates 
overall legitimacy.
5 E-I values approaching +1 are unrealistic because the prior factional analysis of the legitimacy 
network classifies members into coherent network-based factions. Factional affiliation therefore 
makes the tendency toward factional internal relations likely.
Fig. 11.2 Model of lateral 
governance: legitimate 
delegation of decision- 




 Empirical Structures of Lateral Network Governance
 Planned Versus Practiced Governance
Because of the democratic principle of delegating decision-making authority, the 
formally planned governance structure need not match the actual distribution of 
legitimacy in the network. Formal positions such as those of managing director or 
management board member, and formal bodies such as the advisory or supervisory 
board, set forth responsibilities and decision-making authority, but they do not pre-
clude the legitimacy of other network members. Some members can be seen as 
important (legitimate) for certain decisions in the network even though they do not 
hold an office legally granting decision-making authority. Instead, other members’ 
initiative and influence on the decision-making process can even be expected or 
required.
To test this conjecture, I compared the formally planned and the actually prac-
ticed forms of network governance. Figure 11.3 juxtaposes the ideal-type diagram 
of formal governance with the empirically documented distributions of legitimacy. 
The structure of legitimacy distribution in the two networks is depicted by nodes 
representing the members of the respective networks and by edges representing the 
individual relations between the surveyed members involved in the delegation of 
legitimate decision-making authority.
In both case studies, there is only moderate statistical relation between planned 
and practiced governance (with coefficients of 0.18 in the case of ConsultingNet 
and 0.23 in the case of Dentis). I could thus confirm the expectation and, from the 
Fig. 11.3 A comparison between planned and practiced governance in two networks. Grey 
nodes = network members; black nodes = network members on the board of directors. Source: 
Design by author
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networks’ perspective, the hope that the planned structure of governance is con-
tained within the actual distribution of legitimacy: Formal offices are held by legiti-
mate actors. However, the actual distribution of legitimacy strays from the planned 
structure in notable ways, as revealed by the two parameters with which I measure 
this facet of the networks—density and centralization. With the network’s density, I 
learn the percentage of theoretically possible votes that were received. With central-
ization, I gauge the network’s tendency to concentrate all delegation relations on 
only one actor. Unanimity—100% centralization—would register as a perfect star. 
If delegation relations were completely distributed between the members, central-
ization would be 0. With my analysis, I learned that practiced governance in both 
networks is distributed across many more members than was formally planned. The 
structures that were actually used had greater density than foreseen, and the degree 
to which power was delegated was less centralized.
Thus, the actual number of actors legitimately positioned to affect the process of 
making acceptable decisions substantially exceeds the stipulated number. The low 
degree of centralization with governance as actually practiced reflects the tendency 
of lateral governance not to reduce to the formal agents of governance. By virtue of 
social legitimacy, informal members also figure in governance as practiced in the 
networks, becoming part of the de facto agent of network governance. The model-
ing of a formal governance structure does not capture the reality of network gover-
nance. Focusing on formal membership in executive boards alone can thus quickly 
prove inadequate. Legitimate members could feel disregarded or could later contest 
decisions that have been taken.
 Local Versus Global Legitimacy: Structures for the Delegation 
of Decision-Making Authority
In the first part of my analysis, I revealed the divergence between the practiced and 
planned governance in lateral networks. However, the concept of lateral network 
governance makes for an even more discerning evaluation of the express structures 
of the distribution of legitimacy. In this section, I use the model of lateral network 
governance developed above, which makes it possible to set up a matrix in which 
the legitimacy is plotted for every network member according to strength (indegree) 
and structure (E-I index). With this matrix, I can single out three roles of legitimacy: 
low, local, and global. The role of low legitimacy is characterized by the marginal 
degree of legitimacy conferred by the network partners (see Fig. 11.4, bottom left 
and right quadrants). Low legitimacy is registered as a below-average indegree 
(d n dI i i   ), which reflects the number of times an actor in the network is named 
by other members.
All members with above-average legitimacy are represented in the upper quad-
rants of the matrix and are the analytical agent of governance. They are highly rel-
evant to governance but differ—some of them considerably—in their position 
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within the distributive structure through which legitimate decision-making author-
ity is bestowed. The second role of legitimacy—the local—appears in the upper left 
quadrants (Fig.  11.4). Its above-average legitimacy is granted by a more or less 
unitary subgroup describable as a faction because it has an E-I smaller than zero in 
each instance. By contrast, the third role of legitimacy, the global, appears in the 
upper right quadrant (Fig. 11.4). It is characterized by an E-I greater than zero, has 
its legitimacy from the network as a whole, that is, primarily from outside a unitary 
faction. Members with local legitimacy, such as in ConsultingNet, advocate deci-
sions for a homogenous part of the network, with those decisions not necessarily 
enjoying support throughout the network. Members with global legitimacy, how-
ever, unite above-average and network-wide acceptance by the other members and 
have a greater likelihood of being able to work toward decisions that are more capa-
ble of building consensus and winning acceptance than would otherwise be the 
case. Such members serve as representatives of the network as a whole, such as in 
the Dentis network.
With Fig. 11.4, I illustrate the distribution of members in the matrix for both 
networks. The empirical models suggest three important insights. First, both net-
works have an agent of governance not adequately represented by their formal 
offices. In both networks, above-average decision-making authority is delegated to 
a handful of members whose legitimation is considerably more than purely formal. 
In ConsultingNet, in addition to the two board members formally elected, seven 
more members were named as legitimate representatives. In Dentis, another four 
were found as equally legitimate as the four formal board members. Second, the 
place that the formal offices occupy in both networks is evident. Although there are 
significant similarities between the planned and the actually practiced structures of 
legitimation, both networks had numerous other members with above-average legit-
imacy. The identified agent of lateral network governance therefore delineates the 
Fig. 11.4 Empirical distribution of legitimacy in the matrix of lateral network governance. Source: 
Design by author
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actual governance structure and complements the work of the supervisory board. 
Third, ConsultingNet and Dentis differed considerably in the composition of the 
two governance roles. ConsultingNet members with above-average legitimacy 
derived their acceptance almost exclusively from a local faction, not from the over-
all network. In contrast, the distribution of legitimacy in Dentis comprised many 
members with above-average, network-wide legitimacy and who could therefore 
gain acceptance in the network much more easily than the prominent members of 
ConsultingNet with only local legitimacy. Notably, ConsultingNet nosedived at the 
time the survey data was analyzed, whereas Dentis continued investing in profes-
sionalization. Giving reasons for the problems cited in the case study on 
ConsultingNet, its members described matters affecting the entire network that had 
brought on a torrent of objections. Apparently, the legitimacy of the responsible 
decision-makers had thus only been partial or insufficient. A large share of network 
members had meanwhile left it. Dentis, by contrast, had no serious trouble with its 
governability and ability to take action and has continued to successfully purse its 
common goals.
 Conclusion
In this article I have elaborated on a theory of lateral network governance, with 
which I conceptually surmount the divide between formal and informal governance 
by focusing on the relational distribution of the legitimacy to rule and control in a 
governance agreement among equals. With this concept of lateral network gover-
nance I seek to reconcile the voluntary nature of network membership and the 
expectation of nonhierarchical cooperation on the one hand with an interest in effec-
tive agents of governance and compliance with its normative and procedural stan-
dards on the other. For this vision of lateral network governance I am drawing on the 
culture of democratic decision-making, in which the smallest possible, sufficiently 
representative group of delegates negotiates consensus-based decisions that meet 
with network-wide acceptance and promote long-term consensus on objectives and 
identification. Although I have focused predominantly on legitimacy in this article, 
future research should further explore the role of power in such governance arrange-
ments. The nexus to concepts of power constitutes a promising link between eco-
nomic geography and political geography (Allen, 2011; Allen & Cochrane, 2007; 
Grabs & Ponte, 2019; Griffin, 2012).
Methodologically, I have drawn on methods of social network analysis to turn 
this concept into empirical practice. While network methods have become increas-
ingly recognized and used in human geography (Giuliani, 2007; Glückler, 2007; ter 
Wal & Boschma, 2009), network researchers have simultaneously acknowledged 
the role of space and place in real social networks (Doreian & Conti, 2012). Future 
research on local and network governance will benefit from further cross- fertilization 
between network studies and geography, for instance, by adopting positional, 
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dynamic, and multi-level approaches (Glückler & Doreian, 2016; Glückler, Lazega, 
& Hammer, 2017; Lazega & Snijders, 2016).
Empirically, my analysis of two case studies reveals that concentrating solely on 
the formal structure of governance while neglecting the invisible spheres of actually 
practiced governance can lead to conflicts and mounting resistance in network col-
laboration. Instead, the analysis of the relational distribution of legitimacy helps 
actors examine and, if necessary, adapt network governance by identifying the most 
legitimate actors and discrimentating the locus—local or global—of their legiti-
macy for governance.
A theory of lateral network governance does not imply static architectures of 
organization but serves as a compass guiding daily network governance. The actual 
design of a governance structure depends not only on the four building blocks—
context, object, mechanism, and agency of governance—but also on its geographi-
cal and institutional context in order to convey appropriate, legitimate, and effective 
practice of network governance.
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Chapter 12
Knowledge and the Deliberative Stance 
in Democratic Systems: Harnessing 
Scepticism of the Self in Governing Global 
Environmental Change
Simon Niemeyer
Deliberative democracy is characterized as an approach to governance that valorizes 
the operation of reason (Chambers, 2012; Cohen, 2007). Although there is a danger 
of this interpretation implying hyper-rationalism, as some researchers have sug-
gested, considerable scope exists for understanding the relationship between knowl-
edge, reason, and governance in a broader sense using a deliberative lens (see 
Bächtiger, Niemeyer, Neblo, Steenbergen, & Steiner, 2010). To begin, the emphasis 
on deliberation implies that the mere fact of knowledge is insufficient to derive 
legitimacy for any particular action. An actor may use knowledge to demonstrate 
the existence of climate change, for example, but the choice of what action to take 
involves normative questions about what the polity values, which can only be 
addressed with reference to citizens.
At the same time, the relationship between citizens, knowledge, and collective 
choices is not improving, and may possibly even be deteriorating (Capstick, 
Whitmarsh, Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Upham, 2015). The problem is not ignorance per 
se, nor a lack of baseline will (O’Brien, 2012). When surveyed, most citizens 
endorse environmental sustainability, but the message is often lost in political trans-
lation. However, it is important to understand the broader dynamics of knowledge, 
and the processes whereby these are translated into action. Take for example the 
“governance trap,” where basic acceptance of the fact of climate change fails to 
translate into action, because citizens and the government each attribute responsibil-
ity for such action to the other, thus ossifying inaction (Pidgeon, 2012). In this 
chapter, I seek to develop an understanding of these processes through a deliberative 
framework.
To this end, I begin the chapter with a survey of the challenge of translating 
knowledge into political action, demonstrating how a governance lens, particularly 
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a deliberative one, can illuminate these dynamics. I then illustrate them using a case 
study that compares the effect of knowledge gains of climate impacts to the absence 
or presence of deliberation, via relative changes to discourses of climate change 
governance. I argue that an important feature influencing the impact is not just the 
role of knowledge, but also the changing disposition of citizens, which is impacted 
by the deliberative context. I examine this dispositional effect using the concept of 
the deliberative stance, then develop these findings into broad possibilities for 
improving the relationship between knowledge and governance in deliberative sys-
tems, before revisiting the overall findings in a concluding section.
 Knowledge and Governance Systems in Climate Change
Researchers have known the basic science underpinning anthropogenic climate 
change since the latter part of the nineteenth century. Originally heavily contested, 
the scientific consensus has moved on from debating its existence to yielding 
increasingly alarming revisions of earlier findings in respect to its pace and impacts 
(Oreskes, 2018).
Yet, despite the growing evidence there is a growing gap between the scale of the 
problem and the need for action that it implies (e.g., Dunlap, 2013). Self-interest at 
the national level is part of the problem, particularly where politics is dominated by 
the fossil fuel and associated industries (e.g., Christoff, 2013), but this is only part 
of the picture. In any system of governance there remains a thread of legitimization 
between the public and decision makers responding to (or at least managing) popu-
lar demand for action on climate change. The problem remains that this level of 
demand has varied considerably over time, even declining in some countries 
(Capstick et al., 2015).
Although a liberal view might support the right of citizens to choose as they 
wish, a deliberative democratic view of governance demands that such a deficit be 
understood. If it reflects a systematic dislocation between generalizable public 
interest (such as maintaining a healthy environment; see Dryzek, 1990) and 
expressed preferences, remedies must be sought to realign the two.
In recent history, researchers have viewed these dynamics through an information 
deficit prism, whose proponents hold that the public, once appraised of the climate 
change risk, will follow suit and demand action. To be sure, climate change knowl-
edge is correlated to action (Bord, O’Connor, & Fischer, 2000), and there exists a 
knowledge deficit in relation to climate change among members, evidenced for exam-
ple by a tendency to conflate localized air pollution, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and 
ozone depletion as drivers of climate change (Capstick et al., 2015). However, this 
relationship does not contribute very much to understanding the overall picture.
Closer inspection of knowledge dynamics through the lens of governance sug-
gests a richer dynamic. For a start, knowledge itself is limited. Definitive knowledge 
in respect to climate change is increasingly unobtainable, given the complexities of 
the issue. Acquiring knowledge in respect to climate change concerns the degree of 
specialization required to understand all its extant dimensions—to a point where it 
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is impossible for any given individual to be fully conversant. This complexity leads 
to the problem of the knowledge-ignorance paradox, in which the need for special-
ization induces ignorance even among experts. Among citizens, it also serves to 
remove knowledge ever further and decrease inclination to engage with complex 
issues such as climate change. Its complexity, in combination with a lack of easily 
communicable metaphors to translate it into a “hot” issue, makes it difficult to hold 
public attention (Ungar, 2000).
Consequently, governance systems require knowledge specialization, which is 
predicated on trust, but this increased knowledge paradoxically has the potential to 
undermine this trust. The greater demands on collective knowledge for complex 
issues such as climate change confront a countervailing need for cognitive clo-
sure—closing the mind to information inconsistent with prior beliefs (Kruglanski & 
Boyatzi, 2012)—that is driven by greater demands on citizens’ limited time and 
cognitive resources. Even the most knowledgeable citizen—including climate sci-
entists—will need to resort to trust in the wider knowledge system in which they are 
situated. Many citizens appear to do just that: They accept the scientific consensus 
in respect of anthropogenic climate impact and support action even if they do not 
individually possess detailed knowledge (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & 
Maibach, 2015). Where the message’s implications diverge from prior beliefs, how-
ever, there is a danger of ever-increasing complexity driving a wedge between the 
scientist and the citizen—that is, in the absence of creating a deliberative context.
Even so, the overall relationship between knowledge and behavior is complex 
and mediated by a range of factors, including worldview, norms (social and per-
sonal), intentions, and habits.1 Knowledge, in the form of belief in the human causes 
and consequences of climate change, appears to be a requisite (Bord et al., 2000) but 
not a sufficient condition for action, which also requires acceptance of responsibil-
ity for action (Capstick et  al., 2015). Ever more sophisticated models to predict 
environmental behavior (Klöckner, 2013) still only account for a small proportion 
of variation in actual behavior, and, even if accurate, inform remedies that are piece-
meal at best (Shove, 2010).
A key contention here—which suggests both a diagnosis and a cure—is that 
these relationships, between knowledge and behavior, are at least partly constructed 
by the governance context in which such behaviors occur, as well as being part of 
the processes that form that context. One example of this context shaping the role of 
knowledge is that of the prevailing ideological setting (e.g., McCright, Dunlap, & 
Marquart-Pyatt, 2016). Researchers well understand the role of worldview and ide-
ology in determining views on climate change, and they can be powerful forces that 
influence the views of scientists themselves within knowledge systems (e.g., 
Carlton, Perry-Hill, Huber, & Prokopy, 2015).
These forces also play a role in attempts to reconstruct politics in ways that either 
support or work against the uptake of knowledge in political systems. McCright and 
1 The knowledge dimension in environmental psychology models predicting behavior tends to fol-
low the form of awareness about the consequences associated with action, and awareness of indi-
vidual responsibility for that action. For a review, see Klöckner (2013).
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Dunlap (2010), for example, have described an ideologically driven attempt to work 
against the ideal of reflexive modernism (Beck, 1992) and critical self-evaluation 
and confrontation of the consequences of human actions on the environment via the 
centrality of impact science—as opposed to production science focused on eco-
nomic output—and social movements. Many of these strategies involve attacking 
the institutions as part of the machinery of reflexivity, as well as framing decision 
choices to induce “non-decisions” that maintain a status quo more consistent with 
their interests. This includes strategies modeled on casting enough doubt on the sci-
ence of climate change to forestall public mobilization (Oreskes & Conway, 2010; 
see also Chap. 3 by Scott).
Reflexive modernists advocate remedies for the problem of knowledge distorting 
practices in political systems such as those used by “merchants of doubt” (Oreskes 
& Conway, 2010) at the macro-institutional level via the privileging of impact sci-
ence and advocacy by interest groups (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2010). The 
approach is aimed at government: balancing the impact of knowledge against unre-
flexive forces that often seek to maintain an advantageous status quo. However, the 
effectiveness is limited to the extent that it fails to engage with the effect of these 
processes on citizens, delegitimizing a reflexive approach just enough to maintain 
the status quo.
 Deliberative Democracy: Reflexive Systems, Reflexive Citizens
Deliberative democracy offers a different frame from which to view the uptake of 
knowledge in governance systems, as well as how that process might be improved. 
It implies an approach to governance that engages citizens in a manner that encour-
ages political discourse and reflection of a deliberative quality, that such a process 
should be broadly inclusive, and that the considered will of citizens find a mecha-
nism inducing consequences for both specific decisions and the operation of the 
system of governance as a whole (Dryzek, 2009).
Deliberative democrats speak of a relationship between reflexive and delibera-
tive modes of governance at the wider “systems” level (e.g., Dryzek & Pickering, 
2017; Stevenson & Dryzek, 2012), but it is also important to think of how citizens 
function as part of these systems, and how individual-level dispositions impact on 
larger scale dynamics (Owen & Smith, 2015). Habermas (2006, p. 418), for exam-
ple, draws this link when he refers to the reflexive character of the public sphere as 
a function of how all citizens “can revisit perceived public opinions and respond to 
them after reconsideration.”
Less developed than theories of deliberative democracy, however, are well con-
structed and practical mechanisms for understanding the knowledge-action dynam-
ics among citizens. Researchers face the challenge of empirically capturing the 
nature of these dynamics and translating them into mechanisms for boosting the 




A relevant consideration involves what actual features of deliberation yield the 
hypothesized benefits. Although deliberative democracy researchers have tended to 
focus on the quality of deliberation as a process (Bächtiger et al., 2010) and the ideal 
features that it embodies—such as openness, sincerity, respect, reciprocity, and 
intersubjectivity—there is a growing interest in how deliberation is experienced by 
citizens and in the demands that it makes of them.
Deliberation cannot be divorced from a set of (reflexive) capabilities that are 
implicit in deliberative theory via characteristics such as open-mindedness. Owen 
and Smith (2015) have described something akin to the activation of these capabili-
ties when they advance the idea of a “deliberative stance”:
Part of the political ideal of deliberative democracy is that its (normative) stability is gener-
ated by citizens being able intelligibly to conceive of (adopt a stance towards) themselves 
as equals engaged in a process of public reasoning oriented to a shared practical judgment, 
where such a process involves citizens reflectively taking up each other’s standpoints. 
(p. 219)
The ideal of the deliberative stance reflects a predilection for truth seeking and con-
testation (Curato, Niemeyer, & Dryzek., 2013), an openness to arguments, and a 
capacity for empathy (Morrell, 2010), taking seriously alternative arguments while 
simultaneously treating them with judicious scepticism (Kruglanski & Boyatzi, 
2012). It implies Socratic humility, an open-mindedness that continually resists the 
need for cognitive closure, inviting ongoing negotiation of the relationship between 
the self and knowledge and its integration into thought.
 Knowledge, Information, and Deliberation: A Case Study
One factor that improves the uptake and integration of knowledge is that of context 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), including the governance setting in which politically 
relevant knowledge is acquired (e.g., Pierce, Lovrich, & Dalton, 2000).
Although the term “context” can cover a multitude of possibilities (see e.g., 
Shove, 2010), here the governance context is primarily viewed through a discursive 
lens, in which the public sphere, which is a product of discourses reproduced among 
individuals as discursive sites, where discourses are broadly understood in similar 
terms to Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008, p. 481) as “a set of categories and concepts 
embodying specific assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capa-
bilities.” Discourses enable the mind to process sensory inputs into coherent 
accounts, which can then be shared intersubjectively.
This definition of discourse provides a clue to their capacity to shape the dynam-
ics of knowledge uptake in a governance context as well as shaping that context. 
These dynamics can be demonstrated via an Australian study on public responses to 
climate change and governance in the Australian Capital Region (from here on, the 
ACR study; see Hobson & Niemeyer, 2011). The study involved investigating dis-
courses around the question of climate change, adaptation, and governance and the 
relative impact of exposure to climate change scenarios and participation in a delib-
erative process.
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The empirical approach—described in detail in Hobson and Niemeyer (2011)—
involved surveying responses to 33 statements covering themes dealing with beliefs 
about climate change, trust in knowledge sources, beliefs about the capacity of the 
system of governance to respond to the challenge, and demands about what should 
be done to improve that capacity (see Table 12.3 in the Appendix).
Researchers recorded two kinds of responses. The first, non-discursive, approach 
involved a standard Likert-scale response to the statements, from “strongly dis-
agree” to “strongly agree” on an 11-point scale (−5,5), permitting a broad analysis 
of aggregate changes. The second, discursive approach, required participants to 
sort/rank statements into a quasi-normal distribution across the same scale for anal-
ysis based on Q methodology to identify the climate governance discourses 
reported below.
The survey responses were recorded at the following four stages:2
Stage 1: Baseline survey before exposure to the climate change scenario;
Stage 2: Following exposure to the High Emissions climate change scenario;
Stage 3: Prior to participation in a three-day deliberative process on climate change 
adaptation and policy, 3 months after the climate change scenario interviews; and
Stage 4: Immediately following deliberation.
Following the surveying of baseline perspectives (Stage 1), participants in 
Stage 2 experienced modelled climate impacts for the region as part of an extended, 
individual interview process. The researchers communicated the scenario via a 
series of PowerPoint slides illustrating modelled climate impacts associated with a 
“high emissions” scenario in the years 2050 and 2100.3 Participants were asked to 
reflect on their real-world reaction to exposure to the scenario and to re-perform the 
surveys.
Stage 3 involved re-performing the surveys months following the scenario inter-
view, immediately prior to participation in a three-day deliberative process. The 
process began with group activities designed to activate norms consistent with the 
deliberative stance, followed by 2 days of presentations from witnesses speaking to 
a wide range of issues associated with climate change and group discussion (see 
Hobson & Niemeyer, 2011). The final day involved group deliberation developing 
policy recommendations dealing with climate change and adaption, which was fol-
lowed by the post-deliberative survey (Stage 4). The scenario phase of the study 
2 An additional stage was included in the original study involving exposure to a “medium” emis-
sions climate change scenario, but is not reported here (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2011).
3 The scenarios were developed using the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation’s (CSIRO) OzClim model, which contains patterns of regional changes in climate 
projected from 23 global climate models run by and other research centres and archived at the 
Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison (PCMDI). The model enables users to 
select from six SRES scenarios (taken from the ‘Special Report on Emissions’) and two commonly 
used CO2 concentration stabilisation scenarios to generate projections for any of the available 
global climate models (Năkićenović et al., 2000). An additional “medium emissions” scenario was 
included in the study, but not reported here.
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collected viable data from 103 participants, 34 of whom—out of the 40 selected—
went on to complete the deliberative process (Stages 3 and 4).
The list of statements used for the Q-study component of the survey can be found 
in the appendix’s Table 12.3. As per Q method, these were drawn from a database 
of real language statements pertaining to relevant dimensions of climate change and 
adaptation discourses in the public sphere (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2011). An abridged 
selection of these most relevant for the discussion here is shown in Table 12.1 below.
The average responses to the statements using the first (Likert) method are shown 
in the four columns to the right of the statements for each stage of the study, for the 
subset of deliberative participants. Results for the larger set of participants in the 
scenario study are shown in square brackets. The significance of change for each 
result compared to the baseline is indicated by an asterisk, with an additional col-
umn showing the significance of change for the deliberative phase (Stages 3–4).
Table 12.1 contains significant and dramatic changes in relation to beliefs fol-
lowing exposure to the climate change scenarios (statements 1, 3, and 25) and 
increased trust in scientific knowledge (6), but a decrease in information from the 
media (12). There was no change in belief regarding the quality of overall gover-
nance response to the issue (2), but an increased tendency to outsource this issue 
and to lay blame at the feet of government (33), rather than seek a broader response 
within the community. As will be seen below, it makes sense that there is no increase 
in the already high demand for education in climate change, particularly as it was 
understood by those most in favor of it at the baseline stage (climate sceptics, see 
below). This contrasts to the increasing demand that the government take responsi-
bility (32).
The average responses in Table 12.1 for Stage 3 (3-month follow-up, prior to 
participation in the deliberative process) reveal that in most cases the effect of infor-
mation is not sustained, as I further discuss below The standout exception to this 
trend is declining trust in information from the government (7) and, to a lesser 
extent, the media (12)—although in this case, as for the other changes at this stage, 
the effect is a residual from changes that occur in the scenario stage.
Deliberation, by contrast, had a qualitatively different impact. Some dramatic 
changes occurred, the most significant being the belief that there will be positive 
response to climate change (2) and demand for more educational programs (4). 
Beliefs about the reality of climate change grew during deliberation (1, 3, and 25; 
although the latter two deliberative changes fell just short of achieving significance). 
And, although participants did not complete a follow-up survey after participation 
in deliberation, a number did participate in meetings 6 months after the event, as 
well as a number of semi-structured interviews during which most reported the 
enduring nature of the views formed during deliberation. This included a belief that 
climate change is real and problematic, despite a recent break occurring to a long- 
term drought (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2011).
For almost every survey item in Table 12.1, the observed effect from the scenario 
stage (information effect) among the deliberative cohort is similar to the group as a 
whole, except in the case of Item 8 (need for strong political leadership). However, 
there is an overall trend of more conservative results among the wider group, likely 
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Table 12.1 Statement responses—knowledge, trust, governance (Likert Scale)
Stage 1. 
Base-line



















Beliefs about climate change







3 Climate variation is 
normal, so there is 
no problem
−1.97 −3.29*** −2.74* −3.21**
[−1.84] [−3.27]***
25 Australia is 
particularly 
vulnerable
2.79 3.74* 3.43* 3.79*
[2.65] [3.65]*
Trust in Knowledge Sources
6 Trust what scientists 
say
1.82 2.09* 1.42 3.04* **
[1.89] [2.23]*
7 Trust what 
government says
0.12 −0.76 −1.11** −0.88*
[0.55] [0.47]
12 Trust what media 
says
−2.79 −1.35*** −1.89* −2.55
[−2.18] [−1.15]***
Governance capacity
2 The response to 
climate change will 
be positive
0.15 0.41 −0.63 −1.87*** ***
[−0.07] [0.22]
33 Failure to address 
climate change is the 
fault of political 
leaders
0.82 1.97*** 2.21* 1.85*
[0.76] [1.65]***
Governance demands
4 Need more 
educational 
programmes
3.62 3.65 3.57 4.26* ***
[3.27] [2.91]
8 Need strong political 
leadership
3.91 4.59** 3.90 4.57* **
[3.88] [4.10]
32 Government should 
take responsibility
3.21 3.79* 3.61 3.90* *
[2.82] [3.87]*
Note. Source: Design by author. Figures show the average response for that stage
Significance levels indicate the significance of change compared to the previous stage (apart from 
overall change indicated in the RHS column) based on T-scores where H0: no change in average 
response; p < 0.05*, p < 0.01**, p < 0.001***
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due to self-selection bias—something also observed in relation to other studies 
(e.g., Curato & Niemeyer, 2013; see also Jennstål, 2018)—where a particular type 
of usually conservative and deep climate sceptic participant withdraws after agree-
ing to participate in deliberation. I will revisit this issue, and the implications for the 
overall findings, below.
 Discursive Transformation
The ability to identify relevant “types” of individual, such as the deliberative-shy 
deep sceptics, was facilitated by a second type of analysis, using the forced distribu-
tion scores, based on Q methodology (Brown, 1980). This Q analysis helped to 
discern different themes in the responses to statements among participants—called 
factors; although here I use the term “discourses” in an informal sense (see Dryzek, 
1990). The approach is more consistent with the “sense-making” approach of dis-
cursive psychology (Niemeyer, 2019)—although there are limits to this interpreta-
tion of the method (Danielson, 2015)—where the associations between items 
emerge as part of the analysis, rather than a priori.
The analysis, which is described in detail in Hobson and Niemeyer (2011), 
resulted in four discourses, reflecting different levels of agreement/disagreement 
with the entire set of 33 statements, within which the positions of most participants 
could be located:
 A. Government Scepticism
 B. Government Imperative
 C. Pragmatism
 D. Alarmed Defeatism
I report the “typical” responses to the statements, which are used to interpret the 
discourses, in Table 12.3 in the appendix. In order to more easily communicate the 
features of each discourse—and later locate participants within them—I have 
located abridged versions of the survey statements schematically in Fig. 12.1 among 
the four overlapping discourse spheres. The statements paraphrased in Table 12.1 
are shown in bold.
Discourse A represented a particular form of climate scepticism—where a dedi-
cated analysis revealed a number of variations (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2013)—with 
much lower levels of trust in knowledge sources (scientists, government, media) 
compared to the other discourses. Individuals associated with this discourse tended 
to believe climate change is an important issue—as did those in all the discourses. 
However, the risk is overstated for this cohort, who tended to ascribe climate change 
to natural climate variation.4
4 The study included a large proportion of climate sceptics, a number of who held deeply sceptical 
positions that could not easily incorporated into the main discourse analysis and do not quite fit 
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Proponents of Discourse B are much more concerned about climate change, with 
greater levels of trust in scientific knowledge. But there is a strong element of dis-
pleasure in the government’s response to the issue, emphasizing centralized action 
in ways that may not ultimately prove particularly adaptive in the absence of addi-
tional recognition of individual responsibility (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2013)—which 
is consistent with social psychological models used to predict pro-environmental 
behavior (Klöckner, 2013).
Discourse C, although a very small discourse in terms of influence among par-
ticipants, represents a pragmatist view whose proponents are optimistic that solu-
tions can be found without causing too much disruption. Discourse D, by contrast, 
is entirely maladaptive, representing a retreat from any form of cooperative attempt 
to govern in manner that improves the collective response (see Hobson & Niemeyer, 
2011). This is not due to a lack of knowledge, but to acceptance that dramatic 
change is occurring.
The study’s participants can be located schematically on the discourse map—
using their factor loadings, indicating how strongly they correlate to the standard 
responses to the survey statements represented by the discourse (see Hobson & 
Niemeyer, 2011). The baseline (and high emissions) locations are indicated by the 
into Discourse A.  A separate analysis was conducted separately for the entire climate sceptic 
cohort, and is reported in Hobson and Niemeyer (2013).
Fig. 12.1 Discourses of climate change adaptation and governance. Source: Design by author
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arrows in Fig. 12.2, where the points at the beginning of each arrow reflect the base-
line position of participants, prior to exposure to the climate change scenarios.5 At 
the study’s baseline stage, most participants could be located within Discourse B.
In Fig. 12.2, I capture the resulting movement across the discourse map from 
exposure to the climate change scenario. The scenario intervention induced a strong 
overall movement in the direction of Government Imperative (Discourse B), reflect-
ing less an increase in reflexivity than a redirection from merely blaming govern-
ment on the issue to demanding it take action. But it also involved a movement 
toward Alarmed Defeatism (D), which is an unreflexive perspective that represents 
a wholesale retreat from a desire to act on the issue (see Hobson & Niemeyer, 2011). 
As anticipated, improved knowledge about climate change impacts thus did not 
appear to improve adaptive capacity and reflexivity.
As discussed above in relation to the Likert responses, the acquisition of knowl-
edge about climate change had no lasting effect. Figure 12.3 shows the impact of the 
knowledge gains between Stages 1 and 2 following exposure to the climate change 
scenarios (lighter arrows with closed head) compared to the subsequent movement 
between Stages 2 and 3  in the follow-up prior to participation in the deliberative 
5 The deep climate sceptics who do not fit into this discourse schema are shown outside the map at 
a point reflecting those discourse they are most closely (but not significantly) associated with.
Fig. 12.2 Migration across discourses: stages 1–2 (Baseline-High Emissions Scenario). Source: 
Design by author
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process (heavier arrows with open, double head). The figure reveals that most partici-
pants return to a position approaching their baseline after the initial impact of infor-
mation. As is often the case for other studies, the effect of information alone is short 
lived (see Hobson & Niemeyer, 2011; Howell, 2011).
Deliberation, on the other hand, had a very different impact—both quantita-
tively and qualitatively. The Likert response analysis in Table 12.1 indicates strong 
changes during deliberation, but looking at the changes through the lens of the 
discourses reveals the substantive story. The impact not only included a move 
across the existing discourse map; it involved a reconfiguration of the map itself 
and the way in which participants perceived possibilities for governance in rela-
tion to climate change. I schematically describe these post-deliberative discourses 
in Fig.  12.4 in the same manner as the scenario discourses in Fig.  12.2. They 
include:
A′. Accommodating Scepticism
B′. Governance and Engagement Imperative
E.    Collective Action Imperative
F.     Adaptive Reassurance
Overall, deliberative engagement increased the desire for more inclusive 
approaches to governance, rather than for outsourcing to government—observed in 




respect to other deliberative processes (Niemeyer, Batalha, & Dryzek, 2013), whose 
researchers commonly report increases in internal political efficacy (Morrell, 2005). 
This transformation is reflected in the change in nomenclature from “government” 
to “governance.” Sceptics became more accommodationist in their perspective 
(Discourse A′).
Following deliberation, most participants were ultimately located in the modified 
Discourse A′ or the new Discourse E (Collective Action), but the content of these 
new discourses is at least as important as the distribution of the participants. The 
overall post-deliberative discursive landscape represents greater adaptive possibili-
ties compared to the other research stages (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2011).
Of particular interest here is the relationship between knowledge and gover-
nance. With my analysis associated with Table 12.1, I have already alluded to a 
changing context in terms of beliefs about climate change, trust in knowledge 
sources, beliefs about governance capacity, and demand for changes to governance. 
I have summarized these features for both sets of discourses in Table 12.2 below, 
including the overall assessment of compatibility with creating the governance con-
ditions for improved climate change adaptation as analyzed in Hobson and 
Niemeyer (2011).
In Table 12.2, I report the major features pertaining to governance, knowledge, 
and adaptation for the three main discourses in both discourse maps, as well as 
Fig. 12.4 Climate change Discourses: post-deliberation. Source: Design by author
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































summarize the overall changes occurring during deliberation reported in Table 12.1.6 
These must be assessed together because, although there is a significant overall 
change, the specific nature and source of the change varies between discourses. For 
example, the increased belief in evidence supporting climate change occurs mainly 
among the less entrenched sceptics associated with Discourse A, but they are less 
associated with the overall increase in trust in scientific sources of knowledge. That 
comes from participants associated with Discourses A′ and B′—and erstwhile scep-
tics who migrated to Discourse A’ during deliberation. Discourse A accounts for 
most of the observed overall change—in terms of increased belief in climate change, 
trust in scientists, belief in capacity for a positive response, and demand for educa-
tion about climate change, increased leadership, and the role of government—by 
virtue of most participants associated with it post-deliberation. Particularly interest-
ing is the emergence of Discourse E, which Hobson and Niemeyer (2011) associate 
with the strongest potential for adaptive climate governance. It represents an 
increase in the factors that contribute to improved collective action via increased 
acceptance of the reality of climate change and personal and collective efficacy in 
undertaking action—important factors contributing to the likelihood of increased 
action (Klöckner, 2013).
Overall, the findings point to deliberation contributing to substantial discursive 
transformation of the sort that is consistent with the kind of reflexivity demanded by 
the climate change issue. Researchers in another climate change adaptation and 
deliberation study, in this case conducted in Sydney, Australia, have also observed 
overall transformative dynamics very similar to those reported above 
(Schlosberg, Collins, & Niemeyer, 2017).
 Knowledge, Reflexivity and Deliberative Systems
With my findings in relation to the ACR case study, I illustrate the relationship 
between governance settings, knowledge uptake, and the potential behavioral response 
to climate change, which in turn feeds back into the governance context. Mere expo-
sure to alternative knowledge or positions is not itself enough to induce reflection.
Worse, exposure to information in the absence of deliberation may actually be 
counterproductive if the response induces cognitive closure in the face of increasing 
dissonance via similar dynamics to those discussed earlier in respect to increasing 
issue complexity. The existence of high and in some cases increasing levels of cli-
mate scepticism owes some of its genesis to this phenomenon (Capstick et al., 2015).
A key factor influencing these dynamics is the citizens’ disposition in their interac-
tion with that knowledge. And that disposition is, in turn, influenced by the context. 
Accessing alternative arguments in a non-deliberative context—such as online 
6 I have omitted the fourth discourse for both maps for reasons of space. In both cases, the number 
of individuals associated with these discourses is very small and they do not constitute a major 
feature in the overall analysis.
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(Twitter), where the broader politics is characterized by hyper-partisanship (Bail et al., 
2018)—can actually lead to a decline in openness to information. By contrast, chang-
ing that context to a more deliberative one induces a qualitatively different interaction 
with knowledge inputs, as evidenced by the ACR climate change case study.
To be sure, deliberation does not fundamentally change citizens, who still have 
roughly the same set of capabilities as before. But it serves to activate a set of capa-
bilities—referred to earlier under the “deliberative stance” rubric—that is otherwise 
not ordinarily activated in political settings. Part of this activation involves switch-
ing modes of cognition from shallow to deeper (see Niemeyer, 2011). But other 
kinds of activation also occur, consistent with the deliberative stance. The ideals of 
openness and intersubjectivity, valorized by deliberative democrats, stand in con-
trast to social psychological phenomena, such as cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 
2013) and motivated reasoning (Taber & Lodge, 2006).
The deliberative stance as described here implies a form of scepticism of the self: 
an acceptance that views may be incomplete or in need of updating. It is as much an 
affective disposition as a cognitive one, where high levels of anxiety can inhibit the 
processing of knowledge, particularly where it involves confronting implications 
and/or high levels of complexity. I observed this in the emergence of the Alarmed 
Defeatism discourse (D) in the ACR case study, which would likely undermine any 
effort to find collective solutions to the issue—with comparable effects observed 
elsewhere (e.g., Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan, & Jaeger, 2001).
Another kind of anxiety can be observed in the form of deep climate sceptics, who 
usually hail from a demographic that feels threatened by structural changes necessary 
to meet the challenge, as well as holding certain (usually conservative) political values 
(Whitmarsh, 2011). As for the Twitter example (Bail et al., 2018) in the ACR case 
study, exposure to the climate change scenarios absent of deliberation sometimes 
entrenched existing views rather than transforming them (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2013).
There are limits to this effect. Although participation in deliberation changed 
these dynamics for many of the sceptics, those most deeply sceptical opted instead 
to exit the process altogether (Hobson & Niemeyer, 2013), demonstrating the limits 
to inducing self-scepticism and a deliberative stance for these groups. But, as I will 
discuss below, even these dynamics might be addressed to some extent if the issues 
of knowledge and environmental communication and inducing the deliberative 
stance were to be dealt with through a systemic lens.
 Systemic Deliberative Dynamics
The findings so far reinforce the idea that the dynamics of environmental knowledge 
and behavior must be viewed as part of a wider governance context 
(Burgess, Harrison, & Filius, 1998). But this is not to suggest that improving knowl-
edge uptake (or in the case of climate change, acceptance) requires exclusive focus 
at the macro level. The effects must be understood in systemic terms—neither 
macro- nor micro-level, but rather operating at both levels as part of an overall sys-
temic effect. Despite the onus on individual-level capacity in the form of the 
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deliberative stance herein, exclusive focus on micro-level, individual knowledge 
dynamics at best is only likely to yield gains incommensurable to the challenge 
(Shove, 2010) and more of the same kind of linear modeling of environmental 
behavior that fails to escape the orbit of a knowledge deficit paradigm (O’Brien, 
2012). Such an approach also reinforces the previous assertion regarding the incom-
plete nature of the impact science strategy advocated by reflexivity scholars, which 
fails to account for the processes that contribute to its uptake.
The nature of systems thinking required to address these shortcomings is 
informed by the nature of the dynamics observed above. The deliberative context of 
the ACR project impacted on the manner in which individuals interacted with the 
information provided. It reconfigured the citizens’ orientation toward the knowl-
edge system—accepting a division of labor in its production (Christiano, 2012)—
ameliorating the effects of the knowledge ignorance paradox (Ungar, 2000) as part 
of a changing discursive landscape. It also inured citizens to the forces of blandish-
ment represented by anti-reflexive political forces and strategies of “merchants of 
doubt” (Oreskes & Conway, 2010), something that researchers have observed in 
relation to a number of issues with similar knowledge dimensions (Niemeyer, 2011).
The key here is the changing discursive landscape within which individual 
capacities in the form of the deliberative stance were activated. An important con-
textual factor facilitating these changes is not just the mere fact of citizens deliberat-
ing, but the evolving language that was deployed as part of developing a shared 
understanding of the issue, which is partly captured by the discursive changes 
reported in Fig. 12.4.
These changes constitute systemic effects, even though for the ACR they are 
induced in fairly managed, micro-deliberative settings. Once the nature of these 
effects is understood, the challenge remains in terms of the mechanisms whereby 
they might be “scaled up” to a wider audience. There are possibilities, although 
much needs to be done to develop them (Niemeyer, 2014; Niemeyer & Jennstål, 
2018). Shove (2010), for example, advocates an approach to understanding human 
relationships with the environment through the lens of “practices” rather than 
behaviors, and a deepening of deliberative practices in a wider democratic context 
seems to fit well with this approach.
A democratic deepening of this sort yields potential systemic effects on the gov-
ernance system, such as avoiding the climate change governance trap (Pidgeon, 
2012)—as researchers observed in the Australian Capital Region climate change 
and governance study, it led to higher responsiveness at the individual and commu-
nity level, as well as the demand for collective action. Such changes orient the sys-
tem as a whole toward a high-order form of reflexivity (Dryzek & Pickering, 2017), 
with improved trust in knowledge as well as a higher disposition toward translating 
that knowledge into action. The activation of a deliberative stance is neither a cause 
nor an effect of this shift, but an inherent component of an improved democratic 
practice.
To the extent that such practices can be scaled up, it is just possible that a polity 
that is more deliberative not only responds to climate change and the associated 
knowledge more constructively and in ways that reflect the inner desires of its 
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citizens, but will also impact the anxious dynamics that induce citizens’ anti-reflex-
ive forces. These dynamics do not necessarily lead to increased knowledge on the 
part of citizens—although there is good evidence that this would also be the case 
(Andersen & Hansen, 2007; Grönlund, Setälä, & Herne, 2010; Luskin, Fishkin, & 
Jowell, 2002)—but they do appear to hold a good deal of promise in addressing the 
pathologies of knowledge that characterize much of the climate change debate and 
policy response in the prevailing governance context.
 Conclusion
That knowledge alone is insufficient to ensure action on complex and challenging gov-
ernance issues such as climate change is demonstrable on both normative and empiri-
cal grounds. Here, I have attempted to demonstrate the manner in which the context 
plays a role in this process from the perspective of deliberative governance, particularly 
in respect to the discursive landscape that frames the modes in which knowledge may 
be accepted, rejected, or simply ignored. This discursive context includes the changing 
climate itself, which has the power to alter the discursive landscape and, paradoxically, 
work against the operation of reflexivity in governance systems.
Deliberation works on a small scale, by activating capacities that exist in most 
citizens but are not activated in prevailing governance settings. These capacities, 
captured by the concept of the deliberative stance, include a more normatively 
appealing scepticism of the self and a willingness to judiciously consider and absorb 
new information. This does not demand complete comprehension, because a delib-
erative system is based on trust that distributes knowledge generation and synthesis.
Building capacity to capture these dynamics beyond the mini-public could 
involve reforming public engagement informed by deliberative principles in ways 
that scale up these effects. And these reforms could involve harnessing the power of 
mini-publics, to the extent that they can be articulated with the wider governance 
system (Niemeyer & Jennstål, 2018). A good deal of work remains to be done on 
such approaches and their effectiveness.
In spite of these gaps, in this chapter I have demonstrated the utility of conceptu-
alizing knowledge uptake through the lens of governance. The adoption of systems 
thinking beyond micro-level information deficit approaches or macropolitical strat-
egies is also of relevance. A discursively understood system of governance cannot 
separate the citizen from the governance context, and it is here that productive solu-
tions might be found.
 Appendix
Table 12.3 shows the statements used in the Q sort for the CCPS case study, along 
with the z-scores representing the typical level of agreement/disagreement for each 
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Chapter 13
Nurturing Adaptive Governance Through 
Environmental Monitoring: People, 
Practices, Politics in the Kruger 
to Canyons Biosphere Region, South Africa
Lisen Schultz, Simon West, and Cláudia Florêncio
How can governance become more adaptive to rapidly evolving knowledge? How 
can it address problems spanning different sectors, scales, and interests in a holistic 
manner? And how can it navigate novel challenges where no obvious response 
exists? These are core questions of the literature on adaptive governance, which 
brings together studies on natural resource management, environmental gover-
nance, and collaborative governance, in pursuit of pathways to sustainability in the 
context of rapid social-ecological change. In this chapter, we briefly introduce the 
concept of adaptive governance to a broader audience, identify two key research 
frontiers in the literature, and address them through an empirical case study of the 
Environmental Monitors (EM) program in the Kruger to Canyons Biosphere Region 
(K2C) in South Africa—exploring the people, practices, and politics of adaptive 
governance.
 What Is Adaptive Governance?
Adaptive governance refers to governance in the context of complexity and uncer-
tainty (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003). In adaptive governance, actors are linked 
across scales (local, regional, global) and sectors (state, private, civil society), in 
learning-based approaches that emphasize monitoring and experimentation, with 
the aim of responding to evolving challenges, issues, and threats 
(Schultz,  Folke,  Österblom,  & Olsson, 2015). Although the concept of adaptive 
governance has been used in several fields, including political science and health 
research (see Chaffin, Gosnell, & Cosens, 2014), in this paper we refer to adaptive 
governance as applied to sustainability issues. In the field of sustainability science, 
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adaptive governance emerged from social-ecological systems perspectives, where 
people are seen as inextricably interwoven with the natural environment 
(Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005). On the one hand, researchers have used 
adaptive governance as a descriptive concept to analyze how governance systems 
have responded (or not) to complex sustainability challenges, including wetland 
degradation (Olsson, Folke, Galaz, Hahn, & Schultz, 2007), climate change (Boyd 
& Juhola, 2014), deforestation (Boyd, 2008), and overfishing (Österblom & 
Sumaila, 2011; Valman, Österblom, & Olsson, 2015). On the other hand, they have 
utilized adaptive governance as a normative concept, to prescribe how governance 
should be structured in an anthropocene era where surprises, cascading effects, and 
tipping points will be the norm (Berkes, 2017; Duit & Galaz, 2008; Galaz, 2014). 
As we will show, the distinctions between descriptive and normative uses of adap-
tive governance are often blurred in practice.
Collaboration, learning, and bridging organizations are key features of adaptive 
governance (Karpouzoglou, Dewulf, & Clark, 2016). Collaboration draws attention 
to the formal and informal partnerships and networks that connect actors operating in 
different domains, and potentially work to enhance the institutional fit between gov-
ernance systems and the problems they seek to address (Folke, Pritchard, Berkes, 
Colding, & Svedin, 2007). Learning captures the importance of monitoring, experi-
mentation, and multiple sources of knowledge and ways of knowing, for developing 
more holistic understandings of sustainability challenges and for facilitating ongoing 
adaptation to changing contexts (Cundill,  Leitch, Schultz, Armitage,  & Peterson, 
2015). Bridging organizations have been identified as central to initiating and sus-
taining adaptive governance over time (Folke et al., 2005; Hahn, Olsson, Folke, & 
Johansson, 2006; Schultz, 2009). Bridging organizations work to connect different 
actors, facilitate dialogue, share information, resolve conflict, and build trust, lower-
ing the transaction costs of collaboration for participants. However, the characteris-
tics that enable bridging organizations to play this role—such as their flexibility and 
lack of allegiance to one particular type of authority—mean that they are often 
ephemeral organizations that suffer from a lack of consistent funds and high turnover 
of staff (Moss, Medd, Guy, & Marvin, 2009), and experience tensions and challenges 
in their attempts to be “all things to all people” (Parker & Crona, 2012, p. 263).
 Research Frontiers in Adaptive Governance Literature
Over the past 15 years, adaptive governance literature has evolved into a vibrant 
body of scholarship exploring governance in the context of rapid social-ecological 
change. More recently, researchers articulating new theoretical perspectives 
(Boyd,  Ensor,  Broto, & Juhola, 2014; Leach,  Scoones,  & Stirling, 2010; van 
Kerkhoff & Lebel, 2015) and attempting to review and synthesize the literature 
(Chaffin et al., 2014; Karpouzoglou et al., 2016) have identified a number of gaps, 
grey areas, and pressing questions for the next wave of adaptive governance scholar-
ship to address. In this chapter, we address one empirical and one theoretical 
research frontier.
L. Schultz et al.
295
An empirical challenge concerns the emergence of adaptive governance—how 
does it ‘come about’ (Chaffin,  Folke, & Hahn, 2014)? So far, researchers have 
pointed towards a range of factors, including the role of leadership (Olsson, Folke, 
& Hahn, 2004), the creation of “vertical” and “horizontal” networks (Österblom & 
Folke, 2013), and the building of trust between different actors including, for 
instance, scientists, policymakers, and citizens (Schultz et  al., 2015). Moreover, 
analysts have focused on how windows of opportunity (produced by, e.g., a policy 
change, the creation of a new organization, or a biophysical perturbation) and per-
ceptions of crisis may stimulate shifts to adaptive governance (Olsson et al., 2006). 
These factors are indicative, but raise a number of questions: What is perceived as a 
crisis, by whom? Whose interpretations “matter” and provide a sufficiently compel-
ling vision to provoke change? What kinds of knowledge are important for the 
emergence of adaptive governance, and how is this knowledge produced, collected, 
and used? And how do practices associated with the emergence of adaptive gover-
nance, such as network-building and information-sharing, fit within, and connect to 
existing practices of governance? Moreover, the existing empirical literature is 
weighted to the Global North and implies that particular kinds of financial, human, 
and technological resources are necessary for the emergence of adaptive gover-
nance (e.g., Galaz, 2014). It is therefore important to empirically explore if and how 
adaptive governance might emerge with the different kinds of resources available in 
developing countries and the Global South (Karpouzoglou et al., 2016).
A theoretical challenge is to develop accounts that are grounded in the experi-
ences and practices of the people “doing” adaptive governance in messy, real-world 
contexts (e.g., van Kerkhoff & Lebel, 2015; Wyborn, 2015). The first wave of adap-
tive governance scholars highlighted the value of individual leadership and interper-
sonal networking, and emphasized the importance of establishing “the right links, at 
the right time, around the right issues” (Westley, 2002, p. 357; Folke et al., 2005; 
Olsson et al., 2006). These studies move towards more agential accounts of adap-
tive governance, as compared to purely structural accounts whose authors focus on 
network patterns and information flows (for a combination of these approaches, see 
Berdej & Armitage, 2016). But they provide rather functional explanations of adap-
tive governance, where individual action is motivated by the pursuit of self- evidently 
“better-functioning” governance systems, and potentially idealistic accounts of 
individual “heroes” (Leach et al., 2010; Stirling, 2016). These functional explana-
tions do not enable us to explain how workable solutions are arrived at by actors 
who—like all of us—bring many different meanings, preferences, and interests to 
their activities, and whose everyday work is guided by multiple responsibilities, 
rationales, and imperatives. For instance, what constitutes the “right” issue, link, or 
time is a fundamentally interpretive question that depends on the meanings ascribed 
to particular situations (and desirable means and ends) by those involved. Therefore, 
if the literature is to account for how adaptive governance is enacted—and how it 
helps practitioners to navigate complexity (if indeed it does)—it will be necessary 
to develop theoretical understandings that can account for the everyday experiential 
contexts in which adaptive governance takes shape. In these situations, the ‘best’ 
way forwards is always to some extent unclear and undecided, and all kinds of 
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decisions need to be made about, for example, the kinds of knowledge to produce, 
the types of interpersonal and inter-organizational connections to establish, and the 
sorts of information to share (e.g., West, Schultz, & Bekessy, 2016). In developing 
such approaches, researchers will explore how adaptive governance emerges 
through the daily decisions and practices of imperfect people, struggling to get work 
done in confusing and demanding situations.
 Towards a People, Practices, and Politics Perspective 
on Adaptive Governance
In this paper, we address these research frontiers by sketching out an analytical lens 
centered around people, practices, and politics (3P) and applying it to an empirical 
case of the potential emergence of adaptive governance. We intend people, practices 
and politics to be useful primarily as broad “sensitizing concepts,” providing a gen-
eral sense of guidance and “directions along which to look” rather than strictly 
applicable definitive concepts (Blumer, 1954, p. 7). Indeed, the broad nature of the 
3P scheme means that it will probably be of most use in the interdisciplinary context 
of sustainability science rather than, perhaps, governance studies or political sci-
ence, where these concepts may be taken for granted. In developing our 3P lens, we 
draw on theoretical approaches in deliberative and decentered governance. 
Deliberative governance emerged as a way of capturing the shift from ideas of gov-
ernment to governance in the 1990s and the accompanying focus on deliberation 
through distributed decision-making, citizen participation, informal social net-
works, and cross-scale connections between agencies and organizations (Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003). Researchers have recently articulated decentered governance as a 
more critical perspective on these shifts, noting that ideas of ‘governance’ have 
become a new orthodoxy and emphasizing more radical democratic possibilities 
(Griggs, Norval, & Wagenaar, 2014). What both share, and what distinguishes theo-
ries of deliberative and decentered governance from adaptive governance (apart 
from the focus in AG on complex social-ecological change), is their rootedness in 
interpretive theories that situate accounts of governance in terms of the production 
of meaning through, for example, experience, discourse, and practice.
By prioritizing “people” in our 3P scheme, we wish to highlight that the rather 
abstract-seeming qualities of adaptive governance—including scientific monitor-
ing, information-sharing, and network building—are enacted by people, with their 
particular (and unique) capabilities, experiences, emotions, hopes, and desires. In 
more theoretical terms, here we aim to draw out the agential nature of governance 
work, which entails the creative, contingent construction of meaning by those 
involved (Griggs et al., 2014; Westley et al., 2013). With the term practice we seek 
to emphasize the active nature of “doing” adaptive governance and draw attention 
to the way that adaptive governance emerges through acting on the situation at hand, 
which involves physical engagement with, for instance, tools and artefacts, material 
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environments, and colleagues. More theoretically, we seek to make clear that people 
involved in adaptive governance are not free to simply construct their own mean-
ings, but that these meanings are enabled and constrained within collective fields of 
activity including, for example, organizational routines, policies and imperatives, 
social habits, and technologies (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). Finally, through the 
emphasis on politics we aim to nurture greater sensitivity to the plurality of beliefs, 
allegiances and values that, as Griggs et al., (2014, p. 9) put it, actors bring to “the 
spaces in which collective problem solving takes place.” This means that enact-
ments of adaptive governance are always political, in the sense that they involve the 
articulation of, and deliberation between, different interests, identities, intentions, 
and visions. This first attempt at articulating a 3P lens inevitably requires more work 
and we invite others to build on and critique this approach. In the rest of this chapter, 
we develop this broad lens though a case study of the K2C Biosphere Region in 
South Africa.
 Methods
Previous researchers have suggested that UNESCO Biosphere Reserves (BRs) are 
particularly well placed to play a bridging role within adaptive governance (Hahn 
et al., 2006; Schultz et al., 2018). We identified the K2C as a particularly interesting 
site in this regard because participants are actively working with concepts of adap-
tive management and governance as means to address pressing sustainability issues 
in a highly contested social-ecological context. Within the K2C we focused particu-
larly on the implementation of the Environmental Monitors (EM) program. The EM 
program is a national governmental initiative that seeks to enhance governance 
responses to rhino poaching and also address high unemployment rates around 
Protected Areas (PAs). To enact the EM program the K2C has employed local peo-
ple within Host Institutions (HIs) that are part of the K2C partnership network—
including local government, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), research 
organizations, and private game reserves—to conduct environmental monitoring, 
protected area patrols, environmental education, and generally help HIs to fulfill 
their organizational mandates. To develop our 3P lens, we adopted a qualitative, 
broadly interpretive research approach. Interpretive approaches are considered par-
ticularly appropriate for exploring the experiences of people in enacting policies, 
projects, and programs, and how these experiences shape their practices.
In total, we conducted 40 semi-structured qualitative interviews. Twenty-four of 
these were conducted in 2013 (13 with EM participants and 11 with participants in 
the broader K2C stakeholder network), and 16 were conducted as follow-up inter-
views in 2015/2016. This longitudinal approach enabled us to capture experiences 
from the first 3-year phase of the project. We selected respondents to ensure cover-
age of the range of HIs participating, as well as the range of roles within the project, 
including HI managers, data collators, and the EMs themselves, and transcribed the 
interviews verbatim. Although we did not develop a formal thematic analysis for 
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this chapter, we adopted a broadly thematic approach to derive insights from our 
interview data, employing primarily deductive strategies (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Firstly, we focused on the aspects of the EM project most relevant to features of 
adaptive governance—knowledge generation, information-sharing, networking and 
collaborating, and responding to change. Secondly, we employed our 3P lens to 
enhance our sensitivity to particular aspects of our interviewees’ accounts of their 
work relating to these features, including experiences, emotions, and meanings 
(people); routines, technologies and patterns of activity (practices); and interests, 
visions and values (politics). To reflect the holistic nature of interviewee experi-
ences, we have chosen to interweave people, practices, and politics throughout our 
presentation of the case material, rather than address them separately for each adap-
tive governance feature. The 3P lens therefore flows through our analysis, rather 
than being rigidly applied in each section.
 The Case: Towards Adaptive Governance in the K2C Region
The Central Lowveld and Escarpment region lies in South Africa’s northeastern 
corner, stretching from the savannah ecosystems of the iconic Kruger National Park 
(KNP) in the East to the afro-montane forest of the Blyde River Canyon and 
Drakensberg Escarpment in the West. The landscape is strikingly demarcated along 
biophysical, jurisdictional, socio-economic, and ethnic lines. The KNP and the 
many private nature reserves that border it form a large network of PAs—initially 
created by white Afrikaans and British settlers in the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies by forcibly evicting black African communities—that cater to a wealthy 
national and international tourist market (Carruthers, 1995). During the apartheid 
era (1948–1994), black communities of various tribal and geographic origins were 
forced into “homelands” bordering the PA network, which effectively functioned as 
ghettoes and suffered from chronic state neglect, lack of economic opportunity, and 
high levels of poverty (Pollard, Shackleton, & Carruthers, 2003). The homelands 
were abolished with the advent of democracy in 1994, but their legacy remains 
imprinted on the landscape. The population in the former homeland areas in the 
region is circa 1.5 million and rising, with a density sometimes exceeding 300 peo-
ple per km2 (Pollard et al., 2003; Pool-Stanvliet, 2013) and a landscape consisting 
of settlements (including the towns of Bushbuckridge and Acornhoek) set amongst 
communal rangelands (Coetzer, Erasmus, Witkowski, & Reyers, 2013). The broader 
region also contains wealthier settlements, such as Hoedspruit, that cater to the 
PA-related tourist industry, as well as commercial agriculture, mining, and—
towards the Drakensberg escarpment—areas of plantation forestry (Coetzer 
et al., 2013).
The democratic transition in the early 1990s prompted a profound shift in the 
governance of the region. Single-party rule and the homelands system made way for 
a new system of provinces and municipalities, and dominant political rhetoric 
shifted towards reconciliation, equity, and broad-based economic empowerment 
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(Ramutsindela & Simon, 1999). Reflecting international shifts in environmental 
policy, the natural resources sector adopted a suite of policies and legislation empha-
sizing integrated catchment and ecosystem-level management, cooperative gover-
nance, and equitable distribution of resources (Colvin et  al., 2008). At the same 
time, the KNP began to recognize the importance of the wider landscape to the 
integrity and sustainability of park ecosystems, and shifted from an “inward- 
looking, isolationist” management approach to a complexity-oriented, social- 
ecological perspective emphasizing learning and collaboration between the broad 
range of stakeholders in the region (Pollard,  du Toit, & Biggs, 2011; 
Venter, Naiman, Biggs, & Pienaar, 2008). In practical terms, this shift in philosophy 
has led to the dropping of fences between the KNP and the neighboring private 
nature reserves, and to the creation of a number of social projects that seek to engage 
the former homelands communities.
In this context, various conservation and development actors began to support 
the idea of a Biosphere Reserve (BR) in the region as a means for, as one respondent 
put it, “different communities to reach out over borders,” and ensure a future for 
biodiversity conservation in the region while also making sure that conservation 
contributed to equitable and sustainable socio-economic development. BRs are 
intended to function as learning sites for sustainable development, with three types 
of zoning that correspond with three thematic functions: core zones that emphasize 
nature conservation, buffer zones of limited human use that support scientific 
research, monitoring and education, and transition areas with larger human popula-
tions that foster sustainable development (Fig. 13.1; UNESCO, 1996). Designated 
in 2001, the K2C Biosphere Region—named region to avoid the guns and guards 
connotation of reserves—bridges the provinces of Limpopo and Mpumulanga, and 
spans two district municipalities and four local municipalities (covering approx. 
2.6 million hectares in total). In the K2C, the BR zones were not applied in the styl-
ized sense of model BRs but according to the existing landscape mosaic (Coetzer 
et al., 2013). The KNP and the Blyde River Nature Reserves form the core areas, the 
private nature reserves the buffer zones, and the areas of rangeland, settlements, 
agriculture, and mining the transition zones (Fig. 13.2).
Fig. 13.1 A stylized representation of the Biosphere Reserve zonation. Source: Design by authors
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Although the K2C represents geographic space, it is also a non-profit company 
tasked with pursuing actions to fulfill the BR mandate. As an organization, the 
K2C’s attempts to nurture partnerships and collaboration, and implement and sup-
port projects, with a view to reconciling biodiversity conservation and sustainable 
development. In particular, the K2C seeks to address a range of interlinked sustain-
ability challenges in the region, including lack of economic opportunity, severe 
inequality, poaching (especially of rhino), high levels of poverty and HIV/AIDS, 
droughts, habitat degradation (Coetzee, Biggs, & Malan, 2012), and an influx of 
refugees (Coetzer, Erasmus, Witkowski, & Bachoo, 2010). However, as with the BR 
network more generally, the K2C has—until recently—received relatively little leg-
islative or financial backing. Interviewees recalled that in the first decade of opera-
tion, the K2C largely consisted of several committed individuals attempting to 
attract funding and generate activity to fulfill the designation. In the late 2000s, 
however, the so-called ‘Anyway Group’, a “long-standing informal stakeholder net-
work” of conservation, government, and community actors (many of whom were 
influential in the original biosphere designation process), re-mobilized under the 
auspices of the K2C (Coetzee et al., 2012, p. 4). Their intention was to simultane-
ously ensure the alignment of a number of incoming sustainability initiatives to the 
region—including USAID’s RESILIM program, and the national government’s EM 
program and Wildlife Economy concept—while also attracting further international 
funding through the Global Environment Facility (GEC). In the words of one 
Fig. 13.2 The BR zonation as applied to the K2C. Copyright 2018 by Wehncke van der Merwe. 
Reprinted with permission
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interviewee, the K2C label was used to “[form] networks in order to obtain collec-
tive outcomes.” This led in turn to the reinvigoration and formalization of the K2C 
stakeholder network involving many government, NGO, business and community 
actors in the region, the creation of forums convening actors under the themes of 
Environmental Education, Natural Resource Management Projects, Lowveld 
Protected Areas, and GEF Small Grants (GEF, Global Environment Facility), and 
the inauguration of the K2C Network Coordination Unit intended to align all of 
these initiatives. This institutional work has been heavily informed by complex 
social-ecological systems thinking, including strategic adaptive management and 
adaptive governance (Coetzee et al., 2012).
This brief overview, although inevitably simplified and incomplete, suggests that 
the K2C is becoming an increasingly important bridging actor and governance hub 
in the region. Although we do not aim to evaluate in this chapter whether adaptive 
governance is or is not happening in the K2C region, the interplay between formal 
and informal institutions—see, for instance, Volume 13 on institutions in this series 
(Glückler, Suddaby, & Lenz, 2018), emphasis on learning and collaboration, and 
response to complex social-ecological issues—certainly reflect key adaptive gover-
nance principles and create fertile ground for more adaptive forms of governance to 
emerge. In the remainder of this chapter, we “zoom in” to explore how one aspect 
of the K2C nexus of activity, the EM program, may be supporting key aspects of 
adaptive governance in the region, and highlight the challenges faced by partici-
pants in their everyday work enacting the program.
 Results: Nurturing Adaptive Governance Through 
the Environmental Monitors Program
The South African Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) designed the EM 
program in response to two crises: an explosion in rhino poaching from 2010 
onwards, and a widespread lack of employment opportunities in areas adjacent to 
PAs (DEA, 2014). The program, initiated in 2012, is part of the Expanded Public 
Works Programme’s (EPWP) suite of projects, including Working for Water, 
Working for Wetlands, and Working for the Coast, where the aim is to alleviate 
poverty by providing temporary work and skills development for the unemployed. 
The specific aim of the EM program is to enhance the integrity of PAs by combat-
ting poaching through monitoring programs, patrols, and environmental education 
(DEA, 2014). The Biodiversity Social Projects (BSP) wing of South African 
National Parks (SANParks) was designated as the implementing authority, and the 
initial intention was to roll out the program within national parks and private nature 
reserves. The Kruger region inevitably became a primary focus, with the KNP being 
the most concentrated site of rhino poaching in the world (Lunstrum, 2014), and the 
K2C—despite, as a sustainability organization outside the PA network, constituting 
something of an anomaly in the program as a whole—was consequently selected to 
participate. The implementation manager at the time recalled that because of
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… the strategic placement of the K2C, and the upcoming GEF funding, we zoomed in on 
the K2C itself and then decided we wanted to—because it is such a huge knowledge hub, 
and there is so much pressure on this whole Bushbuckridge area as well, we decided we 
[would] establish a program there.
In turn, the coordinator of the K2C saw the EM program as a way to strengthen the 
recently re-mobilized K2C stakeholder network, and to fulfill the K2C goal of rec-
onciling biodiversity conservation with socio-economic development:
[T]he catalyst for the Anyway Group*, or the groupings of the K2C Biosphere network, was 
about preparing for GEF [funding], but it is also a method of linking to one another and 
[creating] the synergy where it is more effective than the sum of its parts…. The EM pro-
gram was the practical way for us to do both these things: the network and to empower people.
Indeed, in its enactment through partnerships and networks of diverse actors, the 
EM program at the K2C has taken on much more significance—for adaptive gover-
nance in particular—than EPWP-type projects in general and has become a nation-
ally recognized “flagship” site in the EM program as a whole.
The K2C EM program is managed by the K2C coordinator from the K2C offices 
in Hoedspruit, supported by four “data collators” responsible for training and sup-
porting EMs, collating the data produced and conducting administrational tasks. 
The EMs themselves are placed within Host Institutes (HIs) participating in the 
K2C stakeholder network, including public and private nature reserves, NGOs, 
community-based organizations, and research organizations. The Maeba Group, a 
leadership group of 12 EMs and the data collectors, functions as a link between the 
data collators and the wider EM group, and devises a monthly learning framework 
for all EMs (consisting of Health and Safety, Vocational, and Life Skill themes). At 
the end of the program’s first stage in March 2016, the K2C was employing 265 
people, which constitutes 19.5% of those employed in the EM program across 
South Africa (SANParks BSP & K2C, 2016). The program has subsequently been 
extended for another 3  years. The K2C EM program has exceeded participant 
expectations of what can be achieved through public works style programs, 
despite—or perhaps because of—the fact that its parameters were not strictly delin-
eated beforehand. As a SANParks-BSP manager notes,
I think that probably the biggest challenge was when we started [in 2012] there wasn’t 
really any clear direction from [the DEA] as to what they wanted to do with the program. 
For example, the concept document around the program was only developed in 2014. And 
that was a year later, so that was a struggle to clearly outline how the program should be 
implemented.
Indeed, the precise form that the EM program has taken at the K2C—and its contri-
bution to adaptive governance in the region—has emerged largely through day-to- 
day negotiation between the actors involved. In the following sections, we employ 
our 3P lens to explore how the challenges of enacting the EM program at the K2C 
can shed light on key aspects of adaptive governance: generating knowledge, shar-
ing information, networking and collaborating, and responding to change (see 
Table 13.1).


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13 Nurturing Adaptive Governance Through Environmental Monitoring: People…
304
 Generating Knowledge
In the early days of setting up the EM program, managers from the HIs met several 
times to sketch out its parameters. A key concern was what the EMs would be 
required to do—particularly in terms of data collection. The more scientifically- 
oriented HIs suggested that there should be a core set of indicators that all EMs 
should monitor, whereas others—particularly community-based organizations—
argued for more flexibility. A scientific HI representative remembers, “there were 
some that felt that they must contribute to a broader program, and others that said, 
‘no we are employing them and we can use them for what we like.’” In the end, 
flexibility won out. The DEA assesses SANParks’ implementation of the program 
primarily on person-days worked, so SANParks did not have a strong incentive to 
ensure common data collection requirements in the program. This left it up to the 
scientific HIs to advocate for and nurture practices of data standardization in the 
program, and they have not done so systematically given their limited human and 
financial resources. Currently, some EMs do not collect data at all, but carry out 
various tasks related to the mandate of the HI such as environmental and health 
education and patrols (this flexibility is considered a strength of the EM program by 
the community-based organizations). Those that collect data do so under five 
themes: PAs; rangelands; fresh water (Fig. 13.3); health; and socio-economic trends 
in rural communities. There are no standardized indicators or variables within or 
across the entirety of these five themes. Rather, the EMs collect data according to 
the interests and needs of their HIs—for instance, the locations of snares and holes 
Fig. 13.3 Monitoring 
rainfall. Source: 
Photography by Cláudia 
Florêncio
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in the fences of game reserves—and on emerging issues or perceived potential 
threats in the region (e.g. sand mining, invasive alien species, family planning and 
firewood collection). Nevertheless, pockets of collaboration in data collection have 
emerged informally. For instance, one research-based HI is collaborating with sev-
eral game reserves to synchronize variables monitored. One researcher noted that 
such collaboration was—perhaps counter-intuitively—easier with non-research- 
based organizations:
… the most collaborative ones have been the least scientific ones! The guys running nature 
reserves, they are quite open to us coming with a predefined list of [variables and] data col-
lection methods. But the [other research organizations] have their own research ideas and 
so they are not so open to some other researcher coming in.
Ensuring the standards of the data collected has also been a key concern for the 
research-based HIs. As the EM program is primarily a poverty relief program, 
ensuring data standards is directly connected with the skills development compo-
nent. The hired EMs have had relatively little formal education (they are not trained 
scientists) and may not necessarily have been particularly interested in environmen-
tal data collection prior to employment in the program. Training is therefore essen-
tial. This has been relatively extensive, with training conducted by the HIs and by 
partners in the network—for instance in the identification of species (Fig. 13.4) and 
the use of new monitoring technology such as CyberTracker software. Nevertheless, 
the EM program does not expressly provide funding for training and equipment. 
Although in theory money for training could be included in the budget, this would 
mean reducing funding to actually employ EMs (and as a poverty relief program, 
Fig. 13.4 Learning to identify species at a scientific HI. Source: Photography by Cláudia Florêncio
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employment is inevitably the priority). This means that training is unevenly distrib-
uted among the HIs. As one scientific HI participant noted, “I think that’s where the 
whole idea has slacked a little bit—there’s some strong host institutions and then 
there’s some slack ones, and it’s not necessarily the institution’s fault, but it’s more 
the resources.” The use of CyberTracker technology is accordingly limited, with 
clipboards also used (partly due to skepticism of the technology by some HIs), and 
there is no funding available to employ a data manager to train EMs and “clean” the 
data collected.
Almost all HIs expressed regret that they could not spend more time training and 
supervising their EMs during their long hours in the field. The lack of supervision 
and low pay of some of the EMs has posed challenges of motivation and discipline, 
with HIs reporting that the boredom some EMs experience sometimes prompts 
them to “spend a lot of time on Facebook.” For several of the data collators, this is 
a problem because it “demotivates other EMs” who are working hard. Nevertheless, 
despite these challenges, a significant amount of data has been collected, and many 
HIs expressed astonishment at the EMs’ commitment and willingness to learn, and 
mastery of scientific data collection in a relatively short time span. Overall then, 
data collection is not the only objective of the program, which also includes patrols, 
environmental and health education, and generally helping the HIs to fulfill their 
mandates—under the overarching goals of job creation and skills development. 
Therefore, the type and quality of the data produced is affected by the other impera-
tives operating in the program, and the practical trade-offs imposed by time and 
resources. Although these are familiar issues for practitioners working in such pro-
grams, these issues have yet to be worked into the adaptive governance literature, 
and used to develop theoretical and practical understanding of what it takes to nur-
ture adaptive governance and what it might achieve.
 Information-Sharing
The intricacies of sharing information have been a recurring theme in the EM pro-
gram. As one participant notes,
The biggest challenge is, we have got all this data, we need to [collate] all this data, we need 
to utilize this data, and it has to be distributed. So we have had it on the agenda for quite 
some time, [and] we actually need to find a proper way forward.
Throughout the lifespan of the project so far, scientific participants in particular 
have raised the idea of constructing a common database to share data and informa-
tion between participating HIs (and amongst the K2C stakeholder network more 
broadly) with the aim of coordinating activities and making data available for 
broader use and analysis. However, this has taken several years to materialize, with 
work starting on the database in 2017. In the meantime, data sharing has been ad 
hoc: “No formal sharing is happening. It is more spontaneous, like ‘by the way, do 
you have this?’ And then the person shares it or not.” Participants offered different 
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and sometimes contradictory explanations for the challenges in constructing a data-
base, which speak to broader tensions about the utility of knowledge for governance 
and the practicalities and politics of “real-world” adaptive governance.
Participating HIs have been reluctant to, in the words of one participant, “just 
start handing the data out,” for various reasons. Scientific institutions have been 
wary of relinquishing intellectual property rights: “many of them are like, ‘you are 
going to collect this data and then you will go and publish it and we will get noth-
ing.’” Meanwhile, representatives of private game reserves are wary of data on, for 
example, rhino movements falling into the hands of poachers, or worried that data 
will be used to critically scrutinize their land management practices. Moreover, the 
sharing of information by participating health institutions is regulated by legal 
frameworks safeguarding patient confidentiality. There are also a number of practi-
cal issues in constructing a database. There are very different kinds of data being 
collected by the different HIs, on different topics and variables, with different pro-
tocols, and of varying quality. There would therefore be a significant amount of 
work needed to prepare and “clean” data, as well as providing detailed information 
on the methods and assumptions used to collect each type of data:
…because just columns of numbers are pretty useless … if people don’t understand what 
those variables mean, how they were collected, what the limitations of the data are … If 
people don’t have a deep understanding of the actual data, the quality of the data, [then] the 
data can be used in ways that are inappropriate.
There is no money provided within the EM program to employ a trained consultant, 
or train the data collators or EMs to conduct these technical and time-intensive tasks.
These complex considerations have led to a range of perspectives on the issue. 
For some, a database is unnecessary, and peripheral to the overall value of the EM 
program. As one participant argues, “you just can’t really collect it in one interface. 
Maybe for me it’s about respect you know. So if somebody wants these data that you 
are collecting now, then they need to go to you.”
Some participants add that the degree of collaboration renders the database 
pointless: “… we know where [the data] is, and we can ask for it [if we need it].” 
Indeed, there has been informal sharing throughout the first program cycle, and as 
another participant describes, “99.99% of the time they are willing to share, no 
problem. Because you are friends with them, and you know each other profession-
ally from the area.” Nevertheless, for others, the idea of a shared database of some 
kind is an important criterion for the program’s worth and success—to ensure that 
partners coordinate actions, avoid duplication of work, and maximize the use and 
value of the data collected. Indeed, one actor’s description of current practice serves 
as an illustration of why some participants continue to advocate for the database:
So all of that data is basically sitting on my computer at the moment, it’s not on a common 
server. I think I emailed some of the data, just the spreadsheets to K2C, for the data colla-
tors, but I don’t know what they have done with it.
Through the initiative of one HI that has sourced additional external funding, work 
started in 2017 on a “meta-database” with a provisional understanding that it will 
identify what kind of data is being collected and stored by whom, rather than 
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providing immediate access to the data itself. Whatever the shape and form of the 
database that eventually emerges, it will be conditioned by all of these consider-
ations, and likely coexist with all sorts of informal and issue-driven data sharing. All 
this is to show that the precise forms of AG that emerge in particular places arise 
through the intricate, often messy negotiation of people, practices, and politics.
 Networking and Collaborating
Although formal mechanisms of information sharing have been slow to materialize, 
the EM program has significantly strengthened networking and collaboration among 
the K2C stakeholder network in a more general sense. The multi-sectoral partner-
ship approach to program implementation adopted by the K2C was novel for 
national SANParks BSP staff with long experience of working with EPWP pro-
grams: “[W]hen we started the Working for Water program, networking was impor-
tant, but it was different government departments that needed to be involved. It 
wasn’t like a partnership program which the K2C is very effective in.” This has 
resulted in new connections established between actors across scales, with one 
national actor noting that, “I would never have spoken to Balule or Timbavati [pri-
vate nature reserves] before, but now I do and because of the EM program we cre-
ated a platform.” The program has also stimulated new connections across domains. 
In particular, participants from private game reserves reported that they had estab-
lished new lines of communication and trust building with communities “beyond 
the fences” by employing local people as EMs, and by collaborating with 
community- based HIs in the program. Many of these connections have been estab-
lished through everyday work on the program, and through informal and chance 
meetings—although the data collators and the Maeba group hold monthly meetings 
to share experiences, there are no formal meetings between HI representatives. This 
lack of formal meetings among HI representatives was experienced by participants 
both as a positive and a negative. Although many HIs expressed a desire to initiate 
such meetings—particularly in order to, for example, share experiences and coordi-
nate and standardize the data collection (see above)—they were also aware that they 
were already overstretched with attending meetings across a huge geographic 
region. As one interviewee observed, meetings are “such a ball.” Indeed, K2C staff 
have explicitly tried to avoid creating meeting fatigue, and participants often take 
the chance to discuss EM-related issues at other K2C events. There is also an annual 
“EM day” that functions as a celebration and an update on work within the EM 
program, and a “K2C Partners’ Day” that situates the EM program within the K2C 
network more broadly (Fig. 13.5).
Many participants perceived the distinct role and broad mandate of the K2C as 
essential to fostering engagement and collaboration in the EM program. Indeed, the 
K2C’s “intermediary” status, linking the KNP with the broader landscape, enabled 
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K2C representatives to capture the funding for the EM program in the first place, 
and through its broad mandate the K2C has the ability to connect very different 
organizations. As one participant notes,
… the K2C is like a net thrown on the entire area … they go from helping local communi-
ties with the tribal authorities, to the traditional healers, to the schools, to waste manage-
ment, to the game reserves, to education, health. I mean it is a very broad spectrum and that 
is what makes it so good.
Although the K2C has had this mandate for some time, the EM program has pro-
vided a tangible, concrete initiative to incentivize collaboration. In this sense, the 
K2C coordinator notes that the program has “galvanized networking because there 
was a central pivot point … with this common program.” In particular, by taking 
responsibility for the administration of the program, the K2C substantially lowered 
transaction costs for organizations to participate. As one HI participant explains,
… the time sheets and all of that, you know? The fact is that if I had to do that, I wouldn’t 
have taken on EMs because I don’t have an administrator. It [would be] taking time away 
from writing papers, doing funding grants, writing reports. If I had to do all of that admin, 
there is no way I could have taken on the EMs.
Nevertheless, participants also situated their involvement in the program within a 
broader political context. Some interviewees raised the concern that the strong net-
works in the K2C region meant that it was increasingly seen as an attractive place 
for the national government to roll out projects, without necessarily undergoing the 
Fig. 13.5 Participants at the K2C Partners’ Day. Source: Photography by Cláudia Florêncio
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degree of public scrutiny that would happen elsewhere. Others noted that the emer-
gence of collaboration in the region was occurring in the context of weak govern-
ment presence and capacity (that they were “stepping in” to fulfill roles that could 
potentially be done by government).
 Responding to Change
 Revision of management actions and strategies
The use of monitoring data to revise and inform management actions and gover-
nance strategies is a key element of adaptive governance. In some cases of adaptive 
governance, members of a central node collect and analyze data, and then use the 
data to inform formal decision-making at a broad regional or (inter-)national scale 
(e.g., Österblom & Folke, 2013). This is not, at the moment, the case within the 
South African EM program as a whole. The national manager explains that
… from an implementation perspective [SANParks is] more interested just in, ‘are people 
being employed?’ ‘what are they doing?’ and ‘what is the ratio?’ because these are our 
objectives and deliverables linked to the program. The K2C would be more interested in 
the data.
Although the K2C functions as a central node in the K2C EM program, it does not 
yet have the capacity to process and analyze the data collected across all participat-
ing HIs (see discussion above), or the mandate to use the data to inform or revise 
formal decision-making in local, regional, or national government. Rather, the data 
use in the K2C network has so far been uneven and distributed, with the HIs using 
the data in different ways. In the private nature reserves, the EMs have collected 
data on snares and holes in the game fences, which have been used to inform anti- 
poaching strategies, as well as participating in regular monitoring activities such as 
game counts and vegetation surveys, which inform ongoing management activities. 
EMs have also collected data on invasive species in the K2C region, which has been 
used to inform the Working for Water “bush clearing” teams:
So if it is for the bush clearing team, as soon as we collect the data, we give it to the people 
in charge of the bush clearing and then they will have to see what action needs to be planned, 
if the place is big we will need a month to go there, this is the type of herbicides that we will 
need, we need how many workers, how many days…
In addition, data collected by EMs on soil erosion spurred the creation of a 
Rehabilitation Project to address the problem. The data collected on socio-economic 
trends in local communities have not yet been used to inform management activities 
but have provided a better understanding of potential emerging issues: “[F]rom 
what we collected we learned a lot from it and now we have an understanding of 
what is going on in our villages, what are the social problems or the economic prob-
lems in our villages.” Nevertheless, the lack of capacity, time, and resources to 
analyze much of the data collected has proved a persistent challenge. As one 
L. Schultz et al.
311
research-based HI explains, some data collected by EMs has been used in Masters 
projects, but “to be honest, some of the other data hasn’t necessarily been kind of 
used or analyzed.”
 Fulfilling organizational mandates
The EM program has provided HIs with the resources to better achieve their indi-
vidual mandates. For instance, participating environmental education organizations 
noted that the manpower provided by the EMs enabled them to reach a much bigger 
audience:
… nine schools is huge learning that would not have taken place without [the EM program]. 
I would still be going to one school once every two weeks… [Our] impact would be a 
couple of hundred kids rather than 1200 kids.
This increased organizational capacity has enabled HIs to better respond to emerg-
ing threats—not only through the EMs themselves, but also by allocating EMs to 
tasks that will “free up” other staff. For instance, the recent explosion in rhino 
poaching prompted many national parks and game reserves to redirect resources 
from traditional conservation management activities to anti-poaching. Although the 
EMs do conduct some anti-poaching activities (and indeed there is an armed EM 
unit), they have also provided the KNP and some private nature reserves with the 
manpower to continue to perform their more traditional land management activities. 
Likewise, research organizations have used EMs to collect data and support research 
into emerging environmental threats: “We are using the EMs to collect data for 
certain research questions that otherwise we wouldn’t have the resources to collect 
the data ourselves.” Perhaps most strikingly, the EM program has enabled the K2C 
itself to fulfill its own mandate of pursuing activities that reconcile conservation and 
development through partnerships. Many interviewees reported learning about the 
K2C—and appreciating its value—for the first time through the EM program: 
“[F]or me, the environmental monitors program has actually opened my eyes [to the 
fact that there] is a biosphere reserve, basically.” Indeed, interviewees felt that the 
EM program had enhanced the K2C’s reputation as a trustworthy “broker” linking 
different actors in the region.
 Human development and capacity building
Participants reported that the EM program has been particularly successful in devel-
oping the skills and enhancing the capacity of those participating (Fig. 13.6). Many 
EMs reported having developed self-confidence through their work on the program:
… the confidence to stand in front of people and talk, I think that is the biggest impact. 
Because before I didn’t have that confidence to stand, I was shaking, nervous. But now 
yeah, I think I have more self-confidence to stand in front of people and facilitate talks.
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Skills development is a stated aim of all EPWP projects, but they have also been 
frequently criticized for their limited success in this regard (e.g., Mccord, 2005). 
Indeed, it is arguably the enactment of the EM program through the networks (and 
with the coordination of) the K2C that has strengthened the skills development and 
training component in this case. This has occurred through, for example, mobilizing 
the network to provide training to EMs, exchange visits to other EM sites, and ini-
tiatives like the Maeba Group, where particular committed EMs gather to pursue 
self-defined learning goals:
… the people that were actually selected to be Maebas because of their potential, their 
willingness, and their commitment to the program. So they were chosen to be Maebas to 
supervise and support the EMs and train them and build capacity among the EMs.
Nevertheless, many respondents expressed concern that the EM program did not 
offer permanent positions, or sufficient opportunities for job progression within the 
program—both wider problems characteristic of EPWP programs in general 
(McConnachie,  Cowling, Shackleton, & Knight, 2013). However, the training, 
skills, and experience acquired had enabled some EMs to find better job opportuni-
ties outside the program. The K2C EM program has also built capacity among HIs, 
especially the community-based organizations with little previous experience of 
participating in government-run programs:
… out here in the rural areas previously if you needed someone to work, you drove past, 
you picked them up and off you went. This project has made the Host Institutions realize 
that you have to, regardless of the status of the job and the salary, you need to treat that 
person as an employee that you would treat like any other employee.
Although human development and capacity-building are not necessarily classic 
aspects of adaptive governance as referred to in the literature so far, they appear 
Fig. 13.6 Collecting data on cattle health in the rangelands. Source: Photography by Cláudia 
Florêncio
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absolutely essential for scientific forms of adaptive governance to emerge at a grass-
roots level in the context of a developing country. The data gathered may not neces-
sarily always be of the highest scientific quality, but this may not be the main point 
of the exercise. Rather, the process of gathering the data is immensely valuable in 
itself, as participants learn to navigate the people, practices, and politics that the 
pursuit of sustainability entails.
 Concluding Discussion
Early articulations of adaptive governance emerged through researchers’ attempts 
to describe what they were observing in the evolving management and governance 
of complex sustainability issues. Nowadays, adaptive governance, and related ideas 
of complex social-ecological systems, have entered into the conceptual vocabulary 
of governance practitioners and are being actively used in attempts to mold and 
shape governance practices. In this paper, we have presented an empirical case 
study of the K2C Biosphere Region, where ideas of strategic adaptive management 
and adaptive and multi-level governance are being actively used to shape gover-
nance and program implementation. In an attempt to ground our analysis in the 
everyday experiential environment of practitioners, we have developed an analytical 
lens based around 3Ps—people, practices, and politics—and used it to explore the 
ongoing implementation of the EM program. This has enabled us to portray adap-
tive governance as it is “in the making” (rather than a retrospective account of a 
particular outcome), thus highlighting the everyday decisions and choices that bring 
life to abstract ideas such as “networking” and “information-sharing.” This shift in 
perspective enables us to provide a number of useful contributions to the adaptive 
governance literature.
First, our study supports previous findings of the importance of bridging organi-
zations and their networks to initiate and sustain adaptive governance over time, 
while adding details from real-world accounts. Importantly, the experience of the 
K2C indicates the need for bridging organizations to provide a specific reason or 
incentive for other actors to engage with them (thus enabling them to “bridge”). In 
the K2C’s case, the implementation manager at the BSP wing of SANParks and the 
K2C coordinator identified a window of opportunity to situate EMs within the K2C 
stakeholder network. The flexible, partnership-based approach taken by the K2C in 
enacting an initially rather traditional “public works” style program constitutes an 
innovative approach to nurturing more adaptive and collaborative governance in the 
region. Through the EM program, the K2C has initiated connections and facilitated 
discussions between many actors who had not previously worked together, and has 
nurtured these connections by, for example, attempting to avoid meeting fatigue and 
organizing celebrations to motivate engagement. Our study also reveals the central-
ity and importance of everyday administrative tasks to successful “bridging,” 
including, in the EM program’s case, taking responsibility for time-sheets, employ-
ment contracts, and so on across many different kinds of Host Institution.
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Second, our findings problematize and add detail to the idea that adaptive gover-
nance is formed by coordinating actors around a shared vision, prompted by a per-
ception of crisis. The creation of the EM program as a whole was prompted by a 
perception within the conservation sector and the national government of rhino 
poaching as a “crisis.” However, although rhino poaching is certainly a major issue 
within the K2C region and the K2C BR stakeholder network, it is only one of a 
range of pressing, interlinked sustainability issues. Indeed, the EM program at the 
K2C was conceived as a means of addressing a much broader suite of issues, cap-
tured under the broad K2C vision of reconciling biodiversity conservation and sus-
tainable development through partnerships. And although the vast majority of 
participating HIs in the EM program would agree with this broad vision, our results 
highlight the innumerable perspectives among participants on what this vision 
means for their work, how they might help to fulfill that vision, and what it is pos-
sible and/or desirable to do given practical possibilities and constraints. Within 
attempts at coordination around a broadly shared vision, then, our study highlights 
the many different kinds of negotiation around particulars. For instance, activity 
within the program was shaped by negotiation between different versions of suc-
cess, including person-days worked (SANParks), scientific data and a shared data-
base (some scientific HIs), and training, capacity-building, and skills development 
(K2C). More generally, our results highlight the interplay of meaning and action—
within innumerable everyday decisions—that shape the way adaptive governance 
emerges in practice.
Third, by focusing on adaptive governance in the making we emphasize that 
adaptive governance does not simply emerge in a particular place and replace all 
other kinds of governance, but rather that adaptive practices may evolve within and 
infuse a governance landscape that carries many influences. Moreover, it is not nec-
essarily immediately apparent what practices are useful and will enhance adaptive-
ness in a particular context—indeed, “adaptive” is not a universal criterion, certain 
practices are more or less adaptive in relation to existing arrangements. A good 
example of this lies in the discussions around the proposed common database within 
the EM program. Although a shared database to synthesize information and use it to 
inform relevant decision-making would perhaps be considered more quintessen-
tially adaptive in the literature, not all participants in the EM program necessarily 
saw it as desirable. Even if the resources were there to create and maintain a data-
base, the K2C does not have formal decision-making authority in the sense of a 
government authority to act upon the data gathered. In this context, the networking 
and collaboration between the diverse set of HIs in the region—initiated by the 
K2C—might be considered even more valuable, by nurturing a web of formal and 
informal information sharing and enhancing “adaptiveness” more generally across 
the landscape.
Finally, our study provides a valuable complement to an adaptive governance 
literature weighted to “high-level” governance contexts in the Global North, includ-
ing multinational corporations, international institutions, and so on (Galaz, 2014; 
Österblom, Jouffray, Folke, & Rockström, 2017). In focusing on how adaptive gov-
ernance might be nurtured and strengthened through a poverty alleviation program 
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in the Global South, we suggest that the developing the capacity and skills to per-
form the “knowledge work” required for adaptive governance (gathering, synthesiz-
ing, and using information) may potentially be an appropriate development strategy 
in certain contexts. Indeed, interviewees noted that human development and 
capacity- building have been key outcomes of the program.
To conclude, adaptive governance is no longer just a descriptive academic con-
cept, but also a normative goal and a lived experience of an increasing number of 
people across the globe. Continuously bringing this lived experience into the evolu-
tion of the concept is crucial for making ideas of adaptive governance meaningful 
and useful, for practitioners and academics alike.
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Chapter 14
Ex Ante Knowledge for Infectious Disease 
Outbreaks: Introducing the Organizational 
Network Governance Approach
Jörg Raab, Patrick Kenis, Marleen Kraaij-Dirkzwager, and Aura Timen
 The Importance of Knowledge in Infectious 
Disease Outbreaks
The world is regularly and increasingly confronted with the outbreaks of infectious 
diseases (Smith et al., 2014). In the Netherlands, for example, infectious diseases 
are a clear health risk (Volksgezondheidenzorg.info, n.d.). In 2010, more than 
30,000 hospital admissions were related to infectious diseases and almost 18,000 
patients were treated in outpatient care facilities. Despite structural control mea-
sures (e.g., immunization programs, clean water, hygiene, and sanitation efforts), 
new infectious diseases emerge due to factors such as increased trade through glo-
balization, migration, and adaptation of microorganisms and can become serious 
public health issues. In addition to the morbidity and mortality of infectious dis-
eases, outbreaks cause societal distress and large societal costs.
The large quantity of unknown factors makes it impossible to assess such an 
occurrence’s timing, duration, or path of development in advance. Given the 
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uncertainty and complexity, the question is to what extent and how policymakers 
can prepare to control a large—possibly cross-border—infectious disease outbreak. 
In the present paper, we take up this task by advancing an approach to gain relevant 
knowledge to control the outbreak before it has taken place. This is an exceptional 
challenge for at least two reasons. First, outbreaks of infectious diseases very often 
show high complexity in the sense that they are characterized by incomplete, con-
tradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize and 
change during their development. Second, a large number of actors are likely to 
become active in case of an outbreak of infectious diseases, because they believe 
they have a stake in the outbreak. Other relevant actors, however, might not become 
active even though others think they should have a stake in the outbreak manage-
ment. Consequently, an orderly response is unlikely and an unclear and even con-
fusing set of actors will probably form. Improving capacity to respond to outbreaks 
of infectious diseases therefore requires researchers to gain knowledge on the evolv-
ing actor set and its interdependencies.
Asserting that knowledge is simply unavailable—given the wicked conditions 
mentioned above—is not an option considering what is at stake in controlling infec-
tious disease threats (just think of the 11,000 persons who died because of an Ebola 
infection; Medaglini, Santoro, & Siegrist, 2018; Munjita, Chileshe, & Mutemwa, 
2015). Consequently, in the present paper we develop an approach to the production 
of useful knowledge for preparing the control of infectious disease outbreaks. We 
label it the organizational network governance approach, which we build on three 
main arguments: First, the response to infectious disease outbreaks can best be con-
ceptualized as an organizational network response; second, we can describe and 
analyze the structure of an organizational network using network analytical meth-
ods; and third, we can assess these networks in terms of their effectiveness in con-
trolling disease outbreaks using governance concepts. We will demonstrate our 
approach by introducing two infectious disease threat scenarios and show the value 
of conceptualizing them as crisis-response networks, analyzing them as social net-
works and assessing them from a governance perspective. In this way, we create 
available knowledge for an effective response to infectious disease outbreaks.
 The Research Context
Two fictitious but realistic scenarios of infectious disease outbreaks in the 
Netherlands
This study is based on two fictitious but realistic outbreak scenarios in the 
Netherlands: an outbreak of a New Asian Corona Virus (NAC) and an outbreak of 
the West Nile Virus (WNV). The New Asian Corona Virus is a fictive coronavirus but 
falls in the category of viruses emanating from Asia causing serious respiratory ill-
nesses such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) or MERS (Middle East 
respiratory syndrome). There are no vaccinations or other preventative medicines to 
date. The virus is transmissible between humans via airborne infection or direct 
contact. There is no evidence for transmission via feces. Coronaviruses can cause 
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various diseases in animals as well as people, varying from the common cold to 
severe respiratory syndromes. In humans, coronaviruses cause about 15–20% of 
upper respiratory infections. Disease symptoms vary by virus type, but coronavi-
ruses often produce symptoms such as fever, coughing, fatigue, shortness of breath, 
and gastrointestinal symptoms like diarrhea. Some coronaviruses cause very serious 
symptoms, such as pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), and 
multiorgan failure.
Much remains unknown about coronaviruses because they are hard to isolate. 
The first detection of an animal coronavirus in the laboratory was in 1937. Human 
coronaviruses were discovered in 1960. An outbreak of SARS-CoV (severe acute 
respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus) occurred in 2003–2004, causing over 
8000 reported patients worldwide, of which about 10% died. In June 2012, scien-
tists identified the first case of MERS-CoV infection in Saudi Arabia. The number 
of infected persons has exceeded 1800 cases globally, of which 640 have died. 
National and European systems are in place to notify and monitor important cases 
of MERS-CoV. In the Netherlands, MERS-CoV occurred in 2014 in two persons 
who travelled back from Saudi-Arabia.
The West Nile Virus is an arbovirus, which is transmitted from animals to humans 
or horses via mosquitoes (Bellini, Zeller, & van Borte, 2014; Weaver & Reisen, 
2010). Wild birds are the primary enzootic cycle of WNV, with mosquitoes trans-
mitting the virus amongst these wild birds (Bellini et al., 2014). When (climate) 
conditions permit, virus circulation may increase and spillover transmission via 
mosquitoes to humans or horses can occur. When transmission occurs, humans and 
horses usually serve as a dead-end host, meaning that not enough viral load is built 
up to infect mosquitoes. However, human-to-human transmission is possible fol-
lowing blood or organ donation from an infected donor. Although no symptoms 
occur in most human infections, in 20–30% of infections symptoms such as sudden 
onset of fever, headache, fatigue, and myalgias arise (Lim, Koraka, Osterhaus, & 
Martina, 2011), as well as gastrointestinal complaints with the risk of dehydration.
WNV can affect all ages, with high incidences among younger individuals, and 
among the elderly and immunocompromised. In addition, both susceptibility and 
the severity of the infection increase with age (Lim et al., 2011). Elderly people are 
therefore at higher risk of developing neuroinvasive disease, which may result in 
encephalitis, meningitis, or a poliomyelitis-like syndrome (Sejvar, 2014). Such out-
comes are seen in less than 1% of infections, but are significantly more debilitating 
and lead to long-term outcomes in over 50% of cases (Lim et al., 2011; Sejvar, 2014).
There is no available treatment for WNV in humans, other than supportive care 
(Sejvar, 2014), which highlights the impact the disease’s introduction may have on 
a country (Rizzoli et al., 2015). For horses, on the other hand, vaccines are available 
to protect them from developing West Nile Fever and other WNV-related outcomes 
(Bowen et al., 2014; Iyer & Kousoulas, 2013).
National and European systems are in place to notify and monitor cases/the epi-
demiology of WNV (ECDC, 2013). A vast majority of European countries have 
reported either human or animal cases of WNV in the past, for example Greece, 
2010 (ECDC, 2010); Turkey, 2010–2011 (Kalaycioglu et al., 2012); Croatia, 2012 
(Pem-Novosel et al., 2014); Italy, 2012 (Barzon et al., 2012). To date, the Netherlands 
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has had no autochthonous infections of WNV (i.e., infections acquired within the 
country) (Chancey, Grinev, Volkova, & Rios, 2014).
The two fictitious outbreaks would call for immediate responses or what is called 
outbreak management. Outbreak management is partially context specific, as con-
trol measures are related to the pathogen involved (characteristics of the virus or 
bacterium), the route of transmission (through inhalation, direct contact, sexual 
contact, oral intake), and the risk groups (related to many factors: age, immune 
response, and—very importantly—specific behavior). Risk groups can be those 
who become more easily infected due to exposure, or groups at larger risk of devel-
oping complications after an infection. It takes expertise to recognize an outbreak 
(understand the epidemiology and determine the source of infection, the mode of 
transmission, and the risk groups) and to develop effective and timely control 
measures.
In the Netherlands, it is the Public Health Act which regulates the response to 
events threatening public health in the Netherlands, including outbreak manage-
ment (Wet  publieke  gezondheid, 2017). The National Coordination Center 
Communicable Disease Control (in Dutch: Landelijke Coordinatie 
Infectieziektebestrijding, LCI), a department of the National Institute for Public 
Health and the Environment (in Dutch: Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en 
Milieu, RIVM) (later labeled the National Coordination Authority), is charged with 
coordinating actors within the response system if an outbreak involving different 
Dutch regions occurs (RIVM, 2019). The coordination of relevant actors is neces-
sary in order to control the risks associated with an outbreak as effectively (less 
morbidity, mortality, and societal unrest) and efficiently (efficient use of human and 
financial resources) as possible.
To facilitate the formulation and implementation of control measures at the pop-
ulation level, an infrastructure for analysis and decision  making is established 
(RIVM, 2012). The director of the Centre for Infectious Disease Control can invite 
the members of the Outbreak Management Team (OMT) to convene. The OMT is 
formed by a group of “fixed” experts, invited based on their personal expertise (e.g., 
communicable disease specialists, infectiologist, microbiologist, epidemiology, 
general practice; in case of a zoonotic disease, veterinary partners attend). The 
OMT is expanded based on pathogen- or context-specific needs (e.g., specific 
knowledge about risk groups, including specific veterinary expertise). The OMT 
advises the Board of Administrative Executives (in Dutch: Bestuurlijk Afstemmings 
Overleg), directed by the Director-General of the Ministry of Health. The BAO 
advises the Minister of Health on legal, financial, and political aspects of the pro-
posed control measures. The minister of Health will interact with other ministers if 
collective control measures have an effect on, for example, trade, schools, or air-
ports. Once the decision on collective control measures has been taken, the Minister 
of Health requests that the National Coordinating Authority to support actors in 
implementing the control measures with information and coordination as needed for 
an effective response.
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Although there is a clear response system in place, it is evident that given the 
potentially broad societal and economic impact of the described scenarios, a myriad 
of actors within and outside the public health field will become involved.
The infectious disease outbreaks described are characterized by complexity in 
the sense that they entail incomplete, contradictory, and shifting requirements that 
are often difficult to recognize and change during their development. Moreover, 
numerous organizations, agencies, and other actors are likely to be involved in sig-
nificant ways. Consequently, response patterns are emergent rather than routine or 
planned (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007).
 The Research Challenge and Theoretical Approach
Given the empirics of the diseases described above, actors search for relevant 
knowledge to control an outbreak before it takes place. More specifically, we con-
centrate on the question whether investigating the multiplicity of actors related to a 
crisis as well as the relational pattern of knowledge seeking and sharing between 
these actors provides a useful knowledge base for controlling outbreaks of infec-
tious diseases (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2018). The questions become: Who are 
the actors related to an outbreak of a specific disease, what are the patterns of rela-
tionships between these actors, and what information do these possess that are rel-
evant for controlling an infectious disease outbreak? Before presenting our findings 
based on an analysis of two fictitious disease outbreaks, we discuss our research’s 
theoretical foundation.
We propose conceptualizing a situation of an infectious disease outbreak as an 
organizational network response, in which a myriad of actors will become active 
while others stay inactive (nevertheless others expecting them to become active). 
Different types of relationships will or will not develop between these actors, result-
ing in a system of information sharing, command, collaboration, and so forth 
(Glückler & Panitz, 2016). The assumption is that this so-called organizational net-
work decisively influences the response’s development and quality. We base such 
analysis of crisis response from an organizational network-response perspective on 
the following assumptions. First, we begin our organizational network-response 
from a realist perspective and do not a priori include or exclude certain organiza-
tions that should (or should not) be part of the response. We thus widen our lens to 
include possible peculiarities of the crisis leading to improper measurement or miss-
ing important knowledge (see, e.g., Weick’s (2006) study on the WNV incidence in 
new NYC in 1999). Indeed, stakeholder analysis has become important in crisis 
response analysis, but few studies exist whose researchers examine crisis response 
from an overall network perspective (compared to ego-centric perspectives, with 
stakeholders as alters). Second, such an approach opens a perspective for studying 
the network positions and interactions between the different actors in the networks, 
thus producing knowledge about the network’s dispersion, information flow, leading 
organizations, the presence of peripheral groups, and so on (Glückler & Doreian, 
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2016). Third, such an approach serves as a basis for better understanding how col-
laboration and communication between actors can be improved (Moon et al., 2015; 
Swaan et al., 2017; Vinck et al., 2011), linking its findings to a governance perspec-
tive. We here define governance as the structures and interactive processes that steer 
actors’ activities towards a common goal (Ansell & Torfing, 2016; Kenis, 2016). 
Whereas networks describe the actors and the relational patterns between these 
actors, a governance perspective adds the question of whether and how these net-
works lead to network outcomes. Given the absence of market logic or classical 
hierarchical logic, the question becomes which mechanisms steer the network’s 
functioning. We consider these mechanisms essential to understanding how a set of 
organizations and its relational patterns function in a network form of organization. 
We here define actors, relational patterns, and mechanisms as network- level gover-
nance (Glückler, Dehning, Janneck, & Armbrüster, 2012).
The organizational network governance approach proposed here is first and foremost 
an analytical one, whose utilizers attempt to create knowledge to improve response pre-
paredness by conceptualizing the response system as a network based on actors and 
their ties. Network is thus used as an empirical tool (Raab & Kenis, 2009). As stated 
above, however, we believe that in a situation where neither market nor hierarchical 
mechanisms seem likely to work, as is the case for international infectious disease 
threats, network as a form of governance or governance tool is the most likely and 
appropriate option. Whether the most appropriate response is based on a shared gover-
nance mode, lead organization or network administrative organization (Provan & Kenis, 
2008), or a mixed form (Berthod, Grothe-Hammer, Müller-Seitz, Raab, & Sydow, 2016) 
is an empirical question and depends on several factors, of which the formal legal frame-
work in which the response takes place is likely an important one.
The organizational-network response approach resonates with recent observa-
tions in the field of crisis management. Recent research on organizational networks 
in general and their use as a tool to respond to disasters and emergencies has signifi-
cantly improved our understanding of the structure, governance, functioning, and 
effectiveness of such systems. In addition, the field of public sector networks in 
general has made important progress regarding the governance of goal-directed net-
works (Raab, van den Oord, & Kenis, 2015). Provan and Kenis (2008), for example, 
have provided the field with a conceptual vocabulary and specific lens that has 
helped researchers to better analyze the different forms of network coordination in 
general (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Glückler, Lazega, & 
Hammer, 2017; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Raab, Mannak, & Cambré, 2015) 
and emergency response systems in particular (Berthod et  al., 2016; Moynihan, 
2009). In addition, the 9/11 terror attacks in New York and Washington triggered a 
whole stream of research on interorganizational response networks (Hu, Knox, & 
Kapucu, 2014; Kapucu, 2009; Moynihan, 2009; Nowell & Steelmann, 2015). The 
perspective of an organizational network-response was recently also proposed in a 
report on “New Directions in Governing the Global Health Domain” 
(Kickbusch, Cassels, & Liu, 2016). Its authors concluded that those dealing with 
health challenges will in the future need to widen their lens to include actors who lie 
outside what has traditionally been defined as the infectious disease architecture. 
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This is due to considerable failures in responses (e.g., Ebola; Moon et al., 2015; 
Stoto & Higdon, 2015) and the increasing interdependencies in today’s world. 
Public health specialists in the Netherlands have also recognized this situation 
(Huizer, Kraaij-Dirkzwager, Timen, Schuitmaker, van Steenbergen, 2014; Kraaij- 
Dirkzwager, Schol, Schuitmaker-Warnaar, Timen, & van Steenbergen, 2019).
How, then, can one usefully describe and analyze an organizational network- 
response that results in reaction to a disease outbreak? Given the fact that we con-
ceptualize the situation as one with an a-priori unknown set of actors and among 
which the interaction has an important effect on controlling an outbreak as early as 
possible and with minimal consequences, we propose network analytical tools as an 
appropriate approach. The use of such tools goes beyond the more common map-
ping of the relevant actors and providing a generic list of all possible actors involved 
and will be introduced in the following.
We thus explore the potential governance system for these two fictitious but real-
istic infectious disease outbreaks through a network lens. Knowledge that we will 
acquire through this exploration will likely help in fighting future outbreaks in the 
following way:
 1. Which actors are mobilized? Are these all the appropriate actors? Some actors 
are frequently not mobilized because they are not part of the core actor set within 
public health, but are nonetheless crucial for outbreak management.
 2. To what extent are those that are deemed important willing to engage? Ideally, 
we would like to see actors on the diagonal, in other words, the more important, 
the more engaged.
 3. In terms of network structure, how are the relevant actors connected? If actors 
form clusters and these are connected by brokers, these brokers should have the 
competence and capacity to function in such a connector role.
 4. In terms of governance, to what extent are core health care actors well and 
densely connected in the center, collectively coordinating the response under the 
LCI’s leadership and well connected (but more sparsely) to the more periph-
eral actors?
Public health authorities can utilize these insights to develop a relational lens with 
which to analyze, structure, and manage the emerging organizational network 
response.
 Introducing Network Analytical Tools for Studying Infectious 
Diseases Responses
Network analytical tools are useful for describing the (in)formal relationships in an 
evolving crisis-response network. Insight into the outbreak networks described in 
the scenarios above provides parallel insights into the unfolding communication 
and coordination at the level of the crisis-response network.
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Network analysis is a method of collecting, analyzing, and visualizing relational 
structures and processes. The network perspective is now more than a metaphor: It 
is a systemic way for researchers to study how societies with their individuals, com-
munities, and organizations interrelate, based on and with its own theoretical state-
ments, methods, and research findings (see Borgatti et al., 2018; Rainie & Wellman, 
2012, for an overview). Proponents study and describe systems of interaction in 
terms of both their actors (called “nodes” or “vertices” in the language of network 
theory) and relationships (called “links”, “ties” or “edges”). Links can be of many 
types, such as information exchange, trust, exchange of resources, and the like. 
Networks are usually represented by data matrices and related diagrams, in which 
the units are represented by points and lines between them, either with or without 
arrowheads dependent on whether they have a direction or not.
Network analysis researchers have developed a great and powerful number of 
ways to describe networks characteristics, which we have summarized in Table 14.1.
 Measures, Data Collection, and Data Analysis
We have operationalized the data collected for the present study in order to contrib-
ute to the knowledge required to help fight future outbreaks in the following ways:
 The List of Actors in the Crisis-Response Networks
In order to mirror reality as best as possible, we used two fictive scenarios as the 
basis for our network analyses. One scenario described the early onset of a West- 
Nile Virus (WNV) outbreak with several autochthonous cases among humans and 
horses in the Netherlands. The second scenario described a rapidly evolving out-
break of a new coronavirus (NAC) after introduction through a traveller returning 
from Asia. (Full descriptions of the cases are available on request.)
Because the networks in both cases included actors from inside and outside the 
public health field, we used exploratory interviews and two focus groups with infec-
tious disease control experts (n = 6 and n = 7, respectively) to determine the network 
boundaries and to develop the questionnaire. In addition, we had to find a way to 
combine concrete organizational actors like the National Coordination Authority 
with actor groups like general practitioners, boards of academic hospitals, emer-
gency physicians, microbiologists, infectiologists, or veterinarians. With the help of 
the two focus groups we defined a relevant actor as: “any organization and/or repre-
sentative that has a positive or negative influence on the prevention, control, treat-
ment, and/or decision making with regard to (the outbreak of) the infectious disease 
at hand.” We also attributed three main characteristics to actors that influence their 
role during an outbreak: their level of influence on outbreak management (related to 
their interest in acting and potentially contributing), the amount and type of 
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Table 14.1 Overview of basic network descriptors




Centrality Indicators of centrality identify the most important node (actors) 
within a network. Given the fact that “important” can mean 
different things (depending on the research questions) there are 
also different centrality indicators. For example we can look at 
the “importance” of an actor (e.g., who is closest to all other 
actors) or the importance of the actor in the cohesiveness of the 
network. The most commonly used centrality indicators are: 
degree, closeness and betweeness. Eigenvector centrality assigns 
relative scores to all nodes in the network based on the concept 
that connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the 




In a directed network, a tie is not a symmetric connection 
between two actors, but an asymmetric link, going from one 
actor to another leading to difference in prominence or prestige 
among actors. The simplest measure of prominence for directed 
networks simply breaks down the degree count for incoming ties 
(in-degree) and outgoing ties (out-degree). Many other centrality 
measures can be similarly adapted to directed networks and used 






Apart from the absolute number of ties an actor in a network can 
have specific positions in a network. An actor who is connected 
to actors who are themselves not directly connected has 
opportunities to mediate between them and the actor itself or the 
overall network can profit from this mediation.
Structural 
partitions
Communities A network is said to have a community structure if the nodes of 
the network can be easily grouped into (potentially overlapping) 
sets of nodes such that each set of nodes is densely connected 
internally. The inhomogeneity of connections suggests that the 
network has certain divisions within it. The most commonly 
used indicators for analyzing community structures in networks 




Density Density indicates the general level of cohesion in a network. It 
calculates the proportion of direct ties in a network relative to 
the total number possible. Denser networks are not by definition 
better than sparser networks. This is contingent on the research 
question and perspective. Would we like to see ‘old boys 
networks’ to be more dense or less dense?
Centralization Centralization refers to the overall cohesion or integration of a 
network. Networks may, for example, be more or less 
centralized around particular actors or groups of actors. Most 
centralized for instance is a star network.
Cohesiveness It refers to the minimal number of actors in a social network that 
need to be removed to disconnect the group. This might be 
important for understanding how social networks shape 
communities, facilitate norm maintenance, or form the basis of 
categorical group identity, among many other things.
(continued)
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knowledge and information they have available (related to their position in the net-
work), and the level of collaboration they engage in. We asked respondents to focus 
on the potential collaborations and coordination with other relevant actors in the 
Netherlands as the scenarios allowed. Based on the generic list of actors available at 
the National Coordination for Communicable Disease control, the focus groups 
identified 98 possibly relevant actors for the WNV scenario and 61 potential actors 
in the NAC scenario. We thus applied a realist strategy in determining the network 
boundaries.
We did not include nonorganized stakeholders such as infected individuals, trav-
ellers, recreational water/land users, hunters, farmers, and gardeners (i.e., specific 
risk-groups) or professionals who were already represented through other organiza-
tions (e.g., equine specialists through the Animal Health Services and Royal 
Netherlands Veterinary Association). To include a representative sample of all these 
stakeholders would mean a disproportional effort at this stage of our exploratory 
research. We excluded media for the same reason. We approached some stakehold-
ers via an umbrella organization—those we judged to be extremely relevant but 
difficult to access directly—for example: boards of the academic hospitals (via the 
Netherlands Federation of University Medical Centres (NFU)) or microbiologists 
(via the Dutch Association of Medical Microbiology (NVMM)). By asking the 
associations to select five representatives from different regions to fill in the ques-
tionnaire, we argue that a proper reflection of their information flows would be 
captured without burdening too many people. In addition, in the case of two organi-
zations—with formal tasks related to infectious disease control and disaster/crisis 
management in the health care sector—that are located throughout the Netherlands, 
all divisions were approached to obtain insights into potential regional differences 
within institutes (i.e., Municipal Health Services (GGD) and Regional Consultation 
on Acute Care (ROAZ)).
Table 14.1 (continued)
Dimension Indicator Rationale for use in empirical analysis
Connectedness The inventory of the total connections among actors is useful for 
getting a sense of how closely coupled the entire network is. 
This information can be used to understand how information 
moves in the network.
Subgraphs and 
components
This indicates that the graph can be partitioned in certain ways. 
A subgraph is a subset of the nodes of a network, and all of the 
edges linking these nodes. Any group of nodes can form a 
subgraph. Components, on the other hand, are portions of the 
network that are disconnected from each other.
Note. Reprinted from “Analyzing policy-making II: Policy network analysis”, by P.  Kenis and 
V. Schneider, 2018, in M. Puppis, K. Donders, L. van Audenhove, & H. van den Bulck (Eds.), The 
Palgrave handbook of methods for media policy research (pp.  471–491), Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan. Copyright 2018 by Springer Nature. Reprinted with permission
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 Data Collection and Types of Ties
We piloted the questionnaire and adapted it accordingly (questionnaire available on 
request in Dutch). We first asked respondents to indicate their role(s) and potential 
contributions (unique skills and capabilities) to outbreak control, and then intro-
duced the scenarios. Second, we incorporated a list of control activities (approved 
by the focus groups of control experts) and asked respondents to indicate in which 
control activities they were likely to be involved. Third, the questionnaire contained 
a table in which we asked respondents to indicate per organization identified if they 
would obtain and/or provide information/advice from and to this organization. 
Fourth, we asked the respondents to indicate with whom of the stakeholders they 
would expect to have the most intense collaboration, plus their expectations of the 
activities the particular stakeholder would undertake. Finally, the respondents were 
asked to indicate their perceived level of influence over the outbreak control in the 
scenario provided and their level of interest in being involved in outbreak control.
We therefore based the network analysis on three types of ties: joint involvement 
in control activities, providing and receiving information/advice, and collaboration. 
For actor groups (health care professionals), we coded a tie as existent (=1) if at 
least 50% of respondents from an actor group—for example, 50% of the general 
practitioners—indicated a relationship, and did additional robustness checks, for 
example, 60% of respondents or at least one respondent.
We used Visone (Brandes & Wagner, 2004) to analyze and visualize the network 
data. We calculated general descriptive network measures for the actor level, such 
as degree, (flow) betweenness, closeness, and status. We further used the spring 
embedder algorithm implemented in Visone to identify possible clusters and visual-
ize the two mode networks of actors and measures for outbreak control in order to 
analyze how the response measures and actors are connected and between which 
actors coordination would be required. For joint involvement we used a spring 
embedder analysis to identify clusters of actors around certain control measures. 
For information/advice provision/reception we applied flow betweenness centrality 
and status, and in case of collaboration we again used the spring embedder to iden-
tify cliques and brokers.
 Data Collection
The questionnaires were sent to the representatives of the actors or selected respon-
dents from actor groups. A reminder was sent 10–14 days later. If a response still 
had not been received after 5 days, the organization was mailed or called as an extra 
reminder to minimize nonresponse. In total, in the NAC case we included 43 actors 
or actor groups in the data analysis, which represents a response rate of 80%. For the 
WNV case, we included 82 actors or actor groups in the data analysis, which repre-
sents a response rate of 82%.
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 Data Analysis
We discussed the analyses’ preliminary outcomes during a 1h focus group with 
communicable disease control specialists (medical doctors, nurses, and policy offi-
cers); public health specialists (medical doctors and policy officers); microbiolo-
gists; entomologists; researchers with an interest in crisis management, preparedness, 
and response related to infectious disease threats; and guideline developers.
 Results
In the following we present the results with actors in an anonymized form (confi-
dentiality was promised to the respondents). We present the actors who have been 
named relevant in the two settings, their involvement, and the distribution of 
information.
 Actors in the Two Networks
An important question in infectious disease outbreak response is, of course, which 
actors should be involved to manage the outbreak. This is a tricky issue. Compared 
to simple or even complicated tasks in which one could specify in advance what the 
perfect task division would be to get the task done, this is quite different when we 
are dealing with “wicked problems” (Head, 2008) or those as complex as explained 
above. Consequently, the first question researchers using an organizational network 
response approach ask is: Who is or should be part of the response system? Often, 
actors who are not part of the core of the public health system might need to be 
involved as early as possible to limit the impact of the outbreak.
The larger number of actors in in the WNV scenario is due to the fact that trans-
mission happens via mosquitos and animals and therefore a large group of actors 
becomes relevant that does not belong to the traditional (human) public health field 
such as hunters, veterinarians, water management associations, or the Ministry that 
deals with agricultural and nature issues in the Netherlands. Different actors consti-
tute the core of the response network in the NAC and the WNV scenario. For 
instance, an organization with the mandate to control mosquitoes and coordinate 
specific veterinary measures are prominent in the core of the network controlling 
the WNV outbreak.
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 Actor Involvement in the Two Networks
Here we focus on to what extent the actors have an interest in actively participating 
in the impact of the outbreak. This is an indicator for whether they see a role for 
themselves in the organizational network response. In order to answer this question, 
we created a power-interest matrix (see Fig. 14.1 above). A power-interest matrix 
combines two types of information: whether the actors see a role for themselves in 
the response and whether they are interested in playing that role. The first tells us 
something about the task allocation and the second tells us something about how 
rewarding they consider their participation or, in other words, how interested they 
are in becoming active in the response. The crosstabulation of these two dimensions 
proves particularly helpful, because it can point to the discrepancy or tension 
between the necessary task allocation and the degree of interest in performing 
one’s task.
In these figures, we show different types of actors (knowledge institutes, health 
care professionals, intermediaries, and public authorities) and their specific position 
in the power interest matrix. Some points in the matrix represent more than one 
actor of the same type. Actors are willing to indicate their self-perceived interest and 
power and differentiate their role in the scenarios (e.g., health care providers esti-
mate a larger role for themselves in the NAC scenario than in the WNV scenario). 
For coordinating parties in the response system, this provides an interesting mirror 
for their own expectations of actor involvement, a starting point for dialogues with 
actors/groups about possible fulfillment of their role in a specific context.
The power-interest matrix (above) also provides an interesting mirror for the 
actors’ own expectations of their involvement and a starting point for dialogues with 
actor(group)s, including about possible rewards and incentives to fulfill their role in 
a specific case and context.
In both scenarios, we see a general linear relationship between self-perceived 
power and interest, with the north-west quadrant remaining empty. This signals that 
many actors who think they have the most power to intervene in the transmission 
also indicate a strong interest in participating. Interestingly, there are also actors 
Power
high












Fig. 14.1 Power interest matrix for the two scenarios. Source: Design by authors
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with self-perceived low power who (might) have crucial skills, assets, or capacities 
at their disposal. The actors in the northeastern quadrant can be described as the 
core actors in the response system in their self-description with high power and high 
interest. It is interesting, for example, that an organization that engages in extermi-
nation of mosquitos is very much aware of their potential role and importance in the 
WNV scenario, and that the health care professionals (yellow triangles) voice strong 
interest in both scenarios but assess their power to be much less in the WNV sce-
nario (most health care professionals are located in the southeastern quadrant in the 
WNV scenario, but appear in the northeastern quadrant in the NAC scenario).
Actors’ involvement regarding specific measures to fight and control the out-
break can also be seen as actors indicating the tasks they plan to perform in the 
outbreak scenarios. In the next two figures we depict the respondents’ answers to 
the question “in which of the following outbreak control measures is your organiza-
tion involved in this scenario.” We had identified 28 measures in the NAC scenario 
and 34 in the WNV scenario as necessary for reacting to and controlling the out-
break, from which respondents could choose. Blue squares represent actors; circles 
the different measures, which were grouped in identification of the infection source 
(pink), developing guidelines and informing health care providers and risk groups 
(yellow), developing and implementing of control measures (green), coordination, 
evaluation, and research (orange). The measures clearly represent the operational 
level of reacting to and controlling an outbreak (Fig. 14.2 and Fig. 14.3).
For the NAC scenario, we can observe nine core actors in the middle who are 
involved in taking different measures and are therefore also likely or at least could 
potentially coordinate the application of these diverse measures. However, there is 
no clear clustering of measures and actors, which means that actors and measures of 
different types are closely connected and that there are no separate actors who deal 
exclusively with specific measures. Therefore, the integration of the different types 
of measures and the measures themselves seems quite high but not very structured. 
A disadvantage of this situation, therefore, could be that it requires significant con-
scious additional coordination, which is relatively inefficient if there is no formal 
structure with mandated or natural coordinating actors (other than the National 
Coordination Authority/NCA). Ideally, some actors would simultaneously be 
involved in certain measures, and others would be specialized and involved only in 
a limited number of other measures.
In the NAC scenario, these nine core actors represent some of the most important 
public health actors in fighting an outbreak, with other actors scattered more at the 
periphery. This analysis implies that when it comes to the coordination of measures, 
it is mainly these nine important public health actors that need to reconcile their 
strategies and actions on the operational level.
In the WNV scenario, the network is characterized more by a bifurcated structure 
with some actors on one side and the others on the other, connected by different 
measures regarding information delivery and (public) communication.
As far as the task allocation is concerned, therefore, many operational tasks are 
performed in the two organization network scenarios and similar tasks are often 
performed by several organizations. These initially look like rather uncoordinated 
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systems, but to better understand the coordination of tasks in the systems we asked 
respondents to nominate up to five actors with whom they would work together 
most intensively in such a scenario regarding limiting transmission of the virus and 
its impact. This is a good indication of the division of labor which would evolve in 
the network.
In Fig. 14.4 and Fig. 14.5 below, we depict the structure based on the type of tie 
“collaboration”. The ties are directed to indicate the nomination. Red undirected 
relations (the thicker lines) indicate that both actors have nominated each other 
reciprocally. These ties, in other words, connect those groups/actors one would 
expect to have the most intense collaboration with respect to outbreak control in the 
specific scenario, and also indicate that organizations hold expectations towards 
each other about their respective roles and contributions in outbreak management.
We have visualized the network using a spring embedder algorithm, placing 
nodes in such a way that connected actors are attracted to each other and placed 
close to each other, and actors who are not connected repel each other and are 
placed further apart. Through this algorithm, network clusters become visible.
Fig. 14.2 Two-mode network based on involvement in reactive measures (NAC). Source: Design 
by authors
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For both scenarios, one can observe that a relatively dense core exists where 
actors also frequently nominate each other in a reciprocal way. Due to the higher 
number of actors, there are also more collaboration relations in the WNV scenario. 
Interestingly, a lot of directed and thus unreciprocated nominations also exist at the 
network’s core. An interesting question to follow-up is, of course, what the ratio of 
these hubs is and the ratio of the connections between the hubs. Are these hubs and 
spokes in effect confirming the law of homophily, which would imply that similar 
actors are more likely to collaborate with each other? This situation is not necessar-
ily the most appropriate one in a situation of complexity, where one would expect a 
more integrated approach to collaboration.
Fig. 14.3 Two-mode network based on involvement in reactive measures (WNV). Source: Design 
by authors
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 Information Distribution in the Crisis-Response Networks
Information provision is about the information actors need to perform their task and 
coordinate their work with others. In what follows, we do not analyze the need, but 
the actual nomination of which actors provide information to other actors. The 
question becomes to what extent the information provision reported contributes to 
the goal of the organizational network, in turn limiting the transmission of the infec-
tious disease and its impact.
In Fig. 14.6, we depict the network structure in a centrality layout with regard to 
the flow betweenness of the actors based on the confirmed ties “giving information/
advice” in case of a virus outbreak. Actors are regarded as central if they lie on a 
path between any two other actors. Ties are seen as pipes through which information 
can flow. The more often an actor is on such a path, the more important it becomes 
for the transmission of information. We assume that information in principle travels 
Fig. 14.4 Collaboration between actors (NAC scenario, min 1x mentioned, red lines reciprocal). 
Source: Design by authors
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on the shortest path between any two actors but that it might also travel on longer 
paths (though is less likely to do so). Therefore, the shorter the paths are, the more 
weight they receive in calculating the flow betweenness centrality.
In Fig. 14.6, we show that the communication network is relatively centralized, 
with the NCA in the most central position. Although a lot more actors are involved 
in the WNV scenario, the structures in the two scenarios very much resemble each 
other, with the Ministry of Health and the Municipal Health Agencies (actors with 
formally described roles in the Public Health Act) in the following ranks with some 
distance to the NCA. The centralization of the communication structure around the 
NCA implies a lead organization type network in terms of governance, because the 
NCA is operationally involved and clearly by far the most central actor. However, 
there are also many linkages between the other actors.
Although links between the alters are present and encouraged in the ideal typical 
model suggested by Provan and Kenis (2008) to avoid information overload in the 
Fig. 14.5 Collaboration between actors (WNV scenario, min 1x mentioned, red lines reciprocal). 
Source: Design by authors
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center and foster innovation, one might wonder how such a considerable number of 
links impact network governance. We believe this may prove a particular challenge 
when it comes to formulating a consistent message to the public and to health care 
professionals.
One possible solution for information provision and coordination is a network 
that is characterized by a central entity with more decentral hubs or brokers. With 
such a network structure, information provision and coordination can be achieved 
relatively efficiently through local hubs that each are responsible for a certain clus-
ter or section of the network. Researchers have reported on this type of solution in 
earlier studies (Lemaire & Provan, 2009; Moynihan, 2009).
In Fig. 14.7 below, we depict the structure based on confirmed ties with regard to 
giving and receiving information or advice in terms of reacting to and controlling an 
infectious disease outbreak in the NAC and WNV scenarios. Compared to Fig. 14.6, 
the actors’ prominence is not determined through flow betweenness centrality but 
by their status. In the two visualizations in the upper row, we have calculated status 
on the basis of outgoing ties; in other words, the more information ties actors have 
to other actors who again spread information to many other actors, the more promi-
nently they are positioned; in other words, these can be labeled as super spreaders, 
to use a term from diffusion theory. This is reversed for the visualizations in the 
second row. Here, actors are the more prominent the more information they receive 
from organizations that already receive a lot of information. In this way, top receiv-
ers of information can be detected.
In both cases, the NCA evidently holds the top position. A set of about 10–15 
organizations also exists that forms the top of the information distribution pyramid. 
Fig. 14.6 Flow Betweenness Centrality based on giving information/advice (confirmed ties). 
Source: Design by authors
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It becomes clear that some actors are both top information spreaders and informa-
tion receivers, such as the NCA, the Ministry of Health, and the municipal health 
services. On the other hand, some actors are primarily receivers of information. The 
questions regarding the preparedness are then: Are the appropriate actors in the 
important positions, are the knowledge institutions well connected with the actors 
that make decisions and have coordination tasks, and are any actor positions in dan-
ger of information overload?
In Table 14.2, we summarize the results for the two scenarios.
Fig. 14.7 Actor status on the basis of confirmed information ties. Source: Design by authors
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 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we present the organizational network governance approach as a way 
to analyze the response to a potential infectious disease outbreak. Although similar 
approaches have been gaining ground in the recent past to analyze organizational 
responses to disasters (Kapucu, 2009; Nowell, Steelman, Velez, & Yang, 2018) and 
to infectious disease outbreaks (Bdeir, Hossain, & Crawford, 2013) in particular, 
most researchers have conducted a retrospective analysis; in other words, they look 
at the response and the structures and governance that evolved after the fact. 
However, if the field wishes to improve preparedness for often uncertain threats, it 
must find a way to assess the capabilities and capacities of a response system to deal 
with a disaster or an outbreak before an incident happens. Researchers should there-
fore ideally gain information ex ante about the potential organizational network 
response to increase preparedness.
In this paper, we have developed a specific and feasible approach to produce such 
knowledge to limit transmission of the infectious disease and its impact. We have 
based this approach, on the one hand, on the observation that infectious disease 
threats by definition provoke an organizational network-response and, on the other 
Fig. 14.7 (continued)
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Table 14.2 Summary of results
NAC scenario WNV scenario
# Actors 61 98
Type of actors Mainly core public health 
actors
Public health actors but also 
hunters, veterinarians, water 
management associations or the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
that deals with farming issues
Actor engagement (power- 
interest matrix): Self 
assessment, how much 
interest an organization has 
in participating in a response 
and its perceived influence 
over the outbreak control
General linear relationship 
between self-perceived power 
and interest with the north-west 
quadrant being empty, in other 
words, no actors indicating 
high power, but low interest in 
outbreak management
General linear relationship 
between self-perceived power 
and interest with the north-west 
quadrant being empty, that is, 
no actors indicating high power, 
but low interest. Several actors, 
especially groups of health care 
professionals indicating high 
interest but only medium or 
even low power in outbreak 
management
Joint involvement (spring 
embedder, two mode): In 
which control activity will 
your organization be 
involved?
28 control measures identified
Similar tasks are often 
performed by several 
organizations. 9 core actors of 
important public health actors 
that are involved in taking 
different measures and could 
potentially coordinate the 
application of these diverse 
measures. However, there is no 
clear clustering of measures 
and actors, which likely 
requires significant conscious 
additional coordination
34 control measures identified
Similar tasks are often 
performed by several 
organizations. Bifurcated 
structure with some actors on 
one side and the others on the 
other connected by different 
measures regarding information 
delivery and (public) 
communication
Collaboration (spring 
embedder): With which of 
the organization do you 
expect your organization will 
have the most intense 
collaboration?
Relatively dense core exists 
where actors also frequently 
nominate each other in a 
reciprocal way. However, also a 
lot of asymmetric nominations
Relatively dense core exists 
where actors also frequently 
nominate each other in a 
reciprocal way. Due to the 
higher number of actors, there 
are also more collaboration 
relations in the WNV scenario. 
However, also a lot of 
asymmetric nominations
(continued)
J. Raab et al.
341
hand, the fact that this response can fruitfully be analyzed using social network 
analysis. The fact that an infectious disease threat provokes an organizational 
network- response was confirmed by our data, which we collected for two fictitious 
but realistic scenarios of infectious disease outbreaks in the Netherlands, an out-
break of a New Asian Corona Virus (NAC) and an outbreak of the West Nile Virus 
(WNV). In both cases, respondents named a very high number of different organiza-
tions, with a substantial number of organizations outside the classical health archi-
tecture, as having a task in responding to the infectious disease threat.
Of course, such an ex ante approach with fictitious but realistic scenarios does 
not limit the need for, and usefulness of after-action assessments. Although collec-
tion of relational data might suffer from recall bias, especially if the incident is far-
ther in the past, relational data based on scenarios might suffer from a social 
desirability bias. What one might do could differ from what would happen in reality. 
However, vignette studies, which are similar to our approach, have been proven to 
Table 14.2 (continued)
NAC scenario WNV scenario




betweenness): To which of 
the organization will your 
organization provide 
information/advice, from 
which will it receive 
information/advice?
Structure is relatively 
centralized with the NCA in the 
most central position. Around 
the NCA implies a lead 
organization type network in 
terms of governance, since the 
NCA is operationally involved 
and clearly by far the most 
central actor. However, we also 
see a lot of linkages between 
the other actors
Structure is relatively 
centralized with the NCA in the 
most central position. Even 
though there are a lot more 
actors involved in the WNV 
scenario, the structures in the 
two scenarios very much 
resemble each other with the 
Ministry of Health and the 
Municipal Health Agencies 
(actors with formally described 
roles in the Public Health Act) 
in the following ranks with 




NCA holds the top position 
both in receiving and providing 
information. There is also a set 
of about 10–15 organizations 
which form the top of the 
information distribution 
pyramid. Analysis shows actors 
that are both top information 
spreaders and information 
receivers like NCA, the 
Ministry of Health, and the 
municipal health services. On 
the other hand, there are actors 
that are primarily receivers of 
information
Very similar structure compared 
to NAC scenario despite larger 
number of actors
Note. Source: Design by authors
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be a useful tool for research for some time and we have tried to minimize the poten-
tial bias in the relational data by basing the analysis on confirmed ties.
We continued our analysis by applying social network analysis to the scenarios 
of infectious disease outbreaks and arrived at several observations. We saw a large 
and highly differentiated network emerge in both cases. The network in the WNV 
scenario is much larger due to the different transmission paths (not human to human 
but via animals and mosquitoes). This results in the involvement of many more 
actors, especially those from outside the traditional (human) public health system, 
such as mosquito exterminators, water associations, and the ministry responsible for 
agriculture and nature. Attention needs to be paid to those actors that presumably 
have a strong influence but little interest. On the other hand, we can also identify 
some actors that assess themselves as having low power, although they appear quite 
important in the status analysis. The information structure is relatively centralized 
around the National Coordination Authority (NCA), which would imply a lead 
organization structure. However, in the analysis of the actor-measures structure, we 
see other actors besides the NCA as potential coordinating actors. If the NCA had 
an exclusive coordinating role, one would expect the NCA to serve as an exclusive 
connector between central measures to control the outbreak. Both networks are well 
integrated but not in a very structured way, which might lead to inefficiencies, dif-
ficulties creating a common information policy, and a risk of overburdening certain 
actors while not meeting the specific (information) needs of other actors. With our 
analysis, we show that given the structures based on various types of ties, the net-
works need additional conscious coordination efforts. But how can coordination in 
such an extensive fuzzy network of heterogeneous actors be ensured?
Looking particularly at the National Coordination Authority (NCA) in outbreak 
management reveals that respondents considered the NCA the “top receiver” and 
“top spreader” of information. Its position in the collaboration networks is, how-
ever, less clear. It is the central actor in the information sharing networks, but what 
this means for its position as the central coordinator remains a guess. This is mainly 
due to the fact that we identified several actors (and thus potential coordinators) in 
the core of those networks around the control measures. We were not able to iden-
tify the same actors as brokers in the actor networks. This might be caused by the 
large amount of interdependencies among the actors. In this study, we did not spe-
cifically ask the respondents about their thoughts on (needed) coordination. 
However, the nominations for collaborations clearly showed us that organizations 
have expectations towards each other, which could be further explored (e.g., 
Organization A expecting Organization B to perform a specific task and Organization 
B indicating that it has no role in this scenario). One possibility is that the NCA 
spreads the information actors need to perform their tasks and coordinate their work 
with others. From the information we have here, it is difficult to assess whether we 
have a “command and control approach,” a “coordination and communication 
approach,” or a “network governance approach,” in terms of Moynihan’s 
work (2009).
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The difficulty with positioning any NCA in a response network coping with an 
infectious disease outbreak might lie in the fact that the same organization needs to 
fulfill both specific operational expert tasks in the organizational network and net-
work administrative tasks (as defined by Provan & Kenis, 2008). Doing both by the 
same organization (and partly) or even by the same persons might lead to difficul-
ties. These could be in only acquiring, processing, and evaluating one-sided infor-
mation, perceived conflicts of interest or shortage of time to exhaustively fulfill both 
the operational expert as well as the monitoring and coordinating functions when it 
comes to task division and task allocation. This might lead to even more problems 
when it comes to contributing to the “integration of effort” (see Puranam, Alexy, & 
Reitzig, 2014). On the other hand, there are clear reasons for combining expert 
medical knowledge and coordination authority in an NCA. After all, it is crucial that 
the central player has immediate access to the best scientific knowledge and infor-
mation about the outbreak. Weick (2009, Chap. 4) also recognized this dilemma in 
his analysis of the WNV outbreak in New York City in 1998. Ideally, the NCA is 
positioned in such a way in the network that it has (1) perceived authority/a mandate 
to coordinate the actors, (2) sufficient time/resources to pool the available informa-
tion as impartially as possible, and (3) can recognize, monitor, and assess the evolv-
ing organizational network.
Looking at our results, one can argue that given the large size of the Dutch net-
work and the lack of “natural” integration of many actors’ efforts, the NCA can 
easily become overburdened in its attempts to facilitate all actors. There is a second 
risk: If the NCA is expected to inform and coordinate all individual actors, this 
could at least partially be in conflict with its role as an actor coordinating the orga-
nizational network.
Given the peculiarities of the evolving organizational network response in a situ-
ation of an infectious disease outbreak as well as the findings from our analysis 
above, another coordination structure to consider could be the core-periphery net-
work structure as recently introduced by Nowell et al. (2018) in their discussion on 
the structure of effective governance of disaster response networks. Scholars have 
theorized a core-periphery structure as potentially providing the benefit of both the 
cohesion and stability of a closed network while also having the flexibility for the 
network to grow and recognize the importance of new actors who become involved 
because of the disease outbreak. It might thus be especially relevant given the fact 
that an organizational network response to an infectious disease outbreak can be 
expected to consist of many different sub processes, for example integration of sci-
entific knowledge about the pathogen and risk groups with laboratory and epide-
miological processes to understand the actual outbreak, developing and supporting 
the implementation of context specific control measures, (targeted) risk communi-
cation to health care professionals and general public, and so forth. The actors 
involved are organized along other individual and network goals: for example, 
patient care or water management in the case of the WNV.  Consequently, the 
approach presented can initiate a dialogue among core actors to share information 
and reflect on the actual situation.
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 Limitations and Future Research
Looking at the recent evaluations of national and international outbreaks, we believe 
that the organizational network governance approach introduced here can strengthen 
outbreak management. At the same time, we are fully aware that this approach is far 
from complete and and researchers must address a number of important issues in 
the future.
In this study, we have in the first place focused on structure as one governance 
characteristic. This focus has produced important insights, as we have demonstrated 
in presenting our network analysis for the two scenarios. With this approach, we 
capture and visualize basic information about the actors as well as about the struc-
ture of the collaboration, knowledge, and information exchange. This explorative 
description creates a basis for practitioners and policy makers to engage in an ex 
ante assessment and identify and address possible bottlenecks and challenges as laid 
out above for the two scenarios used here. It also makes it possible to theorize about 
improving communication and governance of crisis management in general. In this 
study, we have thus understood “network” primarily as an empirical tool. But 
insights produced based on an organizational network governance approach used 
for ex ante and ex post analysis can address questions such as: Which mode(s) of 
governance and which network structures appear(s) to be most suitable for a rapid 
response to an outbreak at the (inter)national level? And which methods and data 
are most appropriate for assessing a response system ex ante or during the event in 
order to understand the needs and preferences for network-coordination?
However, the data we have collected for this study does not allow us to make any 
causal statements about the effectiveness of certain structures for the prevention 
of—or even a response to—an actual event. One way to get a step closer would be 
to run serious games/simulations with practitioners, in which certain structural 
characteristics could be manipulated and then assessed by the participants and 
observers in terms of the effectiveness of the information transmission and coordi-
nation. In the long run, studying organizational network responses and their out-
comes together with ex ante assessments should improve the field’s understanding 
of the relationship between structures, governance, and effectiveness of responses 
under different conditions and for different infectious diseases.
Future research should also unpack the relationship between governance and 
disasters and complexity in disasters in terms of authority and behavior. Given the 
absence of features related to legal autonomy and formal authority for the largest 
part of the organizational network, the question is what role authority plays in these 
situations and how this can take form. The same is the case for actors’ behavior. 
What factors actually motivate actors to take on responsibilities in the context of an 
organizational network to limit the transmission of the virus and its impact, even if 
public health is not part of their core mission and activity?
Given new global health threats and their potentially enormous impact, it is 
essential that insights are gained in which governance characteristics of the organi-
zational network produce the type of knowledge necessary for limiting the 
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transmission of the virus and its impact. This is not only vital for coordination in the 
implementation of measures coping with the outbreak, but already when a situation 
is perceived and analyzed at the start. As Weick (2009, p. 53) states, “if we spot 
flaws in collective induction, then we may find an explanation for their genesis in 
the way people are organizing. Stated more compactly, the degree of intelligence 
manifest by a network of nodes may be determined by the quality, not just the quan-
tity of its interconnectivity (Taylor and Van Every, 2000:213).”
 Appendix
The results presented in this chapter are based on research that had been conducted 
since 2015 before the Covid-19 pandemic. Unfortunately, one of the scenario’s that 
we used for the study, that is, the outbreak of a New Asian Corona Virus, actually 
came true faster than we could have imagined. The actual outbreak made us aware 
that our study is based on the implicit assumption that the outbreak of a Corona 
virus would remain a local outbreak that we would be able to contain. In March, the 
Dutch public health system was quickly overwhelmed by the speed and the scale of 
the outbreak that had been happening under the radar since late February in the 
Netherlands. Therefore, we think that the results are applicable only for the first two 
weeks in March for the actual outbreak when the system was still in a containment 
phase. Once the outbreak came into a situation of community spread and was rec-
ognized as such, the whole governance system changed significantly. Given the 
scale and severity of the situation, the response to the outbreak was located at the 
highest government level on a daily basis and the Dutch prime minister instituted an 
informal decision and coordination body that met once a week that had not been 
part of any planning beforehand.
However, even in a changed governance system, we could confirm some of the 
major findings of the study as well. First, we could see that it is essential that the 
National Coordination Authority
(1) has a perceived authority/a mandate to coordinate the actors, (2) has suffi-
cient time/resources to pool the available information as impartially as possible, and 
(3) can recognize, monitor, and assess the evolving organizational network. In addi-
tion, we could observe the difficulties we predicted for the coordination of a highly 
differentiated system of tasks and actors with overlapping activities and roles. The 
Dutch government reacted after some time mainly by centralizing the coordination 
of essential tasks such as getting protective material, distribution of ICU beds or 
testing and tracing. What the actual outbreak also confirmed was the difficult posi-
tion, the National Coordination Authority finds itself in due to the fact that it fulfills 
several different roles such as knowledge hub, coordination center, public informa-
tion organization and the public authority that issues rules and guidelines.
Most importantly, though, we have seen in the actual outbreak that in differenti-
ated democratic societies such as the Netherlands, coping with such outbreaks is not 
only an epidemiological but also a complex organizational and governance 
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challenge. The perspective we put forward in this paper therefore is very valid and 
essential and should receive the necessary attention as we move forward in this 
pandemic and prepare for possible new outbreaks of infectious diseases in the future.
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Chapter 15
Collective Learning and Institutional 
Collective Action in Fragmented 
Governance
Serena Y. Kim, William L. Swann, and Richard C. Feiock
Fragmentation of authority presents opportunities and challenges for governance. 
Multiple and/or overlapping political boundaries and jurisdictions can benefit gov-
ernments by expanding citizen choice, increasing policy experimentation and 
knowledge diffusion, and reducing public expenditures (Andersson & Ostrom, 
2008; McGinnis, 1999; Ostrom,  Tiebout, & Warren, 1961; Schneider, 1986). 
However, fragmentation and lack of integration also produces externalities, or spill-
overs affecting third parties, that exacerbate institutional collective action (ICA) 
dilemmas, creating situations where authorities’ particularistic incentives are mis-
aligned with collective interests (Feiock, 2009, 2013; Swann & Kim, 2018). For 
instance, in the context of air quality management, all governments in a fragmented 
region benefit from reduced air pollution, but each government has an incentive to 
free-ride and not contribute to the costs of achieving cleaner air.
ICA dilemmas hinder service delivery and common pool resource protection, 
and lead to fiscal problems and unsustainable outcomes (Hendrick, Jimenez, & Lal, 
2011; Jimenez, 2014). Thus, finding ways for governments to overcome ICA dilem-
mas is important for policymakers and researchers. The ICA framework (Feiock, 
2007, 2013) is a valuable analytical lens for understanding how governments use 
integrative mechanisms to overcome barriers to collective action and promote col-
laborative governance. The ICA empirical literature has explored the structural, 
social, political, and economic factors shaping collaborations (Andrew & Carr, 
2013; Berardo & Scholz, 2010; Feiock & Scholz, 2010; Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 
2009; Gerber, Henry, & Lubell, 2013; LeRoux, Brandenburger, & Pandey, 2010), 
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but little attention has been given to the role of learning in ICA dilemmas. Although 
learning is implicitly assumed to be a critical mechanism through which govern-
ments resolve ICA dilemmas, prior research has not developed a theory to articulate 
how this process may work.
The importance of learning is underscored in multiple literatures, including pol-
icy diffusion (Berry & Berry, 1999; Shipan & Volden, 2008), institutional change 
(Ostrom, 1990, 2005), advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988), and policy learning 
(Dunlop & Radaelli, 2018; Tamtik, 2016). Organizational theorists have also long 
considered how learning facilitates improved decision-making, practices, and per-
formance (Argyris, 2003; Argyris & Schön, 1978; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March 
& Olsen, 1995; Senge, 1990). More recently, researchers have paid attention to 
learning in collaborative governance, as collaborators face increased uncertainty 
and complexity (Crona & Parker, 2012), but the relationship between learning and 
collaboration is complex. Interorganizational collaboration is thought to enhance 
collective learning processes and their cognitive and behavioral products (Gerlak & 
Heikkila, 2011; Hartley & Benington, 2006; Powell, 1998; Powell, Koput, & Smith- 
Doerr, 1996). However, learning is also believed to be a key facilitator of collabora-
tion, social networking, and institutional change (Ansell, Lundin, & Öberg, 2017; 
Koontz, Gupta, Mudliar, & Ranjan, 2015).
To unpack this relationship, we posit a dynamic, iterative process through which 
collaboration leads to collective learning, which can subsequently enable govern-
ments to share and expand knowledge to better overcome ICA dilemmas in the 
future, or exacerbate such dilemmas if actors collectively learn to be more opportu-
nistic. This iterative relationship lends itself to theories of collaborative governance 
evolution in that governments with little or no history of collaboration begin by 
solving smaller, “first-order” coordination problems of information exchange before 
taking on larger, “second-order” cooperation problems (Feiock & Scholz, 2010) 
such as formalizing collaborative institutions. Although the ICA literature implies a 
logical connection between collaboration and learning (Hawkins, Krause, Feiock, 
& Curley, 2017; Swann, 2017; Zeemering, 2019), extant scholarship has yet to tease 
out the explicit roles and implications for learning within ICA scenarios.
In this chapter, we examine the role of collective learning in employing alternative 
integrative mechanisms for overcoming ICA dilemmas. We ask: How does experience 
in collective action affect collective learning, and subsequently, how does it influence 
the ability of governments to overcome future barriers to collaboration? Surveying the 
extant literature and utilizing illustrative examples, we derive propositions for how 
collaborative governance may affect collective learning, and how collective learning 
may in turn enable governments to resolve future collaboration problems such as 
resource sharing, large-scale organizational reforms, and wicked policy problems.
In the next section, we review the ICA framework, discussing the implications of 
its empirical research for knowledge governance. We then define collective learning 
and describe how it relates to collaborative governance. Next, we advance proposi-
tions for the relationship between collective learning and integrative mechanisms 
for overcoming ICA dilemmas. We conclude by discussing the implications of 
knowledge governance for practice and future research.
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 ICA Foundations, Components, and Empirical Applications
The ICA framework offers an institutional explanation for the emergence and dura-
bility of collective action among public authorities such as municipalities, public 
agencies, public service organizations, or national governments. Over the decade, 
many scholars have applied this framework to explain efforts to mitigate ICA dilem-
mas and improve collaborative governance. This section describes ICA’s intellec-
tual foundations, components, and applications to knowledge governance.
 Theoretical Foundations
ICA proponents draw on elements of five theoretical traditions to explain the emer-
gence and durability of collaborative governance. ICA is first informed by the col-
lective action literature, whose authors hold that individuals’ incentives may or may 
not align with collective interests, depending on the nature of the good and contex-
tual governing rules (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 2005). For example, Ostrom (1990) 
demonstrates how principals voluntarily govern themselves to obtain joint benefits 
and ensure the sustainable use of natural resources in the face of individual incen-
tives to behave opportunistically. ICA assumes that policy actors can design and 
cultivate institutions based on trust, reciprocity, and mutuality to overcome collec-
tive action problems through means other than regulation or privatization (cf. 
Glückler, Suddaby, & Lenz, 2018).
Second, ICA proponents draw from local public economies (LPEs) researchers 
(McGinnis, 1999; Ostrom et al., 1961), who posit that polycentricity, or “having 
multiple governing authorities at differing scales rather than a monocentric unit” 
(Ostrom, 2010, p. 552), can expand citizen choice, facilitate self-governance, and 
produce some public services more efficiently. However, polycentricity yields spill-
overs, in the form of positive and negative externalities that create collective action 
dilemmas, such as in air quality management and environmental policy. Feiock and 
Scholz (2010) classify these dilemmas as problems of “coordination” and “coopera-
tion.” The former relates to information asymmetries and the inability of actors to 
identify joint opportunities; the latter involves how to incentivize actors to work 
collectively and avoid opportunistic behavior. For example, resolving a coordina-
tion problem like information asymmetry might entail joint fact finding about air 
pollution sources and effects, whereas overcoming a cooperation problem, such as 
resource sharing or governmental reforms for climate protection, would require 
building trust and shared norms and values.
Third, ICA proponents consider how transaction costs are associated with obtain-
ing information, negotiating and enforcing agreements, and aligning actors’ values, 
preferences, and incentives (Feiock, 2007; Williamson, 1991). In the context of ICA 
situations, Feiock (2013) highlights two dimensions of transaction costs: autonomy 
and decision-making costs. ICA assumes that such costs increase as decisions 
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become more hierarchically and/or externally imposed and deviate from local pref-
erences. For instance, as air quality policies emanate from increasingly higher levels 
of government, local authorities have increasingly less discretion in their implemen-
tation and thus incur higher autonomy costs.
Fourth, ICA incorporates social network theories to explain how social capital—
or the shared social resources (e.g., trust, reciprocity, and social structures) that can 
lead to collective action—reduces the likelihood of opportunistic behavior and 
lower barriers to collaboration (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, Leonardi, & 
Nonetti, 1993). ICA assumes that increasing strong and weak network ties among 
actors will enhance the emergence and durability of collaborations. For example, 
city governments with weak ties bridging them to other actors and networks may 
have more information available to innovate and implement air quality policies, but 
cities with strong, bonding ties built on reciprocity, trust, and shared norms would 
be more likely to commit to improving air quality because they are confident their 
partners will live up to agreements.
Finally, ICA researchers draw on policy tools (Salamon, 2002) and political mar-
kets (Feiock, Lubell, & Lee, 2014) to understand the interplay between government 
policy suppliers and constituent group policy demanders. ICA assumes policy 
choice and design are a function of political bargaining and negotiation between 
governmental officials and affected constituencies. In air quality management, this 
would imply that constituencies favoring environmental protection versus develop-
ment would vie for the attention and favorable treatment of policymakers by provid-
ing their political support.
 Integrative Mechanisms, Transaction Costs, 
and Collaboration Risk
Collaborative arrangements to overcome ICA dilemmas take a number of distinct 
forms. Feiock (2013) proposes a taxonomy of 12 generic integrative mechanisms, 
ranging from informal networks, where local actors preserve their autonomy and 
rely on trust and reciprocity to develop cooperative agreements, to centrally imposed 
authority, where consolidated governments are large enough to internalize policy 
spillovers and achieve economies of scale but at the expense of localized autonomy 
and policy variation. Figure 15.1 displays these mechanisms.
With the ICA framework, researchers posit that authorities can better link the 
integrative mechanism to the ICA dilemma by matching the scale and coerciveness 
of the integrative mechanism to the scale and nature of the policy problem. For 
instance, transportation planning in the United States is often delegated to regional 
authorities, such as metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), to avoid particu-
laristic decisions and better coordinate across jurisdictions, whereas informal net-
works have been often used for environmental management in areas like watersheds 
S. Y. Kim et al.
355
that span boundaries and involve numerous, diffuse, and heterogenous resource 
users (Scholz, Berardo, & Kile, 2008).
Employing an integrative mechanism can resolve a collective action problem, 
but it imposes varying levels of transaction costs. Figure  15.1 illustrates how 
decision- making and autonomy costs relate to integrative mechanisms for institu-
tional collective action (Feiock, 2013). The horizontal dimension captures the level 
of scope and complexity in collaboration, ranging from single issues on a bilateral 
scale to encompassing issues on a multilateral scale. The vertical dimension indi-
cates the four levels of authority for collaborative arrangements: social embedded-
ness, contracts, delegation, and imposed authority. The diagonal dimension shows 
how autonomy and decision-making costs increase as issue complexity rises and 
authority becomes centralized. ICA proponents assume the preferred integrative 
mechanism overcomes the ICA dilemma by imposing the least costs and affording 
the most autonomy.
“Collaboration risk,” or actors’ perception of the likelihood that collaborative 
efforts will fail, is a key determinant of the integrative mechanism choice (Feiock, 
2013). In theory, more authoritative and encompassing mechanisms will be neces-
sary as collaboration risk increases. Although transaction costs are a function of the 
integrative mechanism choice, collaboration risks reflect actors’ ex-ante subjective 
assessment of collaboration success or failure. Following Maser (1998), three types 
of collaboration risks are defined: Coordination risk refers to the inability to recon-
cile mutually beneficial opportunities; division risk concerns the difficulty of agree-
ing on the distribution of collaborative gains and costs; and defection risk is the 
likelihood that participants will not comply with a cooperative agreement 
(Feiock, 2013).
Collaboration risk emerges from the “collaboration situation,” which consists of 
the (1) “nature of the problem” (e.g., coordination or cooperation problems, mini-
mizing common pool resource problems, or internalizing externalities); (2) “actor 
Fig. 15.1 Integrative mechanisms for overcoming ICA dilemmas. Adapted from R.  C. Feiock 
(2013, p. 404). Copyright 2013 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Adapted with permission
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characteristics” (e.g., stakeholder preferences, interests, political dispositions, and 
resource asymmetries); and (3) “existing institutions” (e.g., rules, norms, shared 
values, and structural characteristics, such as actors’ individual or organizational 
networks, influencing how they have interacted in the past). In other words, collabo-
ration risk is conditioned by the nature of the problem, actor characteristics, and 
existing institutions, which in turn influences the integrative mechanism choice.
Figure 15.2 illustrates this relationship, that is, how the collaboration situation 
relates to collective outcomes and integrative mechanism choices. Many of the ICA 
empirical literature’s authors have examined these relationships, mostly the direct 
effect of the collaboration situation on collaboration choices and outcomes. In this 
chapter, we add a fourth component—collective learning—to this model and argue 
that it has the potential to reduce collaboration risks and lead to more self- organizing 
integrative mechanisms, such as informal networks, that impose fewer decision- 
making and autonomy costs. To begin developing this theory, we first need to con-
sider how the ICA literature informs knowledge governance.
 Empirical Applications for Knowledge Governance
Although both are integral to learning, information and knowledge are different. 
Generally, information consists of facts about something or someone, but knowl-
edge is gained through experience, education, and the analysis of information. In 
this sense, learning relates more to knowledge than information, but having (good) 
information should facilitate learning.
Obtaining information about collaboration can be costly but is essential (Feiock 
et al., 2009). So far, researchers have focused on how the informal networking of 
individual policymakers influences decisions to formally collaborate interorganiza-
tionally (Andrew & Carr, 2013; Hawkins,  Hu,  & Feiock, 2016; LeRoux et  al., 
2010). They claim that informal networking enables actors to build trust and shared 
Fig. 15.2 Linkages between collaboration situation, risks, and choices and outcomes. Source: 
Design by authors
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understanding through dialogue and information exchange, which can lead to for-
mal interorganizational collaborations. Although not explicitly mentioned, learning 
could be a key mechanism through which informal networking influences these 
partnerships, as information sharing enables actors to learn about similar projects in 
other jurisdictions and serve as brokers in collaboratives (Spekkink & Boons, 2016).
Information is not only a facilitator of collaboration but can also be obtained, 
assimilated, and disseminated through collaboration. ICA researchers investigating 
estuary policy networks, for example, suggest that organizational actors seek out 
partnerships with popular, well  connected organizations to obtain informational 
resources (Berardo & Scholz, 2010; Scholz et al., 2008). Actors use network ties to 
obtain more information about other actors’ credibility and to increase their techni-
cal knowledge of the policy area.
Some collaboratives, however, may inhibit information acquisition, especially 
over time. Governments tend to collaborate with other governments that are politi-
cally, demographically, and geographically similar (Gerber et al., 2013; Lee, 2016). 
Although homophily-based collaboration may be beneficial for lowering initial bar-
riers like lack of trust, such collaboration may not be conducive to generating new 
information, because similar actors in the same networks likely have similar infor-
mation. Thus, actors may be better off collaborating with heterogeneous partners to 
acquire new information (Burt, 1992).
Acquiring knowledge goes a step further than gathering information and requires 
combining information with analysis and experience. One way actors build knowl-
edge in collaboration is through focusing on intermediate outcomes or “small wins” 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). This approach is similar to what 
Feiock and Scholz (2010) discuss in terms of addressing first-order dilemmas such 
as coordinating joint efforts for planning and fact finding, before tackling second- 
order dilemmas such as cooperating in resource exchanges. This evolution of col-
laboration lends itself to collective learning: Actors build a foundation for learning 
as they gather information, resolve coordination issues, and achieve intermediate 
outcomes, and build knowledge incrementally through the cooperative application 
of information towards collective aims. In the following section, we draw on collec-
tive learning research to begin building a theory to explain the relation between 
collective learning and institutional collective action.
 Learning and Collective Action
In recent years, scholars have emphasized the importance of learning in collective 
action (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013; 
Koontz et  al., 2015; Newig,  Günther, & Pahl-Wostl, 2010). Although they have 
defined learning in numerous ways, scholars generally agree that it involves both 
cognitive and behavioral changes. From this perspective, it is insufficient for one to 
learn by experiencing changes in the brain unless such changes are acted upon 
(Argyris, 2003). However, attributing policy change to learning has proved difficult 
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(Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013), because policy change can occur for many reasons such 
as mimicry and imitation, bargaining and negotiation, and exogenous influences such 
as economic, political, and cultural shifts, which may or may not involve learning.
Learning occurs at both the individual and collective level. Although individuals 
can experience cognitive and behavioral changes, these changes do not necessarily 
transfer to the group. Collective learning involves alteration to social structures, 
which are comprised of institutional (i.e., formal and informal rules, norms, and 
expectations) and relational (i.e., social networks) components (Newig et al., 2010). 
However, the process through which individual learning transfers to the group, or 
vice versa, remains unclear.
One possible means is through “single- and double-loop learning,” in which the 
former involves changes based on discrepancies between actions and goals, and the 
latter involves changes in goals based on shifts in values (Argyris, 2003; Newig 
et al., 2010). Single- and double-loop learning at either level may affect learning at 
the other. For example, after an executive learns from performance metrics that the 
achievement of organizational goals is unlikely (single-loop learning), the executive 
engages top management and staff in a discussion about new strategies, or whether 
these goals are the appropriate goals to achieve at the organizational level (double- 
loop learning), and vice versa.
Learning may also transfer across levels through experiential learning, or learn-
ing from past experiences (March & Olsen, 1995). Experiential learning leads to 
accumulation of habits, tradition, customs, and organizational routines at the group 
level. According to March and Olsen, experiential learning involves three processes: 
(1) variation in experience, (2) selection and inference from the experience, and (3) 
retained experience in the form of institutions or rules. Through these processes, 
new ideas brought into the system compete with one another in an existing institu-
tion, which fosters adaptation of behavior through the competition of ideas. In other 
words, ideas proven to be more successful are diffused through forms of instruction 
and exemplification. Researchers believe that this mutual interaction between new 
ideas and existing institutions leads to learning.
 Collective Learning Processes and Products in Governance
Following Heikkila and Gerlak (2013), we define collective learning as involving 
(1) collective processes such as acquiring (i.e., collecting or receiving information), 
translating (i.e., interpreting or applying new information), and disseminating (i.e., 
transferring information across groups) knowledge, and (2) collective products such 
as cognitive and behavioral changes. Heikkila and Gerlak argue that the collective 
processes of knowledge acquisition, translation, and dissemination influence the 
emergence of collective products that we typically associate with policy learning: 
new ideas, strategies, rules, and policies.
The relationship between collective learning processes and products may not be 
unidirectional, as collective learning products could influence the processes or steps 
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through which actors learn, and vice versa. Thus, we view collective learning as a 
dynamic, iterative, self-reinforcing process that strengthens actors’ ability to adapt 
and learn further through improving processes. Through collective learning processes 
and products, actors develop their capacity to learn in more intelligent ways and gen-
erate and share greater knowledge over time. However, it is plausible that actors can 
also collectively learn to be more strategic and pursue their self-interests in collabora-
tives, which would lead them to guard knowledge and information from others.
Although learning occurs in all sectors, we focus on the role of collective learn-
ing in producing public value (Moore, 1995), viewing the processes of learning––
knowledge acquisition, sharing, translation, and adaptation––as courses of action 
that can cultivate mutual reciprocity and democratic values such as legitimacy and 
inclusivity. When it comes to learning products in governance, political and contex-
tual knowledge about citizen preferences or building consensus are equally impor-
tant as scientific and technological knowledge. Although researchers believe that 
these processes and products of collective learning are important for collaborative 
governance, extant scholarship lacks a theory for how they facilitate institutional 
collective action. We begin developing such a theory in the following section.
 Three Pathways Linking Collective Learning to Institutional 
Collective Action
Figure 15.3 displays our conceptual model for how collective learning can lead to 
the resolution or perpetuation of ICA dilemmas and the improvement of collabora-
tive governance. We posit three pathways linking collective learning to institutional 
collective action. In the first path, collaborative choices and outcomes affect collec-
tive learning: Actors either learn to be better collaborators, or more opportunistic 
and self-interested. “Path A” in Fig. 15.3 is informed by extant research suggesting 
collaboration enhances learning (Hartley & Benington, 2006; Heikkila & Gerlak, 
2013; Leach, Weible, Vince, Siddiki, & Calanni, 2013).
In the second path, collective learning directly mitigates collaboration risks and 
in turn alters the integrative mechanism choice (Path B in Fig. 15.3). Although we 
acknowledge actors can collectively learn to be more strategic and pursue their own 
particularistic interests, we assume greater knowledge about collaboration and more 
information about partners enable actors to better deal with collaboration problems, 
heterogeneous preferences, and weak institutions for collaboration, thus reducing 
collaboration risk.
In the third path, collective learning moderates the relation between the collabo-
ration situation and risks (Path C in Fig.  15.3). That is, collective learning has 
greater impact in high-complexity ICA situations characterized by highly frag-
mented, specialized, and multifaceted contexts (e.g., global climate change or inter-
national epidemic prevention) than in low-complexity ICA situations (e.g., local 
waste management contracts). Our logic is that because we are treating the 
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collaboration situation as exogenous, collective learning has very little direct influ-
ence over the current situation or the complexity that authorities face, but rather 
affects the extent to which such complexity influences collaboration risks.
 Path A: Collaboration Choices and Outcomes Influencing 
Collective Learning
In this section, we explore how collaboration choices and outcomes enhance collec-
tive learning (Path A in Fig. 15.3). Collaboration is critical for knowledge acquisi-
tion, diffusion, and development because learning often occurs through external 
opportunities and insights (Crona & Parker, 2012; Powell, 1998). Collaboration has 
been found to help policy actors discover and assimilate new knowledge that is 
integral for learning in governance (Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011; Hartley & Benington, 
2006; Leach et al., 2013). Our first claim is that collaboration delivers new knowl-
edge to policy actors, which in turn facilitates learning and the ability to govern 
fragmented governments in the future. Below, we discuss how different integrative 
mechanisms may have differentiated effects on collective learning, and how social 
networking and other information technology advancements may influence such 
learning.
Fig. 15.3 Three pathways of collective learning in ICA situations. Source: Design by authors
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 Integrative mechanism choices and collective learning
Although collective learning is enhanced by collaboration, there may be trade-offs 
between different learning components (i.e., knowledge acquisition, translation, 
sharing, adaptation, and retainment). Research suggests that decentralized or poly-
centric collaboration is more conducive to knowledge generation, dissemination, 
and experimentation, but authoritative integrative mechanisms may be better for 
retaining knowledge through formalized rules (Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011; Heikkila 
& Gerlak, 2013; March & Olsen, 1995). Thus, we posit that different integrative 
mechanisms (Fig.  15.1) have differentiated advantages for collective learning. 
Although voluntary, informal integrative mechanisms may offer advantages in 
information acquisition and knowledge creation (Willem & Buelens, 2007), 
imposed or delegated integration, which entail greater hierarchy, may be more effi-
cient in translating, adopting, and retaining knowledge (March, 1991; March & 
Olsen, 1995). Likewise, more “managed networks” (i.e., led internally or externally 
by a single organization) could offer advantages in processing information in a more 
systematic and organized manner to maintain stability, but may inhibit the ability to 
adapt and discover new knowledge over time (Provan & Kenis, 2008).
There are also benefits of assimilating diverse networks of actors to enhance col-
lective learning. Although vertical integration of a learning system is conducive to 
coping with larger problems and reduces coordination and information-sharing 
costs, autonomous horizontal learning across multiple and overlapping jurisdictions 
fosters policy experiments, evaluation, and adaptation (Koontz et al., 2015). Thus, 
although researchers have acknowledged, for example, potential trade-offs in learn-
ing between exploration and exploitation (March, 1991), overlapping collaborative 
structures may provide some advantages for collective learning. In the ICA context, 
self-organizing and more authoritative mechanisms could complement each other, 
especially in complex situations. For example, empirical research on climate change 
adaptation finds the need for both authoritative, top-down and self-organizing, bot-
tom- up collaborative networks in the production and sharing of knowledge (Homsy 
& Warner, 2013). Interactive, two-way collaborative learning and localized net-
works involving diverse stakeholders are essential for addressing complex problems 
(Weber & Khademian, 2008).
Proposition 1: Self-organizing integrative mechanisms are better for acquiring and dis-
seminating new information, but more authoritative mechanisms are better for processing 
and retaining knowledge.
Proposition 2: Combining integrative mechanisms (e.g., self-organizing with more authori-
tative mechanisms) will improve collective learning and enable authorities to take on more 
complex, second-order ICA cooperation problems in the future.
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 Social networking, technology, and collective learning
Social networking and other information technology advancements reduce the cog-
nitive distance between partners and facilitate communication and collaboration 
opportunities, thereby potentially enhancing shared understanding and collective 
learning. For example, social networking services, webinars, video conferencing, 
and cloud services can enhance governments’ ability to absorb information and 
foster the shared norms and understanding traditionally cultivated by in-person dia-
logue. Mutual understanding and shared values are believed to emerge from fre-
quent communication and social interactions. For example, policy dialogue in 
informal networks helps actors build trust and norms of reciprocity, enabling them 
to overcome ICA dilemmas and formalize interorganizational collaborations 
(Andrew & Carr, 2013; Hawkins et al., 2016; LeRoux et al., 2010). Social network-
ing services can complement or, in some instances, replace the in-person, face-to- 
face dialogue that has enabled authorities to develop collaboratives.
Other information technology such as databases, cloud computing, and shared 
servers could also mitigate challenges in collective action for knowledge gover-
nance (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013). Knowledge acquisition and dissemination can be 
facilitated through a unified information-sharing platform, allowing collaborative 
partners to assemble, standardize, simplify, and update information. These 
information- technology management tools enable organizations to better combine 
knowledge discovery and retention practices, and thereby manage information in a 
more synergistic way. For example, constructing shared servers where actors col-
lectively encode, store, and retrieve information could enhance knowledge discov-
ery, sharing, and retention in governance.
Whether through in-person conversation or electronic-based dialogue, collabora-
tives require actors to build trust, mutuality, and shared understanding through dia-
logue (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Current technology has expanded opportunities for 
dialogue, with the help of web-based information sharing and video conferencing 
platforms. With these advancements, it should be easier to find potential collabora-
tors with similar interests and arrange meetings, even though actors are not geo-
graphically close. We argue that these increased opportunities for dialogue will lead 
to more collaboration opportunities and better outcomes, which in turn enhance 
collective learning and the ability to tackle higher-order cooperation problems as 
collaboratives mature.
Proposition 3: Social networking services and advances in information technology man-
agement enhance collaboration by providing capacity and facilitating dialogue, which in 
turn promotes collective learning and the ability to address more complex, second-order 
cooperation problems in the future.
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 Path B: Collective Learning Influencing Integrative 
Mechanisms Through Collaboration Risk Mitigation
Integrative mechanism choices (Fig. 15.1) are shaped by the collaboration risks of 
coordination, division, and defection (Carr, Hawkins, & Westberg, 2017; Feiock, 
2013). But collective learning could mitigate these risks by providing actors with 
greater knowledge about other actors, joint benefits (and costs), and collaborative 
opportunities. Thus, our second claim is that integrative mechanism choices (and 
presumably their endurance and outcomes) can be directly altered by mitigating 
collaboration risks through collective learning (Path B in Fig. 15.3). In other words, 
the relationship between collective learning and integrative mechanism choices is 
mediated by collaboration risk mitigation. Below, we discuss how collective learn-
ing relates to the three types of collaboration risks.
 Coordination risk
Coordination risk emerges as participants conflict over cooperative goals or the par-
ticipants’ responsibilities, and is inherent in situations where actors identify the 
benefits of joint activity but fail to collaborate due to information incompleteness 
(Carr et  al., 2017; Feiock, 2013). For example, interlocal collaboration for eco-
nomic development may be hindered as actors fail to reach consensus because of 
lack of information about future economic conditions and the high uncertainty of 
economic ventures (Hawkins, 2009).
Coordination risk may be strongly related to resource discrepancies. For exam-
ple, when affluent governments are able to implement proactive collaborative poli-
cies to protect wetlands and wildlife habitats (see Porter & Salvesen, 1995), 
neighboring impoverished governments may not have the same expertise and 
resources to take similar or complementary actions, which may exacerbate informa-
tion sharing in ICA situations.
When coordination risk is high, lead network actors could also play a key role in 
mitigating such risk through collective learning. Researchers have widely identified 
knowledge sharing and information exchange as key facilitators of collaborative gov-
ernance (Ansell & Torfing, 2015; Lubell,  Mewhirter,  Berardo, & Scholz, 2017; 
Shrestha, Berardo, & Feiock, 2014), and lead agencies are more likely to facilitate 
learning by disseminating new information and knowledge across organizations 
(Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011). Researchers have found that lead agencies help establish 
a common vision among participants in regional water management and allow for the 
development of norms and informal rules that are pivotal for learning (Conrad, 2015).
In addition, integrating different types of knowledge may also mitigate coordina-
tion risk (Lubell et al., 2017; Yang, 2017). For example, utilization of local knowl-
edge (such as indigenous, traditional, or community knowledge) to make sense of 
scientific and political knowledge (i.e., understanding the interests of other actors) 
has been found to enhance the performance of interjurisdictional desertification 
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prevention (Yang, 2017). From this perspective, we argue that utilizing different 
types of knowledge will help solve the conflicts over collaborative goals and reduce 
uncertainties associated with collaborative arrangements.
 Division risk
Division risk arises when actors share general collaborative goals but are unable to 
agree on how to distribute the benefits and costs associated with joint activities. 
Division risk increases as a party to an agreement becomes relatively worse off. 
Here, we argue that collective learning––in the form of shared knowledge about 
partners’ payoffs, interests, and needs––mitigates division risk.
Consider the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Division risk 
could be mitigated by mutual knowledge about the social, economic, and political 
situations of partner countries. Let us assume, for example, that the enactment of 
NAFTA worsened conditions for Mexico’s energy companies. This collaborative 
would suffer from high division risk, because Mexico could roll back the agreement 
under a new administration. However, NAFTA could mitigate such uncertainty 
through more accurate projections about expected benefits (or costs) 
(Zumbrun, Pérez, & Harrup, 2018). This knowledge can empower Mexican officials 
to persuade domestic interest groups wary of NAFTA consequences and reduce 
their uncertainty about economic payoffs.
Research suggests that frequent interaction mitigates the problem of dividing 
collaborative benefits (Lubell et  al., 2017), and informal networking in frequent 
regional meetings leads to greater formal interlocal collaboration (Tavares & Feiock, 
2017), minimizing the division risk associated with formal agreements (Hawkins 
et  al., 2016). We posit that frequent informal interactions will help participants 
reach a consensus about how to divide the benefits and costs of collaborative 
arrangements, especially in the early stages of collaboratives.
Over time, the development of a strong history of collaboration and collective 
learning should have the most impact on reducing division risk. For example, Boer, 
and Bressers (2011) point out that interregional water governance in the Netherlands 
dates back to the thirteenth century, and this long history allow actors to better deal 
with uncertainty. Rather than controlling interregional collaboration for water gov-
ernance from the top-down, which may result in decreased flexibility and autonomy, 
adaptive approaches based on mutual trust and a history of reciprocity have enabled 
participants in the Netherlands to more effectively adjust collective benefits and 
costs (Boer & Bressers, 2011).
 Defection risk
Defection risk emerges when actors renege or free-ride on an agreement or collec-
tive effort. Defection risk differs from coordination and division risks in that partici-
pants have conflicting interests (Feiock, 2013). That is, noncompliers achieve better 
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outcomes by free-riding or reneging, but compilers end up worse off because they 
bear the full cost of providing the public good. In reality, it is extremely difficult to 
obtain complete information about partners’ motivations and commitment to 
achieving collective goals. Thus, proponents of transaction cost economics (TCE) 
argue that it is necessary to align incentives and/or design effective monitoring 
mechanisms. But collective learning may mitigate the need for monitoring or, in the 
ICA context, more authoritative integrative mechanisms by building a better under-
standing of partners’ motives and tendencies to engage in self-interested or coopera-
tive behavior (Nooteboom, 2000).
Generally, more authoritative integrative mechanisms are required when defec-
tion risk is high (Feiock, 2013). In transportation planning, for example, when 
municipalities lack trustworthiness and the capacity to make credible commitments 
to a collective effort, regional authorities such as MPOs are more likely to utilize 
vertical, top-down integration to prevent opportunistic behavior among municipali-
ties. But collective learning may shift the integrative mechanism choice from more 
authoritative to more self-organizing (Fig. 15.1), as actors begin to understand more 
about their partners’ credibility and trustworthiness. For instance, governments that 
have contracted with a nonprofit for decades may not need stringent monitoring 
mechanisms because defection risk is low, and they can rely more on relational or 
informal contracting (Terman & Feiock, 2016).
We summarize our arguments on how collective learning influences collabora-
tion choices and outcomes through the mitigation of the three collaboration risks as 
follows:
Proposition 4: Collective learning directly reduces collaboration risks (i.e., coordination, 
division, and defection risks), thus increasing the likelihood of adopting more self- 
organizing integrative mechanisms for resolving ICA dilemmas in the future.
 Path C: Collective Learning Moderating the Collaboration 
Situation-Risk Linkage
Our third claim is that collective learning has a greater impact in high-collaboration 
risk situations than in low-collaboration risk situations. In other words, collective 
learning moderates the relation between the collaboration situation and collabora-
tion risks (Path C in Fig.  15.3). For example, learning about actors’ needs and 
capacities, institutional differences, and political and economic environments is 
relatively more critical in complex, high-risk situations (e.g., global climate change 
mitigation, international drug trafficking, multinational disease prevention, etc.), 
than in relatively less complex, lower-risk situations. Table 15.1 summarizes this 
contrast between high- and low-risk ICA situations.
Feiock (2013) suggests that, to address real-world problems with integrative 
mechanisms, the sources of collaboration risk should be diagnosed. He divides the 
sources of collaboration risk into three categories: (i) the nature of the problem, (ii) 
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actors’ preferences, and (iii) existing institutions. Each source adds to collaboration 
risks and relates to collective learning in a differentiated manner.
The nature of the problem lies in the specific type of ICA dilemma (e.g., mini-
mizing air pollution in a region, managing the ecosystem of a watershed, etc.) and 
collaboration risk varies depending on the nature of the problem, that is, the more 
complex the problem, the higher the collaboration risk. Interlocal shared services 
for solid waste management, for example, generally entail lower collaboration risk 
than, say, international efforts to combat global drug trafficking (see Munsing & 
Lamb, 2011). Although authority is fragmented in both cases, the latter issue is 
exponentially more complicated, as it involves more actors and has far more con-
founding variables at play (e.g., illegal labor markets, money laundering, macroeco-
nomic conditions, etc.). In the public policy literature, these problems are typically 
described as more intractable or wicked. Logically, collaboratives to resolve these 
problems should thus involve greater risks. We argue that collective learning is more 
valuable in these high-risk situations because participants more strongly require 
knowledge and information sharing about the nature and characteristics of the prob-
lems. In high-risk situations, where other complex issues are related, and/or critical 
events are frequently happening, it is more vital for participants to learn the circum-
stances and history and to use this knowledge to adapt to fast-changing problems.
Actor preferences refer to the extent of social, economic, and political diversity 
or homogeneity among collaborating units (Feiock, 2013). Collaboration risk is 
higher when actor preferences are heterogenous and information about other actors 
is limited. As in the previous example, collaboration between two adjacent munici-
palities in solid waste management entails relatively lower collaboration risk than in 
an international drug enforcement network. Collective learning about other actors’ 
behavior, capacity, and incentives is therefore more important when actor prefer-
ences are heterogenous, because actors have a greater need to develop a shared 
understanding of where their preferences diverge and align.
Table 15.1 Low and High Collaboration Risk Situations
Collaboration situation 
(sources of collaboration 
risk) Low collaboration risk High collaboration risk
Nature of the problem Jurisdictions and authority are 
less fragmented, more 
centralized
Jurisdictions and authority are 
highly fragmented, more 
decentralized
Issue is simple (first-order 
coordination problem)
Issue is complex (second-order 
cooperation problem)
Coordination is sufficient (e.g., 
information sharing, fact 
finding, etc.)
Cooperation is required (e.g., 
shared authority, institutional 
reform, etc.)
Actor preferences Homogenous preferences Heterogeneous preferences
Reputations are well known Little is known about actors
Existing institutions Abundant history and 
institutions of collaboration
Little history and institutions of 
collaboration
Note. Source: Design by authors
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Finally, existing institutions entail the rules, laws, and political, economic, and 
social circumstances embedded within the integrative (or collaborative) mechanism 
(cf. Glückler et al., 2018). Collaboration risk is lower when actors have effective 
collaborative institutions for resolving collective action problems. For instance, two 
local governments with a long history of working together will have lower collabo-
ration risk than other local governments with little previous interaction. Collective 
learning and shared knowledge about other governments’ institutions, such as rules, 
norms, and practices should be be more valuable for those municipalities with few 
existing institutions for collaboration. In a high-risk situation with little history of 
collaboration, there is a greater need to learn individual actors’ roles, incentives, and 
future contributions in and for collaboratives. Actors will also have to learn what 
collaborating institutions will work and what must be done to sustain collaborative 
benefits. We summarize our arguments on how and why collective learning may 
have greater impact in high-collaboration risk situations than in low-collaboration 
risk situations as follows:
Proposition 5: The indirect or moderating effect of collective learning on collaboration risk 
is greater in high collaboration risk situations than in low collaboration risk situations.
 Concluding Thoughts
Learning is important in all facets of society and is especially critical in governance, 
where the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge is often a core function 
(Willem & Buelens, 2007). Fragmentation of authority can present significant bar-
riers to knowledge sharing and collective learning. Thus, identifying how govern-
ments overcome barriers to sharing knowledge and collectively learning about 
collaboration is important. Combining theories of collective learning (Heikkila & 
Gerlak, 2013) and institutional collective action (Feiock, 2013) is one avenue for 
enhancing our understanding of knowledge sharing in fragmented governance. This 
chapter has discussed how collaboration choices and outcomes can improve collec-
tive learning, which in turn lowers barriers to fostering better collaborative arrange-
ments by mitigating collaboration risks. The model proposed in this chapter suggests 
multiple pathways and propositions to be tested in future research.
It is important to note why institutional collective action has significant implica-
tions for collective learning. Collective learning may not have an enduring influence 
unless such learning is institutionalized in organizations. That is, in order for the 
learning-collaboration feedback loop to work, collective learning should change 
how actors collaborate; they become either more cooperative or more self-interested 
through collaboration. In this way, the mutual reinforcement between learning and 
collaboration can enhance long-term institutional resiliency, or “the degree to which 
political institutions lessen the significance of crisis, turbulence, and challenges 
using technologies, networks, or policy coalitions for knowledge governance” 
(March & Olsen, 1995, p.  184). More relevant knowledge acquired through 
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“learning- by-doing” and “trial-and-error” helps build long-lasting, adaptive, and 
resilient institutions and enhances actors’ ability to anticipate the future (Koontz 
et al., 2015). We expect that the more collaborative institutions are exposed to chal-
lenges, the better they can gauge what knowledge and information is valuable and 
worth absorbing and utilizing. Even if participants opt out of or fail in collaboration, 
the competition, conflicts, and difficulties in collective action can provide valuable 
insights, assuming actors are not encouraged to behave more opportunistically 
based on what they learn.
Our model also implies that governments may be able to more effectively utilize 
collective learning for collective action by acknowledging partners’ heterogeneous 
experiences and ideas as sources of acquiring new information and knowledge; uti-
lizing social networking services and information technology advancements for col-
laboration and collective learning; and understanding that collaboration must be 
developed over time, through multiple iterations. Actors in collaboratives will inevi-
tably make mistakes, but better collaborators will learn from these mistakes and, in 
doing so, enhance their ability to collaborate in the future.
Although we have noted the many benefits of collective learning for collabora-
tive governance, political institutions bear some inherent limitations. As March and 
Olsen (1995, p. 238) point out, political systems easily forget: Lessons that are not 
coded into rules, traditions, and standard operating procedures are lost through turn-
over and the passage of time. Conversely, political institutions remember some 
things too well or too poorly: Rules can take on their own justification and build 
beliefs that sustain them far beyond their original intent; institutional memories can 
be adulterated by self-interested desires, tactics, and reinterpretations of experi-
ences. Moving forward, it is thus important to consider the context in which collec-
tive learning takes place and to be careful about generalizing across sectors or 
cultures.
Secondly, our model of collective learning in ICA situations (Fig. 15.3) assumes 
actors are learning to be more cooperative than self-interested and opportunistic. 
This is a big assumption, and actors could very likely learn to be more opportunistic 
and guarded in collaboratives, especially in the case of failures or dysfunctions. 
Empirically teasing out when actors learn to be cooperative and when they learn to 
be noncooperative is a key challenge for future research.
Finally, although many researchers over the decades have offered numerous and 
fruitful ways of measuring learning in social contexts, there is much work to be 
done. The literature appears to be moving away from convenient yet less-than- 
desirable proxy measures of learning, such as policy diffusion and change, perfor-
mance improvements, strategic redirections, and so forth, and paving the way 
through process-based and behavioral approaches to understanding collective learn-
ing (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013). This is a step in the right direction and greater exper-
imentation in approaches will likely lead to better measures of collective learning.
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Chapter 16
The Remapping of Forest Governance: 
From Shareholder to Stakeholder
Roger Hayter and Alex Clapp
Resource conflicts are a widespread feature of contemporary globalization, and 
resource peripheries have become contested battlegrounds that are challenging 
demands for sustainable development defined in both social and environmental 
terms (Hayter, Barnes, & Bradshaw, 2003). As an expression of these contests, in 
recent decades forest conflicts have proliferated on all continents, in the peripheries 
of rich and poor countries alike (Gritten,  Mola-Yudego, Delgado-Matas, & 
Kortelainen, 2012). Not surprisingly, given the highly varied nature of forest ecolo-
gies and governance around the world, forest conflicts and approaches to their reso-
lution involve diverse actors and motivations, and they vary considerably in nature 
(Moran & Ostrom, 2005). Yet drawing on Westoby’s (1989, p.  196) insight, the 
realization of the non-wood benefits of forests, meaning their environmental and 
cultural values, has been a significant stimulus underlying forestry conflicts. In this 
regard, researchers have proposed remapping as an umbrella concept that refers to 
both a revaluation of forest resources that reforms the dominance of large-scale 
industrial uses to privilege environmental and cultural priorities, and to implement 
new land-use plans and forms of governance based on new inventories, resource 
maps, science, and zoning (Clapp, 2004; Hayter, 2003). In turn, forest remappings 
are interpreted as part of broader paradigmatic transformations of society and econ-
omy that are driven by interacting scientific, technological, cultural, political, and 
historical forces. In evolutionary terms, contemporary remapping is an attempt to 
transform the commodity-driven and shareholder-oriented forest management asso-
ciated with Fordism into more locally diverse forms of governance as part of a post- 
Fordist or information and communication techno-economic paradigm 
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(Clapp,  Hayter,  Affolderbach, & Guzman, 2016). This transformation is not 
straightforward, but conflict-ridden and contingent.
Researchers have variously defined forest conflicts as disputes over the access 
and management of resources, as incompatible activities aimed at restricting one 
another, or as clashes among diverse institutional interests over the control and use 
of forests as economic, environmental, or cultural resources (Gritten et al., 2012; 
Hayter et al., 2003). Although these definitions are related, the focus on forest con-
flicts as institutional clashes captures the sense of remapping as a search for para-
digmatic change. In practice, conflicts vary considerably in scope and severity and 
can, for example, involve minor disputes over (perceived) violation of minor regula-
tions or of inappropriate behavior in the context of existing rules and customs. 
Agents of conflict-driven remapping, however, specifically seek to fundamentally 
change existing policies, regulations, “habits of thought” (Veblen, 1899), and the 
“rules of the game” (North, 1990). In practice, the forces of contemporary remap-
ping are especially evident in peripheries where forest resources have been primar-
ily exploited by corporations for industrial benefits and the forest sector deemed a 
principal engine of export-led economic growth, such as in British Columbia (BC), 
Tasmania, and New Zealand (Affolderbach, Clapp, & Hayter, 2012; Clapp, 2004; 
Hayter, 2003; Hayter & Barnes, 2012).
The drivers and direction of contemporary remapping are contentious, caught up 
in the contesting impulses of neoliberalism and new forms of locally contingent 
stakeholder governance. On the one hand, Roche (1990) and McCarthy (2006) see 
neoliberalism as a dominating influence over forest policies in New Zealand and BC 
respectively, variously expressed in terms of privatization, deregulation, enchant-
ment with MNCs, forest commodification, and more intangibly as a mind-set com-
mitted to market solutions. Among poorer countries, Tsing (2005, p. 7) interprets 
neoliberalism as a “universal” force in constant “friction” with local resource prac-
tices. From this perspective, neoliberalist adherents’ faith in the priority of market 
forces to achieve economic efficiencies at the global scale is a powerful impulse in 
forest peripheries, forming the basis of what we summarily label as a shareholder 
model or approach to remapping. Yet Roche and McCarthy are highly critical of 
neoliberal policies and, as implied by Tsing’s (2005) friction metaphor in resource 
peripheries, these policies have been resisted. Indeed, limits to the implementation 
of neoliberalism have been recognized in large part because of opposition from 
newly empowered stakeholders and the development of an alternative stakeholder 
model of governance towards the remapping of forest peripheries (Clapp et  al., 
2016; Hayter & Barnes, 2012). In this approach, formerly marginalized actors, such 
as environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs), indigenous peoples, 
and other local community actors, become formal stakeholders who gain access to 
and influence in decision-making processes hitherto dominated by the vested inter-
ests of big business and governments. Creators of stakeholder models of governance 
imply reductions or modifications in the autonomy of both government and busi-
ness, constraining though not necessarily rejecting market forces to emphasize envi-
ronmental values and the goals of local communities, including indigenous peoples. 
Conflicts arise as new stakeholders seek new, often radical definitions, land zones, 
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and legal rights to replace entrenched legally defined resource tenures and the com-
modity values they represent.
In this chapter, we assess the concept of remapping primarily as a transition from 
shareholder to stakeholder thinking, for positive and normative reasons. Utilizers of 
the stakeholder model of remapping capture important trends in forest use in rich 
export-driven peripheries and are closely aligned to the development of what Ostrom 
(2010, p.  641) labels “polyvalent governance” within common property models 
derived from experiences in many poor countries (Moran & Ostrom, 2005). As an 
ideal type, stakeholders engaged in successful remapping can identify the need for 
new institutional arrangements and innovations, both to facilitate dialogue among 
parties in conflict, and to establish durable rules and organizations that enact coop-
erative forms of sustainable development (Affolderbach et al., 2012; Clapp et al., 
2016). In this virtuous cycle, sustainable development generates localized external 
economies and incorporates public goods and ecosystem services as well as the 
material values of forests. Such an evolution in resource peripheries may be seen as 
an extension of Amin and Thrift’s (Amin & Thrift, 1995) institutional thickness, 
originally conceived to help researchers understand urbanization processes. In con-
trast, shareholders seeking private sector deregulation produce institutional thin-
ning, while underlining the contentious nature of remapping.
Stakeholder-driven remapping is neither inevitable nor inevitably favorable. 
Cooperative stakeholder arrangements are necessarily experimental, especially so 
in peripheral regions whose inhabitants are trying to re-invent themselves. These 
experiments face uncertainties both political and epistemological, rooted in the 
nature of bargaining among new and old stakeholders and in new processes of sci-
ence and learning. The engagement of more stakeholders in turn implies more 
diverse views and hopes for the future, with the future itself of ambiguous length. 
Further, institutional thickening may mean more bureaucracy without local devel-
opment, and institutional thinning may imply the reverse. As Bestor (1998) articu-
lates, the idea of markets is ambiguous, comprising a diverse range of actors and 
relationships, and if market actors are privileged in shareholder approaches, they 
also feature as local stakeholders.
Nevertheless, stakeholder and shareholder models are useful contrasting starting 
points for understanding remappings of resource peripheries with which broader 
debates over the meaning of globalization can be expressed (Hirst & Thompson, 
1996; Kelly, 1999). Thus, stakeholder-remappings are part of globalizing processes 
that shift policy making from hierarchical control by governments and markets to 
more diffuse, democratic forms of governance in which new social forces gain 
leverage (Bevir, 2012; Jessop, 1998; Mayntz, 2003). In this thinking, if neoliberal-
ism is a global force shaping resource use (Tsing, 2005), so too are the environmen-
tal movement (O’Riordan, 2001; Zimmerer, 2006) and the surge in demands for 
indigenous rights (Mander & Tauli-Corpuz, 2006), and all feature local adaptations 
and resistances that interact with one another. Policy formulation is complex and 
cannot be easily reduced to neoliberal formulations, a view consistent with the 
theme of the limits of neoliberalism (Hayter & Barnes, 2012; Johnston & Glasmeier, 
2007; Weller & O’Neill, 2014).
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We have organized the rest of this chapter into three sections in which we pro-
gressively elaborate stakeholder-remapping in its broader societal and policy con-
text, in the natures it produces, and in how it might be evaluated (Fig. 16.1). First, 
forest remappings are discussed as expressions of socio-economic paradigmatic 
changes, stimulated by crisis and conflict and in which actors view contemporary 
remapping as an uncertain policy challenge to the markets and hierarchy gover-
nance model of Fordist forestry with its emphasis on commodification. In the sec-
ond section, we distinguish stakeholder and shareholder impulses in contemporary 
remapping and elaborate the former by highlighting institutional innovation and 
thickening in emerging forms of governance. In the last, most speculative section, 
we explore the meaning of good governance in remapping and how stakeholder- 
remapping may be assessed. We recognize that forest transitions in one form or 
another are globally widespread (Mather, 1992) and that particular forms of forest 
conflict, remapping, and conflict resolution are contingent and varied. Although we 























Fig. 16.1 Fordist forest policy. Source: Design by authors
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the discussion will resonate more broadly in other forest regions and to spatially 
distributed resources in general. Although the latter concern is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, many key resources coexist in the same peripheries and share in broad 
outline the challenges posed by changing social values.
 Remapping Fordist Forestry as Paradigm Change
Theorists of economic transformation and paradigmatic change, such as Freeman 
and Louça (2001), emphasize the role of innovation and root their work in the expe-
rience of core countries and leading edge sectors. Similarly, researchers with more 
spatially sensitive complementary approaches also focus on core regions and 
agglomerations (Storper, 1997), as do the authors of the original idea of institutional 
thickness (Amin & Thrift, 1995). Yet the implications of paradigmatic change for 
resource peripheries and industries are profound (Hayter, 2000). Indeed, forest pol-
icy everywhere is shaped by and evolves in accordance with changing social atti-
tudes and forms of industrialization or innovation-driven paradigms. Reference to 
paradigmatic change helps illuminate the role of crisis and conflict as catalysts, and 
the broader evolutionary forces shaping and challenging contemporary remapping.
Drawing on North American experience, three broad forestry remappings can be 
identified in relation to paradigm changes since the nineteenth century (Clapp et al., 
2016; Franklin,  Berg,  Thornburgh, & Tappeiner, 1997; Hayes & Glendenning, 
2005). First, nineteenth century industrialization and the rise of largely unfettered 
market forces heralded an era of deforestation (1850–1910), driven by colonization, 
dispossession, and speculation, in which old-growth forests, once the common 
property of indigenous peoples, were remapped as state- or privately-owned 
resources to facilitate business investment. In tandem with the expansion of the fac-
tory system, the scale of forestry and wood-processing activities increased rapidly, 
stimulated by innovations in steam-powered technology, machinery, and wood 
pulping, implementers of the latter targeting the coniferous forests of northern 
regions, including the Pacific Northwest and BC (Rajala, 1998).
Subsequently, policy-makers’ searches for more sustainable forest industries and 
forest-based communities ushered in a second Fordist era of remapping, in accor-
dance with a new “scientific” forestry (1915–1970, peaking after 1945). They based 
this remapping on sustained yield principles and related silvicultural practices, 
largely developed in Europe, that supported policies that remained primarily com-
mitted to facilitating the industrial use of forests. As part of Fordism’s mass produc-
tion culture, forest sector activities increased in scale, and were linked within newly 
emerging horizontally and vertically integrated MNCs that owned or controlled vast 
tracts of forest. Land ownership and large-scale, secure timber tenures were expected 
to promote sustained yield forest rotations that would allow replacement after har-
vesting (Hayter, 1976), but the structural incentives for resource depletion were 
revealed in ambitious and front-loaded timber harvest targets (Clapp, 1995; 
Marchak, Aycock, & Herbert, 1999). During Fordism, technological developments 
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also enabled the use of hardwoods in pulp and paper, leading to large-scale pine and 
eucalyptus forest monoculture plantations in Australia, Brazil, Chile, New Zealand, 
South Africa, the southern United States, and other semi-tropical and warm temper-
ate regions (Clapp, 2001).
Although a central principle, sustained yield proved problematical for industry, 
while the nonindustrial benefits of forests were also undermined. In response, a 
third remapping has taken place since 1970, part of what is variously labeled as 
post-Fordism: the information and communication techno-economic paradigm 
(ICT), or globalization. Forestry experts suggest that this remapping has been domi-
nated by demands for adaptive, flexible ecosystem-based management aimed at sus-
tainability—ecologically, culturally, and economically. Meanwhile, technological 
changes featuring micro-electronic technologies have deepened economies of scale 
and scope in forest product manufacturing.
Environmental opposition to forest commodification has been an important 
driver of conflict. In Tasmania, for example, as early as 1885, enactors of a pioneer-
ing Forest Act explicitly recognized the problem of environmental degradation and 
created a conservator of forests who subsequently reported forestry practices as 
“chaotic,” even if not much was to change for some time (Carron, 1985; Gee, 2001). 
In North America, Widick (2009) has documented the rise of environmentally- 
driven forest conflicts in California since the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
and Lee and Field (2005) and Langston (2005) in relation to Washington and 
Oregon, and Wilson (1998) for BC, have documented the role of professionally 
organized environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) in challenging 
prevailing industrial forest practices, especially large-scale clearcutting. The par-
ticipants of the resulting debates have challenged the scientific wisdom of the 
Fordist forestry practices that became institutionalized in North America, and whose 
one-size-fits-all advice “imposed a rational, uniform and simplistic order on the 
complexities of localized ecological systems” (Lee & Field, 2005, p. 3). However, 
as Langston (2005) argues, Fordist sustained yield and silviculture experienced sig-
nificant problems even for industry. Industrialized forestry practices aimed at maxi-
mizing processing efficiencies go hand in hand with a variety of economic risks 
related to: changes in the species mix to less economically desirable trees, along 
with the widespread practice of even-aged clear-cutting; increased damage due to 
disease and insects, fire-proneness, and erosion; and intractable conflicts with other 
users. Moreover, as mill capacities increased as a result of improvements in effi-
ciency, declining forest productivity associated with the maturation of the resource 
cycle has led inevitably to the closure of mills, a well-documented trend in Oregon, 
Washington, and British Columbia (Hayter & Edenhoffer, 2016; Robbins, 2006).
Remappings resonate beyond western settler societies. Fordist forestry, in one 
form or another, became widespread, expressed in many developing countries by 
investments in big, export-oriented, foreign-owned pulp and paper mills, often 
using plantation wood. In Brazil and Chile, for example, direct foreign investment 
in the forest sector was a key, often controversial aspect of national development 
strategies in the 1960s and 1970s (Clapp, 1995; Dauvergne, 1997; Marchak, 1995). 
Indeed, forest conflicts are globally widespread, and collectively inspire urgent 
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pleas for changes in forest governance, typically to better address local development 
needs simultaneously with promoting environmental sustainability.
 Fordist Forestry in British Columbia
Utilizing an outline of the evolution, nature, and challenge to Fordist forestry in 
British Columbia (BC), we can better illustrate the general as well as the unique 
processes of remapping (Hayter, 2000). In BC, consistent with practices across 
much of Canada, the provincial government has controlled forest resources since 
joining Confederation in 1871. Although sporadic ventures into industrial forestry 
had previously occurred, the arrival of the transcontinental railroad in Vancouver in 
1885 stimulated a rapid, entrepreneurial-led growth of logging and the forest indus-
tries. In support of this growth, the provincial government privatized some forests 
as railroad land grants and introduced various licenses and leases to permit logging. 
But forestry became frenzied and speculative, with no concern for renewal, and in 
response to fears of forest liquidation, the licensing boom was halted in 1905. 
Following the advice of a Royal Commission established in 1909, the provincial 
government passed the Forestry Act of 1912 to further limit alienation of forest 
lands, while retaining the principle of public ownership. Following another Royal 
Commission, full commitment to Fordism awaited the 1947 Forest Act Amendment. 
This Amendment and subsequent amendments created large-scale tenures that were 
offered to corporations, often multinational, over long and renewable time horizons, 
in exchange for major investments in integrated forest product activities. The ten-
ures were intended to be large enough to allow sustained-yield logging, and a new 
appurtenancy clause required that timber be processed in local mills to ensure the 
retention of local employment and a corresponding promotion of development 
within the province. Essentially, the provincial government sought resource bar-
gains with MNCs to stimulate development and set low rates of stumpage—the fee 
paid for timber cut—to reflect the costs and uncertainties of exporting commodities 
from remote areas to distant markets.
For Fordist BC, forest policy was inseparable from industrial policy. With timber 
valued for its industrial uses alone, old growth forests were routinely classified as 
decadent or over-mature, calling for rapid harvest before their economic value 
dropped further from the inexorable advance of heart rot and decay. From an indus-
trial perspective, the particular form of Fordism that developed in BC could be 
labelled “permeable” (Jenssen, 1989), featuring a high level of foreign ownership, 
with corresponding profit leakage, reliance on imported technology, and limited 
development of value-added options. Such truncated development stands in contrast 
to Scandinavian experience where forest industries remained under domestic control, 
with multiplier effects captured within the region (Raumolin, 1985). Nevertheless, 
BC’s forest industries boomed after 1945, generating many spin-offs and high-
income union employment, while spreading growth throughout the province. 
Moreover, this growth was relatively stable, and during Fordism average incomes in 
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resource communities in BC’s periphery were as high if not higher than in the 
Vancouver metro core (Davis & Hutton, 1989). Since the 1980s, however, BC’s 
resource communities have experienced considerable instability, labor replacement, 
and downsizing (Hayter & Edenhoffer, 2016; Markey, Halseth, & Manson, 2012).
Fordist forestry in BC started to unravel in the 1970s as growth trajectories lev-
eled off and became more volatile amid a series of increasingly deep recessions, 
culminating in the severe crisis of the early 1980s. This crisis proved a turning point 
in the fortunes of the forest industry and in public conceptions of forest governance. 
The recession exposed the industry’s declining competitiveness: Factories had 
become technologically obsolescent, especially on the coast, and timber supplies 
had declined in quality and accessibility. In 1981, the government first recognized 
the onset of the fall-down effect, in which old-growth forests were replaced by 
lower-yielding second-growth forests, and timber yields per hectare plummeted. 
Even as industry members began to downsize and restructure, this recession sparked 
deep-seated and long-lasting “wars in the woods” exacerbated by intersecting envi-
ronmental, aboriginal, and trade conflicts (Hayter, 2003). ENGOs argued that gov-
ernment and industry were sustaining neither the economy nor the environment, and 
indigenous groups were alarmed that the forest resource would be downgraded prior 
to the settlement of their treaty claims. At the same time, a trade war over BC’s 
lumber exports to the US erupted when US sawmillers, also threatened by the reces-
sion, believed their problems to be caused by cheap lumber imports from BC, and 
accordingly sought protection through the creation of the Coalition for Fair Lumber 
Imports (CFLI). This initiated 35 years of duties, litigation, export restrictions, and 
managed trade, which continued in newly aggravated form in 2017.
In BC, as elsewhere, economic crisis should not be considered “the” cause of 
remapping, but rather an important catalytic event occurring as part of longer-run 
technological, economic, political, and social forces of change. By the 1970s, atti-
tudes across western economies were becoming more pro-environment, whereas 
established industries were experiencing productivity problems, both trends being 
evident in BC’s forest economy. Furthermore, in contrast to the rest of Canada and 
other western settler societies, BC’s failure to sign treaties with indigenous peoples 
had long been a source of concern waiting to be sparked. These conflicts empow-
ered environmental and aboriginal interests, not because of a shared view of solu-
tions, but because of their shared opposition to existing forest policy and shareholder 
entitlements.
 Policy Uncertainty
Anticipating the direction and outcomes of remapping is hard, especially when 
assessments are made during periods of crisis and conflict. Crisis is important for 
provoking remapping, as it is for society-wide paradigmatic transformations, 
because it reveals the need for change, and weakens vested industrial interests 
through their downsizing, failure, and declining power. At the same time, crisis 
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energizes new stakeholders by strengthening their arguments and social legitimacy. 
Yet successive waves of investment in equipment and infrastructure, managerial 
know-how and labor skills, and attitudes towards economic growth leave estab-
lished resource policies and industries deeply ingrained. These forces of inertia are 
powerful, metaphorically captured by the ideas of the staple trap and the resource 
cycle; equally challenging is the difficulty of distinguishing short-term or cyclical 
recessions from secular or turning point recessions in resource sectors in which a 
history of boom and bust is “normal” and the end of natural abundance is inconceiv-
able. Moreover, cost-reduction strategies in response to immediate survival needs 
can obscure the need to adapt by investing in R&D, innovation, and a more skilled 
workforce from industry members.
Forest conflicts similarly shape the contours of remapping. Widely publicized 
protests—logging blockades, civil disobedience, market boycott campaigns, disrup-
tions of corporate meetings, and the shaming of environmental culprits—have 
become symbols of these conflicts. In tandem, litigation has become a vital tool of 
legitimizing and empowering protest, and of shaping remapping. As Langston 
(2005, p. 72) argues of forest conflicts in Oregon: “What mattered most about litiga-
tion was that it forces a variety of stakeholders, with multiple voices, multiple sto-
ries, and multiple perspectives to communicate with each other.” Litigation has also 
been an important tool in promoting aboriginal rights in peripheries, not least in BC, 
where the Supreme Court of Canada has made several decisions since 1997 that 
have significantly increased aboriginal control over traditional territories. In 
Australia and New Zealand, aboriginal rights in resource peripheries have also 
gained judicial recognition. In the case of Tasmania, where the indigenous popula-
tion was eliminated, contemporary logging is forbidden wherever artifacts repre-
senting the region’s aboriginal heritage, such as evidence of stone tools, are present 
(Hayter & Barnes, 2012).
Forest conflicts have been generated by newly empowered stakeholders to initi-
ate remapping processes, and their resolution has required new institutions. Indeed, 
institutional innovation is essential to implement compromises among established 
and new stakeholders with different motivations and mandates. Such innovation in 
turn produces new uncertainties and policy dilemmas, rooted in its experimental 
nature and the range of interests that have to be accommodated. For example, envi-
ronmental bargaining over forests, especially old growth forests, is inherently dif-
ficult because adversaries have fundamentally different views of resource values 
and no common goal or easy metric to resolve conflicts (Affolderbach, 2011). What 
might be described as cultural bargaining over aboriginal rights, self- determination, 
and resource tenure is no less fraught with conflicting value systems. Furthermore, 
forest policy involves expectations over long-term horizons that are hard to define, 
can vary among participants, and over the past decade have become more compli-
cated by the implications of climate change, which themselves vary from place to 
place. In this regard, the ecological implications of sustainable forestry will require 
increased scientific knowledge of local conditions and ecosystems that can be antic-
ipated to shape forest policy in ways yet unforeseen as they evolve. Faced with these 
dilemmas, forest remapping is inescapably uncertain.
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 Globalization and Forest Conflict Resolution: Shareholder 
and Stakeholder Models
The destabilization of Fordism since the late 1970s and the onset of a contemporary, 
more volatile period of globalization have posed significant policy challenges, stim-
ulating debates about appropriate forms of governance from global to local levels 
(Jessop, 1998; Mayntz, 2003). These debates have resonated strongly throughout 
forest peripheries where the models of stakeholder or shareholder remapping pro-
vide alternative starting points to remapping (Fig. 16.1). The shareholder model’s 
proponents are allied to neoliberal thinking, emphasizing markets, hierarchies, and 
the economic motivations of shareholders. In this approach, environmental values 
can be achieved through privatization and deregulation—that is, by the establish-
ment of appropriate property rights and market exchange rather than by regulation 
(Anderson & Leal, 2015). In contrast, the proponents of the stakeholder model of 
remapping promote more broadly-based decision making driven by new stakehold-
ers, including those committed to principles of sustainability, and whose empower-
ment comes at the expense of vested market interests and entrenched government 
and corporate hierarchies. Put another way, the shareholder’s share is predomi-
nantly, sometimes exclusively, economic, whereas the stakeholder’s stake may also 
be cultural, ethical, environmental, or intrinsic.
In idealized form, shareholder and stakeholder  remapping represent different, 
contentious ideologies and policy prescriptions. Yet these processes are problematic 
to disentangle and both impulses may exist in the same periphery, both subject to 
context and contingency. In an Indonesian context, specifically the forest and min-
ing activities of Kalimantan, Tsing (2005) argues that the impact of neoliberalism as 
a universal force is modified by local frictions in the form of local cultural practices, 
contributing to hybrid neoliberal forms. At the same time, locally rooted stakehold-
ers typically seek economic development that involves serving markets, and formu-
lators of local plans cannot ignore global connections, whether perceived as threats 
or opportunities. Further, the environmental and cultural interests underlying new 
stakeholder models can be seen as either countervailing responses to neoliberal- 
inspired stakeholder remapping or as quasi-autonomous alternatives with distinc-
tive roots and mandates. Indeed, the evolution of environmentalism is intimately 
linked with industrialization, becoming a powerful expression of contemporary glo-
balization (or universal, in Tsing’s terms) in response to the implications of 
Fordism’s rapidly escalating demands for resources in support of mass production 
and consumption. In turn, environmentalists have sought to impose their views, 
sometimes against resistance from local peoples who wish to preserve local prac-
tices (Stevens, 2014).
As mentioned in our introductory comments, it is tempting to link stakeholder 
and shareholder approaches respectively with institutional thickening and thinning. 
In BC’s Great Bear Rainforest, for example, stakeholder remapping required insti-
tutional innovation and thickening both to bring together opposing parties to 
exchange views and develop respectful relationships (talking the talk), and to 
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implement new forms of governance (walking the walk) that allow actors to use 
forests in mutually acceptable ways (Clapp et al., 2016). More generally, common 
property forest tenures around the globe involve cooperation among diverse partici-
pants (Moran & Ostrom, 2005). Ostrom’s notion (Ostrom, 2010) of “polyvalent 
governance” emerges from stakeholder remapping, and with it she underlines the 
importance of institutional innovation in conflict resolution. In contrast, the privati-
zation of forests in Chile and New Zealand and the reduction in ownership regula-
tions meant the removal of constraints on market-driven interests (Clapp, 1995; 
Roche, 1990). The blurred distinctiveness of shareholder and stakeholder remap-
ping is captured in the terms themselves: Stakeholder once referred to a miner or 
logger who had established a stakes for private profit; now it implies participation in 
more diversified, democratic models of governance.
In practice, remapping is context-driven, shaped by government policies that pri-
oritize development. However, it is often pragmatic, opportunistic, and difficult to 
categorize, even within the same region. In BC, for example, studies have empha-
sized neoliberal (shareholder) influences on forest remappings (McCarthy, 2006), 
the limits and “hybridization” of these influences, and alternative more democratic, 
shareholder models of governance (Hayter & Barnes, 2012). This opacity is reflected 
in broad policy shifts. Thus, during the 1980s, forest policy under a right-wing pro-
vincial government became confused, responding effectively to neither the reces-
sion nor the wars in the woods. During the 1990s, until 2001, initially under the 
slogan of bringing “Peace in the Woods,” a left-wing government introduced a bat-
tery of regulations concerning environmental issues, aboriginal rights, tenure 
reform, regional planning, and timber taxation that are hard to relate to a neoliberal 
agenda. Since 2001, right-wing governments have deregulated forestry to some 
degree, including the removal of appurtenancy, the requirement that logs be pro-
cessed in local mills. Most recently, in 2017 a new minority left-wing government’s 
attempts to return to a remapping agenda have faced considerable challenges cre-
ated by continued industry downsizing and concerns for profitability and by the 
diversity of stakeholder interests. In some respects, stakeholder perspectives have 
been retained or enhanced, such as in the adoption of the community forest model 
(McIlveen & Bradshaw, 2009). Even the controversial removal of appurtenance 
could be seen as a practical (not ideological) response to declining timber supplies 
insufficient to support existing mill capacity. In the case of the iconic Great Bear 
Agreement of 2016, a paradigmatic case of the stakeholder model, although the 
roots of this accomplishment were established in the left-wing forestry regulation of 
the 1990s, its realization has occurred under right-wing government since 2001. 
And if forestry conservation has been a powerful trend in BC, its continuance is not 
automatic: For example, Tasmania’s Nature Conservation Act 2002 is in jeopardy to 
federal electoral politics (Affolderbach, 2011).
However blurred, the shareholder-stakeholder distinction usefully identifies dis-
tinct impulses that can be found, in varying mixes, in forest peripheries around the 
globe. However, if impulses are defined in terms of strong, sometimes ideological 
driving or motivating forces, they are not autonomous. Although shareholder think-
ing is supported by extremely powerful economic and political institutions, 
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stakeholder models are increasingly widespread, a trend desirable for enhancing 
local interests and empowerment in the wise use of resources.
 Shareholder Impulses
The implications of neoliberal imperatives of privatization and deregulation for for-
est peripheries were most dramatically visible in the burgeoning plantation forest 
sectors of Chile and New Zealand. Indeed, Chile may be regarded as a neoliberal 
pioneer, privatizing its plantation forests in the 1970s, predating the emergence of 
Reaganism and Thatcherism as synonyms for neoliberalism in the 1980s. In prac-
tice, however, the expansion of Chile’s plantation sector has been heavily subsi-
dized and promoted by government, notably in the 75% reforestation subsidies 
established by Decree Law 701 in 1974 (Clapp, 1995). Indeed, the plantations were 
privatized twice, as the government re-acquired much of the resources following the 
crisis of the early 1980s, only to then re-auction the plantations and forest lands, in 
the latter case stimulating a considerable degree of foreign investment. Neoliberalism 
continues to exert lasting influence in Chile, where ownership of plantations pro-
vides collateral and thereby secures access to credit.
In New Zealand’s case, in response to economic crisis, the implementers of a 
new national government’s embrace of neoliberalism to provide strategic direction 
for the economy targeted the forest sector (Roche, 1990). In 1987, the New Zealand 
Forest Service was replaced by the Forestry Corporation, a state-owned enterprise, 
that in 1988 began to privatize the country’s plantation forests, first established in 
the 1920s. Privatization, mandated to increase efficiency and reduce the national 
debt, redefined New Zealand’s forest sector. By 1995, over 90% of plantation for-
ests were under private control, and MNCs became major players controlling more 
than half of forest production. Nevertheless, New Zealand’s policymakers com-
bined their commitment to the neo-liberal shareholder model with a new approach 
to conservation. The remaining native forests, most located in mountainous regions, 
were designated for conservation purposes in 1987, and their management turned 
over to a newly created Department of Conservation. New Zealand’s productive 
plantation forest lands have been leased rather than sold outright, and it remains 
possible that they could be subject to Maori land claims, even if the latter have been 
rendered difficult by privatization (Coombes, 2003). Meanwhile in BC, forest lands 
have remained under public control, and environmental and aboriginal interests 
have opposed any suggestion of privatization, despite the strong pro-market, neolib-
eral tendencies routinely associated with right-wing provincial governments.
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 Stakeholder Impulses
In contrast to shareholder thinking, stakeholder impulses to remapping Fordist for-
estry are driven by diverse motivations, initiatives, and understandings, with priority 
given to conservation, sustainable development, and stronger commitments to local 
uniqueness, values, and control. Importantly, the crafters of stakeholder models do 
not exclude markets, and their evolutionary dynamics are highly varied, predating, 
coevolving with, and responding to Fordist forestry. In Japan, for example, during 
the 1950s and 1960s—the heyday of Fordist forestry—small-scale log auctions 
were expanded throughout the country, reducing transaction costs for local private 
wood-lot owners and small-scale sawmills (Reiffenstein & Hayter, 2006). These 
arrangements, rooted in a long history of cooperative forestry (Totman, 1989), are 
now in slow decline, because of significant opportunity costs outside of forestry for 
landowners and workers, coupled with low cost imports. Nevertheless, their contin-
ued operation reflects interlinked local concerns for jobs, community, and the envi-
ronment. In Europe, various forms of small-scale forestry cooperatives exist to 
similarly maintain the multi-purpose attributes of forests (Weiss, 2011). In many 
developing countries where communities are highly dependent on forest resources, 
the actors of various forms of cooperative polyvalent governance manage forests as 
common property (Ostrom, 2010).
The most visceral conflicts occur where proponents of stakeholder approaches 
seek to provide an alternative to shareholder models, and to replace implanted 
Fordist forestry. In these situations, stakeholder models are both more democratic 
and messier because they diversify and decentralize decision making influence over 
forest use. Furthermore, the point of a stakeholder model is to demand paradigmatic 
change in forest use, and to challenge conventional scientific wisdom in forest use 
that has emphasized the one-size-fits-all approach embodied in the so-called normal 
forest. In a North American context, for example, Rajala (1998) argues that forestry 
science evolved as a handmaiden to industry, its scientists privileging the market 
values of timber and emphasizing a standardized approach to harvesting as well as 
the rotational clear cutting of large blocks that were expected either to regenerate 
naturally or by reforestation with a preferred species monoculture. In this view, 
“over-mature” forests lost value with each year they stood to rot, and needed to be 
cut quickly, before they became “worthless” (Percy, 1986). However, as previously 
noted, proponents of this view ignored or under-estimated both environmental and 
technological risks (Langston, 2005). In contrast, environmental and local propo-
nents of stakeholder models emphasize ecological science aimed at preserving the 
multiple attributes of forests and their management in locally contingent ways.
Stakeholder remapping of Fordist forestry practices requires the coevolution of 
learning and bargaining processes among existing vested interests and new stake-
holders. In general terms, learners must embrace knowledge of local ecologies and 
cultural practices and bargaining to embrace actors representing, at least in part, 
noneconomic interests. In BC’s Great Bear Rainforest, for example, institutional 
innovations enabled the warring parties to talk with one another and exchange views 
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in a constructive manner. The Joint Solutions Project (JSP) brought industry mem-
bers and environmentalists face to face to find common ground, and to develop 
proposals for stakeholder negotiations. The Coast Information Team (CIT), a scien-
tific boundary organization, and the Turning Point Initiative, a protocol between 
First Nations and the provincial government, were other crucial institutional innova-
tions that facilitated discussion and bargaining toward the final agreement reached 
in 2016 (Affolderbach et al., 2012; Clapp et al., 2016; Price, Roburn, & MacKinnon, 
2009). The JSP agreement between industry and ENGOs stopped the latter’s market 
campaigns against the companies in return for a moratorium on logging in 30 water-
sheds and led to the creation of the CIT. As a boundary organization, the CIT com-
piled data on the ecology of the GBR in an Ecological Spatial Analysis, a GIS that 
was constructed by and acceptable to all stakeholders—ENGOs, indigenous peo-
ples, industry, and government (Clapp & Mortenson, 2011). This organization 
helped resolve confrontations between ENGOs and industry and encouraged more 
constructive bargains based on shared knowledge and common areas of agreement. 
Meanwhile, the Turning Point Initiative depended on recognition by the provincial 
government that negotiations with indigenous peoples would be “government to 
government” (G2G), rather than merely stakeholder to government (Davis, 2009). 
In this regard, a series of court decisions have empowered First Nations, who, from 
being excluded, have become highly influential, and whose interests, knowledge, 
and consent must now be explicitly included in forestry decision making.
These institutional process innovations were vital to enable contesting parties to 
learn and bargain effectively with one another and construct new rules and codes of 
conduct for the new stakeholder model. Their mission complete in this regard, the 
JSP and CIT are now disbanded, although the GIS data base remains. Further, as a 
result of the dialogue inspired by these initiatives, including the G2G negotiations, 
the final Great Bear Forest Agreement remapped the region in terms of permitted 
activities and their governance, creating more permanent institutions, in the forms 
of new rules and organizations—ecosystem-based management, community for-
ests, conservation areas, indigenous forestry firms, and new forms of financing. Will 
these new developments work out as intended?
 Assessing Stakeholder Remapping as an Emergent Form 
of Good Governance
Do these new stakeholder agreements that have replaced Fordist forestry models, of 
the kind illustrated by the GBR Agreement or more ambiguously by Tasmania’s 
Conservation Act, constitute good governance? The answer is not straightforward. 
As long appreciated, global forest types, uses, and governance are highly differenti-
ated within ecosystems and regions as well as among countries. Nevertheless, the 
idea of global paradigmatic change comprises possibilities for transformation. 
Moreover, the idea of a stakeholder model informed by ecological science is rooted 
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in the importance of local context. Admittedly, the implications of crisis and conflict 
for forest governance within stakeholder models may not be important. For exam-
ple, across Europe, where property rights are well established, institutional innova-
tion in forestry practices is rarely seen as a form of conflict resolution. Elsewhere, 
however, as Ostrom’s (2010) pioneering work has demonstrated for many develop-
ing countries, the creation of various forms of polycentric governance has been vital 
to resolving forest conflicts.
Ostrom (2010, p. 652) systematically analyzed polycentric governance in which 
problem solving is a major theme and developed a common set of eight “design 
principles [that promote] long surviving resource institutions” in managing com-
mon pool resources.
Locally, the success of stakeholder remapping depends upon the effectiveness of 
new routines for meeting stakeholder goals for sustained development. These rou-
tines are most obviously seen in the establishment of formal organizations and rules, 
with associated incentives and penalties. Routines and institutions may also be 
informal and less tangible. Indeed, the authors of a considerable literature suggest 
that social capital in the form of trust, cooperation and social networking enhances 
local development (Storper, 1997). From this perspective, brief reference to Ostrom’s 
(2010, p. 652) systematic analysis of polycentric governance as problem solving 
responses to forestry conflicts around a common set of eight “design principles [that 
promote] long surviving resource institutions” in managing common pool resources 
is a good place to begin contemplation of the effectiveness of stakeholder remapping.
As Ostrom argues, polycentric governance encompasses wide-ranging institu-
tional arrangements that are more complex than economic systems controlled by 
markets and governments. Ostrom’s (2010, pp. 653–654) design principles relate to 
transparency, locally congruent resource appropriation and provision, collective 
choice arrangements, monitoring of users and resources, sanctions, conflict resolu-
tion, recognition of rights, and links to higher levels of governance. Thus, the local 
resource system should be clearly demarcated, and the boundaries between legiti-
mate users and non-users be defined. Resource appropriation and maintenance rules 
should make sense in terms of local ecological conditions and the distribution of the 
benefits and costs of resource utilization should be fair. All stakeholders affected by 
resource use should be part of the decision making process. Users should monitor 
resources, and policymakers should graduate sanctions to penalize rule violation 
and supplement them with low-cost, local mechanisms for conflict resolution. The 
government should recognize local users’ rights to make their own rules. Finally, if 
part of a larger territory, governance mechanisms are needed to ensure coherence 
between local and regional decision making. Further, the rules shaping common 
pool resource use are enormously varied in practice; Ostrom (2010, p.  651), for 
example, recognizes seven categories of rules pertaining to the role of actors (bound-
ary, position, and choice rules) and potential outcomes (information, aggregation, 
payoff, and scope rules).
Moreover, in successful polycentric governance design, principles and rules are 
embedded in social relations in which trust among actors plays a key role (Ostrom, 
2010, p. 642). As a central concept of social capital, trust reduces transaction costs 
16 The Remapping of Forest Governance: From Shareholder to Stakeholder
390
by facilitating mutual understanding, cooperation, and the predictability of behav-
ior. Indeed, in their analysis of community forestry projects in BC, McIlveen and 
Bradshaw (2009) emphasize the strong role of “social cohesion” and “community 
support” in distinguishing successful projects from failures. Like Markey et  al. 
(2012) in their study of transitioning resource communities in BC, these authors 
also identified leadership as a key ingredient for local development, but whose 
availability and capability cannot be guaranteed.
 Implications of Conflict Resolution for Trust and Cooperation
In common pool and property resources, problem  solving occurs when disputes 
arise among users with a shared interest in the resource’s use. In Ostrom’s design 
principles, the problems that arise are best handled locally by accepted mechanisms. 
However, more formidable conflicts arise in the context of remapping when stake-
holders have diverse motivations and goals for resource ownership and use and 
where local, low-profile, and low-cost dispute resolution rules are difficult to con-
struct. Indeed, the effectiveness of agreements rooted in deep-seated conflict and 
mistrust, and where rule setting is politicized and legalistic, must be questioned in 
regards to promoting sustainable development. Are the new rules appropriate or 
even permanent? Will investors face increasing transaction costs? Can stakeholder 
agreements be modified in the light of experience without generating more rancor 
and mistrust? Are the new agreements less democratic than messy and cumber-
some? Is trust and cooperation possible following protest and litigation?
Although finalized only recently, the Great Bear Rainforest Agreement 2016 
helps illuminate the ramifications of these questions. This widely lauded agreement 
demonstrates the trend from top-down hierarchical and distant decision  making 
over forest resources towards more democratic, locally sensitive governance. In par-
ticular, the provincial government and industry have both lost influence, whereas 
ENGOs and most especially First Nations have gained influence. From a social 
capital perspective, the GBR Agreement has achieved significant progress in devel-
oping cooperation, witnessed by the various forms of institutional thickening as 
well as the various stakeholders’ ability to work together. The Agreement also 
embraces a wider range of values and privileges local interests who have intimate 
understanding of local resources and can perhaps be better trusted to achieve sus-
tainable practices.
Yet the main actors involved in the GBR Agreement continue to have different 
values and conflicting mandates. ENGOs, for example, remain as watchdogs over 
industrial logging and have already claimed violations of the Agreement by local 
industry. In contrast, ENGOs are reticent to criticize activities by First Nations, even 
though they were upset (and surprised) by the latter’s decision to reject Forest 
Stewardship Council certification—the supposed Cadillac standard of eco- 
certification—because of its costs and bureaucracy. Forest resources for commercial 
use have been allocated among various indigenous groups who appear to be 
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adopting different strategies, ranging from contracting out or hiring specialized 
companies in ecosystem-based management to hopes of adding value. Whether for-
est resource allocations are individually large enough to justify investments in pro-
cessing facilities is an important question, especially if coordination among 
indigenous groups remains a challenge. Remoteness, difficulties of access, and a 
small population base mean that both local and export markets are extremely limited.
Within the GBR Agreement, the provincial government reserves the right to 
approve mining and other resource developments apart from forestry. Any major 
proposed developments, however, would likely re-ignite opposition and litigation 
from ENGOs and First Nations who now have the support of recent Canadian 
Supreme Court precedents. The fear of further litigation is real and in turn indicates 
higher transaction costs for proposed developments. Beyond perhaps some informal 
local monitoring and policing by indigenous groups, no locally recognized dispute 
settlement mechanism seems to exist that can deal with issues expeditiously. Any 
negotiations for large-scale developments are likely to be messy, at least. Indeed, in 
stakeholder remapping, such as in the GBR, different interests have distinctive 
forms of legitimacy, and each group needs to demonstrate some form of achieve-
ment to the particular constituencies they serve or wish to address.
From a local development perspective, trust and cooperation are important in 
developing competitiveness because they reduce the transaction costs of exchange 
and facilitate the development of localized external economies. Moreover, where 
human resources are sparse, trust and cooperation are even more important to ensure 
that available energy is not wasted. But trust and cooperation take time to construct, 
both informally and formally, and actors must combine them with some form of 
penalty to prevent opportunism and free riders. From a governance perspective, the 
failure to develop workable social bargains might well encourage neoliberal 
impulses in which markets are seen as a more efficient alternative. For local com-
munities and ENGOs, such failure may reinforce conflictual modes of behavior. 
Even so, from a common property perspective, progress towards clear design prin-
ciples is evident, for example, in identifying the GBR boundary and the boundaries 
of ecological sub-regions, the recognition of resource user rights (and benefit 
streams) among indigenous peoples and principles of local empowerment, and 
acknowledgement of monitoring functions.
 Conclusion
Forest use and governance is highly varied around the world, engaging societies at 
all levels of development. Driven by the depletion of old-growth forests, rising pop-
ulation pressures, growing industrial demands for resources, and the globalization 
of markets, forest conflicts have become widespread. Forest conflicts themselves 
are highly varied, and may involve: arson, violence, and illegal expropriation, impo-
sitions of radically different government policies on local economies, localized dis-
putes among competing users, and the paradigmatic remapping of forest use away 
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from a narrow focus on commodity production towards a recognition of environ-
mental and cultural benefits of the forest. In this chapter, we have explored this lat-
ter theme.
Remapping is inherently contentious as it involves threats to vested interests and 
deeply ingrained ideas about resources and development, and it requires alternative 
patterns of forest use and governance. These proposals have roots in both share-
holder and stakeholder models or ways of thinking. If this duality is blurred in 
practice, we have argued that stakeholder models—akin to Ostrom’s concept of 
polyvalence—potentially provide differentiated, locally informed, and empowering 
ways to realize the goals of remapping in support of sustainable development. 
Proponents of shareholder approaches emphasize the public goods and benefits of 
forests, while recognizing the divergent interests of local and nonlocal actors. 
Moreover, the creation of stakeholder models on the ground requires innovative 
thinking, both in terms of bringing divergent parties together and developing new 
forms of cooperation and trust with new routines and institutions that enact 
cooperation.
At the same time, stakeholder models need to be validated beyond simple repu-
diation of shareholder (neoliberal) thinking. That is, stakeholder approaches must 
be evaluated in terms of their desired goals and mandates. In this regard, future 
researchers face important challenges. Comparative analyses of the institutional 
innovations underlying remapping would sharpen understanding of the global-local 
dynamics shaping initiatives and possibilities regarding new forms of governance. 
More generally, there is a need to develop frameworks to compare and critically 
assess whether stakeholder approaches to conflict resolution are working as desired, 
both in the pioneering regions generating them and in other regions whose inhabit-
ants look to them as models for resource governance. The creators of such frame-
works might also incorporate a wider range of resource activities within the theme 
of remapping, contrasting the spatial footprint and environmental impacts of min-
ing, fishing, and grazing with those of forestry.
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Chapter 17
The Governance of Global Innovation 
Systems: Putting Knowledge in Context
Christian Binz and Bernhard Truffer
 Broadening the Governance of Innovation Systems
In a globalizing knowledge economy, innovation processes increasingly depend on 
interaction between distant places (Corpataux,  Crevoisier, & Theurillat, 2009). 
However, most authors of innovation policy literature continue to focus on pro-
cesses that happen within specific territorial boundaries such as countries or regions. 
They generally justify their national or regional focus by arguing that science, tech-
nology, and innovation policies are typically formulated by national or regional 
policy makers, or that innovation related governance structures differ substantially 
between regions and countries. This perspective has been particularly salient in 
innovation system frameworks, which have become one of the core frameworks to 
inform innovation policy from a governance perspective (Sharif, 2006). In order to 
address the challenges of globalization, researchers must thus elaborate a number of 
conceptual extensions to innovation system approaches. In particular, regionally or 
nationally embedded innovation processes must be connected to dynamics that 
emerge from multiscalar actor networks or from the interplay between innovation 
processes in different spatial subsystems (Martin, 2016; Weber & Truffer, 2017).
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The concept of Global Innovation Systems (GIS) was recently developed to address 
some of these challenges (Binz & Truffer, 2017), building on recent contributions in 
innovation studies whose authors emphasize actor networks and institutional contexts 
for innovation that are interrelated across spatial scales (Bunnell & Coe, 2001; Carlsson 
& Stankiewicz, 1991). Various analytical approaches have conceptualized the increas-
ing importance of international linkages between and beyond territorial innovation sys-
tems (for an overview, see, e.g., Carlsson, 2006; Grillitsch & Trippl, 2013). However, 
other scholars have criticized these concepts for remaining rather vague about how 
supranational actor networks and institutions influence innovation processes and how 
they differ between different types of sectors and industries (Binz, Truffer, & Coenen, 
2014; Coenen, Benneworth, & Truffer, 2012; Grillitsch & Trippl, 2013).
The GIS framework accordingly explicitly specifies how key system resources for 
innovation are formed in multiscalar networks. In order to grasp the complex spatial 
configuration of a GIS, two conceptual extensions are proposed. First, subsystems are 
defined based on the actors, networks, and institutions that generate key system 
resources (knowledge, market access, financial investment, and technology legiti-
macy) that are necessary for innovation processes (see Binz,  Truffer, & Coenen, 
2016). These subsystems may or may not coincide with territorial boundaries of coun-
tries or regions. Second, the overall performance of a GIS depends on whether the 
relevant subsystems effectively interrelate through so-called structural couplings. 
These extensions lead to a typology of four ideal-type GIS configurations, distin-
guishing the industry’s dominant innovation modes—STI (science- technology and 
innovation) versus DUI (doing, using, and interacting) (Jensen, Johnson, Lorenz, & 
Lundvall, 2007)—and the economic system of valuation in which markets for the 
innovation are constructed—standardized valuation in global mass markets versus 
customized valuation in local contexts (Huenteler, Schmidt, Ossenbrink, & Hoffmann, 
2016; Jeannerat & Kebir, 2016). Depending on the innovation and valuation mode, the 
elements of a GIS may be either spatially mobile (with many international spillovers) 
or rather sticky (with most spillovers constrained to specific regional contexts).
The proposed focus on multiscalar industry dynamics calls for new innovation 
governance approaches, which require coordination between multiple actors both 
inside and outside of specific countries or regions. We define innovation governance 
in line with prior governance and innovation studies as the self-organizing networks, 
negotiated interorganizational coordination, and decentered, context mediated inter- 
systemic steering that influences the creation, diffusion, and application of novel 
technologies, products, and services (Benz,  Lütz,  Schimank,  & Simonis, 2007; 
Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991; Jessop, 1998). Proponents of innovation system 
approaches early on implicitly adopted a governance perspective in that they per-
ceived state actors and their innovation policy interventions as only one—if often 
very important—actor group in broader agentic constellations that jointly shape the 
directionality of emerging technologies and industries (Weber & Rohracher, 2012; 
Weber & Truffer, 2017). Innovation governance in GIS therefore emphasizes the 
interplay among different actors who may be active in and across distant territorial 
subsystems, their transnational networks, as well as the multiscalar institutional 
structures that may promote, hinder, or shape the trajectory of emerging technolo-
gies and industries. In this context, conventional national and regional innovation 
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policymakers must reflect on how they intervene in transnational innovation pro-
cesses, what kind of system resources they mobilize locally or anchor from distant 
regions, and how actors residing outside their own jurisdictions may be influenced. 
Furthermore, it also puts in relief what sort of coordinative institutions are needed 
at a global level that may shape, hinder, or promote new solutions to emerging 
global challenges. The recent globalization of renewable energy industries high-
lights the need for such an approach (Binz, Tang, & Huenteler, 2017). It is probably 
still fair to say that the topic of global innovation system governance has not received 
sufficient attention (Truffer, 2012).
In the present chapter, we will formulate a first tentative contribution to the prob-
lem of global innovation system governances by elaborating on implications of the 
multiscalar governance constellations that align with the four innovation system 
configurations proposed by the GIS concept’s supporters (Binz & Truffer, 2017). 
The increasing globalization of innovation activity calls one to understand, antici-
pate, and integrate effects of spatial spillovers in place-based innovation governance 
strategies. One of this framework’s key implications is that the existing focus on the 
governance of knowledge creation must be complemented with strategies that target 
“valuation” processes, as in the construction of new markets, the management of 
technology legitimacy, or the mobilization of financial investment (Jeannerat & 
Kebir, 2016).
We will elaborate these arguments as follows. We first review challenges that 
globalization poses to the existing innovation system literature. In the following sec-
tion, we introduce the Global Innovation System framework alongside the industrial 
typology derived from an in-depth assessment of the innovation and valuation 
dimension. In the section on policy and governance implications of global innova-
tions systems, we elaborate the governance implications for different actors operat-
ing at various spatial scales. We then reach a conclusion in the last  section and 
provide a view on how knowledge must be contextualized in order to effectively 
inform the governance of increasingly globalizing innovation dynamics.
 Existing Perspectives on Innovation Systems 
in Transnational Contexts
Innovation system scholars emphasize that innovation emerges from complex actor 
networks that combine complementary knowledge stocks and capabilities into new 
solutions, all in the context of specific institutional settings (Lundvall, 1992). They 
utilize a system metaphor to emphasize the distributed yet dynamically coordinated 
nature of many innovation processes. Positive externalities that emerge from the 
interaction among universities, firms, policy makers, NGOs, and various intermedi-
aries are a key prerequisite to the innovation process, which can however not be 
steered or controlled by any actor on his or her own (Nelson, 1993).
Scholars have formulated different variants of the IS concept over the years, 
including a national (NIS) (Lundvall, 1988), sectoral (SIS) (Malerba, 2002), 
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regional (RIS) (Cooke,  Gomez Uranga,  & Etxebarria, 1997), and technological 
(TIS) (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991) approach. Although each variant emerged 
from the same roots in innovation studies and evolutionary economics, their devel-
opers also created their own research program with a somewhat distinct epistemol-
ogy and methodological approach (Coenen & López, 2010). Given these differences, 
cross-fertilization between the various traditions of IS research has remained sur-
prisingly scant (Weber & Truffer, 2017). This siloed thinking in the IS tradition has 
proven to be particularly problematic when trying to formulate a more international-
ized perspective on innovation processes. In an international context, the multisca-
lar overlaps between regional, national, sectorial, and technological elements move 
center stage. Yet, the existing literature on global, international, or multiscalar IS 
has generally reflected a lack of integrative thinking in the IS tradition (Carlsson, 
2006; Niosi & Bellon, 1994; Oinas & Malecki, 2002; Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2009).
The GIS approach builds on recent developments in the TIS tradition and adds 
more internationalized perspectives from other IS literatures, whose authors recently 
emphasized the multiscalar actor networks and institutional contexts that jointly 
support (or hinder) the formation and diffusion of innovation (Jurowetzki, Lundvall, 
& Lema, 2015; Oinas & Malecki, 2002). In some cases, the relevant IS structures 
may be largely reducible to specific territorial contexts, yet in the majority of cases, 
they depend on actor strategies, networks, and institutional dynamics that coevolve 
between different parts of the world. The possible combinations of actors, networks, 
and institutions that support or hinder innovation in GIS are thus almost countless, 
and alternative configurations of the systems’ structure can lead to similar perfor-
mance characteristics (Edquist, 1997). As the different system elements become 
more complexly structured internationally, relating not only to system structures but 
also to key activities, we propose to focus on the formation dynamics around four 
distinct system resources—knowledge, market access, financial investment, and 
technology legitimacy (Binz et al., 2016).
Each of these resources emerge from distributed agency in the system and may 
each depend on actor networks with specific spatial configurations. For example, a 
market for a novel technology may not preexist and have to be proactively con-
structed by firms, prosumers, and intermediaries in specific regions (Dewald & 
Truffer, 2012). Similarly, financial investors may only be willing to invest in an 
innovation after the related industry has been legitimized to some degree and key 
performance and quality standards have been defined for the related products. 
Knowledge may be created in an international network of firms, universities, and 
private R&D labs, whereas technology legitimacy may depend on the formulation 
of globally accepted quality standards (like in the ISO process). In this conceptual-
ization, global innovation systems consist of sub-systems that create each of the 
four necessary system resources and are coupled to each other by multiscalar actor 
networks and institutional contexts (for a more expansive discussion, see Binz & 
Truffer, 2017).
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 Analyzing Global Innovation Systems: Introducing 
Multiscalar Relationships
To further characterize the spatial configuration of system resource formation pro-
cesses, we must elaborate two conceptual elements in more detail: (1) subsystems 
of a GIS and (2) structural couplings between them. In the following, we will elabo-
rate these elements and then propose a heuristic for assessing their spatial 
configuration.
The notion of subsystems closely relates to the question of where system 
resources form and which actors are able to access them. We define subsystems not 
in a spatially predefined way, but as the actor networks and institutions involved in 
the formation of system resources. Subsystem boundaries can correspond to national 
or regional borders, but they may also develop in networks that transcend these 
borders. An emblematic example of multiscalar resource formation processes are 
those created by dispersed communities of practice, as in the open source software 
field. Here, actors are often spread globally, but still develop shared cultures, knowl-
edge stocks and investment models that outsiders would find hard to copy and 
access (Binz & Truffer, 2017; Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003). A similar example is 
innovation in the membrane bioreactor field, which initially emerged from a global 
R&D network spanning engineers in French transnational water companies and 
research institutes in various places around the world (Binz et al., 2014).
In a GIS perspective, the successful creation and diffusion of an innovation ulti-
mately depends on how actors combine knowledge, investment, markets, and legiti-
macy into new configurations that work. The performance of a given GIS thus 
depends on (1) whether each system resource is created in a subsystem and (2) 
whether subsystems are coupled to each other in order to form a coherent global 
innovation trajectory. Structural coupling here relates to the foundational elements 
of an IS – actors, networks, or institutions (see Bergek et al., 2015). For example, 
internationally active firms, international conferences, and trade fairs or an indus-
try’s professional culture and quality standards are all examples of coupling domains 
that may integrate knowledge, market, financial, and institutional elements from 
various GIS subsystems.
Resource formation and coupling dynamics in GIS are accordingly multipolar 
and fluid. As key system resources are emerging from subsystems with varying 
geographies, actors in the GIS will in many cases be unable to directly appropriate 
a dominant share of them in-house or inside a given region or country. Instead, they 
will have to create strategic alliances and rely on nongeographic types of proximi-
ties to access and anchor a full resource portfolio in a given place (Boschma, 2005). 
Resourceful actors with a global reach (e.g., transnational companies, global donor 
organizations, or professional associations) are in a superior position to facilitate 
effective integration of spatially spread subsystems, but integration may also hap-
pen in a specific region with very dense inter-organizational networks, or even in a 
loosely coupled community of traveling technology experts (Larner & Laurie, 2010).
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Given this high spatial complexity in any GIS, the question arises of how the 
generic system configuration may be systematized for different industries. Binz and 
Truffer (2017) start from the well-established assumption in the sectorial innovation 
systems literature that differences in an industry’s technology characteristics condi-
tion the spatial characteristics of the innovation processes (Huenteler et al., 2016; 
Malerba, 2005). The GIS framework complements this view by emphasizing the 
coevolution of an industry’s knowledge base with capabilities to facilitate institu-
tional and market embedding. The latter concerns in particular processes like mar-
ket formation, resource mobilization, and technology legitimation, which together 
define technology valuation, as in the ways in which new products, means of pro-
duction, and infrastructures are connected to relevant demands and symbolic frames 
of the customer base. Proponents of the GIS framework therefore propose an indus-
try typology that distinguishes two principal components: characteristics of techno-
logical innovation (focusing mostly on knowledge related system resources) and 
product valuation (related to market formation, the mobilization of financial 
resources, and legitimacy).
On the technological innovation side, industries can be characterized with regard 
to whether they subscribe more to a science and technology driven (STI) innovation 
mode or whether they depend on learning by doing, using, and interacting (DUI) 
(Jensen et al., 2007). The STI mode is more common in industries with science- 
based, analytical knowledge bases (e.g., biotechnology, pharma, solar PV), whereas 
the DUI mode characterizes innovation based on engineering-based synthetic 
knowledge bases (e.g., car manufacturing, machine tools, wind power) 
(Asheim, Coenen, & Vang, 2007; Herstad, Aslesen, & Ebersberger, 2014; Martin & 
Moodysson, 2013). STI-based industries rely on scientific principles, which can be 
codified in models, patents, and reports. Formalized R&D inside the company, tight 
industry-university linkages and radical technology breakthroughs characterize 
these fields (Huenteler et al., 2016). In STI-based industries, knowledge can rela-
tively easily get disembodied and exchanged in space. This industry type will 
accordingly give rise to significant knowledge spillovers beyond regional and 
national borders (Moodysson & Jonsson, 2007; Schmidt & Huenteler, 2016).
Regarding the characteristics of valuation processes, one may distinguish 
between standardized and customized valuation systems (Jeannerat & Kebir, 2016). 
In the former case, valuation is happening in global mass markets with highly con-
verging user tastes and distribution channels. TV sets, for example, may be pro-
duced anywhere and shipped to supermarkets all over the world to cater to very 
similar user tastes. In customized valuation systems, in contrast, new products will 
have to be strongly tailored to specialized user preferences that may vary consider-
ably in space. Before an innovation may be sold, the innovation system actors will 
have to engage in intense user-producer interaction to form new use-patterns, estab-
lish socially accepted price-performance relationships, or create reputational capital 
in the form of brands and labels (Dewald & Truffer, 2011; Fligstein, 2007). It fol-
lows that GIS with standardized valuation systems will create considerable spatial 
spillovers, whereas customized valuation systems require territorially embedded 
and thus spatially sticky interaction processes.
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By cross-tabulating these two dimensions, a typology of four ideal-type GIS con-
figurations can be derived (cf. Fig. 17.1). Industries can be roughly positioned in the 
framework relative to each other, as they often represent different mixtures of innova-
tion and valuation approaches. Also, the position in the typology may depend on the 
maturation stage of a particular product or industry. These complexities notwith-
standing, the four types can be correlated with a characteristic GIS configuration (see 
Fig. 17.1). The combination of an STI innovation mode and a standardized valuation 
system will lead to a footloose spatial structure of the GIS with various spillovers 
inside and between each subsystem. We would therefore expect system resource for-
mation processes to depend on substantial interaction at an international level or to 
shift rapidly from one region to the next. This setup may be exemplified by the solar 
PV module industry or by home electronics manufacturing. The combination of a 
customized form of valuation with a DUI technological innovation mode will—in the 
other extreme—lead to a spatially rather sticky GIS configuration, with spillovers 
largely restricted to specific local/regional contexts. This will ultimately lead to 
strong regional path dependencies and a high variety of customized product variants. 
Typical examples may be the biogas industry or the housing construction sector. 
Industries with a DUI-based innovation mode and standardized valuation system can 
be described as production-anchored GIS types. This setup will create strong and 
Fig. 17.1 Four ideal-type GIS Configurations. Author’s own elaboration, based on Binz and 
Truffer (2017). Copyright 2017 by Elsevier B.V. Adapted with permission
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persistent geographies of industry leaders managing global value chains to serve 
global markets. Examples are the automobile industry or information and communi-
cation technologies (Lee & Lim, 2001). Finally, the combination of an STI knowl-
edge base and highly customized markets will create market-anchored GIS structures. 
This GIS type will often depend on global companies with a strong knowledge base 
in embedding generic technologies into a variety of local contexts. Examples com-
prise personalized cancer medicine, but also many civil engineering- based infrastruc-
ture services (Moors, Fischer, Boon, Schellen, & Negro, 2017; Yap & Truffer, 2019).
The four ideal-type GIS configurations imply radically different governance 
approaches for all those actors who attempt to shape the innovation process, com-
prising multinational companies, universities, as well as policy makers in specific 
regions or countries. It may also apply to intermediary actors like NGOs, civil soci-
ety groups, or professional associations that have an interest in influencing the 
directionality of the emerging innovation trajectories. The resulting governance 
structures of GIS will depend on the interplay between the actors’ different strate-
gies. In the following section, we will elaborate some of the implications that the 
presented typology has for the characteristic governance modes in each GIS type 
and how they impact strategies of companies, noncommercial, and nongovernmen-
tal actors as well as governments at different spatial scales.
 Policy and Governance Implications of Global 
Innovations Systems
The discussion above implies that innovation governance at a national or regional 
level should not myopically focus on regionally available assets, but closely reflect 
the targeted industry’s GIS configuration. Industries with a spatially sticky GIS can 
profit most from conventional innovation governance and policy approaches operat-
ing predominantly at regional to national scales, while footloose GISs are most 
directly challenging traditional governance approaches. Market-anchored and 
production- anchored GISs in turn challenge specific parts of traditional region- or 
nation-focused innovation governance paradigms.
 Innovation Governance in Spatially Sticky GISs
In spatially sticky GISs, system resources as well as innovation and valuation 
dynamics depend on spatial embedding and profit from dense colocation of the 
relevant actors. For instance, developing the first wind turbines was only possible in 
a few territorial clusters in Denmark or Germany, which facilitated dense user- 
producer- intermediary interaction (Garud & Karnoe, 2003). Similar observations 
hold for innovation in the biogas industry (Wirth, Markard, Truffer, & Rohracher, 
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2013). In this GIS type, co-creating the first product designs and market solutions in 
a given region or country continues to provide a sustained first-mover advantage in 
later stages of the innovation trajectory.
Effective innovation governance for this GIS type thus depends on a territorially 
specific strategic niche management rationale (Kemp,  Truffer, & Harms, 2000). 
Producers, users, and various intermediary actors will have to be colocated in a 
given region and supplied with patient capital1 and a (subsidized) market niche in 
which experimentation, trial & error, as well as complex learning-by-doing and 
interacting can occur. In addition, the recombination of preexisting technological 
capabilities in a gradual, related diversification process will be of key importance 
(OECD, 2013). The key element providing comparative advantage lies in stimulat-
ing continuous interaction between the innovation and valuation side of the indus-
try, thus repeatedly improving the product’s main features based on the historically 
grown industrial specialization and cultural identity of a given region. As such, this 
approach goes beyond conventional (manufacturing) cluster initiatives, which we 
would rather relate to the production-anchored GIS type. Structural couplings 
across different territorial innovation systems are perhaps of lowest importance in 
this GIS constellation. They may relate to knowledge exchange through mergers 
and acquisitions or long-term investments in other regions. But essentially, the core 
system resources are largely available in territories where innovation and valuation 
actors co-locate.
An emblematic example of the governance challenge for this GIS type is the 
early wind turbine industry. Garud and Karnoe (2003) observed that the Danish 
(DUI-based, distributed) bricolage approach to developing wind turbines proved 
more effective than the American (STI-based, centrally controlled) breakthrough 
governance approach. Later studies confirmed that the pioneering wind turbine 
regions in Denmark retained considerable first-mover advantages, even in later life-
cycle stages when strong industrial competitors emerged in India or China and 
when the industry disintegrated its value chain (Lewis, 2007). Having a tightly inte-
grated innovation governance mode proved a locational asset throughout the indus-
try lifecycle, which was characterized by repeated radical innovations in different 
parts of the product architecture (blades, gearing, turbine control systems, etc.) 
(Huenteler et al., 2016).
 Innovation Governance in Footloose GISs
The challenges for innovation governance in footloose GIS types directly contrasts 
the above explanations, as this industry type’s innovation system resources emerge 
in internationally dispersed networks that are hard to locate and retain in any 
national or regional context. Rather than spatially embedded learning by doing, this 
1 Private or state-based financial investments made without expectation of turning a quick profit.
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industry type profits from STI-based innovation processes as well as subsidies and 
trade policies that enable the quick upscaling of manufacturing capacities, as well 
as price-competitive production for standardized mass markets.
Conceptually, industries with a footloose GIS type can thus best be governed 
with an STI-based free trade approach: Tax credits, low-interest loans, liberal trade 
policies, and the creation of centers of excellence in science-based R&D will all 
support local firms in accessing internationally available system resources and com-
peting in a fierce global price and quality competition. Patenting, trademarks, and 
technology standardization will be of decisive importance in this type of innovation 
process with a dynamic and often noncumulative technology trajectory (Castellacci, 
2008). Latecomers in this GIS type may profit from anchoring system resources 
available elsewhere in order to embark on dynamic catch-up processes (Binz & 
Anadon, 2018). Innovation governance actors in developed economies will thus 
have to anticipate and deal with latecomers leapfrogging to the technological fron-
tier and fast shifts in the global innovation landscape (Lee & Lim, 2001; Zhu, He, & 
Zhou, 2017). We would accordingly expect transnational corporations to be a core 
actor in this GIS type. They are able to serve global markets and shift the production 
base quickly between regions according to changing production cost differentials. 
For national or regional governments, this GIS type implies a rather weak role with 
an inherent risk of suffering from spill-over effects of national policy efforts.
The experience with the solar PV industry in Germany illustrates how this GIS 
type challenges conventional, nationally delimited innovation governance 
approaches. The quite ambitious market deployment subsidy (feed-in-tariff) that 
Germany introduced in 2002 was aimed at creating a mass market that would pro-
vide various actors in the German renewable energy sector with a first-mover advan-
tage (Hoppmann, Huenteler, & Girod, 2014). Although the policy proved successful 
in the wind power and biogas sectors, its frictions with the PV sector’s footloose 
GIS configuration quickly became apparent. Given the ubiquitous international 
structural couplings and spillovers in this GIS type, the subsidized local mass mar-
ket induced substantial spillovers to latecomers in other places, in particular to 
China (Quitzow, 2015). Chinese PV firms were particularly skillful in accessing and 
anchoring markets, knowledge, investment, and legitimation dynamics from other 
regions in the GIS into a local industrial path that quickly became globally competi-
tive (Binz & Anadon, 2018). German firms and policy makers were initially not 
anticipating the disruptive effects of the manifold spatial spillovers to China 
(Hoppmann et  al., 2014), which ultimately led to significant trade disputes with 
Chinese competitors. The GIS framework suggests that German actors could to 
some degree have anticipated these global interdependencies and that some sort of 
international governance scheme would be needed in footloose GISs to regulate the 
spatially imbalanced costs and benefits of these spatial spillovers.
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 Innovation Governance in Market-Anchored GIS
Market-anchored GISs may in turn profit most from an innovation governance 
approach that relies on a high-quality lead market rationale: Here, creating pilot 
applications and successful new market segments for highly demanding customer 
segments is most decisive for innovation success. In this GIS type, innovation- 
related system resources may circulate globally whereas the valuation dynamics 
will depend on institutional embedding in specific local contexts. Market experi-
ence and demonstration effects in one place may thus be turned into a sticky loca-
tional advantage that can be mobilized when exporting the product to new places 
(Beise & Rennings, 2005).
Conceptually, a governance system that is adapted to this industry type would 
have to facilitate valuation-side dynamics, for example, in the form of deployment 
policies, “public procurement for innovation” (Edquist & Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 
2012), and the close coordination between producers and a local customer base with 
the highest quality requirements (Porter, 1990). For instance, the culturally diverse 
movie audience in Hollywood is a key resource for the local film industry for testing 
the reception of their work in various parts of the world. Rather than supporting 
basic R&D or breakthrough innovation locally, a smart governance design would 
encourage the local industry to access globally available innovative ideas and opti-
mize their (economic/social/environmental) performance in demanding local appli-
cation contexts. GIS governance structures will therefore have to facilitate pipelines 
to global knowledge networks while also supporting a locally embedded actor base 
that experiments with adaptations to the locally specific institutional settings and 
preference structures. National and regional policy makers might be able to define 
specific variations in the design of the solutions that are implemented, while simul-
taneously having to accept the globally predefined core of the technological 
paradigms.
Examples that illustrate this governance challenge can be drawn from the mem-
brane bioreactor (MBR) or the personalized cancer medicine industries (Binz & 
Truffer, 2017; Moors et  al., 2017). In the former case, technological innovation 
emerged from highly internationalized R&D networks that span various EU coun-
tries, Asia, and the USA (Binz et al., 2014). Although various technological designs 
coexisted for a long time, a key question was where first mass-markets would 
emerge that would steer the technological trajectory in a specific direction and 
reduce insecurities and manufacturing prices. US, European, and Chinese actors 
were the first to create niche markets driven by increasingly rigid water quality 
standards (Yap & Truffer, 2019). Given the geographic and institutional particulari-
ties in each region’s valuation system, the chosen technological configuration and 
favored technology providers strongly differed between regions (Yang, Cicek, & 
Ilg, 2006). The MBR industry is now an oligopoly, dominated by lead firms like GE, 
Kubota, or Beijing Origin Water that have strongly adapted their valuation strategies 
to specific market regions. Recently, Chinese firms moved to a leading position 
based on a targeted valuation-side governance approach. By strongly increasing the 
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quality criteria for surface water and standardizing the favored technology designs 
(based on criteria from local design institutes), a large market for high-quality MBR 
systems was created in China that could best be served by a local start-up, Beijing 
Origin Water. These changes in the valuation system enabled Chinese firms to 
quickly innovate, gain a dominant market position in the high-quality home market, 
and subsequently export their products to other latecomer countries (Yap & 
Truffer, 2019).
 Innovation Governance in Production-Anchored GIS
Finally, the case of production-anchored GIS asks for a cluster- and RIS-based gov-
ernance approach (Tödtling & Trippl, 2005), which creates a highly networked, 
specialized manufacturing base. Here, competitive regional advantages will not pre-
dominantly stem from local niche markets, but rather from cumulative synthetic 
knowledge stocks and culturally embedded cooperation patterns in manufacturing 
processes. Innovative products will emerge from collective, experience-based com-
petencies in designing complex technical systems. As such, strengthening local 
knowledge circulation and recombination at the supply side of innovation is more 
important than supporting market structures, which can also be accessed globally 
(Boschma, Coenen, Frenken, & Truffer, 2017).
A governance approach adapted to these challenges would enable informal 
knowledge exchange in dense industry-supplier-university networks, while also 
supporting worldwide market access and knowledge exchange. This governance 
mode may depend on creating intense local knowledge exchange (local buzz) 
(Bathelt, Malmberg, & Maskell, 2004) as well as the creation of local cluster orga-
nizations, networking events, or business incubators supporting spin-offs from the 
incumbent industry and universities. Regional actors would have to jointly create 
applied science organizations with specialized curricula in the respective techno-
logical field and support on-the-job and vocational training. At the same time, the 
regional/national innovation governance structures would have to support exports 
into global markets with, for example, image campaigns abroad or by investing into 
trade infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, etc.) and complementary business service 
industries (market research or logistics). GIS governance actors will thus have to 
foster regional/national knowledge and skill specializations in global production 
networks that are often dominated by multinational lead firms.
The car industry illustrates the challenge of this innovation governance model. In 
terms of valuation dynamics, user tastes have grown highly standardized and gravi-
tate around a few very similar car models. In addition, the manufacturing and sup-
plier networks for cars are globally standardized and organized in highly fragmented 
value chains (Dicken, 2015). On the innovation side, the car industry provides an 
emblematic case of spatially sticky innovation system structures. For almost a cen-
tury, the decisive innovation and design competencies have remained concentrated 
in the headquarters of the major OEM companies that are in turn embedded in 
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policy- supported automotive clusters in Germany, France, Japan, Korea, or the USA 
(Dicken, 2015). The recent ascent of battery-driven and plug-in hybrid vehicles may 
challenge this production-anchored GIS structure. Newcomers such as Tesla, BYD, 
or Google cars are disrupting the sector by introducing more STI-based elements 
related to digitalization and self-driving capabilities. With an increasing shift toward 
an STI-based and customized GIS configuration, the traditional innovation clusters 
in the industry are now forced to build new pipelines to partners in regions with 
IT-based capabilities. Whether and how governance systems in the traditional car 
manufacturing clusters will successfully transform to react to this challenge remains 
an open empirical question (Miörner & Trippl, 2018) (Fig. 17.2).
This GIS-based innovation governance frameworks provides two interrelated 
novel contributions. On the one hand, it helps to assess and predict the prevalence 
of unintended spatial spillovers from national policy interventions, as in the solar 
PV case. On the other hand, it may be used to identify and eliminate factors that 
hinder the fast development and diffusion of innovation at supra-national scales, 
that is, it could be used to expand Weber and Rohracher’s (2012) system failure 
frameworks with a “global policy coordination failure.” In the case of solar PV dis-
cussed above, erratic regional and national policy support in various parts of the 
world led to global overcapacities and trade disputes, which now significantly ham-
per the GIS’s capacity to diffuse the innovation. In this GIS type, a global gover-
nance structure would in principle be needed that integrates and coordinates 
innovation dynamics in various parts of the world. Such a governance structure 
could construct a more level playing field for all involved parties by mitigating trade 
Fig. 17.2 Innovation governance models and policy approaches in each GIS type. Source: Design 
by authors
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disputes and coordinating policy learning and innovation dynamics in various parts 
of the world.
 Policy and Governance Implications: Putting Knowledge 
in Context
In the present chapter, we have elaborated how innovation governance structures 
have to be reconsidered under conditions of increasingly globalizing industry 
dynamics. National and regional competition on industrial leadership grows fiercer 
and more varied than ever, which asks for new ways of overcoming bottlenecks for 
innovation success. This is all the more important in the context of industry dynam-
ics that address global challenges, such as in “cleantech” or “green” sectors. The 
dominant governance approaches to this challenge have so far focused on condi-
tions for leveraging knowledge formation and emphasized intellectual property 
rights and scientific excellence, combined with regional cluster initiatives or smart 
specialization strategies. We have extended this view by showing that innovation 
success in some industries depends on being able to anchor extra-regional system 
resources and addressing valuation processes, that is, the management of emerging 
markets, the generation of technology legitimacy, or the leveraging of financial 
resources. Under these conditions, the portfolio of governance mechanisms extends 
into more procedural or evolutionary options that favor experimentation, the align-
ment of production capacities with local institutional structures, or the proactive 
shaping of new industries in the form of lead market strategies.
A key challenge for governing Global Innovation Systems lies in the fact that 
policies and industry roadmaps are still mostly formulated, legitimized, and exe-
cuted in territorially bounded contexts. Yet we have shown that in almost all indus-
try types (except for spatially sticky GISs), a sound understanding of internationalized 
innovation system structures is a key prerequisite for formulating effective regional 
or national governance schemes and support policies. Simply focusing on local 
innovation capabilities (e.g., through R&D support, clusters, RIS, industrial dis-
tricts, etc.) will not be sufficient. Rather, national or regional governance approaches 
have to be extended to address actors, institutional contexts, and networks that lie 
outside their territories. In some extreme cases, supporting the innovative capacity 
of domestic industries, one might even have to encourage market formation or legit-
imation processes in distant places (e.g., through cooperation with globally active 
NGOs and industry associations). In addition, actors may have to consider new 
governance mechanisms and institutional arrangements that operate at a global 
level in order to counteract barriers for industry formation if pursued through 
national policies in isolation. This relates to questions of intellectual property rights, 
free trade arrangements, the definition of international standards, and the like. In the 
context of Global Innovation Systems, knowledge for governance therefore means 
adapting the governance of knowledge to multiple, multiscalar industrial contexts. 
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Besides knowledge about producing novel technologies, it is equally important to 
competently manage social contexts in which these technologies must be embedded 
and thereby create supportive valuation contexts.
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Chapter 18
Experimentalist Systems in Manufacturing 
Multinationals: Recursivity 
and Continuous Learning Through 
Destabilization
Gary Herrigel
Permanent innovation pressures riddle many contemporary manufacturing sectors 
with uncertainty. In search of new product ideas and processual improvements to 
gain advantage over competitors, firms continuously modify and improve both their 
internal and external relations and processes. Such constant searching and optimiza-
tion destabilizes routines and relations, creating both possibility and hazard for 
firms and their stakeholders. Uncertainty, the distrust that current resources and 
practices will yield future advantage, is both the cause and consequence of these 
continuous optimization processes. As a result, coping with uncertainty is a core 
governance challenge in contemporary manufacturing firms and across their sup-
ply chains.
Production globalization exacerbates these dynamics in two ways. First, it dif-
fuses routine and relational disruption practices to offshore locations. Manufacturing 
MNCs compete with one another all over the world on the basis of cost, quality, and 
innovation. Increasingly, in sectors like automobiles and machinery, product sophis-
tication differs little across the markets in which MNCs actively produce (Horner & 
Hulme, 2017; Horner & Nadvi, 2017; Sutton, 2012). Consequently, firms confront 
uncertainty in offshore markets at least as intense as they experience in their home 
markets. These pressures induce firms to extend their search and optimization prac-
tices (and the continuous routine and relational disruptions that they involve) to 
their offshore locations.
Second, globalized production further generates uncertainty simply through the 
complexity involved in managing the global interrelations and interdependencies of 
far-flung and increasingly sophisticated production clusters manufacturing common 
technologies. Complexity associated with localization pressures—the need to adapt 
models to local tastes and conform with indigenous standards and regulations—
adds to the uncertainty by destabilizing designs and production practice. Further, 
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players at the center of an MNC exploit innovations and improvements that are 
generated both at home and offshore and seek to leverage them for advantage in 
other locations, including the firm’s nominal home location. This in turn further 
disrupts routines and relations in all the receiving locations, creating uncertainty.
The upshot is that many global manufacturing firms live with the uncertainty of 
product change and routine and relational disruption throughout all aspects of their 
global operations, virtually all the time. Indeed, it is not merely something that they 
respond to; it is an environmental situation that they chronically self-induce in order 
to leverage innovation from where it occurs to where it can be advantageously 
deployed.1
In this article, I argue that these highly uncertain environmental conditions and 
internal firm self-disrupting practices are generating a notable shift away from con-
ventionally hierarchical governance architectures in complex manufacturing sectors 
like the automobile and machinery industries. Continuous innovation and change in 
products and processes push traditionally separate functionalities, such as concep-
tion/execution, design/production, finance/manufacturing, assembler/supplier, and 
headquarters/local subsidiary into explicit mutual dependence. The content and 
scope of functionalities and roles, increasingly, are defined and redefined interac-
tively, through the mutual participation of stakeholder parties, rather than through 
top-down processes of command and control. Roles and identities are too unstable 
and transient to support rigid hierarchical authority; the imperative for learning and 
for the diffusion of knowledge throughout the MNC overwhelms the clumsy and 
slow-moving unilateral pretenses of top-down bureaucratic order.
But if traditional hierarchical bureaucratic governance no longer works, how do 
firms govern their global operations? What are the principles of effective gover-
nance under conditions of uncertainty that can accommodate and foster continuous 
routine disruption, innovation, and learning? This article uses case study material on 
German automobile and machinery multinationals to show that at least those MNCs 
are managing the uncertainties that their practices encounter and generate by devel-
oping post-bureaucratic “experimentalist” architectures.2
1 All this in addition to the continuous negotiations and struggles between MNC home office inter-
est and the ambitions of local players, dynamics that have been the focus of much literature on 
MNC Center-Local relations. See, generally, Kristensen and Zeitlin (2004), and for an interesting 
case, Glückler (2014).
2 I am not claiming that there is something specifically German about these practices. They are 
simply German cases. For what it is worth, Netland (e.g., Netland, 2013) and others see the diffu-
sion of self-optimizing CPSs as a general trend. For the material in this paper, I am drawing on a 
series of research projects I conducted with German collaborators. We conducted over 150 inter-
views in Germany, Central Europe, and China between 2008 and 2015  in the automobile, auto 
components, electromechanical, and machinery industries. My aim here is simply to exploit the 
rich and extensive fieldwork that we did in German companies and describe the experimentalist 
dynamics that we found there. I am saving the important discussion of national specificities for 
another day. For a more detailed description of the German case material from which I draw, see 
Herrigel, Voskamp, and Wittke (2017). For an in-depth study whose authors deal extensively with 




These alternative governance architectures are formal systems of multilevel, 
interdependent, stakeholder role-, standard- and goal-setting practices that presup-
pose the provisionality of initial targets (roles, standards, designs, production and 
cost goals, etc.). Iterative evaluation of frameworks in light of the experience of 
putting them into practice, at all levels of the MNC, fosters continuous—and for-
mally prescribed—optimization, improvement and learning throughout the organi-
zation. Centrally (and collectively or jointly) set goals and standards are modified 
through the process of attempting to realize them; formally prescribed requirements 
on the local adapters to defend their changes to central actors both disciplines the 
local and opens the center to the possibility for the transformation of its own goals 
and roles.3 The experimentalist systems are processual and interdependent; they are 
formal and inclusive; and they use collective self-surveillance to foster organiza-
tional and technological learning and innovation.4
In a very general way, such architectures instantiate a variant of what the man-
agement theorists Maurizio Zollo, Sidney Winter (Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 
2002), David Teece (Teece, 2007; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), and A. G. L. Romme 
(1997, 1999; Romme,  Zollo, & Berends, 2010) call “dynamic capabilities.” 
According to Zollo and Winter (2002, p. 340): “A dynamic capability is a learned 
and stable pattern of collective activity through which the organization systemati-
cally generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved effective-
ness.” It is “exemplified by an organization that adapts its operating processes 
through a relatively stable activity dedicated to process improvements.” Such capa-
bilities arise, they argue, “from learning; they constitute the firm’s systematic meth-
ods for modifying operating routine.”
Dynamic capability theorists use the notion in an extremely general way to apply 
to architectures that can govern the revision of operating routines under a wide array 
of environmental conditions. Hence bureaucratic hierarchy and post-bureaucratic 
experimentalism can both be, so to speak, dynamically capable. Zollo and Winter 
(2002) suggest that robust dynamic capabilities of the post-bureaucratic sort—in 
other words, in which deliberative and codified learning processes are integral to 
3 In this sense, the perspective here runs orthogonally to the debate about HQ-subsidiary relations 
and embeddedness, for instance, the influence of local institutional relations on subsidiary prac-
tices (e.g., Becker-Ritterspach & Dörrenbächer, 2009; Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2011). Under the 
important background condition of uncertainty, experimentalist practices routinely accept local 
deviation from central standards, but formally require an explicit justification from local actors. 
The center is open to local modification because its members want to identify and circulate benefi-
cial or effective aspects of local innovations across all its global subsidiaries performing similar 
manufacturing projects. For a discussion of the relationship between the perspective here and the 
global-local literature on MNCs, see Herrigel et al. (2017, Chap. 4).
4 Indeed, because the experimentalist practices presuppose the existence of deep environmental 
uncertainty, the analysis here also runs orthogonally to the HQ-subsidiary literature whose authors 
focus on subsidiary initiative and intra-corporate power relations (e.g., Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 
2008; Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2016; Glückler, 2014). These authors presuppose role posi-
tions where the actors know their interests before they act; the analysis here highlights the way in 
which uncertainty causes precise role identities and interests to emerge out of joint deliberation.
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practice—come into being (a) in turbulent and uncertain environments; (b) when 
there is a learning culture or predisposition in the organization; (c) when less fre-
quently occurring, more heterogeneous, and causally ambiguous tasks are in play.5 
Under these conditions, they argue, purely behavioral or practice-based forms of 
randomly induced learning are conditioned and modified by more directive, delib-
erative, and formal learning mechanisms.
I argue here that post-bureaucratic or “experimentalist” architectures, which are 
generated under the conditions of uncertainty outlined above, are distinctive within 
this genus of dynamic capabilities, for three reasons.6 First, they presuppose exten-
sive stakeholder involvement in the establishment and revision of standards and 
organizational goals. Uncertainty undermines hierarchy, destabilizes roles and 
functions, and makes stakeholder cooperation across boundaries inescapable. Call 
this the principle of transparency and inclusion (Sabel, 2006; Simon, 2015). Second, 
they emphasize the provisionality and continuous revision of deliberatively estab-
lished standards and goals in light of practical experience. Crucially here, where 
bureaucracy governs by rule and relies on unaccountable, informal, and random 
discretion to reconcile rule with practice, experimentalism formally demands 
accountability from discretion (peer review, reason giving) in order to modify and 
improve, rather than simply reconcile, rule and practice. Call this the principle of 
revisable planning or governance by plan rather than by rule (Simon, 2015).
Third, experimentalist architectures are formally proactive and preemptive rather 
than reactive about error, mistake, and deviation in processes. Simon (2015, p. 62) 
says that post-bureaucratic organizations tend “to rely on audits more than com-
plaints, and.… [take] a diagnostic approach to complaints, understanding them not 
just as evidence of idiosyncratic deviance, but as symptoms of systemic malfunc-
tion.” Call this the principle of improvement-oriented self-surveillance.
Experimentalist governance, then, can be understood as a form of dynamic capa-
bilities in that it involves learning not just at the level of operational routines for the 
production of given automobiles or machines; it also involves the optimization and 
recomposition of the learning process itself. But experimentalist architectures are 
distinctive in their explicit effort to use transparency, inclusion, revisable planning, 
and improvement-oriented self-surveillance to cast not only routines but also very 
explicitly the boundaries and inter-relations of roles and functions within the orga-
nization into play. By erecting a governance architecture capable of continuously 
recomposing roles and functions, in addition to routine practices, experimentalist 
governance induces distinctively self-recomposing circular or recursive learning 
processes throughout MNC global operations.
The German firms studied here apply this experimentalist version of dynamic 
capability throughout their organizations, from headquarters to off-shore subsidiary 
and from top management suite to production-level, shop-floor teams. A central 
5 See also Romme et al. (2010).
6 See Simon (2015) for elucidation of post-bureaucratic principles in administrative law; see 




diffusion mechanism for these practices is the Corporate or Comprehensive 
(Ganzheitliche) Production System (CPS) (Netland, 2013; Netland & Aspelund, 
2013; Netland & Ferdows, 2014; Netland & Sanchez, 2014). Inspired by the origi-
nal Toyota Manufacturing System, such team/stakeholder-driven formal systems 
have transformed German manufacturing culture today. Their experimentalist char-
acter enhances companies’ dynamic capability to negotiate uncertainty in their mar-
ket and technological environments through induced processes of circular learning 
and the continuous recomposition of roles and function across organizations in 
response to challenges.
When they are working properly, experimentalist systems foster and diffuse both 
organizational and technological innovation within companies and across supply 
chains (Helper,  MacDuffie, & Sabel, 2000; Herrigel, 2010; Sabel, 2006; Spear, 
2009). As such, they enhance German manufacturing competitiveness and induce 
continuous producer and regional upgrading in emerging economies 
(Herrigel, Wittke, & Voskamp, 2013).
Finally, movement towards experimentalism within manufacturing MNCs is nei-
ther seamless nor uncomplicated (Netland & Ferdows, 2014). Indeed, there are 
three characteristic obstacles to the diffusion in practice of experimentalism’s 
recompositional and circular learning dynamics: hierarchical insulation, stake-
holder exclusion, and inadequate empowerment resources for participants. 
Interestingly, these obstacles exist not only ex ante, as firms attempt to construct the 
experimentalist architectures of corporate production systems and implement them 
throughout their global operations, but they also are continually regenerated by the 
recompositional dynamics of the CPS’s themselves. Revision of commonly agreed- 
upon frameworks frequently redefines power relations and stakeholders, creating 
new possibilities for insulation and exclusion.
In order to prevent such obstacles from paralyzing the global process of recursive 
learning, many experimentalism-oriented German MNCs, using the principle of 
improvement oriented self-surveillance, introduce an array of destabilization mech-
anisms to systematically undermine insulation and exclusion strategies within the 
global firm and reconstitute the deliberative experimentalist learning process. 
Interestingly, CPSs often contain penalty default mechanisms as part of the experi-
mentalist framework which systematically monitor widespread deliberation pro-
cesses for possible paralysis and, when finding it, redefine the deliberative terrain to 
re-start deliberation (and learning) on a new basis.
This article portrays manufacturing MNCs using experimentalist systems as 
extraordinarily dynamic organizations (embedded in equally dynamic supply 
chains) characterized by recursive learning and chronic organizational disruption 
and recomposition over time. A snapshot of these organizations at any instant in 
time contains complex admixtures of joint problem solving, team-based goal set-
ting, hierarchical insulation strategies, and patterns of stakeholder in/exclusion. 
Viewed over time, however, as a constantly self-disrupting process, experimentalist 
multinationals emerge as dynamically recursive learning systems focused on per-
manent organizational and technological optimization and innovation.
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The article proceeds in three sections. The first section outlines the global com-
petitive and strategic conditions that have given rise to experimentalist governance 
architectures within manufacturing multinationals and their supply chains. The sec-
ond  section describes experimentalist architectures and how they work. It also 
addresses a number of failed alternative strategies that German firms pursued prior 
to embracing experimentalist practices. The third section then discusses character-
istic obstacles to experimentalism’s diffusion, many endogenous to the practice of 
experimentalism itself, along with a range of strategies and mechanisms that firms 
deploy to overcome them.
 Experimentalism Grows out of Uncertainty Associated 
with Changing Global Demand and Attendant 
Production Relocation
From a developed country’s manufacturing MNC point view, global opportuni-
ties for growth and expansion have shifted notably in the new century (Baldwin, 
2016; Horner & Hulme, 2017; Kobrin, 2017; Sutton, 2012). During most of the 
twentieth century, the largest manufactured goods markets were also the fastest 
growing ones. For US, German, and Japanese manufacturers, this meant that they 
targeted the bulk of their exports and FDI efforts at developed (western) European, 
North American, and North Asian economies. This situation began to change in 
the new century, however, as emerging market economies, notably the BRICS, 
became the driving forces of global growth (cf. Horner & Nadvi, 2017; World 
Bank, 2015).
Significantly, emerging market demand growth has been so rapid, technologi-
cally challenging, and quantitatively massive that it cannot be serviced through 
exports alone. Instead, firms have been forced to expand FDI and service demand 
in those emerging markets by “producing where they sell.” Since 2009, for exam-
ple, German automobile makers have produced more cars outside of Germany than 
inside Germany (Heymann, 2014; VDA, 2012, p. 30). China has, by far, become 
the largest offshore production location for Germans (VDA, 2017). Similar shifts 
away from export and toward offshore production characterize automobile indus-
try development in Japan, Korea, the USA, and France (VDA, 2017). In most 
cases, companies develop global models that are then adapted to local market 
conditions.
Crucially, this shift toward producing where they sell involves significant 
upgrading of offshore production operations (Herrigel et al., 2013, 2017; Horner & 
Hulme, 2017; Sutton, 2012). Competition for market share in growing markets 
such as China is intense and customer sophistication is developing rapidly (Brandt 
& Thun, 2010). In order to be competitive, FDI manufacturers must pay attention 
to manufacturing economies and product quality. Moreover, the MNC affiliates 
must be able to offer products that appeal specifically to the needs and preferences 
G. Herrigel
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of local customers and that are designed according to host country regulatory 
norms and standards. This presses manufacturers to upgrade local operations in 
three areas: production worker skill levels, supply base sophistication, and local 
R&D, design, and engineering capability (Brandt & Thun, 2010; Herrigel et al., 
2013; Sutton, 2012).
These strategic shifts within MNCs have created extensive “internal” networks 
of interconnected production clusters in different global regions, all focused on 
trying to manufacture the same or very similar end products. This generates quite 
distinctive governance challenges within global manufacturing MNCs. Firms need 
to optimize exports from home locations with global offshore production capacity 
while simultaneously reconciling constant imperatives for process and product 
optimization, innovation, cost reduction, and learning, not only within individual 
plants, but also centrally and locally across vast global organizations. This is not 
easy: Innovation can increase costs; optimization and cost reduction can undermine 
learning; too much local autonomy can generate centrifugal pressures weakening 
the various forms of leverage (learning, knowledge, purchasing) that come with 
global concern membership; too much central direction can undermine local inno-
vation and organizational capabilities crucial for competitive advantage in foreign 
markets.7
Not only that, global competition is so dynamic that there is never a natural 
sweet spot in which all of these competing goals and pressures can be stably recon-
ciled or in which a happy equilibrium can be found. New products, technical inno-
vation, competition among suppliers, new local regulations, currency value shifts, 
organizational learning induced possibility—and much more—all constantly desta-
bilize the ordered practices that firms develop and generate new adjustment and 
governance challenges. Innovation, cost reduction, and learning are imperatives for 
all actors throughout MNC operations, yet environmental uncertainty is so great 
that at any given moment players have no clear sense of what strategy would be 
most optimal for them to achieve those goals. Forced, nonetheless, to act, I here 
argue that they turn to the revisable and recursive measures associated with 
experimentalism.
 Global Strategies Governed by Self-Recomposing 
Experimentalist Learning Architectures Within MNCs 
and Across Supply Chains
Uncertainty along multiple dimensions is thus a crucial element in the emergence of 
the new global governance practices within manufacturing MNCs. It is not, however, 
analytically helpful (nor empirically accurate) to view successful manufacturing 
7 For exploration of these dynamics, see Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008), Becker-Ritterspach and 
Dörrenbächer (2009), and Dörrenbächer and Geppert (2011).
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MNC governance efforts as “reactions” seeking to “cope” with continuously uncer-
tain and recombinatory practices in their organizations and the environment. Rather, 
this section shows that many manufacturing MNCs are creating (transnational) gov-
ernance architectures that systematically induce organizational destabilization and 
recompositional experimentation to foster innovation and learning.8 This proactive 
destabilization is accomplished through the workings of formalized “experimental-
ist” systems, such as corporate production systems (CPSs), Six Sigma programs, and 
other formal systems of open standards (e.g., ISO certifications). Such systems foster 
collective self-analysis through formally transparent and inclusive procedures that 
involve joint goal setting, systematic performance review, prompt problem solving, 
and organized destabilization of insulation and exclusion strategies.
 What Is an Experimentalist Governance Architecture?
I describe the emerging recursive or circular learning-based processes in MNCs as 
“experimentalist” because they resemble what Charles Sabel, Jonathan Zeitlin, 
William Simon, and others call “experimentalist governance architectures” in public 
policy and administrative law contexts (Sabel, 2006; Sabel & Simon, 2011; Sabel & 
Zeitlin, 2008). Those scholars, in turn, draw theoretically on the American Pragmatic 
tradition’s use of the word experimentation. Experimentation, pragmatically under-
stood, describes the relational, interactive, and social character of identity, goal setting, 
and action, in which goals and the means adopted to achieve them are continuously 
modified and optimized through the social action process (cf. Dewey, 1922; Joas, 1996).
In its most abstract analytical form, the experimentalist governance architecture is 
a formalized four-step recursive process. All actors are aware of the formal rules and 
obligations that constitute the system. First, there is joint or collective goal setting. 
Relevant stakeholders (what Dewey called “publics”) commonly affected by a given 
problem openly deliberate about solutions and future goals for their common interac-
tions. Second, local stakeholders then implement/pursue these solutions and goals in 
their milieu. Application or realization of the common standard in the local environ-
ment invariably requires local player discretion: Unanticipated problems emerge, 
intermediate benchmark goals are not fulfilled, local conditions differ from the styl-
izations used during the general deliberations, and so forth. The center permits local 
discretion—deviation from agreed upon practice or standards—in order to facilitate 
problem solving and adaptation that enables the local organization to achieve the goal 
target. But these deviations must be transparent (other players must be able to observe 
or review them). In a third step, the deviation/local change must be defended to the 
central stakeholder teams who delegated the design/standard/goal. Finally, fourth, 
successful local experiments are then used to review the effectiveness and desirability 
8 Again, this condition distinguishes the view here from authors of other HQ-subsidiary literatures 
who take a more structuralist position, attaching specific interests ex ante to particular role posi-
tions, compare Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008).
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of central/common goals and standards. If the local innovation is compelling enough, 
this can result in modification of the central standard (Fig. 18.1).9
The experimentalist governance school applies this framework to workings of 
public policy and regulation (cf. also Sabel, Herrigel, & Kristensen, 2018), but it is 
a very fruitful way to understand how many contemporary MNCs are using CPSs 
and other formal standard-setting and review mechanisms to govern their global 
operations. CPSs are formal systems that organize group- or stakeholder-based goal 
setting within firms to achieve product and process innovation, optimization (cost 
reduction), and learning on a continuous basis.10 The systems are rooted in team 
goal-setting/standardization procedures (regular goal setting meetings) and consti-
tute a hierarchical architecture of team-based goal conversations, ultimately linking 
(through many mediations) the shop floor to the top management.
The conversations are also systematically cross-functional and global. Product 
teams, customer teams, design and manufacturing teams, and continuous improve-
ment teams all are constituted in multiple locations and form super-ordinate or 
umbrella teams that engage with one another across markets and geographical space 
9 Compare this inclusive and mutual role-defining four-step circular model to the more hierarchical 
four-step circular model presented by Zollo and Winter (2002, p. 343): External stimuli and pro-
cessual feedback produce 1.) generative variation (scanning, recombination) →2.) internal selec-
tion (evaluation, legitimation) →3.) replication (knowledge sharing/transfer adaptive variation, 
problem solving) →4.) retention (enactment, routinization).
10 See Friedli and Schuh (2012), Sabel (2006), Spear (2009), Westkämper and Zahn (2009) for 
general discussions; for international case studies of implementation and diffusion, see Clarke 
(2005), Netland (2013), Netland and Federow (2014), Netland and Aspelund (2013), and Netland 
and Sanchez (2014).
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to identify common goals and standards and compare (and defend) their local 
experiments.
CPSs have diffused widely among manufacturing MNCs. Many companies 
brand their CPS (e.g., The Siemens Production System or The Volkswagen 
Production System). The companies also characteristically provide their own corpo-
rate names to the mechanisms of goal setting, self-evaluation (performance review), 
benchmarking, joint problem solving, and goal revision. Despite this nominal vari-
ety, however, all follow the general experimentalist logic outlined above. Many 
smaller companies also embrace similar formal, experimentalist, team-governed, 
lean production-based principles, even though most do not attempt to “brand” 
their system.
The following example, taken from a German Truck and Omnibus transmission 
producer (Auto-Getriebe), illustrates the globally recursive and learning elements of 
these systems.11 Joint German design and manufacturing teams developed a new 
variant of a medium-sized transmission for the global market. They worked out the 
technical specifications, cost targets, and manufacturing time in an iterative experi-
mentation and exchange process between design and manufacturing engineers, the 
prototyping workshop, and the home location shop floor. Very early conversations 
between this product team and a higher-level global strategy team suggested that the 
transmission would also be produced in China, Russia, India, and other emerging 
markets. Design and manufacturing teams from these markets were incorporated 
into the development process and technical specifications, cost targets, and manu-
facturing cycle parameters (metrics and standards) for those markets were provi-
sionally established.
My colleagues and I followed the transfer of the technology to the Chinese mar-
ket. German team members, design and manufacturing engineers, as well as skilled 
workers from the prototype workshop and home location shop floor, traveled to 
China to assist local engineers and workers with the initial production set up. Local 
Chinese engineers educated their skeptical German counterparts about the possibili-
ties and limits of the Chinese location. Adjustments along several dimensions were 
made locally, involving a variety of input material, contour design, machine usage, 
and cycle time metrics and standards. Engineers from the transmission producer’s 
Chinese design center were called in to assist the collaborating teams with these 
adjustments. As design and production metrics and standards were altered, the 
German design office was consulted to approve suggested changes to the original 
targets. The local production and design teams defended the changes to the central 
teams. In the process, the central team noticed that the adjustments in the flow of 
11 I draw all examples from a research project I conducted in eastern Europe and China among 
German automobile and machinery producers and suppliers funded by the Hans Böckler Stiftung. 
Company names must remain confidential. We conducted over 150 open-ended interviews at mul-
tiple firms and subsidiary operations in both industries between 2008 and 2015 and have anony-
mized specific cases by agreement with the case partners. When I refer to specific firm names in 
this text, I am drawing on material that is either in the public domain or is publicly available. 
Compare Herrigel et al. (2017) for full discussion of the study’s empirical basis.
G. Herrigel
425
manufacturing could be used for the same product in eastern European and Indian 
production locations. Changes were made to the central design. Production perfor-
mance both in Germany and in offshore locations was, in this systematic fashion, 
regularly reviewed, metrics and standards were optimized, and roles and relations 
recomposed.
All of this iterated transfer and exchange occurred according to team-based CPS 
procedures. Transnational know-how transfer and experience-driven learning, facil-
itated by formally prescribed team interactions, were systematic features of this 
system. It was also deeply recursive, as the central teams learned from the experi-
ments of the local teams even as the latter were learning from the former. Finally, 
revision of the metrics and standards involved role and rule changes within the 
organization. The division of labor in design and production was continuously opti-
mized and varied. Stakeholder interests were not aligned by the system, they were 
continuously changed by the process of metric and standard creation, performance 
review, and optimization.12
Obviously, the key to this system’s success is that it is global and extends seam-
lessly throughout all the operations of a firm. For innovation, optimization, and 
learning to flow recursively within the MNC, everyone must speak the language of 
the company’s CPS.  Practices of joint goal-setting and systematic performance 
review need to become second nature—a new form of self-disrupting routine (Sabel, 
2006). This raises the interesting problem of how such systems are globalized.
Firms deploy a number of different diffusion mechanisms. Auto-Getriebe, for 
example, created teaching units that it called Centers of Competence (CoC). These 
were especially highly performing functional units (e.g., Transmission Housing 
Assembly) within specific company production locations that had most successfully 
implemented the CPS. These units were then given the responsibility to help other 
units doing the same thing elsewhere adopt the CPS routines and develop the capac-
ity to hit performance targets.
My colleagues and I observed CoC at work in a number of units, including the 
truck-transmission housing assembly group. In all cases, the most advanced work-
shops were located in the company’s home German location. Teams from, for exam-
ple, the assembly workshop (including managers, engineers, and line workers) 
travelled to assembly operations in France, India, and China to assist local teams set 
up operations. These interactions were, in turn, observed by superordinate “interna-
tional” teams composed of management, engineering, and shop floor representatives 
from all truck driveline assembly and logistics operations world-wide. The goals 
were, on the one hand, to get agreement on product and quality metrics and standards 
among all truck driveline assembly operations (and among global suppliers), and, on 
the other hand, to get agreement on the core performance review and problem-solv-
ing procedures consistent with the company’s CPS. The CoC convened face-to-face 
international team meetings once a year. In addition, two- hour phone meetings 
12 These dynamics can also generate counter-productive forms of exclusion and hierarchical insula-
tion. I discuss these possibilities and the mechanisms firms are developing to deal with them in the 
following section.
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occurred once every quarter (always at 15:00 German time), in which the callers 
discussed “red status” (i.e., problem/local deviation) issues and made group decisions.
Crucially, the home country CoC’s ambition was not to impose common assem-
bly procedures, materials, or logistical flows on like units across the entire company. 
Rather, it aimed to construct procedures to achieve agreement on metrics and stan-
dards and establish transparent self-optimizing processes of regular performance 
review. The German location provided the offshore operations with technical advice, 
demonstrated German procedures, and actively assisted with the industrialization of 
the offshore locations. But local managers were given much leeway to achieve 
agreed metrics and standards in locally appropriate ways. Deviations from central 
practices had to be defended, in particular in discussions within the international 
team. But if the metrics and standards could be maintained or improved upon, devi-
ations were accepted. Indeed, other operations embraced especially innovative 
alternative practices, through the information channel of the international team.
Continuous improvement teams (CITs) are an alternative experimentalist gover-
nance diffusion mechanism. These teams are especially common in machinery 
firms. Here, the idea is to create a team of CPS experts (lean production specialists, 
Six Sigma blackbelts, quality engineers, skilled production workers) travelling 
throughout the firm’s functional areas and all global production locations interacting 
with functional teams as CPS consultants and service providers. CIT members con-
tinually provide advice about CPS procedure, how to implement practices of joint 
goal setting and systematic performance review (the next section will show that this 
can be a purposefully disruptive activity). But, significantly, they also enact the CPS 
with their interlocutors, making suggestions for workflow improvement and social-
izing teams in joint problem solving. CIT teams routinely help multifunctional pro-
duction or product teams construct better ergonomic workplace arrangements for 
machining and assembly (using CIT budgeted resources). CITs are also globally 
constituted (indeed, in the two largest machinery producers we observed, CITs are 
the largest global teams) and engage with offshore locations in the same CPS pros-
elytizing and service-providing manner in which it engaged home country teams.
Again, as with the CoCs, the aim of CIT activity is not to impose uniform techni-
cal and work practices across all parts of the company. Rather, it is to cultivate a 
common team-based joint goal setting and systematic performance review practice 
focused on optimization and learning. Notably, even as they help establish intra- and 
inter-team communication procedures, the circulation of experienced CIT members 
diffuses innovation and useful practical innovations throughout the MNCs global 
operations. As the CIT head at a German Power Drive producer (SW-Antrieb) 
told us:
We are very careful to ensure that information … gets transferred.… [W]e train employees, 
world-wide, in these themes.… [I]deas get discussed and solutions outlined at local units all 
over the world—we are permanently present, locally. At the same time, our members are 
constantly traveling between units. We achieve information transfer in this way.
CITs generate organizational learning, establish procedures to sustain it, and 
help to diffuse it within the global organization.
G. Herrigel
427
CoC’s and CITs are two of many variants currently diffusing CPSs across MNC 
firms’ global operations. Like the CPSs they are used to construct, these organized 
practices are disruptive mechanisms. Their aim is to instigate local experimentation 
for practical improvement of jointly agreed upon central norms, metrics, and proce-
dures. They are not establishing incentive alignments; they are convening discus-
sions to define (and redefine) common goals. The SW-Antrieb CIT head describes 
the character of the process in this way:
We present our plans for investment and change to the local colleagues in a workshop in 
their plant. We then get together with the employees and … look at the existing process and 
determine what is good and what is bad …. Once we have done all of these things, we work 
together with the local actors to develop a new production island.… Our job is to see that 
whatever result is worked out is developed and worked through jointly with the colleagues 
locally.
The manager then referred to a Korean case where the local players resisted 
implementing the home company’s blueprints in every detail. “We installed a man-
ual conveyor here only three or four years ago,” the Koreans told them, “and we 
don’t want to just throw it away.” After some detailed back and forth about quality 
and cost differentials between Korea and Germany, the decision was to keep the 
manual conveyor. “This was fine with us because the production costs were signifi-
cantly lower in Korea than in Germany.”
The next section will show how this interactive joint problem-solving process 
plays a crucial role in destabilizing the obstacles to learning that emerge through 
efforts on the part of managers and worker groups and representatives to insulate or 
exclude interests from the experimentalist process. In the present context, however, 
I emphasize again that it is inaccurate to understand the workings of these mecha-
nisms as encounters between distinct home and host country institutional logics.13 
CoC and CIT team actors do not regard the practices of local interlocutors as a 
foreign logic; they view local player perspectives as potential resources to be lever-
aged in a continuous optimization and learning process. Similarly, local players 
regard CoC and CIT players not as hierarchical principals giving them orders out of 
a foreign, institutionally embedded universe, but as potential resources and partners 
to help them achieve goals that both have agreed on. Moreover, when insights 
gained from local deviation prove effective, they are diffused elsewhere in the 
MNC. In this way, institutional logics do not clash; they give rise to deliberation. 
Systematic disruption and joint problem solving gives rise to continuous, mutual 
institutional recomposition.14
13 Once again running orthogonally to the concerns of the embeddedness school of Dörrenbächer 
and Geppert (2011).
14 Crucially, when asked in response to the story of module adaptation in Korea above Is it always 
simply a matter of deviations from a standard module or can the process also result in a recon-
struction (Umbau) of the module (central standard) itself?, the Power Drive CIT Chief replied: 
“That happens quite often. It is very explicitly never excluded as a possibility. It is an essential part 
of the transfer process.”
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MNCs committed to a CPS logic are very emphatic about the system’s distinc-
tively collaborative and experimentalist aspects. Often this is true because many had 
tried (and failed) to arrange the technology transfer process in a more conventional 
hierarchical interest alignment way prior to working toward the experimentalist 
(formally collaborative) architecture. Prior to the CoC’s creation, for example, 
Auto-Getriebe tried to manage technology transfer very hierarchically. Products 
were developed centrally at the home production location. Designs, discrete 
manufacturing- process instructions, and specific machinery to be deployed were 
then handed off to the subsidiary location. The subsidiary locals were then expected 
to implement exactly what had been handed to them, and their incentives were set 
according to centrally determined output and cost measures.
Invariably, locals ran into trouble getting the central designs and machinery to 
work in the ways the Germans did: Locals could not get machines to produce error 
free, costs were out of line, processes ran into unanticipated bottlenecks due to 
operator unfamiliarity with procedure (or differences in training and competence). 
New product ramp-up, as a result, chronically took longer than desired. Under that 
old system, the solution to such problems was to send a team of production and 
design experts from the home location to the subsidiary, where they would typically 
spend weeks telling locals exactly how to set up the German system, make the pre-
scribed machinery work properly, and avoid bottlenecks. According to our senior 
production manager informant, the old system was an endless, and very expensive, 
cycle. The expert teams were no sooner home than they were called back to address 
new problems that had emerged. The old system’s transfer process was too rigid and 
the subsidiaries’ resources to address ramp-up problems too under-utilized.
CoCs were developed to introduce communication, flexibility, and local discre-
tion into the technology transfer process. As described above, a key evaluative cri-
terion was not the CoC’s technological knowledge per se; rather, it was its 
organizational abilities to excel collaboratively within the MNC organization. 
Managers at Auto-Getriebe were driven to this experimentalist architecture largely 
because the old hierarchical incentive alignment arrangement was ineffective. 
Through a benchmarking process, the firm discovered that the Robert Bosch 
Corporation had implemented these CPS-driven experimentalist architectures for 
global product management, and the company decided to do so as well.
 Endogenously Generated Barriers to Experimentalism’s 
Diffusion Within Manufacturing MNCs and How 
Improvement-Oriented Self-Surveillance Mechanisms Also 
Become Destabilization Mechanisms
Market uncertainty, linked and unremitting pressures to innovate and reduce costs, 
and constantly evolving best-practice models drive the adoption and diffusion of 
experimentalist CPSs. The systems are attractive under these conditions both 
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because they make organizational practices transparent to the actors engaging in 
them, and because they help actors see that the endurance of specific practical 
arrangements is contingent upon good performance.
Naturally, there are many barriers to the diffusion of experimentalist CPS prac-
tices. Indeed, even in cases where actors extend the experimentalist logic quite far 
into their organizations, they often encounter limits to further extension. As a result, 
organizational optimization, recomposition, and recursive/circular learning dynam-
ics become compromised and blocked. In this section, I will some of the most pre-
dominant organizational challenges to the diffusion of experimentalism within 
German manufacturing MNCs.15 I will also point to an array of strategies that MNCs 
pursue to overcome these blockages. The main diffusion barriers observed in our 
cases are: hierarchical insulation, stakeholder exclusion, and inadequate empower-
ment resources for participants.
Hierarchical insulation involves efforts on the part of higher level management 
to remove themselves from the continuing stakeholder joint goal setting and self- 
review procedures. In such cases, managers foster experimentalist problem solving 
within the domain that they command, but neither confer across domains with other 
managers or superiors about their domain’s relative performance, nor do they nego-
tiate with peer stakeholders about goal setting. In these cases, principal-agent incen-
tive structures govern top management, whereas experimentalist practices govern 
the practical domains of design and production. Upward diffusion of experimental-
ism is blocked by the power desires and egoism of managerial ambition within 
governance and organizational hierarchies.
Such governance segmentation within companies can lead to suboptimal organi-
zational outcomes. Higher managers pursuing incentives based on results grow 
impatient with the CPS’s process-focused, bottom-up problem-solving procedures. 
They suspend or circumvent the process to generate results for which they will be 
immediately rewarded. This can create chaos and incoherence in the design and 
manufacturing value chain: rigorous problem solving is disrupted, learning blocked, 
and, ultimately, innovation inhibited. In the worst cases, it frustrates and delegiti-
mizes expansive experimentalism at lower levels. Good-willed innovation is blocked 
by arbitrary power driven by rarified and incompatible managerial incentive struc-
tures (cf. Hafner, 2009).
Hierarchical insulation is a central criticism of CPSs in the critical industrial 
sociology literature. Sauer (2013), Gerst (2011a, 2011b), Pfeiffer (2007, 2008a, 
2008b), and Dörre (2015), to take only the most prominent interventions, all point 
to hierarchical elements that are imposed on production line workers without nego-
tiation: Financial data targets set without production level participation and human 
15 I draw most of the empirical examples presented from fieldwork on German and US MNCs. For 
an alternative (complementary) perspective on diffusion obstacles, see Netland and Ferdows (2014).
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resource hiring practices are two aspects of hierarchical management insulation that 
all these authors highlight in particular.16
In our interviews, these pathologies were present, but they were by no means 
uncontested, even by players beyond the shop floor. Indeed, CPSs themselves often 
“officially” characterize such insulation strategies as typical organizational patholo-
gies that must be combatted. As I discuss below, many firms, following the basic 
experimentalist principle of improvement oriented self-surveillance, have devel-
oped mechanisms to destabilize insulation efforts.
Stakeholder exclusion also engenders governance segmentation within organiza-
tions. It involves the implementation of formal self-optimization procedures without 
involving all relevant stakeholders. Thus, manufacturing and design engineers are 
included in product development discussions, but purchasing executives are excluded 
or only brought in after crucial decisions have been made. Alternatively, manufacturing 
and design engineers as well as purchasing people are included, but key suppliers are 
left out or brought in late. These used to be classic errors of exclusion in the early days 
(1990s) of the diffusion of lean practices within industry (Helper, 1991a, 1991b; 
MacDuffie & Helper, 1999; Schumann,  Baethge-Kinsky, Kuhlmann,  Kurz,  & 
Neumann, 1994; Springer, 1999). A great deal of progress has been made in this area 
since then, especially in the supply chain and the product development process (Helper 
et al., 2000; Herrigel, 2010; Sako, 2006; Whitford, 2005). But the large body of critical 
industrial sociological literature is evidence of its continued persistence in German plants.
Perhaps the most prevalent exclusionary barriers are those preventing production- 
line worker participation. Important case studies of CPS introduction in the German 
automobile industry, such as Pfeiffer’s (2007, 2008a, 2008b; Adami, Lang, Pfeiffer, & 
Rehberg, 2008) analysis of a complex automobile assembly line, point to the contin-
ued exclusion of production-level teams’ from upgrading and process redesign dis-
cussions, at least in some plants. This can occur when management designates its 
own agent as speaker of an allegedly self-governing production team, or when higher 
level teams simply rely on plant managers, section supervisors or set-up engineers 
for information on work team performance. It can also happen when continuous 
improvement teams unilaterally impose work-flow improvements without interac-
tion with the line workers whose process they are improving. In all these cases, it is 
usual for workers and supervisors to communicate informally. But without the for-
mal obligation to make their habitual actions transparent, workers can hide informa-
tion (e.g., about finicky machines), protect favorite routines from alteration and, 
worst of all, become complacent about opportunities to make their own collective 
efforts better and more competitive. They withhold or bury basic information about 
the character of production. The firm (and management) in this way foregoes valu-
able knowledge of its operations and squanders resources for recomposition, innova-
tion, and competitiveness (Adami et al., 2008; Pfeiffer, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).
16 Indeed, the Diesel scandal at VW, where subordinates were led to improvise an illegal work-
around in order to satisfy unilateral performance pressures from higher level managers, appears to 
be a model illustration of hierarchical insulation.
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The above forms of exclusion are hierarchically imposed, and thus have an affin-
ity with hierarchical insulation. But it is also possible for certain stakeholder groups 
to self-exclude themselves from experimentalist self-optimization processes. This 
can occur in a variety of ways. In our German cases, we encountered examples of 
works council self-exclusion from newly introduced CPSs in their firm. The works 
councils in these cases viewed the new system as a threat and refused to participate. 
Abstinence from participation in the CPS, however, proved confusing for the 
employees in work teams at all levels, because they experienced a management 
discourse of empowerment and self-organization and a works council/union dis-
course of property divide, asymmetric interest, and mistrust. Sometimes, self- 
exclusion backfires for the works council, as the CPS self-optimization process’s 
success undermines the sense of organizational indispensability associated with the 
works council’s role. Other times, the effect is the reverse: Traditional role and iden-
tity cultivation prevents the CPS from gaining genuine traction in the firm.
A final internal barrier to experimentalist diffusion is inadequate empowerment 
resources for participants. Most prominently, this means the lack of adequate skills 
at the production and lower management levels, such as one finds in emerging mar-
ket contexts. Many firms that run CPS procedures in broadly inclusive ways in their 
home market locations find it difficult to implement thoroughly inclusive self- 
optimization practices in emerging market operations. Language and cultural differ-
ence combined with limited skill and educational competences within the available 
labor pool make it difficult to configure production in a way that engages employees 
in useful self-optimization.
In part, low wages and structural weakness on the employee side allows manage-
ment to not try so hard to implement an experimentalist system. Instead, they crassly 
exploit cost advantages without continuous optimization, or they impose improve-
ments developed elsewhere on a compliant workforce. Self-optimization processes 
elsewhere in the company—even those higher up in the emerging market opera-
tion—in this way carry the inefficiency of very low cost and very manipulable labor.
Inadequate empowerment resources are not, however, only an artifact of power 
imbalances. Firms often believe that the constraints that available skill and compe-
tence pools place on efforts to localize home country production and work practices 
result in the loss or destruction of useful knowledge, rather than the generation of 
new or alternative knowledge about familiar technologies and production processes. 
For example, in their German operations, woodworking machinery and automobile 
front-end makers from our sample both use highly skilled workers capable of per-
forming a variety of operations. Their experience generates unique product technol-
ogy knowledge that can be leveraged for innovation in cooperation with engineers 
and product designers. Such workers in these firm’s home locations in Westfalen 
and on the Schwäbische Alb are wholesomely incorporated into self- governing, 
cross-functional teams and in the serial self-review processes in their respective 
firms’ CPS variants.
In China, however, such workers do not exist in the broader Shanghai labor pool 
where the firms have their production operations. Hence, when the firms produce 
the same products in Shanghai that they produce in Germany, even when they make 
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significant localization changes in the product design, the local management teams 
have to devise ways to make the product with far fewer skilled workers. Typically, 
this means that several more narrowly skilled workers will perform in a sequential 
and disintegrated way what one highly skilled worker would perform in a synthetic 
way in Germany. The firms incorporate the disintegrated workers less into the self- 
optimization procedures of their respective CPSs because they believe that the 
knowledge such workers could contribute through inclusion is less valuable. In part, 
this is a violation of the inclusion aspect of the transparency and inclusion principle; 
but there is also an element of the Chinese employees not being able to engage with 
the transparency element.
 Destabilization Mechanisms
Interestingly, all these obstacles exist not only ex ante, as firms attempt to construct 
corporate production systems and implement them throughout their global opera-
tions. They also continually regenerate through the CPS’s experimentalist dynamics 
themselves. The revision of commonly agreed-upon frameworks in light of changes 
to processes and products introduced at a local level frequently redefines power 
relations and stakeholders, creating new possibilities for insulation and exclusion at 
various levels and in different locations within the firm.
For example, many firms find that operations that are highly automated in 
German operations do not require the same degree of automation in lower-wage 
locations, such as Poland or China (or Korea, as in the quoted example provided 
earlier). As a result, local players there deconstruct the home procedures and render 
production flow into a series of manual operations. In some cases, these innovations 
actually prove more flexible and productive than the automated operations that they 
replace and, as a result, cooperating teams in the home operations try to replace 
automation with the newer manual procedures. In so doing, new worker groups 
emerge and teams are re-constituted. If the firm is not careful to ensure that the 
newly emergent groups become integrated into existing team deliberative relations 
in the plant, the new groups can be excluded (not recognized) as (knowledge- 
bearing) stakeholders in the production process. In such cases, managers can grab 
power and monopolize control over crucial levels of knowledge and resource flow 
within the firm.
In order to prevent such obstacles from paralyzing the global recursive learning 
process, many MNCs, in line with the principle of improvement-oriented self- 
surveillance, deploy an array of destabilization mechanisms that systematically 
undermine insulation and exclusion strategies within the global firm and reconsti-
tute the deliberative experimentalist learning process. In particular, the organiza-
tional forms described above as knowledge carriers throughout the MNC’s global 
operations—CoCs, CITs—act as destabilization mechanisms undermining efforts 
to insulate knowledge and exclude stakeholders. This makes sense, their aim is to 
manage center and local deliberation in ways that circulate technical and 
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organizational knowledge through the company’s transparent formal CPS proce-
dures. They both implement the CPS itself and carry knowledge around the global 
firm that CPS procedures generate. Local players seeking to exclude stakeholders 
(e.g., production workers or suppliers) or central actors looking to insulate their own 
practices from the changes generated by subsidiary actors are targeted by these 
“third-party” organizations and challenged to defend their efforts. Often, this chal-
lenge is enough to initiate inclusion processes: Why are production line workers not 
involved in team discussions with line leadership staff and application engineers? 
How will production implementation and run-up problems be dealt with without 
their input?
It is not only talk, either. Because the CoCs and CITs, in particular, are not sup-
posed to impose solutions on players, but simply to instigate local discussions 
regarding the implementation of central technologies and metrics (for CoCs) or of 
possibilities for process improvement in the context of CPS procedures and global 
best practice (CITs), they have the organizational authority to provoke local actors 
into defending exclusion or insulation practices. And, as they are globally active, 
they come to individual central or local conversations with independent knowledge 
of practices throughout the MNC’s operations. They can use this knowledge to 
insist that specific players contend with best practice within the firm. This use of 
organizational mission and accumulated practical knowledge to destabilize rela-
tions is a crucial dimension of CoC and CIT activity. They do not impose solutions, 
but rather use their organizational mission to destabilize practices and provoke 
deliberation about solutions.
But what if, for all that, stalemate or paralysis emerges? Or, what if deliberation 
proves so contentious and arduous that despite exchange, progress is too long 
delayed? In such cases, most CPSs provide for a penalty default (Ayres, 2001; Ayres 
& Gertner, 1989). That is, if local players are locked in dispute or cannot resolve a 
local problem, a higher order stakeholder team will intervene to redefine the prob-
lem that is stymying the local actors in an effort to create better conditions for agree-
ment. Such interventions, moreover, are frequently independent from higher-level 
team judgment. Rather, the CPS itself establishes penalty default triggers—most 
often in the form of time frames for decision making, or outer boundary cost or 
return on investment targets (“gates”) for processes. If local deliberation exceeds 
the allotted time or under- or overshoots cost targets, relevant higher-level teams are 
automatically called in (often following a logic imposed by Six Sigma instruments) 
to evaluate the situation.
The CIT head at SW-Antrieb (quoted earlier) outlined the procedures they follow 
for improvement project implementation. He highlights both the CIT role as a 
destabilization mechanism—in particular in identifying stakeholder exclusion and 
developing strategies for inclusion—and the key role played by penalty default—
primarily in the form of strict time frameworks for project implementation.
We are continuously and permanently improving our processes through the involvement of 
all those who are affected and participating in them. That is our core approach to secure 
process sustainability. If you like, you can see it as a mixture of business reengineering and 
classic Toyota continuous improvement … broadly lean principles. It is a path of many 
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small and tiny steps.… The limiting factor is always the time frame.… Within 12 weeks, we 
try to organize the process in a new way. The 12 weeks are a basic grid for us. If we see that 
the spectrum of themes, the degree of effort, or the scope are too large and can’t be resolved 
within 12 weeks, we then start to segment the themes, and create sequences for effort in 
very transparent ways.
Twelve weeks, in other words, is a penalty default trigger. Projects that cannot be 
accomplished in that timeframe are redefined to facilitate more possible forms of 
collective problem solving. The SW-Antrieb CIT chief also emphasized that the role 
of CIT actors is to make all projects inclusive:
We [the CIT team-gh] in fact rove through the shop floor, observing production and fre-
quently making suggestions for improvement. That is a permanent activity. It frequently 
happens, however, that the middle management comes to us and says: “I have a concrete 
problem in this area. Can you try to get people working toward a solution?” A project will 
be created that is … interdisciplinary in makeup: That is, all stakeholders (Beteiligten) sit at 
the table and we try to construct a comprehensive/inclusive (ganzheitliches) image of opti-
mization. All those affected by the problem participate in the work toward creating a solu-
tion. That is a core principle.
The same manager emphasized that CIT teams were needed as destabilizers 
because the “normal process” of self-optimizing, continuous improvement by spe-
cialized multifunctional teams very often tended toward myopia and self-blockage. 
They inadvertently excluded important players in the value chain:
No matter where you look, at Toyota or other benchmark companies, not a single company 
has been able to operate only self-optimizing teams. External destabilizers such as CITs are 
needed. We are no different. We thought initially that the theme of optimization … would 
establish itself and run by itself. That didn’t happen.… People do not look at their jobs in 
the whole context of production. This is what interdisciplinary project work tries to over-
come. When a worker is active in a specific area of production, that person is generally very 
highly specialized.… But in the project teams, suddenly, he has to be concerned with mate-
rial delivery and preparation as well as where the bevel gears that are made in her station 
will go to next …. The natural initial response here is to throw up your hands and say—this 
isn’t my job, I don’t know anything about this. And the person will avoid looking at the 
whole production process—not out of ill will, but simply because she sticks to what she 
knows. Our job is to remind people to see how their activity fits into the whole. We make 
models of the whole process chain and constantly remind the project participants what the 
big picture is.
Finally, the CIT head emphasized that it would be counter-productive for his 
firm’s CIT team to impose a solution on the parties engaged in the project. Their job 
was to convene a conversation among all the relevant stakeholders. The point is to 
have the stakeholders understand their respective roles and to make all of their 
actions explicit to one another and to the firm’s CIT team. When asked if his firm’s 
CIT imposed solutions on the deliberating project teams, he said:
If we simply imposed solutions on the projects, they would never actually get implemented. 
Why? Because every person who worked on the process once it was up and running would 
try to prove to me that the solution doesn’t work. Instead, our idea is … [that] people have 
to be at the center in the design of the solution because they are the ones who will be respon-
sible for ensuring that the process yields the quality, safety, and reliability that we need.
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And the system only works, he emphasized, if it goes all the way down to the 
production line workers:
The project teams have to include machine operators, set-up people, maintenance, logistics, 
work preparation, work planning, the foreman (depending on how complex the solution 
looks like it will be), someone from the tool shop, and tool maintenance who will be able to 
ensure that the proper tools will be delivered to the new process. That whole team works 
together to come up with a solution for the new production process. In principle, the CIT 
team indicates only what methods and strategies are required.… It is up to the team mem-
bers to choose. Of course, the solution has to be better than what it is replacing. That is the 
standard. The parameters are generated by our company’s formal production system, but 
the solution is generated by the stakeholder problem-solving process…
 Conclusion
All of these activities aimed at stakeholder inclusion and transparency creation are 
permanent and ongoing within successful experimentalist German MNCs. Projects 
and products set up in one year are reviewed the next in order to ensure that the 
original designs are having the desired effect—or to see if optimization projects 
elsewhere in the value chain have created possibilities in the area that were not pos-
sible to see when the initial project was undertaken. Such continuous self- 
surveillance is disruptive. “Daily routines” are made explicit to those enacting them 
and reflection leads to change or recomposition. As a result, manufacturing MNCs 
operating on a CPS logic are constantly in flux. Successfully overcoming problems 
of exclusion or insulation with one project often create new ones. The teams them-
selves, and the destabilizing CoC and CIT teams, must be vigilant and continue to 
root out exclusionary/insulating dynamics. Doing this on a permanent basis fosters 
learning and innovation within the entire global organization.
The upshot of all of this, of course, is quite paradoxical. In the current environ-
ment, manufacturing multinationals’ commitment to learning, permanent self- 
optimization, and recomposition constantly creates the possibility for blockage 
through insulation or exclusion. Indeed, there are no pure examples of a thoroughly 
inclusive and systematically deliberative recursive learning-oriented manufacturing 
multinational. Rather, recursive learning organizations have heterogeneous, hybrid, 
and constantly self-recomposing governance arrangements with varying and highly 
contingent admixtures of joint problem solving, team-based deliberation, hierarchi-
cal insulation, and stakeholder in/exclusion. In this sense, the core emergent institu-
tions in the new multinational are those that disrupt (especially the principles of 
revisable planning and improvement-oriented self-surveillance), rather than those 
that govern. Disruption is a permanent process, while specific formal governance 
arrangements, like the organizational roles they manage, are always ephemeral.
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Chapter 19
Networks as Facilitators of Innovation 
in Technology-Based Industries: The Case 
of Flat Glass
Nebahat Tokatli
To what extent do networks facilitate innovation in technology-based industries? So 
far, most scholars of this question have focused on just a few high-technology 
industries. Consider, for example, the work of Powell and his collaborators, 
Hagedoorn and his collaborators, and Stuart and his collaborators on industries such 
as computers, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology.1 Their overall 
conclusion is that collaborations within networks (which are made up of firms as 
well as institutions such as universities, research institutes, and venture capital) are 
absolutely necessary components of the virtuous cycles that networks and innova-
tion now constitute in these industries: Networks facilitate innovation, and innova-
tive outputs then attract further collaborative ties (see Powell & Grodal, 2005, 
p. 67). Simply put, the networks are the locus of innovation in these industries: For 
example, in biotechnology, the most important force behind innovation is reported 
to be the “structure of its networks” and the “rules governing these networks”—not 
“money,” not “market power,” not even the “sheer force of novel ideas” (Powell & 
Grodal, 2005, p. 59; Powell, White, Koput, & Owen-Smith, 2005, p. 1187).
It follows from this conclusion that if one wishes to thoroughly understand the 
most significant opportunities for innovation in any particular high-technology 
industry (or, perhaps, in any industry for that matter), one should consider focusing 
on that industry’s networks. By placing networks at the heart of their study of 
1 Here, I basically refer to a number of publications especially including Owen-Smith and Powell 
(2004), Powell et al. (2005), Powell, Packalen, and Whittington (2012), Whittington, Owen-Smith, 
and Powell (2009), Powell and Owen-Smith (2012), Powell and Standholtz (2012), Powell and 
Padgett (2012), Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1994), Stuart and Podolny (1996), Stuart (2000), 
and Robinson and Stuart (2007).
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innovation, the above mentioned researchers make the observations that, first, inno-
vative firms and other institutions are now compelled to be part of networks, and, 
secondly, that the network’s structure (architecture or topology) and the manner in 
which they are governed (institutionalized and managed outside governmental rules 
and regulations, except for antitrust regulations and such) matter a great deal (Powell 
et al., 2005, p. 1187). Here it is important to point out that as they give prominence 
to the role that networks play in mobilizing resources for innovation (as scientific 
and technological knowledge is transferred from university laboratories or R&D 
departments to industry and from firm to firm, and converted into commercially 
successful products and processes), they are basically interested in mature and 
diverse industries with large and complex networks. Consequently, their work, for 
the most part, is able to accommodate formal network approaches with their par-
ticular vocabulary (namely, nodes, lines, and their chartable patterns) and reliance 
on mathematical modelling.
Now that researchers have all this work at their disposal, it would be interesting 
to go beyond high-technology industries such as biotechnology, and look into some 
other technology-based industries whose products are developed by the application 
of some degree of technological expertise (without the entire industries necessarily 
being labelled as high-technology), and whose networks are typically smaller and 
less complex than those belonging to biotechnology and similar industries.2 In this 
chapter, I consider one of these industries, namely the flat glass industry, with two 
purposes in mind—one being the primary purpose of the chapter, and the other a 
secondary and somewhat provisional one pointing to further research. My primary 
purpose is to present a reasonably complete picture of the flat glass industry around 
a research question that concerns the extent to which this industry’s networks facili-
tated innovation in the past and continue to do so now. My secondary purpose is to 
explore whether or not a different sort of network thinking is required for this par-
ticular industry—different from the thinking that the students of high-technology 
industries subscribe to as they study, say, biotechnology.
Concerning the primary purpose, I rely on historical accounts such as those of 
Harris (1975), Barker (1977), and Uusitalo and his collaborators, together with con-
temporary information available on the Internet as well as in industry publications.3 
What is common in all these accounts is the observation that the innovative firms in 
the flat glass industry have not been, as Teece (2016, p. 11) would put it, “islands”—
at least not during the last few centuries. I elaborate on this observation here, but 
then argue that each time period requires a slightly different understanding of the 
network concept as the flat-glass industry is studied over a long period of time. This 
is because most innovations in this industry have required technical collaborations 
2 I here use the term technology-based as somewhat of a catch-all phrase to refer to all industries 
whose products are developed by the application of some degree of technological expertise. I am 
thus not using the terms technology-based and high- technology industries interchangeably—a 
point that I will elaborate on later.
3 By “Uusitalo and his collaborators,” I mean the authors of the following publications: Uusitalo 
(1997, 2014a, 2014b), Uusitalo and Mikkola (2010), and Uusitalo and Möller (2015).
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between firms, but the contexts in which these have taken place have changed from 
period to period. For example, in the eighteenth century, technical collaborations 
occurred between firms located on both sides of the English Channel, and in the 
nineteenth century between firms on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. And then, in 
the twentieth century, thanks to a breakthrough innovation, the flat-glass industry 
became basically a “one technology, one license, one product” industry dominated 
by the British flat-glass firm Pilkington. During this period, Pilkington made sure 
that its licensees all over the world were legally bound to share with it whatever 
technologies they might develop in the future—thereby changing the role that net-
works played in this industry with respect to innovations.
Today, there are six firms meeting most of the global demand for flat glass; and 
as far as the primary processing of flat glass (that is the basic manufacture of flat 
glass) goes, collaboration within networks still refers to provisional and transitional 
steps taken by firms in order to enter new markets, open doors for mergers and joint 
ventures, spread risks, or minimize the costs of research and development. However, 
when it comes to the secondary processing of flat glass (i.e., the further processing 
of flat glass by laminating, toughening, coating, or silvering the product), there are 
signs that collaboration within networks might be starting to get closer to that of 
high-technology industries—one sign being a newly emerging idea of establishing 
consortia for major research activities, including a discussion as to who should take 
a leading role in such efforts. Perhaps, we are entering into a period where exciting 
scholarly research possibilities will arise from the larger and more complex net-
works that might emerge from the now maturing industry.
If there really is a possibility of large and complex networks emerging in the 
world of flat glass (at least with respect to the secondary processing of flat glass), 
then it is time to consider the sort of network thinking that might be useful concern-
ing the contemporary flat glass industry. Here, we have some choices to make. After 
all, there is a spectrum of network thinking at our disposal with one end represented 
by Uusitalo and his collaborators, and the other by Powell and his collaborators. 
The former group utilizes the network concept basically as, what Marsden (1990, 
p. 436) calls, a “sensitizing metaphor,” and refrains from developing a formal net-
work approach4; whereas at the other end of the spectrum, the latter group utilizes a 
more formal representation which leads to a particular vocabulary—namely, 
“nodes,” “lines,” and their chartable “patterns.” Consequently, whereas Uusitalo and 
his collaborators become interested in distribution of market power and cogency of 
innovative ideas among firms, Powell and his collaborators let “money,” “market 
power,” and the “sheer force of novel ideas” take the back seat to “structure of the 
networks” and the “rules governing these networks” (Powell et al., 2005, p. 1187).
Concerning this chapter’s second purpose (i.e., exploring whether or not a differ-
ent sort of network thinking is needed for this particular industry), I cautiously 
4 For example, consider the extent to which Uusitalo and Möller (2015) use the words “network” 
(or, in their words, “net”) and “industry” interchangeably. More specifically, by the “two … indus-
trial networks” of the past, they mean “the sheet glass industry and the plate glass industry” 
(p. 1379).
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consider Coward’s (2018, p. 454) critique of the network thinking that Powell and 
his collaborators subscribe to—one such criticism being that there is “no natural 
outside to the network” in this particular network thinking, which Coward (2018, 
p. 453) calls the “unbounded-ness” problem: “Networks are, in principle, infinitely 
extensible” in this understanding—something which leads to “fantasies of preci-
sion”—as if it is possible to have an accurate understanding of how networks work 
and what disrupts their workings. There really are opportunities to reflect on 
Coward’s (2018) concerns here. Consider, for example, the footnote by Powell et al. 
(2005, p. 1191), in which they inform the reader that they had at one point con-
ducted an analysis on a biotechnology network with “250,000 nodes”—that is, 
250,000 firms and institutions such as universities, research institutes, and venture 
capital that were simultaneously sourcing and receiving knowledge. Before elabo-
rating on this and other issues, in the next section, I will first consider some concep-
tual challenges arising from the particularities of the flat-glass industry. It should 
here suffice to point out that the idea is certainly not to contest network thinking in 
its entirety, but rather to open up a discussion of the many conceptual ways of situat-
ing networks within industrial studies.
 Some Conceptual Challenges
The flat-glass industry is not perfectly comparable to the high-technology industries 
from which the research question originated. First of all, the pace of scientific and 
technological development in high-technology industries such as computers, semi-
conductors, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology is now such that single firms no 
longer have all the necessary skills to keep up with progress and come up with sig-
nificant innovations (Powell & Grodal, 2005; Teece, 2016). In fact, collaboration 
within networks in these industries is now more than a provisional and transitional 
step taken by firms in order to enter new markets, spread risks, or reduce the unnec-
essary duplication of research costs and efforts. Rather, they are absolutely neces-
sary components that facilitate innovation. Once innovation occurs, innovative 
outputs attract further collaborative ties (see Powell & Grodal, 2005, p.  67). 
However, most of what is known about networks’ role in innovation comes from the 
study of only a few industries.
Obviously, the particularities of the flat-glass industry matter. For example, as 
mentioned before, the flat-glass industry is not a high-technology industry in the 
sense that, for example, biotechnology is a high-technology industry. Simply put, 
innovation in the flat-glass industry is not as cumulative as in some other industries, 
and innovation’s assets are not as dispersed (locally and globally) as they are else-
where. On the other hand, in some areas such as “high resolution flat panel dis-
plays,” this particular industry is not significantly dissimilar to the above-mentioned 
industries either (see Stuart, 2000, p. 793). Here, it is vital to remember not only that 
there are many technology intensive firms in industries that are not regarded as 
high-technology industries per se, but also that not all firms belonging to 
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high-technology industries are necessarily research-intensive and technologically 
dynamic (Keeble & Wilkinson, 1999).
Another reason why the flat-glass industry might not be perfectly comparable to 
the high-technology industries from which my research question originated is that 
industries such as biotechnology happen to be especially mature and diverse with 
unusually large and complex networks. Obviously, not all technology-based indus-
tries have such large networks. In addition, because history plays a role, it might not 
be possible to understand what compels contemporary firms to be part of today’s 
networks without a thorough understanding of what compelled the firms to network 
with others in the past (including pairing up with only one other firm or institution). 
All this points to the importance of developing a dynamic understanding of the net-
works in a variety of technology-based industries—including those with networks 
not as cohesive and complicated as, say, those belonging to biotechnology.
I must here make a few more conceptual points. First, by giving priority to the 
networks and the rules governing them in the above-mentioned studies on high- 
technology I certainly do not mean to deny the role of what Powell et al. (2005, 
p. 1187) call “the sheer force of novel ideas.” Rather, I mean to emphasize the asso-
ciation between such ideas and the networks. Burt’s (2004) fundamental observa-
tion that novel ideas are better expressed, kept, and evaluated as valuable in 
networked contexts than in isolated contexts can serve as an example: Here, although 
Burt (2004) hypothesizes that this is the case in all settings, there are good reasons 
to believe that it is perhaps especially the case in technology-based industries. Just 
as scientists are supposedly “stimulated to their best ideas by people outside their 
own discipline,” firms are stimulated to their best innovative performances when 
they are placed in contact with firms and institutions that are dissimilar to them-
selves (Burt, 2004, p. 59).
Secondly, I do not deny the importance of money and market power in the above- 
mentioned studies; rather, I mean to emphasize the association between these fac-
tors and the networks. Money and market power are important resources, and 
“resource rich” firms are more capable of altering their positions by reconfiguring 
their networks; still, what matters the most is being networked. Simply put, discon-
nectedness is a “liability” (Powell et al., 2005, pp. 1137–1138). In fact, economists 
now sometimes wonder whether a firm is “too connected” to fail, just as they once 
used to wonder whether a firm was “too big” to fail. This focus makes especial sense 
in high-technology industries, where the fast pace of scientific and technological 
developments leads to insurmountable disadvantages for isolated firms (including 
even the most moneyed and powerful ones). Simply put, in such industries, leaving 
aside the fact that no single firm can master and control all the competencies required 
for innovation, no single firm can even absorb the available resources (say, the 
$17 billion grant money offered to biotechnology by the federal government in the 
United States in the year 2000 only—Powell et al., 2005, p. 1142).
Obviously, it is relatively easy to see how and why the “network” concept comes 
into play in the context of innovation in high-technology industries: The term 
“research consortium” has been commonplace in Japan and Europe for a long time, 
and the Unites States caught up with the idea in the late 1980s after the National 
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Cooperative Research Act of 1984 stipulated that joint R&D ventures between com-
petitive firms “must not be held illegal per se” (Lee & Lee, 1991). At that time, 
perhaps only “50–100 firms worldwide” had excellent R&D capabilities whose 
research collaboration with each other, universities, and governments could turn 
otherwise daunting research projects into possibilities (Teece, 2016, p.  30). The 
early well-known research collaboration experiences in the United States included 
the Sematech consortium (founded in 1987), whose network of innovators came 
from 14 domestic semiconductor manufacturers and the U.S. government. The con-
sortium was created to search for new semiconductor manufacturing processes that 
would make the United States competitive with Japan—fundamentally because 
Japan’s dominance was causing concern within the American defense establish-
ment, whose military systems relied heavily on sophisticated electronics (Lee & 
Lee, 1991).
Today there are a “hundred plus strong technology firms … and hundreds of new 
enterprises” in almost every technology-based industry worldwide with excellent 
R&D capabilities that have research collaborations with public institutions and uni-
versities in the U.S., Europe, and Asia (Teece, 2016, p. 30). Consequently, today’s 
well-known research consortia are often multinational in nature—the Human 
Genome Project (launched in 1990), whose two multinational rival networks pub-
lished their findings between 2001 and 2006, being an example.
The literature provides some information on the structure and governance of the 
networks in these well-known examples of research consortia—the most challeng-
ing governance issue being that of making sure that the research collaboration is far 
enough removed from commercialization that firms can cooperate in the laboratory, 
though still remain able to compete in the marketplace (Lee & Lee, 1991). This 
issue is connected to the potential antitrust violations that have always been a con-
cern: The National Cooperative Research Act protects “pure research activity” and 
allows commercial activity only as far as it is “reasonably required” for research 
(ibid.).
However, there is now a widespread belief that the idea of “pure research activ-
ity” is unrealistic. Today, excellent R&D capabilities (both basic and applied 
research) must go hand in hand with excellent commercial capabilities (which 
require research into products’ commercialization and marketing)—see Hage and 
Hollingsworth (2000). Also, what Teece (2016, p. 31) calls “multi-invention con-
texts” are now the norm—contexts in which individual products and processes 
“draw on multiple internal and external sources of technology (patented or unpat-
ented).” For example, innovations in laser and computer technology can now be 
developed much more effectively in collaboration than separately, and further pos-
sibilities appear when innovations in optical fiber are also added to the mix (Teece, 
2016, p. 31). In fact, in many industries, innovation is now all about combining 
multiple innovations from different industries—Apple’s iPod being an example 
(Pitelis & Teece, 2010).
Consequently, today’s networks now comprise multiple forms of research coop-
eration including, on the one hand, research consortia, industrial parks, and such, 
and, on the other, what Teece (2016, p. 27) calls “naked licensing.” In between, 
N. Tokatli
447
there are multiple options including joint ventures and strategic alliances—either 
equity-based or non-equity-based (see Robinson & Stuart, 2007); there are mergers 
and acquisitions; and there are corporate venture capital investments whose influ-
ences on innovation performance have recently received special attention (see, e.g., 
Phelps,  Heidl, & Wadhwa, 2012; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006; Wadhwa,  Phelps, & 
Kotha, 2016). As a result, empirical research into the manner in which networks 
influence knowledge creation (and, thus, innovations) often produces conflicting 
results. For example, Phelps et al. (2012) review article on the subject comprises 
empirical results from the literature they describe as “conflicting/inconsistent/
mixed” at least 35 times. A single empirical study can sometimes include different 
conclusions about different industries, just as what is found in one region is not 
always found in another region—see Baptista (2000) and Rowley,  Behrens, 
and Krackhardt (2000) for industry cases, and Beaudy and Breschi (2003) for the 
regional cases.
Among other factors, the degree to which knowledge sharing is institutionalized 
as a professional practice in a particular industry makes a significant difference; 
whether or not a high degree of uncertainty surrounds a particular industry matters; 
and whether or not the industry’s competitive demands require the exploration of 
new ideas (rather than the exploitation of what is already known) is a factor. In addi-
tion to the industries and regions, the firms themselves also matter—for example, 
see Stuart (2000) and Robinson and Stuart (2007) for the degree to which network 
effects can be different for publicly and privately held firms, for well endowed and 
not so well endowed firms, and for large and technologically sophisticated firms and 
small and technologically unsophisticated firms (see also Beaudry & Breschi, 
2003). Finally, the particular products and processes matter as well: For example, 
whereas some products require tight links between those doing basic research and 
those doing product development research (as well as research on manufacturing 
processes, research on quality control, and research about the commercialization 
and marketing of products), many products do not need such tight links (Hage & 
Hollingsworth, 2000).
In summary, the literature’s contributors offer many conjectures concerning the 
structures and governance rules of high-technology industries that might be studied 
in an actual, not necessarily high-technology, industry context. For example, one of 
the many conjectures in stated in the literature is: “Equity joint ventures facilitate 
knowledge transfer better than other governance modes and lead to increased orga-
nizational knowledge creation,” and “can mitigate the unintended leakage of partner 
knowledge that is unrelated to the partnership” (Phelps et al., 2012, p. 1134).
As mentioned before, the actual industry that is of primary interest here is the 
flat-glass industry. If one is to investigate the degree to which networks facilitate 
innovation in the flat-glass industry or consider conjectures around this question 
(conjectures similar to those mentioned above), one must clearly first develop some 
basic understanding of the past and present particularities of the flat-glass industry.
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 The Flat-Glass Industry—A Brief History
I here use term “flat-glass industry” to refer to the manufacturing of the glass found 
in windows, cars, appliances, electronic devices, solar panels, and so forth. In his 
book entitled The Substance of Civilization, Sass (1998) writes that flat glass was as 
technology-based “ten thousand years ago” as it is today. Although this statement is 
certainly correct on a fundamental level, it requires elaboration: Even though the 
product might have stayed “forever the same,” the process of manufacturing glass 
has, of course, changed over history—a history that I will discuss in this section.
Any historic account of glass must include the fact that although “glass was 
glass,” there were, for a long time, important differences between sheet glass (ordi-
nary window glass), and plate glass (more sophisticated window glass, and, since 
the 1920s, automobile glass). Sheet glass was expected to have some imperfections 
(such as little pits, tiny bubbles, and slight distortions), and thus could be manufac-
tured relatively inexpensively. On the other hand, plate glass was expected to be 
ground and polished for perfection, and thus could only be produced on a large scale 
at capital-intensive and innovation-heavy plants. Until the 1980s, these two types of 
glass were manufactured by two different industries. This was not because the plate 
glass manufacturers did not manufacture any sheet glass, but because they never 
really excelled in the manufacturing of this relatively inexpensive kind of glass.
Anyone offering an historic account of glass must also pay attention to the degree 
to which, as early as the eighteenth century, glass manufacturing firms (especially 
those which manufactured the relatively more expensive plate glass) learned from 
each other and collaborated. For example, as Harris (1975) discusses in detail, in the 
eighteenth century, the British Ravenhead learned the technique of casting plate 
glass from the French Saint-Gobain, whereas Saint-Gobain learned the technique of 
using coal in glass furnaces from its British competitor. Barker’s (1977) excellent 
account of the glass industry also contains information as to the manner in which 
British firms such as Pilkington, Chances, and Hartleys and the French Saint-Gobain 
continued learning from each other during the nineteenth century—a time period 
when the competition coming from cheap Belgian glass became significant. Barker 
(1977) also offers similar information on the beginning of the twentieth century—a 
time period that he calls the “new age of industrial diplomacy” (p. 197). This period 
(1900–1914) was the time when glass manufacturers from continental Europe 
formed “conventions” to determine glass prices—a point whose importance will 
become clearer later. This time period was also when Saint-Gobain decided to take 
a stake in the British Chances, and when North American influences were being felt 
in Britain and Europe.
In the 1920s, there was intense industrial diplomacy between the major plate 
glass manufacturing firms such as the British Pilkington; the U.S. based firms 
Pittsburg Plate Glass, Guardian, Libbey-Owens-Ford, and Ford Motor; the French 
Saint-Gobain; and the Japanese Asahi Glass. While these plate glass manufacturers 
were producing their plate glass (distortion-free glass not only for architectural uses 
but also for more sophisticated applications such as automobile glass), the 
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sheet-glass manufacturers such as the German firms Deutsche Libbey-Owens 
Gesellschaft (Delog) and Deutsche Tafelglas (Detag) were manufacturing ordinary 
window glass somewhat inexpensively. This was possible because, as mentioned 
above, ordinary glass was expected to contain occasional flaws and distortions, and 
this allowed manufacturers to dispense with grinding and polishing the product.
During the 1930s, the plate-glass manufacturers improved the quality of their 
glass, thanks to an important technical development that had first been commercial-
ized in the late 1920s: the Pittsburgh technique of grinding and polishing. The 
Pittsburgh technique replaced the Fourcault technique that glass manufacturers had 
used to grind and polish since the mid-1910s. Meanwhile, sheet-glass manufactur-
ers such as the German Deutsche Tafelglas (Detag) were also steadily producing 
better and better quality sheet glass. In the 1940s and 1950s, as the quality gap 
between the expensive plate glass and the inexpensive sheet glass kept narrowing, 
the sheet-glass industry started to seriously threaten the plate-glass industry. This 
was because, as mentioned before, although plate glass manufacturers such as 
Pilkington and Pittsburgh Plate Glass had been excelling in the manufacturing of 
expensive plate glass, they were not so successful in the production of the cheaper 
sheet glass (Barker, 1977; Uusitalo & Möller, 2015).
It is worth repeating here how intimate and interconnected the firms within the 
plate-glass industry (including Pilkington and Pittsburgh Plate Glass) were just 
before and during this especially competitive period. In the 1940s and 1950s, the 
plate-glass manufacturers had shares in each other’s companies, and exclusive (or 
non-exclusive) cross-licensing (or sub-licensing) arrangements with each other. 
Moreover, they routinely engaged in fidelity agreements and quota arrangements 
among themselves, which required that there were always some “diplomatic activi-
ties” going on between the plate glass manufacturing firms—something which 
reveals quite a lot about the historic particularities of the industry (Barker, 1977, 
p. 368). The British firm Pilkington’s “hand in the world of industrial diplomacy” 
was especially strong (p. 357)—“diplomatic activities” being perhaps a euphemism 
for cartel-like practices, something to which I will return later.
Then in 1959, just when the competition between plate-glass manufacturers and 
sheet-glass manufacturers had become especially fierce, Pilkington’s innovation of 
float glass came to the rescue of the plate-glass industry. This technique was a game 
changer for two reasons: First, it brought tremendous cost and efficiency improve-
ments to the plate-glass manufacturers; and, secondly, the licensing policy that 
Pilkington designed and implemented for this new technology turned out to be 
consequential.
I cannot over-emphasize the first point: The new technique of manufacturing 
float glass (in which sand, soda ash, limestone, dolomite, alumina are all melted, 
then poured across the surface of a bath of molten tin, and then spread and flattened 
before being drawn horizontally in a continuous ribbon) was unquestionably supe-
rior to any previous technique for two basic reasons. First of all, the float-glass 
process finally enabled firms to design processes that could operate continuously: 
that is, 365 days per year, throughout the working life of the float lines (which is 
between 10 and 15  years). Linking “all the islands of automation into one 
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continuous process” led to significant cost and efficiency-related improvements. In 
fact, the technique turned glassmaking “into a highly efficient and automated indus-
try”: It reduced the length of the production line by more than half, increased the 
volume of finished glass by 15–25%, eliminated the use of costly abrasives, less-
ened waste, and finally diminished labor costs by 80% and energy costs by 50% 
(Utterback, 1994, pp. 112–113). Secondly, the float technique eliminated the pro-
cesses of grinding and polishing and produced glass with such an incredible flatness 
that no amount of grinding and polishing could match it (Pilkington 1969, cited in 
Utterback, 1994, p. 115). The overall result was a dramatic decline in glass prices 
(Teece, 2000, p. 225).
Pilkington’s float-glass technique was also a game changer in the industry 
because of Pilkington’s licensing strategy: With the help of Alastair Pilkington him-
self (the mechanical engineer who developed the process), the firm decided on a 
policy of initially licensing the process only to the existing major plate-glass manu-
facturers. Today’s observers have different interpretations here. Uusitalo and Möller 
(2015) write that the previous Pittsburgh and Fourcault techniques had been liber-
ally licensed to all firms that could afford it, but that Pilkington chose a different 
path and left out an entire industry: that of the sheet-glass industry. Here, they point 
to the fact that, in 1960, the German sheet-glass manufacturer Deutsche Tafelglas 
(Detag) applied for a license from Pilkington and was refused, and consider this as 
a sign of Pilkington’s illiberal licensing policy (Uusitalo & Möller, 2015).5 Their 
conclusion is that Pilkington’s decision of which firms would be allowed to acquire 
the license ended up determining today’s winners and losers (the German and 
Scandinavian sheet-glass manufacturers were wiped out after their applications for 
a Pilkington license were rejected), and redrawing the geography of flat-glass man-
ufacturing (through the territorial restrictions that came with the license itself).
Teece’s (2000) interpretation is completely different: Pilkington’s float process 
replaced only the grinding and polishing stages of the overall glass-production pro-
cess, and it was for this reason that Pilkington initially restricted the license to those 
major plate-glass manufacturers that were already skilled at the other stages of pro-
duction and had the other marketing and distribution capabilities necessary to rap-
idly commercialize the technique. Furthermore, Teece (2000, p. 228) claims that 
otherwise “the terms and conditions employed by Pilkington to license the process 
innovation were generally as liberal or more liberal than those found in agreements 
for other glass technologies,” such as the Pittsburgh and Fourcault techniques.
In 1962, it was Pittsburg Plate Glass (PPG), Pilkington’s licensor of the Pittsburg 
technique since 1929, who (after lengthy negotiations over the terms) became the 
first flat-glass manufacturer to be licensed to use the float process. During the rest of 
the 1960s and 1970s, the remaining plate manufacturers worldwide acquired the 
license one by one. Pilkington invested in a number of countries (Canada in 1967 
and Mexico in 1968) before becoming a public company in 1970, but especially 
5 Uusitalo and Möller (2015) believe that the fate of the German Deutsche Tafelglas (Detag) was 
sealed in 1960 when Detag’s application for a license from Pilkington was refused.
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accelerated its efforts to invest abroad after going public (again Canada in 1970, 
Australia in 1974, Sweden in 1976, and South Africa in 1977). The U.S. firm 
Guardian acquired the Pilkington technique in 1971, and in 1976, 21 non-British 
firms were paying float royalties to Pilkington (Barker, 1977). Thanks to Pilkington’s 
own investments and those of its licensees, float glass replaced plate glass in a short 
period of time (Neuman, 1996).6 In the 1980s, float glass then also replaced sheet 
glass, thus allowing the industry to converge into a single industry, classified by a 
single four-digit code—the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code (Uusitalo, 
2014a, 2014b). In the process, a number of German, Scandinavian, and Belgian 
firms (and, in fact, almost the entire German sheet-glass industry) disappeared.
The plate-glass manufacturers who acquired the license agreed to a number of 
conditions: They would use the technology to construct and operate float-glass 
plants in a limited number of countries (a territorial restriction), observe Pilkington’s 
sub-licensing rules, and report and share with Pilkington all future technological 
improvements that they might develop (Neuman, 1996). Consequently, Pilkington 
enjoyed an unquestionable power over the industry and, according to an estimate by 
Teece, Grindley, and Sherry (cited in Teece, 2000), made $5.3  billion (in 1992 
prices) from its float innovation. However, as early as the 1980s, there were also a 
few signs suggesting that Pilkington would not be able to retain its licensing privi-
leges forever. For example, in 1983, following a lawsuit by Pilkington, the U.S. firm 
Guardian was legally released from the majority of its obligations under its licens-
ing agreements with Pilkington. From then on, Guardian was able to construct float 
glass plants outside its territory. And then in 1994, when over 90% of flat glass 
worldwide was being manufactured under the Pilkington license, the U.S. Department 
of Justice challenged Pilkington and alleged that the firm was continuing to impose 
restrictions on its licensees even after the expiration of its licenses. Following this 
lawsuit, a consent decree eliminated all of the limitations Pilkington had imposed 
on its U.S. licensees: from then on, they were allowed to use the float technology 
free of charge and sublicense any third party anywhere in the world. The decree also 
provided, in effect, a similar “safe harbor” for any other American individual or firm 
who was not a Pilkington float-glass licensee to use any float technology in its pos-
session without any liability to Pilkington (Neuman, 1996).
Intense intra-industry competition followed the decree. The new century’s first 
decade was a time period in which there was an increase in demand for safety glass, 
stricter regulations concerning energy efficiency, capacity increases, and declining 
prices. Herold and Paha (2016) write that it was under these conditions that, between 
2004 and 2005, the top four firms in Europe initiated the establishment of a cartel. 
In fact, the European Commission claimed in 2008 that these cartel practices had 
started even earlier: namely, between 1998 and 2003, when the firms’ representa-
tives regularly met and decided on the allocation of glass supplies and the division 
of market shares. That same year, in 2008, the European Commission fined the 
6 See, for example, how Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson’s then newest factory became outdated before it 
even went into production (Utterback, 1994, p. 121, Footnote 18).
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French Saint-Gobain, the British unit of Japanese Nippon Sheet Glass and Asahi 
and others a record 1.4  billion euros ($1.77  billion) for price-fixing during 
1998–2003 (Kanter, 2008). The French Saint-Gobain was fined the largest amount 
(896 million euros, i.e., $1.1 billion), because it was a repeat offender when it came 
to engaging in cartel practices. The firm had been fined twice in the 1980s for cartel 
pricing in Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Nippon Sheet Glass’s 
British unit was fined 370  million euros ($470  million), and Asahi was fined 
113.5 million euros ($144 million). Although these high fines indicated that cartel 
practices were risky, they proved not to be crippling (see Stephan, 2009).
 Today’s Flat Glass Industry
Today, six firms meet most of the global demand for float glass: Namely, NSG 
(Nippon Sheet Glass, Japan—which acquired Pilkington in 2006), AGC (Asahi 
Glass Co, Japan), Saint-Gobain (France), Guardian (US), Taiwan Glass (Taiwan), 
and Şişecam (Turkey). Of these six, NSG, AGC, and Saint-Gobain represent the old 
guard, whereas Guardian is a relatively newer firm (established in 1932 and acquir-
ing the Pilkington technique in 1971) that has been a powerful actor for some time. 
Şişecam is a genuine newcomer (established in 1935, acquiring the Pilkington tech-
nique in 1977, which has become a regional power in Europe during the last few 
years). Taiwan Glass is the youngest of all (established in 1964 and acquiring the 
Pilkington technique in 1974) and, like Şişecam, is more regional than global, with 
float lines only in China and Taiwan.
These firms are remarkably similar to each other: They all are multi-product/
multi-owned brand firms operating geographically separated production facilities in 
multiple countries. The first four (namely, NSG, AGC, Saint-Gobain, and Guardian) 
share most of the global demand almost equally, whereas the other two (namely, 
Şişecam and Taiwan Glass) fulfill regional roles. Among the countries in which 
these six firms operate float lines, Germany and the BRIC countries (namely Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China) are at the top of the list, with float lines operated by four 
or five of these six firms. As mentioned before, each of these six firms reports 
exactly the same turning point in their respective histories: namely, the year when 
they acquired the Pilkington license.
There seems to be an overall disappointment in the industry today that, when it 
comes to the primary processing of glass, the industry has not experienced any 
innovation that can be considered as consequential as Pilkington’s float-glass pro-
cess.7 In fact, not only have no industry-shattering innovations occurred since the 
introduction of the Pilkington technique, but even the most incremental innova-
tions have been few and far between. According to Thomsen (2013), this last point 
7 Since the publication of the Pilkington license, thousands of licenses related to float glass have 
been published in the world (Nascimento, 2014). However, unlike the Pilkington license, they have 
not been breakthrough licenses.
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makes the industry one with a “slow clock speed,” and, in fact, a “dinosaur.” 
Obviously, industry insiders are not exactly satisfied with recent innovations—
such as Corning’s fusion drawing technique in which the pristine surfaces of the 
glass are not touched by molten tin—something which results in a remarkably flat 
and uniformly thick glass that can withstand a high degree of chemical strengthen-
ing, providing it with unusual optical clarity, touch sensitivity, and damage resis-
tance, and thus making it even more suitable for use as electronic device 
display glass.8
However, when it comes to glass’s secondary processing (i.e., the further pro-
cessing of flat glass by, among others, laminating, toughening, coating, or silver-
ing the product), there are more technological developments to be discussed with 
respect to architectural glass, automotive glass, electronic display glass, and solar 
glass. For example, in the area of architectural glass, which fills an overwhelming 
share of the global demand for flat glass, there are possibilities for further innova-
tions with respect to the coating technology9 and the fenestration of flat glass.10 
The most recent trends seem to be towards increased energy performance 
(increased stringency, better tuning of the building envelope, and optimal use of 
daylighting), increased building performance (acoustics optimization and such), 
and better aesthetics/design (larger glass units, and larger ranges of decorative 
glass).11
In order to be used in the automotive industry, glass needs to be appropriately 
toughened (thermally or chemically strengthened), laminated, and bent specifically 
for use in automobile windshields (and perhaps occasionally turned into 
8 Corning based its fusion drawing technique on James Franklin Hyde’s 1932 discovery of a high 
purity fused silica that only became useful over 80 years after its conception. Corning now uses the 
fusion drawing technique in the production of its Gorilla Glass (a cover glass used in devices such 
as tablets, notebook personal computers, and cell phones).
9 The coating technology enhances the performance of architectural glass by turning it into glass 
with low-emissivity and solar control, glass with scratch resistance qualities, and even self-clean-
ing glass. There are basically two alternatives: pyrolytic coating (hard coating—used since the 
1970s) is produced through chemical vapors deposited onto the glass during the glass production. 
A newer technique which is called sputtered coating (soft coating—used since the 1980s) is 
applied off-line independently of the float manufacturing process by depositing layers of thin 
metallic and oxide coatings onto the surface of precut glass. In sputtered coating, the primary 
material has for some time been silver: Today single-silver, double-silver, and triple-silver layers 
are all commercially viable, although there are now concerns about moving towards four-silver 
layers because it looks as if this might be a point of diminishing returns for firms when the weight 
and cost of the product are taken into account.
10 The fenestration of flat glass refers to the design and placing of windows in building including 
double-glazing (insulating). There are a number of alternative double-glazing techniques: warm-
edge spacers, gas filled glazing (the gases being argon, krypton, and xenon), aerogel filled glazing, 
vacuum glazing, and, more recently, glazing via the application of an electric current (electrochro-
mic glass).
11 In the absence of industry shattering innovations, a number of observers believe that what would 
be best for the industry is a substantial increase in today’s window to wall ratios—preferably 60% 
glass on the surface of buildings (instead of today’s 40%). Obviously, this is a policy-related issue.
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bullet- proof safety glass). Here, innovation researchers focus on making wind-
shields especially thin in order to make vehicles lighter and more energy efficient, 
in addition to giving automotive glass scratch resistance and noise-reducing quali-
ties. The trend seems to be going away from the traditional soda-lime-silica wind-
shield glass to high-alumina, high-strength windshield glass. Devices such as 
televisions, cell phones, laptop computers, tablet computers, and notebook comput-
ers require specially manufactured cover glass with a specific thickness, optical 
clarity, touch sensitivity, and damage resistance. Finally, there is the area of solar 
photovoltaic and solar thermal power generation that requires glass to be used as 
plates, front electrodes, and condensing heliostats.
In summary, in the area of the primary processing of its product, the flat-glass 
industry is not at all similar to well-studied high-technology industries (such as 
computers, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology). In addition, col-
laborations between the industry’s top six firms continue to be along the lines of 
licensing, joint-ventures, and such, with Saint-Gobain’s recent collaborations with 
Şişecam being examples. In 2008, the French and Turkish firms agreed to combine 
forces to first open a flat-glass factory in Egypt in 2010 and then a flat-glass, mirror, 
and coated-glass manufacturing facility in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone of 
the Republic of Tatarstan in Russia in 2014. The industry also continues to be char-
acterized by mergers and acquisitions. For example, in 2012, the Turkish firm 
Şişecam acquired the Romanian GlassCorp (that was formerly known as Geamuri 
SA), reportedly for the purpose of capacity increases. This acquisition was followed 
by a 2014 investment of 65  million euros in GlassCorp. In 2013, Şişecam also 
acquired an over 50% stake in HNG Float Glass Limited in India and acquired Fritz 
Holding (one of the world’s technology leaders in encapsulated automotive glass), 
reportedly for the purposes of capacity increases and market access: Fritz had facili-
ties in Germany, Slovakia, and Hungary and manufactured automotive glass for 
clients such as Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Porsche, Audi, and Lamborghini. Finally, in 
2016, Şişecam acquired the Sangalli Vetro Porto Nogaro facility at a price of 
84.7 million euros ($91.81 million). During the same year, in 2016, the owner of 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass (PPG) sold the company to a Mexican manufacturer for 
$750 million.
However, things might be different when it comes to the product’s secondary 
processing: Here there are signs that collaboration might now refer to something 
more than it does in the area of glass’s primary processing. For one thing, the flat 
glass firms now seem to be aware of the possibility that networks might not only 
reduce the unnecessary duplication of their research efforts, but also make other-
wise daunting research projects possible. For example, Beerkens, Bange, and Durán 
(2008, p. 368) mention two industry meetings that took place in Switzerland less 
than a decade ago during which “the first steps to define and organize large scale 
projects in the glass society with the aim of developing breakthrough technologies 
in glass products and glass production” were discussed. More recently, an industry 
insider has stated that the lead firms want “there to be linkages amongst all the 
people who work in glass research” (a research director at Corning, cited in Corning, 
2016). At least there is now talk about who “should take a leading role in defining, 
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initializing, and organizing consortia for major research activities, addressing inno-
vative glass products” (Beerkens et  al., 2008, p.  368). A new period is perhaps 
dawning in which exciting scholarly research possibilities will arise from the newly 
emerging, large, and complex networks of a now-maturing industry.
 Conclusion: Looking at the Flat-Glass Industry 
from a Network Perspective
To what extent do networks facilitate innovation in technology-based industries? 
Scholars who have studied a number of high-technology industries such as today’s 
biotechnology industry answer this question with certainty: Networks facilitate 
innovation to such an extent that the primary force behind innovation is now the 
“structure” of these networks and the “rules governing these networks”—not 
“money,” not “market power,” not even the “sheer force of novel ideas” (Powell & 
Grodal, 2005, p. 59; Powell et al., 2005, p. 1187). Consequently, they allocate most 
of their research energy into developing formal network approaches (known for 
their particular vocabulary of nodes, lines, and their chartable patterns, and for their 
reliance on mathematical modelling), and conduct analyses of large and complex 
networks—sometimes large enough to have as many as “250,000 nodes” (see 
Powell et al., 2005, p. 1191). The conviction is that if researchers thoroughly under-
stand the structure and governance of the networks through which thousands (if not 
hundreds of thousands) of firms and institutions such as universities, research insti-
tutes, and venture capital simultaneously source and receive knowledge from each 
other, then they can even make predictions about these high-technology industries’ 
future innovations. This approach has certainly not been without its critics. For 
example, consider Coward (2018, p. 453), who is concerned, among other things, 
about the “fantasies of precision” that this sort of thinking might lead to as networks 
expand and researchers unavoidably abandon more and more of the substantive 
contents of the nodes whose numbers keep increasing.
Here, with the above mentioned criticism of Coward (2018) in mind, I have 
looked into the flat-glass industry—an industry in which a number of research 
intensive and technologically dynamic firms are now reasonably networked, as 
opposed to being isolated like “islands,” as Teece (2016, p.  11) would put it. 
However, the flat-glass industry does not make the official lists of high-technology 
industries; the assets of innovation might not yet be as dispersed (locally and glob-
ally) as they are elsewhere; and its networks are not as large and complex as, say, in 
biotechnology. Consequently, it is understandable that the flat-glass industry has not 
yet been subject to any formal network approaches in a manner similar to some 
other technology-based industries.
However, throughout their history (or at least during the last few centuries) the 
innovative flat-glass firms seem to have been stimulated to their best innovative 
performances when they established contact with other firms. The accounts of how, 
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say, the British Ravenhead learned the technique of casting plate-glass from the 
French Saint-Gobain, whereas Saint-Gobain learned the technique of using coal in 
glass furnaces from its British competitor, can serve as an example. Thus, the obser-
vations around the case of the flat-glass industry are mostly in accordance with 
Burt’s (2004) fundamental observation that novel ideas are better expressed, kept, 
and considered valuable in networked contexts than in isolated contexts.
On the others hand, it is difficult to go as far as imagining “money,” “market 
power,” and the “sheer force of novel ideas” taking the back seat to the “structure of 
its networks” and the “rules governing these networks” in the flat-glass industry, 
even though this might be the case in biotechnology (see the related claims of 
Powell et al., 2005, p. 1187; and of Powell & Grodal, 2005, p. 59). The most break-
through innovation in the flat-glass industry, namely the innovation of the float tech-
nique, was fundamentally a “single firm” innovation (the single firm being the 
British Pilkington) that resulted in the industry turning into a “one technology, one 
license, one product” industry for decades. After this innovation, Pilkington made 
sure to legally obligate its licensees worldwide to share with Pilkington whatever 
technologies they might develop in the future—thereby suggesting the possibility 
that in this industry, instead of networks facilitating this breakthrough innovation, 
the innovation itself facilitated the configuration of today’s networks. More specifi-
cally, I am here referring to the networks of Pilkington’s licensees who found them-
selves compelled to share all innovative ideas they might develop in the future with 
Pilkington. Obviously, the idea behind Pilkington’s licensing policy was making 
sure that Pilkington would not miss out on any innovation that might appear any-
where in the world.12
What is perhaps most interesting here is that Pilkington offered its float-glass 
licenses only to the existing major plate-glass manufacturers, thereby wiping out the 
sheet-glass manufacturers in Germany, Scandinavia, and elsewhere, and redrawing 
the geography of flat-glass manufacturing (through the territorial restrictions that 
came with the license itself). However, no consensus as yet exists as to the nature 
and consequences of the manner in which Pilkington governed its innovation. It is 
here worth mentioning Teece’s (2000, 2016, p.  19) assertion that by settling for 
“naked licensing,” Pilkington failed to fully benefit from its innovation: It should 
have created a “true network” around its game-changing innovation in the manner 
that today’s high-technology firms do: “Pilkington [was] unprepared and unable to 
implement the technology by itself on a worldwide basis … [Thus] widespread 
licensing seemed the best alternative” (Teece, 2016, p. 8).
Interestingly, Pilkington’s network-creating policies were also shrouded in con-
troversy: For example, Uusitalo and Möller (2015) observed that the previous 
Pittsburgh and Fourcault techniques had been liberally licensed to all the firms that 
could afford it, but that Pilkington chose a different path and excluded an entire 
industry. On the other hand, Teece (2000, p. 228) claims the opposite: “The terms 
12 It is interesting to note that since the publication of the Pilkington license, no license has been 
related to a breakthrough innovation, perhaps rendering Pilkington’s expectations a little too opti-
mistic (see Nascimento, 2014).
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and conditions employed by Pilkington to license the process innovation were gen-
erally as liberal or more liberal than those found in agreements for other glass tech-
nologies,” such as the Pittsburgh and Fourcault techniques. This certainly would be 
a good starting point for a thorough analysis of the flat-glass industry following this 
breakthrough innovation. More specifically, I suggest further research on the flat-
glass industry similar to the somewhat Schumpeterian analysis that Powell and his 
collaborators conducted on the emergence and growth of the biotechnology indus-
try in the Unites States in the pre-1988 period. I also suggest that future researchers 
should consider the question of what constitutes a “true network” (Provan & Kenis, 
p. 231; Teece, 2000, 2016, p. 19).
Obviously, my above suggestions for further work refer to the primary process-
ing of flat glass. There is even more room for further work concerning the secondary 
processing of the product (i.e., the further processing of flat glass by laminating, 
toughening, coating, or silvering the product with the purpose of turning glass into 
more sophisticated products such as high resolution flat panel displays). When it 
comes to flat glass’s secondary processing, innovation’s assets are now much more 
dispersed (locally and globally) than they were before. Also, contexts in which indi-
vidual products and processes draw on multiple internal and external sources of 
technology are now becoming more and more pervasive in glass’s secondary pro-
cessing. For example, innovations in laser technology (such as those around ultra- 
short pulse lasers) and innovations in glass can now be developed much more 
effectively in collaboration than separately. Similarly, when innovations in optical 
fiber and glass are brought together, new near-to-eye display technologies become 
possible. It is now possible to pick up from where Uusitalo and his collaborators left 
off and study the contemporary manner in which flat-glass firms feel compelled to 
be part of networks, together with the network structures and rules that seem to be 
emerging.
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